GREGORY OF NYSSA:

DOGMATIC TREATISES, ETC.

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Title: NPNF2-05. Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, Etc.
Creator(s): Gregory of Nyssa
Schaff, Philip (1819-1893) (Editor)
Print Basis: New York: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1892
Rights: Public Domain
CCEL Subjects: All; Proofed; Early Church;
LC Call no: BR60
LC Subjects:

Christianity

Early Christian Literature. Fathers of the Church, etc.
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A SELECT LIBRARY

OF THE

NICENE AND

POST-NICENE FATHERS

OF

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

SECOND SERIES

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH WITH PROLEGOMENA AND EXPLANATORY NOTES.

VOLUMES I-VII.

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SUPERVISION OF

PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY IN THE UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW
YORK.

AND

HENRY WACE, D.D.,

PRINCIPAL OF KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.

VOLUME V

GREGORY OF NYSSA: DOGMATIC TREATISES, ETC.

T&T CLARK

EDINBURGH

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WM. B. EERDMANS PUBLISHING COMPANY

GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN
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Editor's Preface.

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These translations from the works of St. Gregory of Nyssa have involved
unusual labour, which the Editor hopes will be accepted as a sufficient
apology for the delay of the volume. The difficulty has been extreme of
conveying with correctness in English the meaning of expressions and
arguments which depend on some of the most subtle ideas of Greek
philosophy and theology; and, in addition to the thanks due to the
translators, the Editor must offer a special acknowledgment of the
invaluable help he has received from the exact and philosophical
scholarship of the Rev. J. H. Lupton, Surmaster of St. Paul's School.
He must renew to Mr. Lupton, with increased earnestness, the expression
of gratitude he had already had occasion to offer in issuing the
Translation of St. Athanasius. From the careful and minute revision
which the volume has thus undergone, the Editor ventures to entertain
some hope that the writings of this important and interesting Father
are in this volume introduced to the English reader in a manner which
will enable him to obtain a fair conception of their meaning and value.

Henry Wace.

Kings College, London, 6th November, 1892.
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select writings and letters

OF

Gregory, bishop of nyssa.

Translated, with prolegomena, notes, and indices,

by

William Moore, M.A.,

Rector of Appleton,

Late Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford;

and

Henry Austin Wilson, M.A.,

Fellow and librarian of Magdalen College, Oxford.
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Preface.

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That none of the Treatises of S. Gregory of Nyssa have hitherto been
translated into English, or even (with one exception long ago) into
French, may be partly due to the imperfections, both in number and
quality, of the mss., and by consequence of the Editions, of the great
majority of them. The state of the mss., again, may be owing to the
suspicion diligently fostered by the zealous friends of the reputation
of this Father, in ages when mss. could and should have been multiplied
and preserved, that there were large importations into his writings
from the hands of the Origenists--a statement which a very short study
of Gregory, whose thought is always taking the direction of Origen,
would disprove.

This suspicion, while it resulted in throwing doubts upon the
genuineness of the entire text, has so far deprived the current
literature of the Church of a great treasure. For there are two
qualities in this Gregory's writings not to be found in the same degree
in any other Greek teacher, namely, a far-reaching use of philosophical
speculation (quite apart from allegory) in bringing out the full
meaning of Church doctrines, and Bible truths; and excellence of style.
With regard to this last, he himself bitterly deplored the days which
he had wasted over the study of style; but we at all events need not
share that regret, if only for this reason, that his writings thereby
show that patristic Greek could rise to the level of the best of its
time. It is not necessarily the thing which it is, too easily, even in
other instances, assumed to be. Granted the prolonged decadence of the
language, yet perfects are not aorists, nor aorists perfects, the
middle is a middle, there are classical constructions of the
participle, the particles of transition and prepositions in composition
have their full force in Athanasius; much more in Basil; much more in
Gregory. It obscures facts to say that there was good Greek only in the
age of Thucydides. There was good and bad Greek of its kind, in every
epoch, as long as Greek was living. So far for mere syntax. As for
adequacy of language, the far wider range of his subject-matter puts
Gregory of Nyssa to a severer test; but he does not fail under it. What
could be more dignified than his letter to Flavian, or more choice than
his description of the spring, or more richly illustrated than his
praises of Contemplation, or more pathetic than his pleading for the
poor? It would have been strange indeed if the Greek language had not
possessed a Jerome of its own, to make it speak the new monastic
devotion.

But the labours of J. A. Krabinger, F. Oehler, and G. H. Forbes upon
the text, though all abruptly ended, have helped to repair the neglect
of the past. They in this century, as the scholars of Paris, Ghent, and
Basle, though each working with fewer or more imperfect mss., in the
sixteenth and seventeenth, have been better friends to Gregory than
those who wrote books in the sixth to defend his orthodoxy, but to
depreciate his writings. In this century, too, Cardinal Mai has rescued
still more from oblivion in the Vatican--a slight compensation for all
the materials collected for a Benedictine edition of Gregory, but
dispersed in the French Revolution.

The longest Treatise here translated is that Against Eunomius in 13
Books. The reproduction of so much ineffectual fencing in logic over a
question which no longer can trouble the Church might be taken
exception to. But should men like Gregory and Basil, pleading for the
spirit and for faith and for mystery against the conclusions of a hard
logician, be an indifferent spectacle to us? The interest, too, in the
contest deepens when we know that their opponent not only proclaimed
himself, but was accepted, as a martyr to the Anomoean cause; and that
he had large congregations to the very end. The moral force of Arianism
was stronger than ever as its end drew near in the East, because the
Homoeans were broken up and there was no more complicity with the court
and politics. It was represented by a man who had suffered and had made
no compromises; and so the life-long work, previous to his, of Valens
the bishop at last bore fruit in conversions; and the Anomoean teaching
came to a head in the easily understood formula that the 'Agennesia was
the essence of the Father--an idea which in the Dated Creed Valens had
repudiated.

What, then, was to be done? Eunomius seemed by his parade of logic to
have dug a gulf for ever between the Ungenerate and the Generate, in
other words between the Father and the Son. The merit and interest of
this Treatise of Gregory consists in showing this logician as making
endless mistakes in his logic; and then, that anything short of the
"eternal generation" involved unspeakable absurdities or profanities;
and lastly, that Eunomius was fighting by means of distinctions which
were the mere result of mental analysis. Already, we see, there was
floating in the air the Conceptualism and Realism of the Middle Ages,
invoked for this last Arian controversy. When Eunomius retorted that
this faculty of analysis cannot give the name of God, and calls his
opponents atheists for not recognizing the more than human source of
the term 'Agennetos, the last word of Nicene orthodoxy has to be
uttered; and it is, that God is really incomprehensible, and that here
we can never know His name.

This should have led to a statement of the claims of the Sacraments as
placing us in heart and spirit, but not in mind, in communion with this
incomprehensible God. But this would have been useless with such
opponents as the Eunomians. Accuracy of doctrine and clearness of
statement was to them salvation; mysteries were worse than nothing.
Only in the intervals of the logical battle, and for the sake of the
faithful, does Gregory recur to those moral and spiritual attributes
which a true Christianity has revealed in the Deity, and upon which the
doctrine of the Sacraments is built.

Such controversies are repeated now; i.e. where truths, which it
requires a certain state of the affections to understand, should be
urged, but cannot be, on the one side; and truths which are logical, or
literary, or scientific only, are ranged on the other side; as an
instance, though in another field, the arguments for and against the
results of the "higher criticism" of the Old Testament exhibit this
irreconcilable attitude.

Yet in one respect a great gain must have at once resulted to the
Catholic cause from this long work. The counter opposition of Created
and Uncreate, with which Gregory met the opposition of Generate and
Ungenerate, and which, unlike the latter, is a dichotomy founded on an
essential difference, must have helped many minds, distracted with the
jargon of Arianism, to see more clearly the preciousness of the
Baptismal Formula, as the casket which contains the Faith. Indeed, the
life-work of Gregory was to defend this Formula.

The Treatise On Virginity is probably the work of his youth; but none
the less Christian for that. Here is done what students of Plato had
doubtless long been asking for, i.e. that his "love of the Beautiful"
should be spiritualized. Beginning with a bitter accusation of
marriage, Gregory leaves the reader doubtful in the end whether
celibacy is necessary or not for the contemplative life; so absorbed he
becomes in the task of showing the blessedness of those who look to the
source of all visible beauty. But the result of this seeing is not, as
in Plato, a mere enlightenment as to the real value of these visible
things. There are so many more beautiful things in God than Plato saw;
the Christian revelation has infinitely enriched the field of
contemplation; and the lover of the beautiful now must be a higher
character, and have a more chastened heart, not only be a more favoured
child of light, than others. His enthusiasm shall be as strong as ever;
but the model is higher now; and even an Aristotelian balance of moral
extremes is necessary to guide him to the goal of a successful
Imitation.

It was right, too, that the Church should possess her Phaedo, or
Death-bed Dialogue; and it is Gregory who has supplied this in his On
the Soul and the Resurrection. But the copy becomes an original. The
dialogue is between a sister and a brother; the one a saintly
Apologist, the other, for argument's sake, a gainsayer, who urges all
the pleas of Greek materialism. Not only the immortality of the soul is
discussed, but an exact definition of it is sought, and that in the
light of a truer psychology than Plato's. His "chariot" is given up;
sensation, as the basis of all thought, is freely recognized; and yet
the passions are firmly separated from the actual essence of the soul;
further, the "coats of skins" of fallen humanity, as symbolizing the
wrong use of the passions, take the place of the "sea-weed" on the
statue of Glaucus. The grasp of the Christian philosopher of the traits
of a perfect humanity, so conspicuous in his Making of Man, give him an
advantage here over the pagan. As for the Resurrection of the flesh, it
was a novel stroke to bring the beliefs of Empedocles, Pythagoras,
Plato, and the later Platonists, into one focus as it were, and to show
that the teaching of those philosophers as to the destinies of the soul
recognized the possibility, or even the necessity, of the reassumption
of some body. Grotesque objections to the Christian Resurrection, such
as are urged nowadays, are brought forward and answered in this
Treatise.

The appeal to the Saviour, as to the Inspiration of the Old Testament,
has raised again a discussion as to the Two Natures; and will probably
continue to do so. But before the subject of the "communication of
attributes" can be entered upon, we must remember that Christ's mere
humanity (as has been lately pointed out [1] ) is, to begin with,
sinless. He was perfect man. What the attributes of a perfect, as
contrasted with a fallen, humanity are, it is not given except by
inference to know; but no Father has discussed this subject of Adam's
nature more fully than Gregory, in his treatise On the Making of Man.

The reasons for classing the Great Catechism as an Apologetic are given
in the Prolegomena: here from first to last Gregory shows himself a
genuine pupil of Origen. The plan of Revelation is made to rest on
man's free-will; every objection to it is answered by the fact of this
free-will. This plan is unfolded so as to cover the whole of human
history; the beginning, the middle, and the end are linked, in the
exposition, indissolubly together. The Incarnation is the turning-point
of history; and yet, beyond this, its effects are for all Creation. Who
made this theology? Origen doubtless; and his philosophy of Scripture,
based on a few leading texts, became, one point excepted, the property
of the Church: she at last possessed a Theodicee that borrowed nothing
from Greek ideas. So far, then, every one who used it was an Origenist:
and yet Gregory alone has suffered from this charge. In using this
Theodicee he has in some points surpassed his master, i.e. in showing
in details the skilfulness (sophia) which effected the real "touching"
of humanity; and how the "touched" soul and the "touched" body shall
follow in the path of the Redeemer's Resurrection.

To the many points of modern interest in this Gregory should be added
his eschatology, which occupies a large share of his thoughts. On
Infants' Early Deaths is a witness of this. In fact, when not occupied
in defending, on one side or another, the Baptismal Formula, he is
absorbed in eschatology. He dwells continually on the agonizing and
refining processes of Purgatory. But to claim him as one who favours
the doctrine of "Eternal Hope" in a universal sense is hardly possible,
when we consider the passage in On the Soul and the Resurrection where
he speaks of a Last Judgment as coming after the Resurrection and
Purgatory.

So much has been said in a Preface, in order to show that this Volume
is a step at least towards reinstating a most interesting writer,
doubtless one of the most highly educated of his time, and, let it be
observed as well, a canonized saint (for, more fortunate than his
works, he was never branded as a heretic), in his true position.

In a first English translation of Treatises and Letters most of which
(notably the books against Eunomius) have never been illustrated by a
single translator's note, and by but a handful of scholia, a few
passages remain, which from the obscurity of their allusion, local or
historical, are unexplained. In others the finest shades of meaning in
one Greek word, insisted on in some argument, but which the best
English equivalent fails to represent, cause the appearance of
obscurity. But, throughout, the utmost clearness possible without
unduly straining the literal meaning has been aimed at; and in passages
too numerous to name, most grateful acknowledgment is here made of the
invaluable suggestions of the Rev. J. H. Lupton.

It is hoped that the Index of Subjects will be of use, in lieu of an
analysis, where an analysis has not been provided. The Index of Texts,
all of which have been strictly verified, while it will be found to
prove Gregory's thorough knowledge of Scripture (notwithstanding his
somewhat classical training), does not attempt to distinguish between
citation and reminiscence; care, however, has been taken that the
reminiscence should be undoubted.

The Index of Greek words (as also the quotations in foot-notes of
striking sentences) has been provided for those interested in the study
of later Greek.

W. M.

July, 1892.
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[1] Christus Comprobator, p. 99, sq.
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Works on Analytical Criticism, History, and Bibliography, Consulted.

Rupp (Dr. Julius), Gregors des Bischofs von Nyssa Leben und Meinungen.
Leipzig, 1834.

Moeller (E. W.) Gregori Nysseni doctrinam de hominis natura et
illustravit et cum Origeniana comparavit. Halle, 1854.

Denys (J.), De la Philosophie d'Origene. Paris, 1884.

Dorner (Dr. J. A.), Doctrine of the Person of Christ. Clark's English
translation. Edinburgh.

Heyns (S. P.), Disputatio Historico-Theologica de Gregorio Nysseno.
Leyden, 1835.

Alzog (Dr. J.), Handbuch d. Patrologie. 3rd ed. 1876.

Ceillier (Remi), Histoire Generale des Auteurs Sacres et
Ecclesiastiques. Paris, 1858 sqq.

Tillemont (Louis Sebastien Le Nain De), Memoires pour servir a
l'Histoire Ecclesiastique des six premiers Siecles, Vol. IX. Paris,
1693-1712.

Fabricius (J. A.), Bibliotheca Graeca. Hamburg, 1718-28.

Prolegomena to the Paris edition of all Gregory's Works, with notes by
Father Fronto Du Duc, 1638.

Cave (Dr. W.), Historia Literaria. London, 1688. (Oxford, 1740.)

Du Pin (Dr. L. E.) Library of Ecclesiastical Authors. Paris, 1686.

Fessler (Joseph), Institutiones Patrologiae: Dr. B. Jungmann's edition.
Innsbruck, 1890.
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Dates of Treatises, &c., Here Translated.

(Based on Heyns and Rupp.)

331. Gregory Born.

360. Letters x. xi. xv.

361. Julian's edict. Gregory gives up rhetoric.

362. Gregory in his brother's monastery.

363. Letter vi. (probably)

368. On Virginity.

369. Gregory elected a reader.

372. Gregory elected Bishop of Nyssa early in this year.

374. Gregory is exiled under Valens.

375. On the Faith. On "Not three Gods."

376. Letters vii. xiv. On the Baptism of Christ.

377. Against Macedonius.

378. Gregory Returns to his See. Letter iii.

379. On Pilgrimages. [3]

Letter ii.

380. On the Soul and the Resurrection.

On the Making of Man.

On the Holy Trinity.

381. Gregory present at the Second Council. Oration on Meletius.

382-3. Against Eunomius, Books I-XII.

383. Present at Constantinople. Letter xxi.

384. Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.

385. The Great Catechism.

386. Letter xiii.

390. Letter iv.

393. Letter to Flavian.

394. Present for Synod at Constantinople.

395. On Infant's Early Deaths.
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[3] Rupp places this after the Council of Constantinople, 381. Letters
i., v., viii., ix., xvi. are also probably after 381.
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The Life and Writings of Gregory of Nyssa.

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Chapter I.--A Sketch of the Life of S. Gregory of Nyssa.

In the roll of the Nicene Fathers there is no more honoured name than
that of Gregory of Nyssa. Besides the praises of his great brother
Basil and of his equally great friend Gregory Nazianzen, the sanctity
of his life, his theological learning, and his strenuous advocacy of
the faith embodied in the Nicene clauses, have received the praises of
Jerome, Socrates, Theodoret, and many other Christian writers. Indeed
such was the estimation in which he was held that some did not hesitate
to call him `the Father of Fathers' as well as `the Star of Nyssa' [4]
."

Gregory of Nyssa was equally fortunate in his country, the name he
bore, and the family which produced him. He was a native of Cappadocia,
and was born most probably at Caesarea, the capital, about a.d. 335 or
336. No province of the Roman Empire had in those early ages received
more eminent Christian bishops than Cappadocia and the adjoining
district of Pontus.

In the previous century the great prelate Firmilian, the disciple and
friend of Origen, who visited him at his See, had held the Bishopric of
Caesarea. In the same age another saint, Gregory Thaumaturgus, a friend
also and disciple of Origen, was bishop of Neo-Caesarea in Pontus.
During the same century, too, no less than four other Gregories shed
more or less lustre on bishoprics in that country. The family of
Gregory of Nyssa was one of considerable wealth and distinction, and
one also conspicuously Christian.

During the Diocletian persecution his grandparents had fled for safety
to the mountainous region of Pontus, where they endured great hardships
and privations. It is said that his maternal grandfather, whose name is
unknown, eventually lost both life and property. After a retirement of
some few years the family appear to have returned and settled at
Caesarea in Cappadocia, or else at Neo-Caesarea in Pontus, for there is
some uncertainty in the account.

Gregory's father, Basil, who gave his name to his eldest son, was known
as a rhetorician. He died at a comparatively early age, leaving a
family of ten children, five of whom were boys and five girls, under
the care of their grandmother Macrina and mother Emmelia. Both of these
illustrious ladies were distinguished for the earnestness and
strictness of their Christian principles, to which the latter added the
charm of great personal beauty.

All the sons and daughters appear to have been of high character, but
it is only of four sons and one daughter that we have any special
record. The daughter, called Macrina, from her grandmother, was the
angel in the house of this illustrious family. She shared with her
grandmother and mother the care and education of all its younger
members. Nor was there one of them who did not owe to her religious
influence their settlement in the faith and consistency of Christian
conduct.

This admirable woman had been betrothed in early life, but her intended
husband died of fever. She permitted herself to contract no other
alliance, but regarded herself as still united to her betrothed in the
other world. She devoted herself to a religious life, and eventually,
with her mother Emmelia, established a female conventual society on the
family-property in Pontus, at a place called Annesi, on the banks of
the river Iris.

It was owing to her persuasions that her brother Basil also gave up the
worldly life, and retired to lead the devout life in a wild spot in the
immediate neighbourhood of Annesi. Here for a while he was an hermit,
and here he persuaded his friend Gregory Nazianzen to join him. They
studied together the works of Origen, and published a selection of
extracts from his Commentaries, which they called "Philocalia." By the
suggestions of a friend Basil enlarged his idea, and converted his
hermit's seclusion into a monastery, which eventually became the centre
of many others which sprung up in that district.

His inclination for the monastic life had been greatly influenced by
his acquaintance with the Egyptian monks, who had impressed him with
the value of their system as an aid to a life of religious devotion. He
had visited also the hermit saints of Syria and Arabia, and learnt from
them the practice of a severe asceticism, which both injured his health
and shortened his days.

Gregory of Nyssa was the third son, and one of the youngest of the
family. He had an elder brother, Nectarius, who followed the profession
of their father, and became rhetorician, and like him died early. He
had also a younger brother, Peter, who became bishop of Sebaste.

Besides the uncertainty as to the year and place of his birth it is not
known where he received his education. From the weakness of his health
and delicacy of his constitution, it was most probably at home. It is
interesting, in the case of one so highly educated, to know who, in
consequence of his father's early death, took charge of his merely
intellectual bringing up: and his own words do not leave us in any
doubt that, so far as he had a teacher, it was Basil, his senior by
several years. He constantly speaks of him as the revered `Master:' to
take but one instance, he says in his Hexaemeron (ad init.) that all
that will be striking in that work will be due to Basil, what is
inferior will be the `pupil's.' Even in the matter of style, he says in
a letter written in early life to Libanius that though he enjoyed his
brother's society but a short time yet Basil was the author of his
oratory (logou): and it is safe to conclude that he was introduced to
all that Athens had to teach, perhaps even to medicine, by Basil: for
Basil had been at Athens. On the other hand we can have no difficulty
in crediting his mother, of whom he always spoke with the tenderest
affection, and his admirable sister Macrina, with the care of his
religious teaching. Indeed few could be more fortunate than Gregory in
the influences of home. If, as there is every reason to believe, the
grandmother Macrina survived Gregory's early childhood, then, like
Timothy, he was blest with the religious instruction of another Lois
and Eunice.

In this chain of female relationship it is difficult to say which link
is worthier of note, grandmother, mother, or daughter. Of the first,
Basil, who attributes his early religious impressions to his
grandmother, tells us that as a child she taught him a Creed, which had
been drawn up for the use of the Church of Neo-Caesarea by Gregory
Thaumaturgus. This Creed, it is said, was revealed to the Saint in a
vision. It has been translated by Bishop Bull in his "Fidei Nicaenae
Defensio." In its language and spirit it anticipates the Creed of
Constantinople.

Certain it is that Gregory had not the benefit of a residence at
Athens, or of foreign travel. It might have given him a strength of
character and width of experience, in which he was certainly deficient.
His shy and retiring disposition induced him to remain at home without
choosing a profession, living on his share of the paternal property,
and educating himself by a discipline of his own.

He remained for years unbaptized. And this is a very noticeable
circumstance which meets us in the lives of many eminent Saints and
Bishops of the Church. They either delayed baptism themselves, or it
was delayed for them. Indeed there are instances of Bishops baptized
and consecrated the same day.

Gregory's first inclination or impulse to make a public profession of
Christianity is said to have been due to a remarkable dream or vision.

His mother Emmelia, at her retreat at Annesi, urgently entreated him to
be present and take part in a religious ceremony in honour of the Forty
Christian Martyrs. He had gone unwillingly, and wearied with his
journey and the length of the service, which lasted far into the night,
he lay down and fell asleep in the garden. He dreamed that the Martyrs
appeared to him and, reproaching him for his indifference, beat him
with rods. On awaking he was filled with remorse, and hastened to amend
his past neglect by earnest entreaties for mercy and forgiveness. Under
the influence of the terror which his dream inspired he consented to
undertake the office of reader in the Church, which of course implied a
profession of Christianity. But some unfitness, and, perhaps, that love
of eloquence which clung to him to the last, soon led him to give up
the office, and adopt the profession of a rhetorician or advocate. For
this desertion of a sacred for a secular employment he is taken
severely to task by his brother Basil and his friend Gregory Nazianzen.
The latter does not hesitate to charge him with being influenced, not
by conscientious scruples, but by vanity and desire of public display,
a charge not altogether consistent with his character.

Here it is usual to place the marriage of Gregory with Theosebeia, said
to have been a sister of Gregory Nazianzen. Certainly the tradition of
Gregory's marriage received such credit as to be made in after times a
proof of the non-celibacy of the Bishops of his age. But it rests
mainly on two passages, which taken separately are not in the least
conclusive. The first is the ninety-fifth letter of Gregory Nazianzen,
written to console for a certain loss by death, i.e. of "Theosebeia,
the fairest, the most lustrous even amidst such beauty of the adelphoi;
Theosebeia, the true priestess, the yokefellow and the equal of a
priest." J. Rupp has well pointed out that the expression `yokefellow'
(suzugon), which has been insisted as meaning `wife,' may, especially
in the language of Gregory Nazianzen, be equivalent to adelphos. He
sees in this Theosebeia `a sister of the Cappadocian brothers.' The
second passage is contained in the third cap. of Gregory's treatise On
Virginity. Gregory there complains that he is "cut off by a kind of
gulf from this glory of virginity" (parthenia). The whole passage
should be consulted. Of course its significance depends on the meaning
given to parthenia. Rupp asserts that more and more towards the end of
the century this word acquired a technical meaning derived from the
purely ideal side, i.e. virginity of soul: and that Gregory is alluding
to the same thing that his friend had not long before blamed him for,
the keeping of a school for rhetoric, where his object had been merely
worldly reputation, and the truly ascetic career had been marred (at
the time he wrote). Certainly the terrible indictment of marriage in
the third cap. of this treatise comes ill from one whose wife not only
must have been still living, but possessed the virtues sketched in the
letter of Gregory Nazianzen: while the allusions at the end of it to
the law-courts and their revelations appear much more like the
professional reminiscence of a rhetorician who must have been familiar
with them, than the personal complaint of one who had cause to
depreciate marriage. The powerful words of Basil, de Virgin. I. 610, a.
b., also favour the above view of the meaning of parthenia: and Gregory
elsewhere distinctly calls celibacy parthenia tou somatos, and regards
it as a means only to this higher parthenia (III. 131). But the two
passages above, when combined, may have led to the tradition of
Gregory's marriage. Nicephorus Callistus, for example, who first makes
mention of it, must have put upon parthenia the interpretation of his
own time (thirteenth century,) i.e. that of continence. Finally, those
who adopt this tradition have still to account for the fact that no
allusion to Theosebeia as his wife, and no letter to her, is to be
found in Gregory's numerous writings. It is noteworthy that the
Benedictine editors of Gregory Nazianzen (ad Epist. 95) also take the
above view.

His final recovery and conversion to the Faith, of which he was always
after so strenuous an asserter, was due to her who, all things
considered, was the master spirit of the family. By the powerful
persuasions of his sister Macrina, at length, after much struggle, he
altered entirely his way of life, severed himself from all secular
occupations, and retired to his brother's monastery in the solitudes of
Pontus, a beautiful spot, and where, as we have seen, his mother and
sister had established, in the immediate neighbourhood, a similar
association for women.

Here, then, Gregory was settled for several years, and devoted himself
to the study of the Scripture and the works of his master Origen. Here,
too, his love of natural scenery was deepened so as to find afterwards
constant and adequate expression. For in his writings we have in large
measure that sentiment of delight in the beauty of nature of which,
even when it was felt, the traces are so few and far between in the
whole range of Greek literature. A notable instance is the following
from the Letter to Adelphus, written long afterwards:--"The gifts
bestowed upon the spot by Nature, who beautifies the earth with an
impromptu grace, are such as these: below, the river Halys makes the
place fair to look upon with his banks, and glides like a golden ribbon
through their deep purple, reddening his current with the soil he
washes down. Above, a mountain densely overgrown with wood stretches,
with its long ridge, covered at all points with the foliage of oaks,
more worthy of finding some Homer to sing its praises than that Ithacan
Neritus which the poet calls `far-seen with quivering leaves.' But the
natural growth of wood as it comes down the hill-side meets at the foot
the plantations of human husbandry. For forthwith vines, spread out
over the slopes and swellings and hollows at the mountain's base, cover
with their colour, like a green mantle, all the lower ground: and the
season also was now adding to their beauty with a display of
magnificent grape-clusters." Another is from the treatise On Infants'
Early Deaths:--"Nay look only at an ear of corn, at the germinating of
some plant, at a ripe bunch of grapes, at the beauty of early autumn
whether in fruit or flower, at the grass springing unbidden, at the
mountain reaching up with its summit to the height of the ether, at the
springs of the lower ground bursting from its flanks in streams like
milk, and running in rivers through the glens, at the sea receiving
those streams from every direction and yet remaining within its limits
with waves edged by the stretches of beach, and never stepping beyond
those fixed boundaries: and how can the eye of reason fail to find in
them all that our education for Realities requires?" The treatise On
Virginity was the fruit of this life in Basil's monastery.

Henceforward the fortunes of Gregory are more closely linked with those
of his great brother Basil.

About a.d. 365 Basil was summoned from his retirement to act as
coadjutor to Eusebius, the Metropolitan of Caesarea in Cappadocia, and
aid him in repelling the assaults of the Arian faction on the Faith. In
these assaults the Arians were greatly encouraged and assisted by the
proclivities of the Emperor Valens. After some few years of strenuous
and successful resistance, and the endurance of great persecution from
the Emperor and his Court, a persecution which indeed pursued him
through life, Basil is called by the popular voice, on the death of
Eusebius, a.d. 370, to succeed him in the See. His election is
vehemently opposed, but after much turmoil is at length accomplished.

To strengthen himself in his position, and surround himself with
defenders of the orthodox Faith, he obliges his brother Gregory, in
spite of his emphatic protest, to undertake the Bishopric of Nyssa [5]
, a small town in the west of Cappadocia. When a friend expressed his
surprise that he had chosen so obscure a place for such a man as
Gregory, he replied, that he did not desire his brother to receive
distinction from the name of his See, but rather to confer distinction
upon it.

It was with the same feeling, and by the exercise of a like masterful
will, that he forced upon his friend Gregory Nazianzen the Bishopric of
a still more obscure and unimportant place, called Sasima. But Gregory
highly resented the nomination, which unhappily led to a lifelong
estrangement.

It was about this time, too, that a quarrel had arisen between Basil
and their uncle, another Gregory, one of the Cappadocian Bishops. And
here Gregory of Nyssa gave a striking proof of the extreme simplicity
and unreflectiveness of his character, which without guileful intent
yet led him into guile. Without sufficient consideration he was induced
to practise a deceit which was as irreconcileable with Christian
principle as with common sense. In his endeavours to set his brother
and uncle at one, when previous efforts had been in vain, he had
recourse to an extraordinary method. He forged a letter, as if from
their uncle, to Basil, earnestly entreating reconciliation. The
inevitable discovery of course only widened the breach, and drew down
on Gregory his brother's indignant condemnation. The reconciliation,
however, which Gregory hoped for, was afterwards brought about.

Nor was this the only occasion on which Gregory needed Basil's advice
and reproof, and protection from the consequences of his inexperienced
zeal. After he had become Bishop of Nyssa, with a view to render
assistance to his brother he promoted the summoning of Synods. But
Basil's wider experience told him that no good would come of such
assemblies under existing circumstances. Besides which he had reason to
believe that Gregory would be made the tool of factious and designing
men. He therefore discouraged the attempt. At another time Basil had to
interpose his authority to prevent his brother joining in a mission to
Rome to invite the interference of Pope Damasus and the Western Bishops
in the settlement of the troubles at Antioch in consequence of the
disputed election to the See. Basil had himself experience of the
futility of such application to Rome, from the want of sympathy in the
Pope and the Western Bishops with the troubles in the East. Nor would
he, by such application, give a handle for Rome's assertion of
supremacy, and encroachment on the independence of the Eastern Church.
The Bishopric of Nyssa was indeed to Gregory no bed of roses. Sad was
the contrast to one of his genre spirit, more fitted for studious
retirement and monastic calm than for controversies which did not end
with the pen, between the peaceful leisure of his retreat in Pontus and
the troubles and antagonisms of his present position. The enthusiasm of
his faith on the subject of the Trinity and the Incarnation brought
upon him the full weight of Arian and Sabellian hostility, aggravated
as it was by the patronage of the Emperor. In fact his whole life at
Nyssa was a series of persecutions.

A charge of uncanonical irregularity in his ordination is brought up
against him by certain Arian Bishops, and he is summoned to appear and
answer them at a Synod at Ancyra. To this was added the vexation of a
prosecution by Demosthenes, the Emperor's chef de cuisine, on a charge
of defalcation in the Church funds.

A band of soldiers is sent to fetch him to the Synod. The fatigue of
the journey, and the rough treatment of his conductors, together with
anxiety of mind, produce a fever which prevents his attendance. His
brother Basil comes to his assistance. He summons another Synod of
orthodox Cappadocian Bishops, who dictate in their joint names a
courteous letter, apologising for Gregory's absence from the Synod of
Ancyra, and proving the falsehood of the charge of embezzlement. At the
same time he writes to solicit the interest of Astorgus, a person of
considerable influence at the Court, to save his brother from the
indignity of being dragged before a secular tribunal.

Apparently the application was unsuccessful. Demosthenes now obtains
the holding another Synod at Gregory's own See of Nyssa, where he is
summoned to answer the same charges. Gregory refuses to attend. He is
consequently pronounced contumacious, and deposed from his Bishopric.
His deposition is followed immediately by a decree of banishment from
the Emperor, a.d. 376. He retires to Seleucia. But his banishment did
not secure him from the malice and persecution of his enemies. He is
obliged frequently to shift his quarters, and is subjected to much
bodily discomfort and suffering. From the consoling answers of his
friend Gregory of Nazianzen (for his own letters are lost), we learn
the crushing effects of all these troubles upon his gentle and
sensitive spirit, and the deep despondency into which he had fallen.

At length there is a happier turn of affairs. The Emperor Valens is
killed, a.d. 378, and with him Arianism `vanished in the crash of
Hadrianople.' He is succeeded by Gratian, the friend and disciple of
St. Ambrose. The banished orthodox Bishops are restored to their Sees,
and Gregory returns to Nyssa. In [6] one of his letters, most probably
to his brother Basil, he gives a graphic description of the popular
triumph with which his return was greeted.

But the joy of his restoration is overshadowed by domestic sorrows. His
great brother, to whom he owed so much, soon after dies, ere he is 50
years of age, worn out by his unparalleled toils and the severity of
his ascetic life. Gregory celebrated his death in a sincere panegyric.
Its high-flown style is explained by the rhetorical fashion of the
time. The same year another sorrow awaits him. After a separation of
many years he revisits his sister Macrina, at her convent in Pontus,
but only to find her on her death-bed. We have an interesting and
graphic account of the scene between Gregory and his dying sister. To
the last this admirable woman appears as the great teacher of her
family. She supplies her brother with arguments for, and confirms his
faith in, the resurrection of the dead; and almost reproves him for the
distress he felt at her departure, bidding him, with St. Paul, not to
sorrow as those who had no hope. After her decease an inmate of the
convent, named Vestiana, brought to Gregory a ring, in which was a
piece of the true Cross, and an iron cross, both of which were found on
the body when laying it out. One Gregory retained himself, the other he
gave to Vestiana. He buried his sister in the chapel at Annesi, in
which her parents and her brother Naucratius slept.

From henceforth the labours of Gregory have a far more extended range.
He steps into the place vacated by the death of Basil, and takes
foremost rank among the defenders of the Faith of Nicaea. He is not,
however, without trouble still from the heretical party. Certain
Galatians had been busy in sowing the seeds of their heresy among his
own people. He is subjected, too, to great annoyance from the
disturbances which arose out of the wish of the people of Ibera in
Pontus to have him as their Bishop. In that early age of the Church
election to a Bishopric, if not dependent on the popular voice, at
least called forth the expression of much popular feeling, like a
contested election amongst ourselves. This often led to breaches of the
peace, which required military intervention to suppress them, as it
appears to have done on this occasion.

But the reputation of Gregory is now so advanced, and the weight of his
authority as an eminent teacher so generally acknowledged, that we find
him as one of the Prelates at the Synod of Antioch assembled for the
purpose of healing the long-continued schisms in that distracted See.
By the same Synod Gregory is chosen to visit and endeavour to reform
the Churches of Arabia and Babylon, which had fallen into a very
corrupt and degraded state. He gives a lamentable account of their
condition, as being beyond all his powers of reformation. On this same
journey he visits Jerusalem and its sacred scenes: it has been
conjectured that the Apollinarian heresy drew him thither. Of the
Church of Jerusalem he can give no better account than of those he had
already visited. He expresses himself as greatly scandalized at the
conduct of the Pilgrims who visited the Holy City on the plea of
religion. Writing to three ladies, whom he had known at Jerusalem, he
takes occasion, from what he had witnessed there, to speak of the
uselessness of pilgrimages as any aids to reverence and faith, and
denounces in the strongest terms the moral dangers to which all
pilgrims, especially women, are exposed.

This letter is so condemnatory of what was a common and authorized
practice of the medieval Church that [7] Divines of the Latin communion
have endeavoured, but in vain, to deny its authenticity.

The name and character of Gregory had now reached the Imperial Court,
where Theodosius had lately succeeded to the Eastern Empire. As a proof
of the esteem in which he was then held, it is said that in his recent
journey to Babylon and the Holy Land he travelled with carriages
provided for him by the Emperor.

Still greater distinction awaits him. He is one of the hundred and
fifty Bishops summoned by Theodosius to the second OEcumenical Council,
that of Constantinople, a.d. 381. To the assembled Fathers he brings an
[8] instalment of his treatise against the Eunomian heresy, which he
had written in defence of his brother Basil's positions, on the subject
of the Trinity and the Incarnation. This he first read to his friend
Gregory Nazianzen, Jerome, and others. Such was the influence he
exercised in the Council that it is said, though this is very doubtful,
that the explanatory clauses added to the Nicene Creed are due to him.
Certain, however, it is that he delivered the inaugural address, which
is not extant; further that he preached the funeral oration, which has
been preserved, on the death of Meletius, of Antioch, the first
President of the Council, who died at Constantinople; also that he
preached at the enthronement of Gregory Nazianzen in the capital. This
oration has perished.

Shortly before the close of the Council, by a Constitution of the
Emperor, issued from Heraclea, Gregory is nominated as one of the
Bishops who were to be regarded as the central authorities of Catholic
Communion. In other words, the primacy of Rome or Alexandria in the
East was to be replaced by that of other Sees, especially
Constantinople. Helladius of Caesarea was to be Gregory's colleague in
his province. The connexion led to a misunderstanding. As to the
grounds of this there is much uncertainty. The account of it is
entirely derived from Gregory himself in his Letter to Flavian, and
from his great namesake. Possibly there were faults on both sides.

We do not read of Gregory being at the Synod, a.d. 382, which followed
the great Council of Constantinople. But we find him present at the
Synod held the following year.

This same year we have proof of the continued esteem and favour shown
him by the Imperial Court. He is chosen to pronounce the funeral
oration on the infant Princess Pulcheria. And not long after that also
on the death of the Empress Flaccilla, or Placidia, herself. This last
was a magnificent eulogy, but one, according to Tillemont, even
surpassed by that of Theodoret. This admirable and holy woman, a saint
of the Eastern Church, fully warranted all the praise that could be
bestowed upon her. If her husband Theodosius did not owe his conversion
to Christianity to her example and influence, he certainly did his
adherence to the true Faith. It is one of the subjects of Gregory's
praise of her that by her persuasion the Emperor refused to give an
interview to the `rationalist of the fourth century,' Eunomius.

Scarcely anything is known of the latter years of Gregory of Nyssa's
life. The last record we have of him is that he was present at a Synod
of Constantinople, summoned a.d. 394, by Rufinus, the powerful prefect
of the East, under the presidency of Nectarius. The rival claims to the
See of Bostra in Arabia had to be then settled; but perhaps the chief
reason for summoning this assembly was to glorify the consecration of
Rufinus' new Church in the suburbs. It was there that Gregory delivered
the sermon which was probably his last, wrongly entitled `On his
Ordination.' His words, which heighten the effect of others then
preached, are humbly compared to the blue circles painted on the new
walls as a foil to the gilded dome above. "The whole breathes a calmer
and more peaceful spirit; the deep sorrow over heretics who forfeit the
blessings of the Spirit changes only here and there into the flashes of
a short-lived indignation." (J. Rupp.)

The prophecy of Basil had come true. Nyssa was ennobled by the name of
its bishop appearing on the roll of this Synod, between those of the
Metropolitans of Caesarea and Iconium. Even in outward rank he is equal
to the highest. The character of Gregory could not be more justly drawn
than in the words of Tillemont (IX. p. 269). "Autant en effet, qu'on
peut juger de lui par ses ecrits, c`etoit un esprit doux, bon, facile,
qui avec beaucoup d'elevation et de lumiere, avoit neanmois beaucoup de
simplicite et de candeur, qui aimoit plus le repos que l'action, et le
travail du cabinet que le tumulte des affaires, qui avec cela etoit
sans faste, dispose `a estimer et `a louer les autres et `a se mettre
`a dessous d'eux. Mais quoiqu' il ne cherchat que le repos, nous avons
vu que son zele pour ses freres l'avoit souvent engage `a de grands
travaux, et que Dieu avait honore sa simplicite en le faisant regarder
comme le maitre, le docteur, le pacificateur et l'arbitre des eglises."

His death (probably 395) is commemorated by the Greek Church on January
10, by the Latin on March 9.
__________________________________________________________________

[4] ;;O ton Pateron Pater; ;ho ton Nussaeon phoster, Council. Nic. II.
Act. VI. Edition of Labbe, p. 477.--Nicephor. Callist. H. E. xi. 19.

[5] Now Nirse.

[6] Epist. III. (Zacagni's collection).

[7] Notably Bellarmine: Gretser, the Jesuit, against the Calvinist
Molino.

[8] See Note 1 to the Introductory Letter to the Treatise.
__________________________________________________________________

Chapter II.--His General Character as a Theologian.

"The first who sought to establish by rational considerations the whole
complex of orthodox doctrines." So Ueberweg (History of Philosophy, p.
326) of Gregory of Nyssa. This marks the transition from ante-Nicene
times. Then, at all events in the hands of Origen, philosophy was
identical with theology. Now, that there is a `complex of orthodox
doctrines' to defend, philosophy becomes the handmaid of theology.
Gregory, in this respect, has done the most important service of any of
the writers of the Church in the fourth century. He treats each single
philosophical view only as a help to grasp the formulae of faith; and
the truth of that view consists with him only in its adaptability to
that end. Notwithstanding strong speculative leanings he does not
defend orthodoxy either in the fashion of the Alexandrian school or in
the fashion of some in modern times, who put forth a system of
philosophy to which the dogmas of the Faith are to be accommodated.

If this be true, the question as to his attitude towards Plato, which
is one of the first that suggests itself, is settled. Against
polytheism he does indeed seek to defend Christianity by connecting it
apologetically with Plato's system. This we cannot be surprised at,
considering that the definitions of the doctrines of the Catholic
Church were formed in the very place where the last considerable effort
of Platonism was made; but he by no means makes the New Life in any way
dependent on this system of philosophy. "We cannot speculate," he says
(De Anim. et Resurrect.),..."we must leave the Platonic car." But still
when he is convinced that Plato will confirm doctrine he will, even in
polemic treatises, adopt his view; for instance, he seeks to grasp the
truth of the Trinity from the Platonic account of our internal
consciousness, i.e. psuche, logos, nous; because such a proof from
consciousness is, to Gregory, the surest and most reliable.

The "rational considerations," then, by which Gregory would have
established Christian doctrine are not necessarily drawn from the
philosophy of the time: nor, further, does he seek to rationalize
entirely all religious truth. In fact he resigns the hope of
comprehending the Incarnation and all the great articles. This is the
very thing that distinguishes the Catholic from the Eunomian.
"Receiving the fact we leave untampered with the manner of the creation
of the Universe, as altogether secret and inexplicable [9] ." With a
turn resembling the view of Tertullian, he comes back to the conclusion
that for us after all Religious Truth consists in mystery. "The Church
possesses the means of demonstrating these things: or rather, she has
faith, which is surer than demonstration [10] ." He developes the truth
of the Resurrection as much by the fulfilment of God's promises as by
metaphysics: and it has been considered as one of the proofs that the
treatise What is being `in the image of God'? is not his that this
subordination of philosophical proof to the witness of the Holy Spirit
is not preserved in it.

Nevertheless there was a large field, larger even than in the next
century, in which rationalizing was not only allowable, but was even
required of him. In this there are three questions which Gregory has
treated with particular fulness and originality. They are:--1. Evil; 2.
The relation between the ideal and the actual Man; 3. Spirit.

I. He takes, to begin with, Origen's view of evil. Virtue and Vice are
not opposed to each other as two Existencies: but as Being is opposed
to not-Being. Vice exists only as an absence. But how did this arise?

In answering this question he seems sometimes to come very near
Manicheism, and his writings must be read very carefully, in order to
avoid fixing upon him the groundless charge that he leaves evil in too
near connexion with Matter. But the passages [11] which give rise to
this charge consist of comparisons found in his homilies and
meditations; just as a modern theologian might in such works make the
Devil the same as Sin and Death. The only imperfection in his view is
that he is unable [12] to regard evil as not only suffered but even
permitted by God. But this imperfection is inseparable from his time:
for Manicheism was too near and its opposition too little overcome for
such a view to be possible for him; he could not see that it is the
only one able thoroughly to resist Dualism.

Evil with Gregory is to be found in the spontaneous proclivity of the
soul towards Matter: but not in Matter itself. Matter, therefore, in
his eschatology is not to be burnt up and annihilated: only soul and
body have to be refined, as gold (this is a striking comparison) is
refined. He is very clear upon the relations between the three factors,
body, matter, and evil. He represents the mind as the mirror of the
Archetypal Beauty: then below the mind comes body (phusis which is
connected with mind and pervaded by it, and when thus transfigured and
beautified by it becomes itself the mirror of this mirror: and then
this body in its turn influences and combines Matter. The Beauty of the
Supreme Being thus penetrates all things: and as long as the lower
holds on to the higher all is well. But if a rupture occurs anywhere,
then Matter, receiving no longer influence from above, reveals its own
deformity, and imparts something of it to body and, through that, to
mind: for matter is in itself `a shapeless unorganized thing [13] .'
Thus the mind loses the image of God. But evil began when the rupture
was made: and what caused that? When and how did the mind become
separated from God?

Gregory answers this question by laying it down as a principle, that
everything created is subject to change. The Uncreate Being is
changeless, but Creation, since its very beginning was owing to a
change, i.e. a calling of the non-existent into existence, is liable to
alter. Gregory deals here with angelic equally as with human nature,
and with all the powers in both, especially with the will, whose
virtual freedom he assumes throughout. That, too, was created;
therefore that, too, could change.

It was possible, therefore, that, first, one of the created spirits,
and, as it actually happened, he who was entrusted with the supervision
of the earth, should choose to turn his eyes away from the Good; he
thus looked at a lower good; and so began to be envious and to have
pathe. All evil followed in a chain from this beginning; according to
the principle that the beginning of anything is the cause of all that
follows in its train.

So the Devil fell: and the proclivity to evil was introduced into the
spiritual world. Man, however, still looked to God and was filled with
blessings (this is the `ideal man' of Gregory). But as when the flame
has got hold of a wick one cannot dim its light by means of the flame
itself, but only by mixing water with the oil in the wick, so the Enemy
effected the weakening of God's blessings in man by cunningly mixing
wickedness in his will, as he had mixed it in his own. From first to
last, then, evil lies in the proairesis and in nothing else.

God knew what would happen and suffered it, that He might not destroy
our freedom, the inalienable heritage of reason and therefore a portion
of His image in us. [14] He `gave scope to evil for a nobler end.'
Gregory calls it a piece of "little mindedness" to argue from evil
either the weakness or the wickedness of God.

II. His remarks on the relation between the ideal and the actual Man
are very interesting. It is usual with the other Fathers, in speaking
of man's original perfection, to take the moment of the first man's
residence in Paradise, and to regard the whole of human nature as there
represented by the first two human beings. Gregory is far removed from
this way of looking at the matter. With him human perfection is the
`idea' of humanity: he sees already in the bodily-created Adam the
fallen man. The present man is not to be distinguished from that bodily
Adam; both fall below the ideal type. Gregory seems to put the Fall
beyond and before the beginning of history. `Under the form of
narrative Moses places before us mere doctrine [15] .' The locus
classicus about the idea and the reality of human nature is On the
Making of Man, I. p. 88f. He sketches both in a masterly way. He speaks
of the division of the human race into male and female as a `device'
(epitechnesis), implying that it was not the first `organization'
(kataskeue). He hints that the irrational element was actually provided
by the Creator, Who foresaw the Fall and the Redemption, for man to sin
in; as if man immediately upon the creation of the perfect humanity
became a mixed nature (spirit and flesh), and his fall was not a mere
accident, but a necessary consequence of this mixed nature. Adam must
have fallen: there was no perfect humanity in Paradise. In man's mixed
nature of spirit and flesh nutrition is the basis of his sensation, and
sensation is the basis of his thought; and so it was inevitable that
sin through this lower yet vital side of man should enter in. So
ingrained is the spirit with the flesh in the whole history of actual
humanity that all the varieties of all the souls that ever have lived
or ever shall, arise from this very mixture; i.e. from the varying
degrees of either factor in each. But as Gregory's view here touches,
though in striking contrast, on Origen's, more will be said about it in
the next chapter.

It follows from this that Gregory, as Clement and Basil before him, did
not look upon Original Sin as the accidental or extraordinary thing
which it was afterwards regarded. `From a man who is a sinner and
subject to passion of course is engendered a man who is a sinner and
subject to passion: sin being in a manner born with him, and growing
with his growth, and not dying with it.' And yet he says elsewhere, "An
infant who is just born is not culpable, nor does it merit punishment;
just as he who has been baptized has no account to give of his past
sins, since they are forgiven," and he calls infants aponeroi, `not
having in the least admitted the disease into their soul.' But these
two views can of course be reconciled; the infant at the moment of its
physical birth starts with sins forgotten, just as at the moment of its
spiritual birth it starts with sins forgiven. No actual sin has been
committed. But then its nature has lost the apatheia; the inevitable
weakness of its ancestry is in it.

III. `Spirit.' Speaking of the soul, Gregory asks, `How can that which
is incomposite be dissolved?' i.e. the soul is spirit, and spirit is
incomposite and therefore indestructible.

But care must be taken not to infer too much from this his favourite
expression `spirit' in connexion with the soul. `God is spirit' too;
and we are inclined to forget that this is no more than a negative
definition, and to imagine the human spirit of equal prerogative with
Deity. Gregory gives no encouragement to this; he distinctly teaches
that, though the soul is incomposite, it is not in the least
independent of time and space, as the Deity is.

In fact he almost entirely drops the old Platonic division of the
Universe into Intelligible (spiritual) and Sensible, which helps to
keep up this confusion between human and divine `spirit,' and adopts
the Christian division of Creator and Created. This difference between
Creator and Created is further figured by him as that between

1. The Infinite and The Finite.

2. The Changeless and The Changeable.

3. The Contradiction-less and The Contradictory.

The result of this is that the Spirit-world itself has been divided
into Uncreate and Created.

With regard, then, to this created Spirit-world we find that Gregory,
as Basil, teaches that it existed, i.e. it had been created, before the
work of the Six Days began. `God made all that is, at once' (athroos).
This is only his translation of the verse, `In the beginning God
created the heaven and the earth;' the material for `heaven' and
`earth,' i.e. spirits and chaos, was made in a moment, but God had not
yet spoken the successive Words of creation. The souls of men, then,
existed from the very beginning of creation, and in a determinate
number; for this is a necessary consequence of the `simultaneous
creation.' This was the case with the Angels too, the other portion of
the created Spirit-world. Gregory has treated the subject of the Angels
very fully. He considers that they are perfect: but their perfection
too is contingent: it depends on the grace of God and their own wills;
the angels are free, and therefore changeable. Their will necessarily
moves towards something: at their first creation the Beautiful alone
solicited them. Man `a little lower than the Angels' was perfect too;
deathless, passionless, contemplative. `The true and perfect soul is
single in its nature, intellectual, immaterial [16] .' He was `as the
Angels' and if he fell, Lucifer fell too. Gregory will not say, as
Origen did, that human souls had a body when first created: rather, as
we have seen, he implies the contrary; and he came to be considered the
champion that fought the doctrine of the pre-existence of embodied
souls. He seems to have been influenced by Methodius' objections to
Origen's view. But his magnificent idea of the first man gives way at
once to something more Scriptural and at the same time more scientific;
and his ideal becomes a downright forecast of Realism.

Taking, however, the human soul as it is, he still continues, we often
find, to compare it with God. In his great treatise On the Soul and the
Resurrection, he rests a great deal on the parallel between the
relation of man to his body, and that of God to the world.--`The soul
is as a cord drawn out of mud; God draws to Himself what is His
own.'--He calls the human spirit `an influx of the divine in-breathing'
(Adv. Apollin. c. 12). Anger and desire do not belong to the essence of
the soul, he says: they are only among its varying states. The soul,
then, as separable from matter, is like God. But this likeness does not
extend to the point of identity. Incomprehensible, immortal, it is not
uncreated. The distinction between the Creator and the Created cannot
be obliterated. The attributes of the Creator set down above, i.e. that
He is infinite, changeless, contradictionless, and so always good, &c.,
can be applied only catachrestically to some men, in that they resemble
their Maker as a copy resembles its original: but still, in this
connexion, Gregory does speak of those `who do not need any cleansing
at all [17] ,' and the context forces us to apply these words to men.
There is no irony, to him or to any Father of the fourth century, in
the words, `They that are whole need not a physician.' Although in the
treatise On Virginity, where he is describing the development of his
own moral and religious life, he is very far from applying them to
himself, he nevertheless seems to recognize the fact that since
Christianity began there are those to whom they might apply.

There is also need of a certain amount of `rational considerations' in
advancing a Defence and a Theory of Christianity. He makes this
according to the special requirements of the time in his Oratio
Catechetica. His reasonings do not seem to us always convincing; but
the presence of a living Hellenism and Judaism in the world required
them. These two phenomena also explain what appears to us a great
weakness in this work: namely, that he treats Hellenism as if it were
all speculation; Judaism as if it were all facts. These two religions
were too near and too practically opposed to each other for him to see,
as we can now, by the aid of a sort of science of religions, that every
religion has its idea, and every religion has its facts. He and all the
first Apologists, with the spectacle of these two apparently opposite
systems before them, thought that, in arriving at the True Religion as
well, all could be done by considering facts; or all could be done by
speculation. Gregory chose the latter method. A Dogmatic in the modern
sense, in which both the idea and the facts of Christianity flow into
one, could not have been expected of him. The Oratio Catechetica is a
mere philosophy of Christianity in detail written in the philosophic
language of the time. Not only does he refrain from using the historic
proofs, i.e. of prophecy and type (except very sparingly and only to
meet an adversary), but his defence is insufficient from another point
of view also; he hardly uses the moral proofs either; he wanders
persistently in metaphysics.

If he does not lean enough on these two classes of proofs, at all
events that he does not lean entirely on either, may be considered as a
guarantee of his excellence as a theologian pure and simple. But he is
on the other hand very far from attempting a philosophic construction
of Christianity, as we have seen. Though akin to modern theologians in
many things, he is unlike those of them who would construct an a priori
Christianity, in which the relationship of one part to another is so
close that all stands or falls together. Philosophic deduction is with
him only `a kind of instruction' used in his apologetic works. On
occasion he shows a clear perception of the historic principle. "The
supernatural character of the Gospel miracles bears witness to their
divine origin [18] ." He points, as Origen did, to the continued
possession of miraculous powers in the Church. Again, as regards moral
proof, there had been so much attempted that way by the Neo-Platonists
that such proof could not have exactly the same degree of weight
attributed to it that it has now, at least by an adherent of the newer
Hellenism. Philostratus, Porphyry, Iamblichus had all tried to attract
attention to the holy lives of heathen sages. Yet to these, rough
sketches as they were, the Christian did oppose the Lives of the
Saints: notably Gregory himself in the Life of Gregory Thaumaturgus: as
Origen before him (c. Celsum, passim) had shewn in detail the
difference in kind of Christian holiness.

His treatment of the Sacraments in the Oratio Catechetica is
noteworthy. On Baptism he is very complete: it will be sufficient to
notice here the peculiar proof he offers that the Holy Spirit is
actually given in Baptism. It is the same proof, to start with, as that
which establishes that God came in the flesh when Christ came. Miracles
prove this; (he is not wanting here in the sense of the importance of
History). If, then, we are persuaded that God is here, we must allow
also that truth is here: for truth is the mark of Deity. When,
therefore, God has said that He will come in a particular way, if
called in a particular way, this must be true. He is so called in
Baptism: therefore He comes. (The vital importance of the doctrine of
the Trinity, upon which Gregory laboured for so many years, thus all
comes from Baptism.) Gregory would not confine the entire force of
Baptism to the one ritual act. A resurrection to a new immortal life is
begun in Baptism, but owing to the weakness of nature this complete
effect is separated into stages or parts. With regard to the necessity
of Baptism for salvation, he says he does not know if the Angels
receive the souls of the unbaptized; but he rather intimates that they
wander in the air seeking rest, and entreat in vain like the Rich Man.
To him who wilfully defers it he says, `You are out of paradise, O
Catechumen!'

In treating the Sacrament of the Eucharist, Gregory was the first
Father who developed the view of transformation, for which
transubstantiation was afterwards substituted to suit the mediaeval
philosophy; that is, he put this view already latent into actual words.
There is a locus classicusin the Oratio Catechetica, c. 37.

"Therefore from the same cause as that by which the bread that was
transformed in that Body was changed to a divine potency, a similar
result takes place now. For as in that case, too, the grace of the Word
used to make holy the Body, the substance of which came of the bread
and was in a manner itself bread, so also in this case the bread, as
says the Apostle, `is sanctified by the word of God and prayer:' not
that it advances by the process of eating to the stage of passing into
the body of the Word, but it at once is changed into the Body, by the
Word, as the Word Himself said, `This is My Body;'" and just above he
had said: "Rightly do we believe that now also the bread which is
consecrated by the word of God is changed into the body of God the
Word." This way of explaining the mystery of the Sacrament, i.e. from
the way bread was changed into the Word when Christ was upon earth, is
compared by Neander with another way Gregory had of explaining it, i.e.
the heightened efficacy of the bread is as the heightened efficacy of
the baptismal water, the anointing oil [19] , &c., a totally different
idea. But this, which may be called the metabatic view, is the one
evidently most present to his mind. In a fragment of his found in a
Parisian ms. [20] , quoted with the Liturgies of James, Basil,
Chrysostom, we also find it; "The consecrated bread is changed into the
body of the Word; and it is needful for humanity to partake of that."

Again, the necessity of the Incarnation, drawn from the words "it was
necessary that Christ should suffer," receives a rational treatment
from him. There must ever be, from a meditation on this, two results,
according as the physical or the ethical element in Christianity
prevails, i.e. 1. Propitiation; 2. Redemption. The first theory is dear
to minds fed upon the doctrines of the Reformation, but it receives no
countenance from Gregory. Only in the book in which Moses' Life is
treated allegorically does he even mention it. The sacrifice of Christ
instead of the bloody sacrifices of the Old Testament is not his
doctrine, He develops his theory of the Redemption or Ransom (i.e. from
the Devil), in the Oratio Catechetica. Strict justice to the Evil One
required it. But in his hands this view never degenerates, as with
some, into a mere battle, e.g. in Gethsemane, between the Rescuer and
Enslaver.

So much has been said about Gregory's inconsistencies, and his apparent
inconsistencies are indeed so many, that some attempt must be made to
explain this feature, to some so repulsive, in his works. One instance
at all events can show how it is possible to reconcile even the most
glaring. He is not a one-sided theologian: he is not one of those who
pass always the same judgment upon the same subject, no matter with
whom he has to deal. There could not be a harsher contradiction than
that between his statement about human generation in the Oratio
Catechetica, and that made in the treatises On Virginity and On the
Making of Man. In the O.C. everything hateful and undignified is
removed from the idea of our birth; the idea of pathos is not applied;
"only evil brings disgrace." But in the other two Treatises he
represents generation as a consequence of the Fall. This contradiction
arises simply from the different standpoint in each. In the one case he
is apologetic; and so he adopts a universally recognised moral axiom.
In the other he is the Christian theologian; the natural process,
therefore, takes its colouring from the Christian doctrine of the Fall.
This is the standpoint of most of his works, which are polemical, not
apologetic. But in the treatise On the Soul and the Resurrection he
introduces even a third view about generation, which might be called
that of the Christian theosophist; i.e. generation is the means in the
Divine plan for carrying Humanity to its completion. Very similar is
the view in the treatise On Infants' Early Deaths; "the design of all
births is that the Power which is above the universe may in all parts
of the creation be glorified by means of intellectual natures
conspiring to the same end, by virtue of the same faculty operating in
all; I mean, that of looking upon God." Here he is speaking to the
purely philosophic instinct. It may be remarked that on this and all
the operations of Divine foreknowledge in vast world-wide relations he
has constantly striking passages, and deserves for this especially to
be studied.

The style of Gregory is much more elegant than that of Basil: sometimes
it may be called eloquent. His occasional digressions did not strike
ancient critics as a fault. To them he is "sweet," "bright," "dropping
pleasure into the ears." But his love for splendour, combined with the
lateness of his Greek, make him one of the more difficult Church
writers to interpret accurately.

His similes and illustrations are very numerous, and well chosen. A few
exceptions must, perhaps, be made. He compares the mere professing
Christian to the ape, dressed like a man and dancing to the flute, who
used to amuse the people in the theatre at Alexandria, but once
revealed during the performance its bestial nature, at the sight of
food. This is hardly worthy of a great writer, as Gregory was [21] .
Especially happy are his comparisons in the treatise On the Soul and
Resurrection, by which metaphysical truths are expressed; and elsewhere
those by which he seeks to reach the due proportions of the truth of
the Incarnation. The chapters in his work against Eunomius where he
attempts to depict the Infinite, are striking. But what commends him
most to modern taste is his power of description when dealing with
facts, situations, persons: he touches these always with a colour which
is felt to be no exaggeration, but the truth.
__________________________________________________________________

[9] Cp. Or. Cat. c. xi.

[10] In verba `faciamus hominem,' I. p. 140.

[11] De Perf. Christiani Forma, III. p. 294, he calls the `Prince of
darkness' the author of sin and death: In Christi Resurrect. III. p.
386, he calls Satan `the heart of the earth:' and p. 387 identifies him
with sin. `And so the real wisdom visits that arrogant heart of the
earth, so that the thought great in wickedness should vanish, and the
darkness should be lightened, &c.'

[12] As expressed by S. Thomas Aquinas Summ. I. Qu. xix. Art. 9, Deo
nec nolente, nec volente, sed permittente....Deus neque vult fieri,
neque vult non fieri, sed vult permittere mala fieri.

[13] De Virginit. c. xi.

[14] On Infants' early Deaths, III. p. 336.

[15] Or. Cat. c. viii. D.

[16] On the Making of Man, c. xiv.

[17] Or. Cat. c. xxvi.

[18] Or. Cat. c. iii.

[19] In Sermon On the Baptism of Christ.

[20] A. 1560 fol.; also Antwerp, p. 1562 (Latine).

[21] His comparison of the hidden meaning of the proverb or parable
(III. c. Eunom. p. 236) to the `turned up' side of the peacock's
feather is beautiful in itself for language (e.g. `the varied painting
of nature,' `the half-circle shining in the midst with its dye of
purple,' `the golden mist round the circle'): but it rather fails as a
simile, when applied to the other or the literal side, which cannot in
the case of parables be said to `lack beauty and tint'.
__________________________________________________________________

Chapter III.--His Origenism.

A true estimate of the position and value of Gregory as a Church
teacher cannot be formed until the question of his `Origenism,' its
causes and its quality, is cleared up. It is well known that this
charge began to be brought against his orthodoxy at all events after
the time of Justinian: nor could Germanus, the Patriarch of
Constantinople in the next century, remove it by the device of supposed
interpolations of partizans in the interests of the Eastern as against
the Western Church: for such a theory, to be true, would still require
some hints at all events in this Father to give a colour to such
interpolations. Moreover, as will be seen, the points in which Gregory
is most like Origen are portions of the very groundwork of his own
theology. The question, then, remains why, and how far, is he a
follower of Origen?

I. When we consider the character of his great forerunner, and the kind
of task which Gregory himself undertook, the first part of this
question is easily answered. When Christian doctrine had to be set
forth philosophically, so as to be intelligible to any cultivated mind
of that time (to reconcile Greek philosophy with Christian doctrine was
a task which Gregory never dreamed of attempting), the example and
leader in such an attempt was Origen; he occupied as it were the whole
horizon. He was the founder of theology; the very vocabulary of it,
which is in use now, is of his devising. So that Gregory's language
must have had, necessarily, a close connexion with that of the great
interpreter and apologist, who had explained to his century the same
truths which Gregory had to explain to his: this must have been the
case even if his mind had not been as spiritual and idealizing as
Origen's. But in some respects it will be seen Gregory is even more an
idealist than Origen himself. Alike, then, from purpose and tradition
as from sympathy he would look back to Origen. Though a gulf was
between them, and, since the Council of Nicaea, there were some things
that could come no more into controversy, Gregory saw, where the Church
had not spoken, with the same eyes as Origen: he uses the same keys as
he did for the problems which Scripture has not solved; he uses the
same great weapon of allegory in making the letter of Scripture give up
the spiritual treasures. It could not have been otherwise when the
whole Christian religion, which Gregory was called on to defend as a
philosophy, had never before been systematically so defended but by
Origen; and this task, the same for both, was presented to the same
type of mind, in the same intellectual atmosphere. It would have been
strange indeed if Gregory had not been a pupil at least (though he was
no blind follower) of Origen.

If we take for illustration of this the most vital point in the vast
system, if system it can be called, of Origen, we shall see that he had
traced fundamental lines of thought, which could not in that age be
easily left. He asserts the virtual freedom of the human will, in every
stage and condition of human existence. The Greek philosophy of the
third century, and the semi-pagan Gnosticism, in their emanational view
of the world, denied this freedom. With them the mind of man, as one of
the emanations of Deity itself, was, as much as the matter of which the
world was made, regulated and governed directly from the Source whence
they both flowed. Indeed every system of thought, not excepting
Stoicism, was struck with the blight of this fatalism. There was no
freedom for man at all but in the system which Origen was drawing from,
or rather reading into, the Scriptures. No Christian philosopher who
lived amongst the same counter-influences as Origen could overlook this
starting-point of his system; he must have adopted it, even if the
danger of Pelagianism had been foreseen in it; which could not have
been the case.

Gregory adopted it, with the other great doctrine which in the mind of
Origen accompanied it; i.e., that evil is caused, not by matter, but by
the act of this free will of man; in other words, by sin. Again the
fatalism of all the emanationists had to be combated as to the nature
and necessity of evil. With them evil was some inevitable result of the
Divine processes; it abode at all events in matter, and human
responsibility was at an end. Greek philosophy from first to last had
shewed, even at its best, a tendency to connect evil with the lower
phusis. But now, in the light of revelation, a new truth was set forth,
and repeated again and again by the very men who were inclined to adopt
Plato's rather Dualistic division of the world into the intelligible
and sensible. `Evil was due to an act of the will of man.' Moreover it
could no longer be regarded per se: it was relative, being a `default,'
or `failure,' or `turning away from the true good' of the will, which,
however, was always free to rectify this failure. It was a
steresis,--loss of the good; but it did not stand over against the good
as an independent power. Origen contemplated the time when evil would
cease to exist; `the non-existent cannot exist for ever:' and Gregory
did the same.

This brings us to yet another consequence of this enthusiasm for human
freedom and responsibility, which possessed Origen, and carried Gregory
away. The apokatastasis ton panton has been thought [22] , in certain
periods of the Church, to have been the only piece of Origenism with
which Gregory can be charged. [This of course shows ignorance of the
kind of influence which Gregory allowed Origen to have over him; and
which did not require him to select even one isolated doctrine of his
master.] It has also brought him into more suspicion than any other
portion of his teaching. Yet it is a direct consequence of the view of
evil, which he shares with Origen. If evil is the non-existent, as his
master says, a steresis, [23] as he says, then it must pass away. It
was not made by God; neither is it self-subsisting.

But when it has passed away, what follows? That God will be "all in
all." Gregory accepts the whole of Origen's explanation of this great
text. Both insist on the impossibility of God being in `everything,' if
evil still remains. But this is equivalent to the restoration to their
primitive state of all created spirits. Still it must be remembered
that Origen required many future stages of existence before all could
arrive at such a consummation: with him there is to be more than one
`next world;' and even when the primitive perfection is reached, his
peculiar view of the freedom of the will, as an absolute balance
between good and evil, would admit the possibility of another fall.
`All may be saved; and all may fall.' How the final Sabbath shall come
in which all wills shall rest at last is but dimly hinted at in his
writings. With Gregory, on the other hand, there are to be but two
worlds: the present and the next; and in the next the apokatastasis ton
panton must be effected. Then, after the Resurrection, the fire
akoimetos, aionios, as he continually calls it, will have to do its
work. `The avenging flame will be the more ardent the more it has to
consume' (De Anima et Resurr., p. 227). `But at last the evil will be
annihilated, and the bad saved by nearness to the good.' There is to
rise a giving of thanks from all nature. Nevertheless [24] passages
have been adduced from Gregory's writings in which the language of
Scripture as to future punishment is used without any modification, or
hint of this universal salvation. In the treatise, De Pauperibus
Amandis, II. p. 240, he says of the last judgment that God will give to
each his due; repose eternal to those who have exercised pity and a
holy life; but the eternal punishment of fire for the harsh and
unmerciful: and addressing the rich who have made a bad use of their
riches, he says, `Who will extinguish the flames ready to devour you
and engulf you? Who will stop the gnawings of a worm that never dies?'
Cf. also Orat. 3, de Beatitudinibus, I. p. 788: contra Usuarios, II. p.
233: though the hortatory character of these treatises makes them less
important as witnesses.

A single doctrine or group of doctrines, however, may be unduly pressed
in accounting for the influence of Origen upon a kindred spirit like
Gregory. Doubtless fragments of Origen's teaching, mere details very
often, were seized upon and appropriated by others; they were erected
into dogmas and made to do duty for the whole living fabric; and even
those details were sometimes misunderstood. ` [25] What he had said
with a mind full of thought, others took in the very letter.' Hence
arose the evil of `Origenism,' so prevalent in the century in which
Gregory lived. Different ways of following him were found, bad and
good. Even the Arians could find in his language now and then something
they could claim as their own. But as Rupp well says, `Origen is not
great by virtue of those particular doctrines, which are usually
exhibited to the world as heretical by weak heads who think to take the
measure of everything with the mere formulae of orthodoxy. He is great
by virtue of one single thought, i.e. that of bringing philosophy into
union with religion, and thereby creating a theology. With Clement of
Alexandria this thought was a mere instinct: Origen gave it
consciousness: and so Christendom began to have a science of its own.'
It was this single purpose, visible in all Origen wrote, that impressed
itself so deeply upon Gregory. He, too, would vindicate the Scriptures
as a philosophy. Texts, thanks to the labours of Origen as well as to
the councils of the Church, had now acquired a fixed meaning and an
importance that all could acknowledge. The new spiritual philosophy lay
within them; he would make them speak its language. Allegory was with
him, just as with Origen, necessary, in order to find the Spirit which
inspires them. The letter must not impose itself upon us and stand for
more than it is worth; just as the practical experience of evil in the
world must not blind us to the fact that it is only a passing
dispensation. If only the animus and intention is regarded, we may say
that all that Gregory wrote was Origenistic.

II. But nevertheless much had happened in the interval of 130 years
that divides them and this leads us to consider the limits which the
state of the Church, as well as Gregory's own originality and more
extended physical knowledge, placed upon the complete filling in of the
outlines sketched by the master. First and chiefly, Origen's doctrine
of the pre-existence of the soul could not be retained; and we know
that Gregory not only abandoned it, but attacked it with all his powers
of logic in his treatise, De Anima et Resurrectione: for which he
receives the applause of the Emperor Justinian. Souls, according to
Origen, had pre-existed from eternity: they were created certainly, but
there never was a time when they did not exist: so that the procession
even of the Holy Spirit could in thought only be prior to their
existence. Then a failure of their free wills to grasp the true good,
and a consequent cooling of the fire of love within them, plunged them
in this material bodily existence, which their own sin made a suffering
one. This view had certainly great merits: it absolved the Deity from
being the author of evil, and so was a `theodicee;' it entirely got rid
of the two rival principles, good and evil, of the Gnostics; and it
avoided the seeming incongruity of what was to last for ever in the
future being not eternal in the past. Why then was it rejected? Not
only because of the objection urged by Methodius, that the addition of
a body would be no remedy but rather an increase of the sin; or that
urged amongst many others by Gregory, that a vice cannot be regarded as
the precursor of the birth of each human soul into this or into other
worlds; but more than that and chiefly, because such a doctrine
contravened the more distinct views now growing up as to what the
Christian creation was, and the more careful definitions also of the
Trinity now embodied in the creeds. In fact the pre-existence of the
soul was wrapped up in a cosmogony that could no longer approve itself
to the Christian consciousness. In asserting the freedom of the will,
and placing in the will the cause of evil, Origen had so far banished
emanationism; but in his view of the eternity of the world, and in that
of the eternal pre-existence of souls which accompanied it, he had not
altogether stamped it out. He connects rational natures so closely with
the Deity that each individual logos seems almost, in a Platonic way,
to lie in the Divine which [26] he styles ousia ousion, idea ideon.
They are `partial brightnesses (apaugasmapa) of the glory of God.' He
[27] allows them, of course, to have been created in the Scriptural
sense of that word, which is certainly an advance upon Justin; but his
creation is not that distinct event in time which Christianity requires
and the exacter treatment of the nature of the Divine Persons had now
developed. His creation, both the intelligible and visible world,
receives from him an eternity which is unnatural and incongruous in
relation to his other speculations and beliefs: it lingers,
Tithonus-like, in the presence of the Divine Persons, without any
meaning and purpose for its life; it is the last relic of Paganism, as
it were, in a system which is otherwise Christian to the very core. His
strenuous effort to banish all ideas of time, at all events from the
intelligible world, ended in this eternal creation of that world; which
seemed to join the eternally generated Son too closely to it, and gave
occasion to the Arians to say that He too was a ktisma. This eternal
pre-existence in fact almost destroyed the idea of creation, and made
the Deity in a way dependent on His own world. Athanasius, therefore,
and his followers were roused to separate the divinity of the Son from
everything created. The relation of the world to God could no longer be
explained in the same terms as those which they employed to illustrate
the relations between the Divine Persons; and when once the doctrine of
the consubstantiality of the Father and Son had been accepted and
firmly established there could be no more favour shown by the defenders
of that doctrine to the merely Platonic view of the nature and origin
of souls and of matter.

Amongst the defenders of the Creed of Nicaea, Gregory, we know, stands
well-nigh foremost. In his long and numerous treatises on the Trinity
he employs every possible argument and illustration to show the
contents of the substance of the Deity as transcendent, incommunicable
to creation per se. Souls cannot have the attributes of Deity. Created
spirits cannot claim immediate kindred with the Logos. So instead of
the Platonic antithesis of the intelligible and sensible world, which
Origen adopted, making all equal in the intelligible world, he brings
forward the antithesis of God and the world. He felt too that that
antithesis answers more fully not only to the needs of the Faith in the
Trinity daily growing more exact and clear, but also to the facts of
the Creation, i.e. its variety and differences. He gives up the
preexistence of the rational soul; it will not explain the infinite
variety observable in souls. The variety, again, of the material world,
full as it is of the miracles of divine power, cannot have been the
result of the chance acts of created natures embodying themselves
therein, which the theory of pre-existence supposes. God and the
created world (of spirits and matter) are now to be the factors in
theology; although Gregory does now and then, for mere purposes of
illustration, divide the Universe still into the intelligible and the
sensible.

When once pre-existence was given up, the parts of the soul could be
more closely united to each other, because the lower and higher were in
their beginning no longer separated by a gulf of ages. Accordingly
Gregory, reducing the three parts of man which Origen had used to the
simpler division into visible and invisible (sensible and
intelligible), dwells much upon the intimate relation between the two
and the mutual action of one upon the other. Origen had retained the
trichotomy of Plato which other Greek Fathers also, with the sanction,
as they supposed, of S. Paul (1 Thess. v. 23), had adopted. `Body,'
`soul,' and `spirit,' or Plato's `body,' `unreasoning' and `reasoning
soul,' had helped Origen to explain how the last, the pre-existent soul
(the spirit, or the conscience [28] , as he sometimes calls it) could
ever have come to live in the flesh. The second, the soul proper, is as
it were a mediating ground on which the spirit can meet the flesh. The
celestial mind, `the real man fallen from on high,' rules by the power
of conscience or of will over this soul, where the merely animal
functions and the natural appetites reside; and through this soul over
the body. How the celestial mind can act at all upon this purely animal
soul which lies between it and the body, Origen leaves unexplained. But
this division was necessary for him, in order to represent the spirit
as remaining itself unchanged in its heavenly nature, though weakened
by its long captivity in the body. The middle soul (in which he
sometimes places the will) is the scene of contamination and disorder;
the spirit is free, it can always rejoice at what is well done in the
soul, and yet is not touched by the evil in it; it chooses, convicts,
and punishes. Such was Origen's psychology. But an intimate connexion
both in birth and growth between all the faculties of man is one of
Gregory's most characteristic thoughts, and he gave up this trichotomy,
which was still, however, retained by some Greek fathers, and adopted
the simpler division mentioned above in order more clearly and
concisely to show the mutual play of spirit and body upon each other.
There was soon, too, another reason why this trichotomy should be
suspected. It was a second time made the vehicle of error. Apollinaris
adopted it, in order to expound that the Divine Logos took the place,
in the tripartite soul of Christ, of the `reasonable soul' or spirit of
other men. Gregory, in pressing for a simpler treatment of man's
nature, thus snatched a vantage-ground from a sagacious enemy. His own
psychology is only one instance of a tendency which runs through the
whole of his system, and which may indeed be called the dominating
thought with which he approached every question; he views each in the
light of form and matter; spirit penetrating and controlling body, body
answering to spirit and yet at the same time supplying the nutriment
upon which the vigour and efficacy of spirit, in this world at least,
depends. This thought underlies his view of the material universe and
of Holy Scripture, as well as of man's nature. With regard to the last
he says, `the intelligible cannot be realized in body at all, except it
be commingled with sensation;' and again, `as there can be no sensation
without a material substance, so there can be no exercise of the power
of thought without sensation [29] .' The spiritual or intelligent part
of man (which he calls by various names, such as `the inner man,' the
psuche logike, nous or dianoia, to zoopoion aition, or simply psuche as
throughout the treatise On the Soul), however alien in its essence from
the bodily and sentient part, yet no sooner is united with this earthly
part than it at once exerts power over it. In fact it requires this
instrument before it can reach its perfection. `Seeing, then, man is a
reasoning animal of a certain kind, it was necessary that the body
should be prepared as an instrument appropriate to the needs of his
reason [30] .' So closely has this reason been united with the senses
and the flesh that it performs itself the functions of the animal part;
it is the `mind' or `reason' itself that sees, hears, &c.; in fact the
exercise of mind depends on a sound state of the senses and other
organs of the body; for a sick body cannot receive the `artistic'
impressions of the mind and, so, the mind remains inoperative. This is
enough to show how far Gregory had got from pre-existence and the `fall
into the prison of the flesh.'

His own theory of the origin of the soul, or at least that to which he
visibly inclines, is stated in the treatise, De Anima et Resurrectione,
p. 241. It is that of Tertullian and some Greek Fathers also: and goes
by the name of `traducianism.' The soul is transmitted in the
generating seed. This of course is the opposite pole to Origen's
teaching, and is inconsistent with Gregory's own spiritualism. The
other alternative, Creationism, which a number of the orthodox adopted,
namely that souls are created by God at the moment of conception, or
when the body of the foetus is already formed, was not open to him to
adopt; because, according to him, in idea the world of spirits was
made, and in a determinate number, along with the world of unformed
matter by the one creative act `in the beginning.' In the plan of the
universe, though not in reality as with Origen, all souls are already
created. So the life of humanity contains them: when the occasion comes
they take their beginning along with the body which enshrines them, but
are not created then any more than that body. Such was the compromise
between spiritualism and materialism to which Gregory was driven by the
difficulties of the subject. Origen with his eye unfalteringly fixed
upon the ideal world, and unconscious of the practical consequences
that might be drawn from his teaching, cut the knot with his eternal
pre-existence of souls, which avoided at once the alleged absurdity of
creationism and the grossness of traducianism. But the Church, for
higher interests still than those of pure idealism, had to reject that
doctrine; and Gregory, with his extended knowledge in physic and his
close observation of the intercommunion of mind and body, had to devise
or rather select a theory which, though a makeshift, would not
contradict either his knowledge or his faith.

Yet after admitting that soul and body are born together and attaching
such importance to the `physical basis' of life and thought, the
influence of his master, or else his own uncontrollable idealism,
carries him away again in the opposite direction. After reading words
in his treatise which Locke might have written we come upon others
which are exactly the teaching of Berkeley. There is a passage in the
De Anima et Resurrectione where he deals with the question how an
intelligent Being could have created matter, which is neither
intelligent or intelligible. But what if matter is only a concourse of
qualities, ennoiai, or psila noemata as he elsewhere calls them? Then
there would be no difficulty in understanding the manner of creation.
But even about this we can say so much, i.e. that not one of those
things which we attribute to body is itself body: neither figure, nor
colour, nor weight, nor extension, nor quantity, nor any other
qualifying notion whatever: but every one of them is a thought: it is
the combination of them all into a single whole that constitutes body.
Seeing, then, that these several qualifications which complete the
particular body are grasped by thought alone, and not by sense, and
that the Deity is a thinking being, what trouble can it be to such a
thinking agent to produce the thoughts whose mutual combination
generate for us the substance of that body? and in the treatise, De
Hom. Opif., c. 24, the intelligible phusis is said to produce the
intelligible dunameis, and the concourse of these dunameis brings into
being the material nature. The body itself, he repeats (contra Fatum,
p. 67), is not a real substance; it is a soulless, unsubstantial thing.
The only real creation is that of spirits. Even Origen did not go so
far as that Matter with him, though it exists by concomitance and not
by itself, nevertheless really exists. He avoided a rock upon which
Gregory runs; for with Gregory not only matter but created spirit as
well vanish in idealism. There remain with him only the nooumena and
God.

This transcendent idealism embarrasses him in many ways, and makes his
theory of the soul full of inconsistency. (1) He will not say
unhesitatingly whether that pure humanity in the beginning created in
the image of God had a body or not like ours. Origen at all events says
that the eternally pre-existing spirits were invested with a body, even
before falling into the sensible world. But Gregory, while denying the
pre-existence of souls in the sense of Origen, yet in many of his
treatises, especially in the De Hom. Opificio, seems to point to a
primitive humanity, a predeterminate number of souls destined to live
in the body though they had not yet lived, which goes far beyond
Origen's in its ideal character. "When Moses," Gregory says, "speaks of
the soul as the image of God, he shows that all that is alien to God
must be excluded from our definition of the soul; and a corporal nature
is alien to God." He points out that God first `made man in His own
image,' and after that made them male and female; so that there was a
double fashioning of our nature, he te pros to theion homoiomene, he te
pros ten diaphoran tauten (i.e. male and female) dieremene. On the
other hand, in the Oratio Catechetica, which contains certainly his
more dogmatic statement on every point, this ideal and passionless
humanity is regarded as still in the future: and it is represented that
man's double-nature is actually the very centre of the Divine Councils,
and not the result of any mistake or sin; man's soul from the very
first was commingled (anakrasis is Gregory's favourite word) with a
body, in order that in him, as representing every stage of living
things, the whole creation, even in its lowest part, might share in the
divine. Man, as the paragon of animals, was necessary, in order that
the union might be effected between two otherwise irreconcilable
worlds, the intelligible and the sensible. Though, therefore, there was
a Fall at last, it was not the occasion of man's receiving a body
similar to animals; that body was given him at the very first, and was
only preparatory to the Fall, which was foreseen in the Divine Councils
and provided for. Both the body and the Fall were necessary in order
that the Divine plan might be carried out, and the Divine glory
manifested in creation. In this view the "coats of skins" which Gregory
inherits from the allegorical treasures of Origen are no longer merely
the human body itself, as with Origen, but all the passions, actions,
and habits of that body after the Fall, which he sums up in the generic
term pathe. If, then, there is to be any reconciliation between this
and the former view of his in which the pure unstained humanity, the
`image of God,' is differentiated by a second act of creation as it
were into male and female, we must suppose him to teach that
immediately upon the creation in God's image there was added all that
in human nature is akin to the merely animal world. In that man was
God's image, his will was free, but in that he was created, he was able
to fall from his high estate; and God, foreseeing the Fall, at once
added the distinction of sex, and with it the other features of the
animal which would befit the fall; but with the purpose of raising
thereby the whole creation. But two great counter-influences seem
always to be acting upon Gregory; the one sympathy with the
speculations of Origen, the other a tendency to see even with a modern
insight into the closeness of the intercommunion between soul and body.
The results of these two influences cannot be altogether reconciled.
His ideal and his actual man, each sketched with a skilful and
discriminating hand, represent the interval that divides his
aspirations from his observations: yet both are present to his mind
when he writes about the soul. (2) He does not alter, as Origen does,
the traditional belief in the resurrection of the body, and yet his
idealism, in spite of his actual and strenuous defence of it in the
carefully argued treatise On the Soul and Resurrection, renders it
unnecessary, if not impossible. We know that his faith impelled Origen,
too, to [31] contend for the resurrection of the flesh: yet it is an
almost forced importation into the rest of his system. Our bodies, he
teaches, will rise again: but that which will make us the same persons
we were before is not the sameness of our bodies (for they will be
ethereal, angelic, uncarnal, &c.) but the sameness of a logos within
them which never dies (logos tis enkeitai to somati, aph' hou me
phtheiromenou egeiretai to soma en aphtharsi& 139;, c. Cels. v. 23).
Here we have the logoi spermatikoi; which Gregory objected to as
somehow connected in his mind with the infinite plurality of worlds.
Yet his own account of the Resurrection of the flesh is nothing but
Origenism, mitigated by the suppression of these logoi. With him, too,
matter is nothing, it is a negative thing that can make and effect
nothing: the soul, the zotike dunamis does everything; it is gifted by
him with a sort of ubiquity after death. `Nothing can break its
sympathetic union with the particles of the body.' It is not a long and
difficult study for it to discern in the mass of elements that which is
its own from that which is not its own. `It watches over its property,
as it were, until the Resurrection, when it will clothe itself in them
anew [32] .' It is only a change of names: the logos has become this
zotike dunamis or psuche, which seems itself, almost unaided, to effect
the whole Resurrection. Though he teaches as against Origen that the
`elements' are the same `elements,' the body the same body as before,
yet the strange importance both in activity and in substance which he
attaches to the psuche even in the disembodied state seems to render a
Resurrection of the flesh unnecessary. Here, too, his view of the plan
of Redemption is at variance with his idealistic leanings. While Origen
regarded the body, as it now is, as part of that `vanity' placed upon
the creature which was to be laid aside at last, Gregory's view of the
design of God in creating man at all absolutely required the
Resurrection of the flesh [33] (hos an sunepartheie to thei& 251; to
ge& 187;non). Creation was to be saved by man's carrying his created
body into a higher world: and this could only be done by a resurrection
of the flesh such as the Church had already set forth in her creed.

Again, however, after parting with Origen upon this point, he meets him
in the ultimate contemplation of Christ's glorified humanity and of all
glorified bodies. Both steadily refuse at last `to know Christ
according to the flesh.' They depict His humanity as so absorbed in
deity that all traces of His bodily nature vanish; and as with Christ,
so finally with His true followers. This is far indeed from the Lamb
that was slain, and the vision of S. John. In this heaven of theirs all
individual or generic differences between rational creatures
necessarily cease.

Great, then, as are their divergences, especially in cosmogony, their
agreements are maintained throughout. Gregory in the main accepts
Origen's teaching, as far as he can accommodate it to the now more
outspoken faith of the Church. What [34] Redepenning summarises as the
groundplan of Origen's whole way of thinking, Gregory has, with the
necessary changes, appropriated. Both regard the history of the world
as a movement between a beginning and an end in which are united every
single spiritual or truly human nature in the world, and the Divine
nature. This interval of movement is caused by the falling away of the
free will of the creature from the divine: but it will come to an end,
in order that the former union may be restored. In this summary they
would differ only as to the closeness of the original union. Both, too,
according to this, would regard `man' as the final cause, and the
explanation, and the centre of God's plan in creation.

Even in the special sphere of theology which the later needs of the
Church forced into prominence, and which Gregory has made peculiarly
his own, that of the doctrine of the Trinity, Gregory employs sometimes
a method which he has caught from Origen. Origen supposes, not so much,
as Plato did, that things below are images of things above, as that
they have certain secret analogies or affinities with them. This is
perhaps after all only a peculiar application for his own purpose of
Plato's theory of ideas. There are mysterious sympathies between the
earth and heaven. We must therefore read within ourselves the
reflection of truths which are too much beyond our reach to know in
themselves. With regard to the attributes of God this is more
especially the case. But Origen never had the occasion to employ this
language in explaining the mystery of the Trinity. Gregory is the first
Father who has done so. He finds a key to it in the [35] triple nature
of our soul. The nous, the logos, and the soul, form within us a unity
such as that of the Divine hypostases. Gregory himself confesses that
such thoughts about God are inadequate, and immeasurably below their
object: but he cannot be blamed for employing this method, as if it was
entirely superficial. Not only does this instance illustrate trinity in
unity, but we should have no contents for our thought about the Father,
Son, and Spirit, if we found no outlines at all of their nature within
ourselves. Denis [36] well says that the history of the doctrine of the
Trinity confirms this: for the advanced development of the theory of
the logos, a purely human attribute in the ancient philosophy, was the
cause of the doctrine of the Son being so soon and so widely treated:
and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit came into prominence only when He
began to be regarded as the principle of the purely human or moral
life, as Love, that is, or Charity. Gregory, then, had reason in
recommending even a more systematic use of the method which he had
received from Origen: `Learn from the things within thee to know the
secret of God; recognise from the Triad within thee the Triad by means
of these matters which you realise: it is a testimony above and more
sure than that of the Law and the Gospel [37] .'

He carries out elsewhere also more thoroughly than Origen this method
of reading parables. He is an actual Mystic in this. The mysterious but
real correspondences between earth and heaven, upon which, Origen had
taught, and not upon mere thoughts or the artifices of language, the
truth of a parable rests, Gregory employed, in order to penetrate the
meaning of the whole of external nature. He finds in its facts and
appearances analogies with the energies, and through them with the
essence, of God. They are not to him merely indications of the wisdom
which caused them and ordered them, but actual symptoms of the various
energies which reside in the essence of the Supreme Being; as though
that essence, having first been translated into the energies, was
through them translated into the material creation; which was thus an
earthly language saying the same thing as the heavenly language, word
for word. The whole world thus became one vast allegory [38] : and
existed only to manifest the qualities of the Unseen. Akin to this
peculiar development of the parable is another characteristic of his,
which is alien to the spirit of Origen; his delight in natural scenery,
his appreciation of it, and power of describing it.

With regard to the question, so much agitated, of the 'Apokatastasis,
it may be said that not Gregory only but Basil and Gregory Nazianzen
also have felt the influence of their master in theology, Origen. But
it is due to the latter to say that though he dwells much on the "all
in all" and insists much more on the sanctifying power of punishment
than on the satisfaction owed to Divine justice, yet no one could
justly attribute to him, as a doctrine, the view of a Universal
Salvation. Still these Greek Fathers, Origen and `the three great
Cappadocians,' equally showed a disposition of mind that left little
room for the discussions that were soon to agitate the West. Their
infinite hopes, their absolute confidence in the goodness of God, who
owes it to Himself to make His work perfect, their profound faith in
the promises and sacrifice of Christ, as well as in the vivifying
action of the Holy Spirit, make the question of Predestination and
Grace a very simple one with them. The word Grace occurs as often in
them as in Augustine: but they do not make original sin a monstrous
innovation requiring a remedy of a peculiar and overwhelming intensity.
Passion indeed seems to Gregory of Nyssa himself one of the essential
elements of the human soul. He borrows from the naturalists many
principles of distinction between classes of souls and lives: he
insists incessantly on the intimate connexion between the physical
growth and the development of the reason, and on the correlation
between the one and the other: and we arrive at the conclusion that man
in his eyes, as in Clement's, was not originally perfect, except in
possibility; that being at once reasoning and sentient he must perforce
feel within himself the struggle of reason and passion, and that it was
inevitable that sin should enter into the world: it was a consequence
of his mixed nature. This mixed nature of the first man was transmitted
to his descendants. Here, though he stands apart from Origen on the
question of man's original perfection, he could not have accepted the
whole Augustinian scheme of original sin: and Grace as the remedy with
him consists rather in the purging this mixed nature, than in the
introduction into it of something absolutely foreign. The result, as
with all the Greek Fathers, will depend on the co-operation of the free
agent in this remedial work. Predestination and the `bad will' are
excluded by the Possibility and the `free will' of Origen and Gregory.
__________________________________________________________________

[22] Cf. Dallaeus, de poenis et satisfactionibus, I. IV. c. 7, p. 368.

[23] Cf. De An. et Resurr., 227 C.D.

[24] Collected by Ceillier in his Introduction (Paris, 1860).

[25] Bunsen.

[26] c. Cels. VI. 64.

[27] In Joann., tom. 32, 18.

[28] Comment. in Rom. ii. 9, p. 486.

[29] De Hom. Op. c. viii.; De An. et Resurr. 205.

[30] De Hom. Op. c. viii.

[31] He does so De Principiis I. praef. 5. C. Cels. II. 77, VIII. 49
sq.

[32] De Anim. et Resurrectione, p. 198, 199, 213 sq.

[33] Oratio Cat. 55 A.

[34] Orig. II. 314 sq.

[35] This is an independent division to that mentioned above.

[36] De la Philosophie D'Origene (Paris, 1884).

[37] De eo quod immut., p. 30.

[38] See De iis qui praemature abripiuntur, p. 231, quoted above, p. 4.
__________________________________________________________________

Chapter IV.--His Teaching on the Holy Trinity.

To estimate the exact value of the work done by S. Gregory in the
establishment of the doctrine of the Trinity and in the determination,
so far as Eastern Christendom is concerned, of the terminology employed
for the expression of that doctrine, is a task which can hardly be
satisfactorily carried out. His teaching on the subject is so closely
bound up with that of his brother, S. Basil of Caesarea,--his "master,"
to use his own phrase,--that the two can hardly be separated with any
certainty. Where a disciple, carrying on the teaching he has himself
received from another, with perhaps almost imperceptible variations of
expression, has extended the influence of that teaching and
strengthened its hold on the minds of men, it must always be a matter
of some difficulty to discriminate accurately between the services
which the two have rendered to their common cause, and to say how far
the result attained is due to the earlier, how far to the later
presentment of the doctrine. But the task of so discriminating between
the work of S. Basil and that of S. Gregory is rendered yet more
complicated by the uncertainty attaching to the authorship of
particular treatises which have been claimed for both. If, for
instance, we could with certainty assign to S. Gregory that treatise on
the terms ousia and hupostasis, which Dorner treats as one of the works
by which he "contributed materially to fix the uncertain usage of the
Church [39] ," but which is found also among the works of S. Basil in
the form of a letter addressed to S. Gregory himself, we should be able
to estimate the nature and the extent of the influence of the Bishop of
Nyssa much more definitely than we can possibly do while the authorship
of this treatise remains uncertain. Nor does this document stand alone
in this respect, although it is perhaps of more importance for the
determination of such a question than any other of the disputed
treatises. Thus in the absence of certainty as to the precise extent to
which S. Gregory's teaching was directly indebted to that of his
brother, it seems impossible to say how far the "fixing of the
uncertain usage of the Church" was due to either of them singly. That
together they did contribute very largely to that result is beyond
question: and it is perhaps superfluous to endeavour to separate their
contributions, especially as there can be little doubt that S. Gregory
at least conceived himself to be in agreement with S. Basil upon all
important points, if not to be acting simply as the mouth-piece of his
"master's" teaching, and as the defender of the statements which his
"master" had set forth against possible misconceptions of their
meaning. Some points, indeed, there clearly were, in which S. Gregory's
presentment of the doctrine differs from that of S. Basil; but to these
it may be better to revert at a later stage, after considering the more
striking variation which their teaching displays from the language of
the earlier Nicene school as represented by S. Athanasius.

The council held at Alexandria in the year 362, during the brief
restoration of S. Athanasius, shows us at once the point of contrast
and the substantial agreement between the Western school, with which S.
Athanasius himself is in this matter to be reckoned, and the Eastern
theologians to whom has been given the title of "Neo-Nicene." The
question at issue was one of language, not of belief; it turned upon
the sense to be attached to the word hupostasis. The Easterns,
following a use of the term which may be traced perhaps to the
influence of Origen, employed the word in the sense of the Latin
"Persona," and spoke of the Three Persons as treis hupostaseis, whereas
the Latins employed the term "hypostasis" as equivalent to
"sub-stantia," to express what the Greeks called ousia,--the one
Godhead of the Three Persons. With the Latins agreed the older school
of the orthodox Greek theologians, who applied to the Three Persons the
phrase tria prosopa, speaking of the Godhead as mia hupostasis. This
phrase, in the eyes of the newer Nicene school, was suspected of
Sabellianism [40] , while on the other hand the Westerns were inclined
to regard the Eastern phrase treis hupostaseis as implying tritheism.
The synodal letter sets forth to us the means by which the fact of
substantial agreement between the two schools was brought to light, and
the understanding arrived at, that while Arianism on the one hand and
Sabellianism on the other were to be condemned, it was advisable to be
content with the language of the Nicene formula, which employed neither
the phrase mia hupostasis nor the phrase treis hupostaseis [41] . This
resolution, prudent as it may have been for the purpose of bringing
together those who were in real agreement, and of securing that the
reconciled parties should, at a critical moment, present an unbroken
front in the face of their common and still dangerous enemy, could
hardly be long maintained. The expression treis hupostaseis was one to
which many of the orthodox, including those who had formerly belonged
to the Semi-Arian section, had become accustomed: the Alexandrine
synod, under the guidance of S. Athanasius, had acknowledged the
phrase, as used by them, to be an orthodox one, and S. Basil, in his
efforts to conciliate the Semi-Arian party, with which he had himself
been closely connected through his namesake of Ancyra and through
Eustathius of Sebastia, saw fit definitely to adopt it. While S.
Athanasius, on the one hand, using the older terminology, says that
hupostasis is equivalent to ousia, and has no other meaning [42] , S.
Basil, on the other hand, goes so far as to say that the terms ousia
and hupostasis, even in the Nicene anathema, are not to be understood
as equivalent [43] . The adoption of the new phrase, even after the
explanations given at Alexandria, was found to require, in order to
avoid misconstruction, a more precise definition of its meaning, and a
formal defence of its orthodoxy. And herein consisted one principal
service rendered by S. Basil and S. Gregory; while with more precise
definition of the term hupostasis there emerged, it may be, a more
precise view of the relations of the Persons, and with the defence of
the new phrase as expressive of the Trinity of Persons a more precise
view of what is implied in the Unity of the Godhead.

The treatise, De Sancta Trinitate is one of those which are attributed
by some to S. Basil, by others to S. Gregory: but for the purpose of
showing the difficulties with which they had to deal, the question of
its exact authorship is unimportant. [44] The most obvious objection
alleged against their teaching was that which had troubled the Western
theologians before the Alexandrine Council,--the objection that the
acknowledgment of Three Persons implied a belief in Three Gods. To meet
this, there was required a statement of the meaning of the term
hupostasis, and of the relation of ousia to hupostasis. Another
objection, urged apparently by the same party as the former, was
directed against the "novelty," or inconsistency, of employing in the
singular terms expressive of the Divine Nature such as "goodness" or
"Godhead," while asserting that the Godhead exists in plurality of
Persons [45] . To meet this, it was required that the sense in which
the Unity of the Godhead was maintained should be more plainly and
clearly defined.

The position taken by S. Basil with regard to the terms ousia and
hupostasis is very concisely stated in his letter to Terentius [46] .
He says that the Western theologians themselves acknowledge that a
distinction does exist between the two terms: and he briefly sets forth
his view of the nature of that distinction by saying that ousia is to
hupostasis as that which is common to individuals is to that in respect
of which the individuals are naturally differentiated. He illustrates
this statement by the remark that each individual man has his being to
koino tes ousias logo, while he is differentiated as an individual man
in virtue of his own particular attributes. So in the Trinity that
which constitutes the ousia (be it "goodness" or be it "Godhead") is
common, while the hupostasis is marked by the Personal attribute of
Fatherhood or Sonship or Sanctifying Power [47] . This position is also
adopted and set forth in greater detail in the treatise, De Diff.
Essen. et Hypost. [48] , already referred to, where we find once more
the illustration employed in the Epistle to Terentius. The Nature of
the Father is beyond our comprehension; but whatever conception we are
able to form of that Nature, we must consider it to be common also to
the Son and to the Holy Spirit: so far as the ousia is concerned,
whatever is predicated of any one of the Persons may be predicated
equally of each of the Three Persons, just as the properties of man,
qua man, belong alike to Paul and Barnabas and Timothy: and as these
individual men are differentiated by their own particular attributes,
so each Person of the Trinity is distinguished by a certain attribute
from the other two Persons. This way of putting the case naturally
leads to the question, "If you say, as you do say, that Paul and
Barnabas and Timothy are `three men,' why do you not say that the Three
Persons are `three Gods?'" Whether the question was presented in this
shape to S. Basil we cannot with certainty decide: but we may gather
from his language regarding the applicability of number to the Trinity
what his answer would have been. He [49] says that in acknowledging One
Father, One Son, One Holy Spirit, we do not enumerate them by
computation, but assert the individuality, so to say, of each
hypostasis--its distinctness from the others. He would probably have
replied by saying that strictly speaking we ought to decline applying
to the Deity, considered as Deity, any numerical idea at all, and that
to enumerate the Persons as "three" is a necessity, possibly, imposed
upon us by language, but that no conception of number is really
applicable to the Divine Nature or to the Divine Persons, which
transcend number [50] . To S. Gregory, however, the question did
actually present itself as one demanding an answer, and his reply to it
marks his departure from S. Basil's position, though, if the treatise,
De Diff. Essen. et Hyp. be S. Basil's, S. Gregory was but following out
and defending the view of his "master" as expressed in that treatise.

S. Gregory's reply to the difficulty may be found in the letter, or
short dissertation, addressed to Ablabius (Quod non sunt tres Dei), and
in his treatise peri koinon ennoion. In the latter he lays it down that
the term theos is a term ousias semantikon, not a term prosopon
delotikon: the Godhead of the Father is not that in which He maintains
His differentiation from the Son: the Son is not God because He is Son,
but because His essential Nature is what it is. Accordingly, when we
speak of "God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost," the
word and is employed to conjoin the terms expressive of the Persons,
not the repeated term which is expressive of the Essence, and which
therefore, while applied to each of the Three Persons, yet cannot
properly be employed in the plural. That in the case of three
individual "men" the term expressive of essence is employed in the
plural is due, he says, to the fact that in this case there are
circumstances which excuse or constrain such a use of the term "man"
while such circumstances do not affect the case of the Holy Trinity.
The individuals included under the term "man" vary alike in number and
in identity, and thus we are constrained to speak of "men" as more or
fewer, and in a certain sense to treat the essence as well as the
persons numerically. In the Holy Trinity, on the other hand, the
Persons are always the same, and their number the same. Nor are the
Persons of the Holy Trinity differentiated, like individual men, by
relations of time and place, and the like; the differentiation between
them is based upon a constant causal relation existing among the Three
Persons, which does not affect the unity of the Nature: it does not
express the Being, but the mode of Being [51] . The Father is the
Cause; the Son and the Holy Spirit are differentiated from Him as being
from the Cause, and again differentiated inter se as being immediately
from the Cause, and immediately through that which is from the Cause.
Further, while these reasons may be alleged for holding that the cases
are not in such a sense parallel as to allow that the same conclusion
as to modes of speech should be drawn in both, he urges that the use of
the term "men" in the plural is, strictly speaking, erroneous. We
should, in strictness, speak not of "this or that man," but of "this or
that hypostasis of man"--the "three men" should be described as "three
hypostases" of the common ousia "man." In the treatise addressed to
Ablabius he goes over the same ground, clothing his arguments in a
somewhat less philosophical dress; but he devotes more space to an
examination of the meaning of the term theos, with a view to showing
that it is a term expressive of operation, and thereby of essence, not
a term which may be considered as applicable to any one of the Divine
Persons in any such peculiar sense that it may not equally be applied
also to the other two [52] . His argument is partly based upon an
etymology now discredited, but this does not affect the position he
seeks to establish (a position which is also adopted in the treatise,
De S. Trinitate), that names expressive of the Divine Nature, or of the
Divine operation (by which alone that Nature is known to us) are
employed, and ought to be employed, only in the singular. The unity and
inseparability of all Divine operation, proceeding from the Father,
advancing through the Son, and culminating in the Holy Spirit, yet
setting forth one kinesis of the Divine will, is the reason why the
idea of plurality is not suffered to attach to these names [53] , while
the reason for refusing to allow, in regard to the three Divine
Persons, the same laxity of language which we tolerate in regard to the
case of the three "men," is to be found in the fact that in the latter
case no danger arises from the current abuse of language: no one thinks
of "three human natures;" but on the other hand polytheism is a very
real and serious danger, to which the parallel abuse of language
involved in speaking of "three Gods" would infallibly expose us.

S. Gregory's own doctrine, indeed, has seemed to some critics to be
open to the charge of tritheism. But even if his doctrine were entirely
expressed in the single illustration of which we have spoken, it does
not seem that the charge would hold good, when we consider the light in
which the illustration would present itself to him. The conception of
the unity of human nature is with him a thing intensely vivid: it
underlies much of his system, and he brings it prominently forward more
than once in his more philosophical writings [54] . We cannot, in
fairness, leave his realism out of account when we are estimating the
force of his illustration: and therefore, while admitting that the
illustration was one not unlikely to produce misconceptions of his
teaching, we may fairly acquit him of any personal bias towards
tritheism such as might appear to be involved in the unqualified
adoption of the same illustration by a writer of our own time, or such
as might have been attributed to theologians of the period of S.
Gregory who adopted the illustration without the qualification of a
realism as determined as his own [55] . But the illustration does not
stand alone: we must not consider that it is the only one of those to
be found in the treatise, De Diff. Essen. et Hypost., which he would
have felt justified in employing. Even if the illustration of the
rainbow, set forth in that treatise, was not actually his own (as
Dorner, ascribing the treatise to him, considers it to have been), it
was at all events (on the other theory of the authorship), included in
the teaching he had received from his "master:" it would be present to
his mind, although in his undisputed writings, where he is dealing with
objections brought against the particular illustration from human
relations, he naturally confines himself to the particular illustration
from which an erroneous inference was being drawn. In our estimate of
his teaching the one illustration must be allowed to some extent to
qualify the effect produced by the other. And, further, we must
remember that his argument from human relations is professedly only an
illustration. It points to an analogy, to a resemblance, not to an
identity of relations; so much he is careful in his reply to state.
Even if it were true, he implies, that we are warranted in speaking, in
the given case, of the three human persons as "three men," it would not
follow that we should be warranted thereby in speaking of the three
Divine Persons as "three Gods." For the human personalities stand
contrasted with the Divine, at once as regards their being and as
regards their operation. The various human prosopa draw their being
from many other prosopa, one from one, another from another, not, as
the Divine, from One, unchangeably the same: they operate, each in his
own way, severally and independently, not, as the Divine, inseparably:
they are contemplated each by himself, in his own limited sphere, kat'
idian perigraphen, not, as the Divine, in mutual essential connexion,
differentiated one from the other only by a certain mutual relation.
And from this it follows that the human prosopa are capable of
enumeration in a sense in which number cannot be considered applicable
to the Divine Persons. Here we find S. Gregory's teaching brought once
more into harmony with his "master's:" if he has been willing to carry
the use of numerical terms rather further than S. Basil was prepared to
do, he yet is content in the last resort to say that number is not in
strictness applicable to the Divine hupostaseis, in that they cannot be
contemplated kat' idian perigraphen, and therefore cannot be enumerated
by way of addition. Still the distraction of the hupostaseis remains;
and if there is no other way (as he seems to have considered there was
none), of making full acknowledgment of their distinct though
inseparable existence than to speak of them as "three," he holds that
that use of numerical language is justifiable, so long as we do not
transfer the idea of number from the hupostaseis to the ousia, to that
Nature of God which is Itself beyond our conception, and which we can
only express by terms suggested to us by what we know of Its operation.

Such, in brief, is the teaching of S. Gregory on the doctrine of the
Holy Trinity, as expressed in the treatises in which he developed and
defended those positions in which S. Basil appeared to diverge from the
older Nicene theologians. That the terminology of the subject gained
clearness and definiteness from his exposition, in that he rendered it
plain that the adoption of the Eastern phraseology was a thing
perfectly consistent with the Faith confessed alike by East and West in
varying terms, seems beyond doubt. It was to him, probably, rather than
to S. Basil, that this work was due; for he cleared up the points which
S. Basil's illustration had left doubtful; yet in so doing he was using
throughout the weapons which his "master" had placed in his hands, and
arguing in favour of his "master's" statements, in language, it may be,
less guarded than S. Basil himself would have employed, but in
accordance throughout with the principles which S. Basil had followed.
Each bore his own part in the common work: to one, perhaps, is due the
credit of greater originality; to the other it was given to carry on
and to extend what his brother had begun: neither, we may well believe,
would have desired to claim that the work which their joint teaching
effected should be imputed to himself alone.

So far, we have especially had in view those minor treatises of S.
Gregory which illustrate such variations from Athanasian modes of
expression as are to be found in the writers of the "Neo-Nicene"
school. These are perhaps his most characteristic works upon the
subject. But the doctrine of the Trinity, as he held it, is further set
forth and enforced in other treatises which are, from another point of
view, much more important than those with which we have been
dealing--in his Oratio Catechetica, and his more directly polemical
treatises against Eunomius. In both these sections of his writings,
when allowance is made for the difference of terminology already
discussed, we are less struck by the divergencies from S. Athanasius'
presentment of the doctrine than by the substantial identity of S.
Gregory's reasoning with that of S. Athanasius, as the latter is
displayed, for example, in the "Orations against the Arians."

There are, of course, many points in which S. Gregory falls short of
his great predecessor; but of these some may perhaps be accounted for
by the different aspect of the Arian controversy as it presented itself
to the two champions of the Faith. The later school of Arianism may
indeed be regarded as a perfectly legitimate and rigidly logical
development of the doctrines taught by Arius himself; but in some ways
the task of S. Gregory was a different task from that of S. Athanasius,
and was the less formidable of the two. His antagonist was, by his own
greater definiteness of statement, placed at a disadvantage: the
consequences which S. Athanasius had to extract from the Arian
statements were by Eunomius and the Anomoeans either openly asserted or
tacitly admitted: and it was thus an easier matter for S. Gregory to
show the real tendency of Anomoean doctrine than it had been for S.
Athanasius to point out the real tendency of the earlier Arianism.
Further, it may be said that by the time of S. Basil, still more by the
time when S. Gregory succeeded to his brother's place in the
controversy, the victory over Arianism was assured. It was not possible
for S. Athanasius, even had it been in his nature to do so, to treat
the earlier Arianism with the same sort of contemptuous criticism with
which Eunomius is frequently met by S. Gregory. For S. Gregory, on the
other hand, it was not necessary to refrain from such criticism lest he
should thereby detract from the force of his protest against error. The
crisis in his day was not one which demanded the same sustained effort
for which the contest called in the days of S. Athanasius. Now and
then, certainly, S. Gregory also rises to a white heat of indignation
against his adversary: but it is hardly too much to say that his work
appears to lack just those qualities which seem, in the writings of S.
Athanasius, to have been called forth by the author's sense of the
weight of the force opposed to him, and of the "life and death"
character of the contest. S. Gregory does not under-estimate the
momentous nature of the questions at issue: but when he wrote, he might
feel that to those questions the answer of Christendom had been already
given, that the conflict was already won, and that any attempt at
developing the Arian doctrine on Anomoean lines was the adoption of an
untenable position,--even of a position manifestly and evidently
untenable: the doctrine had but to be stated in clear terms to be
recognized as incompatible with Christianity, and, that fact once
recognized, he had no more to do. Thus much of his treatises against
Eunomius consists not of constructive argument in support of his own
position, but of a detailed examination of Eunomius' own statements,
while a further portion of the contents of these books, by no means
inconsiderable in amount, is devoted not so much to the defence of the
Faith as to the refutation of certain misrepresentations of S. Basil's
arguments which had been set forth by Eunomius.

Even in the more distinctly constructive portion of these polemical
writings, however, it may be said that S. Gregory does not show marked
originality of thought either in his general argument, or in his mode
of handling disputed texts. Within the limits of an introductory essay
like the present, anything like detailed comparison on these points is
of course impossible; but any one who will take the trouble to compare
the discourses of S. Gregory against Eunomius with the "Orations" of S.
Athanasius against the Arians,--the Athanasian writing, perhaps, most
closely corresponding in character to these books of S.
Gregory,--either as regards the specific passages of Scripture cited in
support of the doctrine maintained, and the mode of interpreting them,
or as to the methods of explanation applied to the texts alleged by the
Arian writers in favour of their own opinions, can hardly fail to be
struck by the number and the closeness of the resemblances which he
will be able to trace between the earlier and the later representatives
of the Nicene School. A somewhat similar relation to the Athanasian
position, as regards the basis of belief, and (allowing for the
difference of terminology) as regards the definition of doctrine, may
be observed in the Oratio Catechetica.

Such originality, in fact, as S. Gregory may claim to possess (so far
as his treatment of this subject is concerned) is rather the
originality of the tactician than that of the strategist: he deals
rather with his particular opponent, and keeps in view the particular
point in discussion more than the general area over which the war
extends. S. Athanasius, on the other hand (partly, no doubt, because he
was dealing with a less fully developed form of error), seems to have
more force left in reserve. He presents his arguments in a more concise
form, and is sometimes content to suggest an inference where S. Gregory
proceeds to draw out conclusions in detail, and where thereby the
latter, while possibly strengthening his presentment of the truth as
against his own particular adversary,--against the Anomoean or the
polytheist on the one side, or against the Sabellian or the Judaizer on
the other,--renders his argument, when considered per se as a defence
of the orthodox position, frequently more diffuse and sometimes less
forcible. Yet, even here, originality of a certain kind does belong to
S. Gregory, and it seems only fair to him to say that in these
treatises also he did good service in defence of the Faith touching the
Holy Trinity. He shows that alike by way of formal statement of
doctrine, as in the Oratio Catechetica, and by way of polemical
argument, the forces at the command of the defenders of the Faith could
be organized to meet varied forms of error, without abandoning, either
for a more original theology like that or Marcellus of Ancyra, or for
the compromise which the Homoean or Semi-Arian school were in danger of
being led to accept, the weapons with which S. Athanasius had conquered
at Nicaea.
__________________________________________________________________

[39] See Dorner, Doctrine of the Person of Christ, Div. I. vol. ii. p.
314 (English Trans.).

[40] It is to be noted further that the use of the terms "Persona" and
prosopon by those who avoided the phrase treis hupostaseis no doubt
assisted in the formation of this suspicion. At the same time the
Nicene anathema favoured the sense of hupostasis as equivalent to
ousia, and so appeared to condemn the Eastern use.

[41] S. Athanasius, Tom. ad Antioch, 5.

[42] Ad Afr. Episc. S:4. S. Athanasius, however, does not shrink from
the phrase treis hupostaseis in contradistinction to the mia ousia: see
the treatise, In illud, `Omnia mihi tradita sunt.' S:6.

[43] S. Bas. Ep. 125 (being the confession of faith drawn up by S.
Basil for the subscription of Eustathius).

[44] It appears on the whole more probable that the treatise is the
work of S. Gregory; but it is found, in a slightly different shape,
among the Letters of S. Basil. (Ep. 189 in the Benedictine Edition.)

[45] In what sense this language was charged with "novelty" is not very
clear. But the point of the objection appears to lie in a refusal to
recognize that terms expressive of the Divine Nature, whether they
indicate attributes or operations of that Nature, may be predicated of
each hupostasis severally, as well as of the ousia, without attaching
to the terms themselves that idea of plurality which, so far as they
express attributes or operations of the ousia, must be excluded from
them.

[46] S. Bas. Ep. 214, S:4.

[47] The differentia here assigned to the Third Person is not, in S.
Basil's own view, a differentia at all: for he would no doubt have been
ready to acknowledge that this attribute is common to all Three
Persons. S. Gregory, as it will be seen, treats the question as to the
differentiation of the Persons somewhat differently, and rests his
answer on a basis theologically more scientific.

[48] S. Bas. Ep. 38 (Benedictine Ed.).

[49] De Spir. Sancto, S:18.

[50] On S. Basil's language on this subject, see Dorner, Doctrine of
the Person of Christ, Div. 1. vol. ii. pp. 309-11. (Eng. Trans.)

[51] This statement strikes at the root of the theory held by Eunomius,
as well as by the earlier Arians, that the agennesia of the Father
constituted His Essence. S. Gregory treats His agennesia as that by
which He is distinguished from the other Persons, as an attribute
marking His hypostasis. This subject is treated more fully, with
special reference to the Eunomian view, in the Ref. alt. libri Eunomii.

[52] S. Gregory would apparently extend this argument even to the
operations expressed by the names of "Redeemer," or "Comforter;" though
he would admit that in regard of the mode by which these operations are
applied to man, the names expressive of them are used in a special
sense of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, yet he would argue that in
neither case does the one Person act without the other two.

[53] See Dorner, ut sup., pp. 317-18.

[54] Especially in the treatise, De Anima et Resurrectione, and in that
De Conditione Hominis. A notable instance is to be found in the former
(p. 242 A.).

[55] See Dorner, ut sup., p. 315, and p. 319, note 2.
__________________________________________________________________

Chapter V.--Mss. And Editions.

For the 13 Books Against Eunomius, the text of F. Oehler (S. Greg.
Nyss. Opera. Tom. I. Halis, 1865) has in the following translations
been almost entirely followed.

The 1st Book was not in the 1st Paris Edition in two volumes (1615);
but it was published three years afterwards from the `Bavarian Codex,'
i.e. that of Munich, by J. Gretser in an Appendix, along with the
Summaries (these headings of the sections of the entire work are by
some admirer of Gregory's) and the two introductory Letters. Both the
Summaries and the letters, and also nearly three-quarters of the 1st
Book were obtained from J. Livineius' transcript of the Vatican ms.
made at Rome, 1579. This Appendix was added to the 2nd Paris Edition,
in three volumes (1638).

In correcting these Paris Editions (for mss. of which see below),
Oehler had access, in addition to the identical Munich ms. (paper, 16th
century) which Gretser had used, to the following mss.:--

1. Venice (Library of S. Mark; cotton, 13 Cent., No. 69). This he says
`wonderfully agrees' with the Munich (both, for instance, supply the
lacunae of the Paris Edition of Book I: he concludes, therefore, that
these are not due to Gretser's negligence, who gives the Latin for
these passages, but to that of the printers).

2. Turin (Royal Library; cotton, 14 Cent., No. 71).

3. Milan (Library of S. Ambrose; cotton, 13 Cent., No. 225, Plut. 1;
its inscription says that it was brought from Thessaly).

4. Florence (Library Medic. Laurent.; the oldest of all; parchment, 11
Cent., No. 17, Plut. vi. It contains the Summaries).

These, and the Munich ms., which he chiefly used, are "all of the same
family:" and from them he has been able to supply more than 50 lacunae
in the Books against Eunomius. This family is the first of the two
separated by G. H. Forbes (see below). The Munich ms. (No. 47, on
paper, 16 Cent.), already used by Sifanus for his Latin version (1562),
and by Gretser for his Appendix, has the corrections of the former in
its margin. These passed into the two Paris Editions; which, however,
took no notice of his critical notes. When lent to Sifanus this ms. was
in the Library of J. J. Fugger. Albert V. Duke of Bavaria purchased the
treasures of Greek literature in this library, to found that in Munich.

For the treatise On the Soul and the Resurrection, the Great
Catechetical Oration, and the Funeral Oration on Meletius, John George
Krabinger's text has been adopted. He had mss. `old and of a better
stamp' (Oehler) than were accessible to the Paris editors. Krabinger's
own account of them is this:--

On the Soul. 5 mss. of 16th, 14th, and 11th Cent. All at Munich. In one
of them there are scholia, some imported into the text by J.
Naupliensis Murmureus the copyist; and Sifanus' corrections.

The `Hasselman,' 14th Cent. J. Christopher Wolf, who annotated this
treatise (Aneedota Graeca, Hamburgh, 1722), says of this ms. "very
carefully written." It was lent by Zach. Hasselman, Minister of
Oldenburgh.

The `Uffenbach,' 14th Cent., with var. lect. in margin. Lent to Wolf by
the Polish ambassador at Frankfort on Main, at the request of Zach.
Uffenbach.

Catechetical Oration. 4 mss. of 16th Cent., 1 of 13th Cent., `much
mutilated.' All at Munich.

On Meletius. 2 mss. of 16th Cent., 1 of 10th Cent. All at Munich.

His edition of the former appeared, at Leipzic, 1837; of the two
latter, at Munich, 1838; all with valuable notes.

For the treatise Against Macedonius, the only text available is that of
Cardinal Angelo Mai (Script. Vet. Nova Collectio, Rome, 1833). It is
taken from the Vatican ms. `on silk.' The end of this treatise is not
found in Mai. Perhaps it is in the ms. of Florence.

For fourteen of the Letters, Zacagni (Praefect of the Vatican Library,
1698-1713) is the only editor. His text from the Vatican ms., No. 424,
is printed in his Collectan. Monument. ret. (pp. 354-400), Rome, 1698.

He had not the use of the Medicean ms. which Caraccioli (see below)
testifies to be much superior to the Vatican; there are lacunae in the
latter, however, which Zacagni occasionally fills by a happy guess with
the very words supplied by the Medicean.

For the Letter to Adelphius, and that (on Church Architecture) to
Amphilochius, J. B. Caraccioli (Professor of Philosophy at Pisa)
furnishes a text (Florence, 1731) from the Medicean ms. The Letters in
this collection are seven in all. Of the last of these (including that
to Amphilochius) Bandinus says non sincera fide ex Codice descriptas,
and that a fresh collation is necessary.

For the treatise On the Making of Man, the text employed has been that
of G. H. Forbes, (his first Fasciculus was published in 1855; his
second in 1861; both at Burntisland, at his private press), with an
occasional preference for the readings of one or other of the mss.
examined by him or by others on his behalf. Of these he specifies
twenty: but he had examined a much larger number. The mss. which
contain this work, he considers, are of two families.

Of the first family the most important are three mss. at Vienna, a
tenth-century ms. on vellum at S. Mark's, Venice, which he himself
collated, and a Vatican ms. of the tenth century. This family also
includes three of the four Munich mss. collated for Forbes by
Krabinger.

The other family displays more variations from the current text. One
Vienna ms. "pervetustus" "initio mutilus," was completely collated.
Also belonging to this family are the oldest of the four Munich mss.,
the tenth-century Codex Regius (Paris), and a fourteenth-century ms. at
Christ Church, Oxford, clearly related to the last.

The Codex Baroccianus (Bodleian, perhaps eleventh century) appears to
occupy an independent position.

For the other Treatises and Letters the text of the Paris Edition of
1638 (`plenior et emendatior' than that of 1615, according to Oehler,
probably following its own title, but "much inferior to that of 1615"
Canon Venables, Dict. Christ. Biog., says, and this is the judgment of
J. Fessler) and of Migne have been necessary as the latest complete
editions of the works of Gregory Nyssene. (All the materials that had
been collected for the edition of the Benedictines of St. Maur perished
in the French Revolution.)

Of the two Paris Editions it must be confessed that they are based `for
the most part on inferior mss.' (Oehler.) The frequent lacunae attest
this. Fronto Ducaeus aided Claude, the brother of F. Morel, in settling
the text, and the mss. mentioned in the notes of the former are as
follows:

1. Pithoeus' "not of a very ancient hand," "as like F. Morel's (No. 2.)
as milk to milk" (so speaks John the Franciscan, who emended `from one
corrupt mutilated manuscript,' i.e. the above, the Latin translation of
the Books against Eunomius made by his father N. Gulonius.)

2. F. Morel's. ("Dean of Professors" and Royal Printer.)

3. The Royal (in the Library of Henry II., Paris), on vellum, tenth
century.

4. Canter's ("ingens codex" sent from Antwerp by A. Schott; it had been
written out for T. Canter, Senator of Utrecht).

5. Olivar's. "Multo emendatius" than (2.)

6. J. Vulcobius', Abbot of Belpre.

7. The Vatican. For the treatise On Virginity. (The Paris Editors used
Livineius' Edition, based on (7) and (8).

8. Bricman's (Cologne). For the treatise On Virginity. (The Paris
Editors used Livineius' Edition, based on (7) and (8).

9. OEgidius David's, I.C. Paris. For the treatise On Virginity. (The
Paris Editors used Livineius' Edition, based on (7) and (8).

10. The Bavarian (Munich) for Books II.-XIII. Against Eunomius and
other treatises; only after the first edition of 1615.

Other important mss. existing for treatises here translated are

On Pilgrimages: ms. Caesareus (Vienna): "valde vetustus" (Nessel, on
the Imperial Library), vellum, No. 160, burnt at beginning.

mss. Florence (xx. 17: xvi. 8).

ms. Leyden (not older than fifteenth century).

On the Making of Man:

ms. Augsburgh, with twelve Homilies of Basil, the two last being
wrongly attributed to Gregory (Reizer).

ms. Ambrosian (Milan). See Montfaucon, Bibl. Bibliothec. p. 498.

On Infants' Early Deaths:

ms. Turin (Royal Library).

On the Soul and Resurrection:

mss. Augsburgh, Florence, Turin, Venice.

Great Catechetical:

mss. Augsburgh, Florence, Turin, Caesareus.

Many other mss., for these and other treatises, are given by S. Heyns
(Disputatio de Greg. Nyss. Leyden, 1835). But considering the mutilated
condition of most of the oldest, and the still small number of
treatises edited from an extended collation of these, the complaint is
still true that `the text of hardly any other ancient writer is in a
more imperfect state than that of Gregory of Nyssa.'

Versions of Several Treatises.

Latin.

1. Of Dionysius Exiguus (died before 556): On the Making of Man.
Aldine, 1537. Cologne, 1551. Basle, 1562. Cologne, 1573. Dedicated to
Eugippius.' This Dedication and the Latin of Gregory's Preface was only
once printed (i.e. in J. Mabillon's Analecta, Paris, 1677).

This ancient Latin Version was revised by Fronto Ducaeus, the Jesuit,
and Combeficius. There is a copy of it at Leyden. It stimulated J.
Leuenclaius (see below), who judged it "foeda pollutum barbaria
planeque perversum," to make another. Basle, 1567.

2. Of Daniel Augentius: On the Soul. Paris 1557.

3. Of Laurent. Sifanus, I. U. Doct.: On the Soul and many other
treatises. Basle, 1562 Apud N. Episcopum.

4. Of Pet. Galesinius: On Virginity and On Prayer. Rome, 1563, ap. P.
Manutium.

5. Of Johann. Leuenclaius: On the Making of Man. Basle, 1567, ap.
Oporinum.

6. Of Pet. Morelius, of Tours: Great Catechetical. Paris, 1568.

7. Of Gentianus Hervetus, Canon of Rheims, a diligent translator of the
Fathers: Great Catechetical, and many others. Paris, 1573.

8. Of Johann. Livineius, of Ghent: On Virginity. Apud Plantinum, 1574.

9. Of Pet. Fr. Zinus, Canon of Verona, translator of Euthymius'
Panoplia, which contains the Great Catechetical. Venice, 1575.

10. Of Jacob Gretser, the Jesuit: I. e. Eunom. Paris, 1618.

11. Of Nicolas Gulonius, Reg. Prof. of Greek: II.-XIII. c. Eunom.
Paris, 1615. Revised by his son John, the Franciscan.

12. Of J. Georg. Krabinger, Librarian of Royal Library, Munich: On the
Soul, Great Catechetical, On Infants' Early Deaths, and others.
Leipzic, 1837.

German.

1. Of Glauber: Great Catechetical, &c. Gregorius von Nyssa und
Augustinus ueber den ersten Christlichen Religions-unterricht. Leipzic,
1781.

2. Of Julius Rupp, Koenigsberg: On Meletius. Gregors Leben und
Meinungen. Leipzic, 1834.

3. Of Oehler: Various treatises. Bibliothek der Kirchenvaeter I. Theil.
Leipzic, 1858-59.

4. Herm. Schmidt, paraphrased rather than translated: On the Soul.
Halle, 1864.

5. Of H. Hayd: On Infants' Early Deaths: On the Making of Man, &c.
Kempton, 1874.
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Gregory of Nyssa Against Eunomius.

Letter I.

Gregory to his brother Peter, Bishop of Sebasteia.

Having with difficulty obtained a little leisure, I have been able to
recover from bodily fatigue on my return from Armenia, and to collect
the sheets of my reply to Eunomius which was suggested by your wise
advice; so that my work is now arranged in a complete treatise, which
can be read between covers. However, I have not written against both
his pamphlets [56] ; even the leisure for that was not granted; for the
person who lent me the heretical volume most uncourteously sent for it
again, and allowed me no time either to write it out or to study it. In
the short space of seventeen days it was impossible to be prepared to
answer both his attacks.

Owing to its somehow having become notorious that we had laboured to
answer this blasphemous manifesto, many persons possessing some zeal
for the Truth have importuned me about it: but I have thought it right
to prefer you in your wisdom before them all, to advise me whether to
consign this work to the public, or to take some other course. The
reason why I hesitate is this. When our saintly Basil fell asleep, and
I received the legacy of Eunomius' controversy, when my heart was hot
within me with bereavement, and, besides this deep sorrow for the
common loss of the church, Eunomius had not confined himself to the
various topics which might pass as a defence of his views, but had
spent the chief part of his energy in laboriously-written abuse of our
father in God. I was exasperated with this, and there were passages
where the flame of my heart-felt indignation burst out against this
writer. The public have pardoned us for much else, because we have been
apt in showing patience in meeting lawless attacks, and as far as
possible have practised that restraint in feeling which the saint has
taught us; but I had fears lest from what we have now written against
this opponent the reader should get the idea that we were very raw
controversialists, who lost our temper directly at insolent abuse.
Perhaps, however, this suspicion about us will be disarmed by
remembering that this display of anger is not on our own behalf, but
because of insults levelled against our father in God; and that it is a
case in which mildness would be more unpardonable than anger.

If, then, the first part of my treatise should seem somewhat outside
the controversy, the following explanation of it will, I think, be
accepted by a reader who can judge fairly. It was not right to leave
undefended the reputation of our noble saint, mangled as it was by the
opponent's blasphemies, any more than it was convenient to let this
battle in his behalf be spread diffusely along the whole thread of the
discussion; besides, if any one reflects, these pages do really form
part of the controversy. Our adversary's treatise has two separate
arms, viz. to abuse us and to controvert sound doctrine; and therefore
ours too must show a double front. But for the sake of clearness, and
in order that the thread of the discussion upon matters of the Faith
should not be cut by parentheses, consisting of answers to their
personal abuse, we have separated our work into two parts, and devoted
ourselves in the first to refute these charges: and then we have
grappled as best we might with that which they have advanced against
the Faith. Our treatise also contains, in addition to a refutation of
their heretical views, a dogmatic exposition of our own teaching; for
it would be a most shameful want of spirit, when our foes make no
concealment of their blasphemy, not to be bold in our statement of the
Truth.
__________________________________________________________________

[56] both his pamphlets. The `sheets' which Gregory says that he has
collected are the 12 Books that follow. They are written in reply to
Eunomius' pamphlet, `Apologia Apologiae,' itself a reply to Basil's
Refutation. The other pamphlet of Eunomius seems to have come out
during the composition of Gregory's 12 Books: and was afterwards
answered by the latter in a second 12th Book, but not now, because of
the shortness of the time in which he had a copy of the `heretical
volume' in his hands. The two last books of the five which go under the
title of Basil's Refutation are considered on good grounds to have been
Gregory's, and to have formed that short reply to Eunomius which he
read, at the Council of Constantinople, to Gregory of Nazianzen and
Jerome (d. vir. illust. c. 128). Then he worked upon this longer reply.
Thus there were in all three works of Gregory corresponding to the
three attacks of Eunomius upon the Trinity.
__________________________________________________________________

Letter II.

To his most pious brother Gregory. Peter greeting in the Lord.

Having met with the writings of your holiness and having perceived in
your tract against this heresy your zeal both for the truth and for our
sainted father in God, I judge that this work was not due simply to
your own ability, but was that of one who studied that the Truth should
speak, even in the publication of his own views. To the Holy Spirit of
truth I would refer this plea for the truth; just as to the father of
lies, and not to Eunomius, should be referred this animosity against
sound faith. Indeed, that murderer from the beginning who speaks in
Eunomius has carefully whetted the sword against himself; for if he had
not been so bold against the truth, no one would have roused you to
undertake the cause of our religion. But to the end that the rottenness
and flimsiness of their doctrines may be exposed, He who "taketh the
wise in their own craftiness" hath allowed them both to be headstrong
against the truth, and to have laboured vainly on this vain speech.

But since he that hath begun a good work will finish it, faint not in
furthering the Spirit's power, nor leave half-won the victory over the
assailants of Christ's glory; but imitate thy true father who, like the
zealot Phineas, pierced with one stroke of his Answer both master and
pupil. Plunge with thy intellectual arm the sword of the Spirit through
both these heretical pamphlets, lest, though broken on the head, the
serpent affright the simpler sort by still quivering in the tail. When
the first arguments have been answered, should the last remain
unnoticed, the many will suspect that they still retain some strength
against the truth.

The feeling shewn in your treatise will be grateful, as salt, to the
palate of the soul. As bread cannot be eaten, according to Job, without
salt, so the discourse which is not savoured with the inmost sentiments
of God's word will never wake, and never move, desire.

Be strong, then, in the thought that thou art a beautiful example to
succeeding times of the way in which good-hearted children should act
towards their virtuous fathers.
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Book I. [57]

S:1. Preface.--It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not
accept help.

It seems that the wish to benefit all, and to lavish indiscriminately
upon the first comer one's own gifts, was not a thing altogether
commendable, or even free from reproach in the eyes of the many; seeing
that the gratuitous waste of many prepared drugs on the
incurably-diseased produces no result worth caring about, either in the
way of gain to the recipient, or reputation to the would-be benefactor.
Rather such an attempt becomes in many cases the occasion of a change
for the worse. The hopelessly-diseased and now dying patient receives
only a speedier end from the more active medicines; the fierce
unreasonable temper is only made worse by the kindness of the lavished
pearls, as the Gospel tells us. I think it best, therefore, in
accordance with the Divine command, for any one to separate the
valuable from the worthless when either have to be given away, and to
avoid the pain which a generous giver must receive from one who `treads
upon his pearl,' and insults him by his utter want of feeling for its
beauty.

This thought suggests itself when I think of one who freely
communicated to others the beauties of his own soul, I mean that man of
God, that mouth of piety, Basil; one who from the abundance of his
spiritual treasures poured his grace of wisdom into evil souls whom he
had never tested, and into one among them, Eunomius, who was perfectly
insensible to all the efforts made for his good. Pitiable indeed seemed
the condition of this poor man, from the extreme weakness of his soul
in the matter of the Faith, to all true members of the Church; for who
is so wanting in feeling as not to pity, at least, a perishing soul?
But Basil alone, from the abiding [58] ardour of his love, was moved to
undertake his cure, and therein to attempt impossibilities; he alone
took so much to heart the man's desperate condition, as to compose, as
an antidote of deadly poisons, his refutation of this heresy [59] ,
which aimed at saving its author, and restoring him to the Church.

He, on the contrary, like one beside himself with fury, resists his
doctor; he fights and struggles; he regards as a bitter foe one who
only put forth his strength to drag him from the abyss of misbelief;
and he does not indulge in this foolish anger only before chance
hearers now and then; he has raised against himself a literary monument
to record this blackness of his bile; and when in long years he got the
requisite amount of leisure, he was travailling over his work during
all that interval with mightier pangs than those of the largest and the
bulkiest beasts; his threats of what was coming were dreadful, whilst
he was still secretly moulding his conception: but when at last and
with great difficulty he brought it to the light, it was a poor little
abortion, quite prematurely born. However, those who share his ruin
nurse it and coddle it; while we, seeking the blessing in the prophet
("Blessed shall he be who shall take thy children, and shall dash them
against the stones [60] ") are only eager, now that it has got into our
hands, to take this puling manifesto and dash it on the rock, as if it
was one of the children of Babylon; and the rock must be Christ; in
other words, the enunciation of the truth. Only may that power come
upon us which strengthens weakness, through the prayers of him who made
his own strength perfect in bodily weakness [61] .
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[57] This first Book against Eunomius was not in the 1^st Paris Edition
of Gregory's works, 1615; but it was published three years later from
the `Bavarian Codex,' i.e. that of Munich, by J. Gretser, in an
Appendix, along with the Summaries (i.e. the headings of the sections,
which appear to be not Gregory's) and the two Introductory Letters.
These Summaries and the Letters, and nearly three quarters of the 1^st
Book were found in J. Livineius' transcript from the Codex Vaticanus
made 1579, at Rome. This Appendix was added to the 2^nd Paris Edit.
1638. F. Oehler, whose text has been followed throughout, has used for
the 1^st Book the Munich Codex (on paper, xvi^th Cent.); the Venetian
(on cotton, xiii^th Cent.); the Turin (on cotton, xiv^th Cent.), and
the oldest of all, the Florentine (on parchment, xi^th Cent.).

[58] Reading,-- to monimon...epitolmonta. This is the correction of
Oehler for ton monon...epitolmon which the text presents. The Venetian
ms. has epitolmonti

[59] his refutation of this heresy. This is Basil's 'Anatreptikos tou
apologetikou tou duosebous Eunomiou. `Basil,' says Photius, `with
difficulty got hold of Eunomius' book,' perhaps because it was written
originally for a small circle of readers, and was in a highly
scientific form. What happened next may be told in the words of
Claudius Morellius (Prolegomena to Paris Edition of 1615): `When
Basil's first essay against the foetus of Eunomius had been published,
he raised his bruised head like a trodden worm, seized his pen, and
began to rave more poisonously still as well against Basil as the
orthodox faith.' This was Eunomius' `Apologia Apologiae:' of it Photius
says, `His reply to Basil was composed for many Olympiads while shut up
in his cell. This, like another Saturn, he concealed from the eyes of
Basil till it had grown up, i.e. he concealed it, by devouring it, as
long as Basil lived.' He then goes on to say that after Basil's death,
Theodore (of Mopsuestia), Gregory of Nyssa, and Sophronius found it and
dealt with it, though even then Eunomius had only ventured to show it
to some of his friends. Philostorgius, the ardent admirer of Eunomius,
makes the amazing statement that Basil died of despair after reading
it.

[60] Psalm cxxxvii. 9.

[61] `He asks for the intercession of Saint Paul' (Paris Edit. in
marg.).
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S:2. We have been justly provoked to make this Answer, being stung by
Eunomius' accusations of our brother.

If indeed that godlike and saintly soul were still in the flesh looking
out upon human affairs, if those lofty tones were still heard with all
their peculiar [62] grace and all their resistless utterance, who could
arrive at such a pitch of audacity, as to attempt to speak one word
upon this subject? that divine trumpet-voice would drown any word that
could be uttered. But all of him has now flown back to God; at first
indeed in the slight shadowy phantom of his body, he still rested on
the earth; but now he has quite shed even that unsubstantial form, and
bequeathed it to this world. Meantime the drones are buzzing round the
cells of the Word, and are plundering the honey; so let no one accuse
me of mere audacity for rising up to speak instead of those silent
lips. I have not accepted this laborious task from any consciousness in
myself of powers of argument superior to the others who might be named;
I, if any, have the means of knowing that there are thousands in the
Church who are strong in the gift of philosophic skill. Nevertheless I
affirm that, both by the written and the natural law, to me more
especially belongs this heritage of the departed, and therefore I
myself, in preference to others, appropriate the legacy of the
controversy. I may be counted amongst the least of those who are
enlisted in the Church of God, but still I am not too weak to stand out
as her champion against one who has broken with that Church. The very
smallest member of a vigorous body would, by virtue of the unity of its
life with the whole, be found stronger than one that had been cut away
and was dying, however large the latter and small the former.
__________________________________________________________________

[62] apoklerotheisan. This is probably the meaning, after the analogy
of apoklerosis, in the sense (most frequent in Origen), of `favour,'
`partiality,' passing into that of `caprice,' `arbitrariness,' cf.
below, cap. 9, tis he apoklerosis, k.t.l. `How arbitrarily he praises
himself.'
__________________________________________________________________

S:3. We see nothing remarkable in logical force in the treatise of
Eunomius, and so embark on our Answer with a just confidence.

Let no one think, that in saying this I exaggerate and make an idle
boast of doing something which is beyond my strength. I shall not be
led by any boyish ambition to descend to his vulgar level in a contest
of mere arguments and phrases. Where victory is a useless and
profitless thing, we yield it readily to those who wish to win;
besides, we have only to look at this man's long practice in
controversy, to conclude that he is quite a word-practitioner, and, in
addition, at the fact that he has spent no small portion of his life on
the composition of this treatise, and at the supreme joy of his
intimates over these labours, to conclude that he has taken particular
trouble with this work. It was not improbable that one who had laboured
at it for so many Olympiads would produce something better than the
work of extempore scribblers. Even the vulgar profusion of the figures
he uses in concocting his work is a further indication of this
laborious care in writing [63] . He has got a great mass of newly
assorted terms, for which he has put certain other books under
contribution, and he piles this immense congeries of words on a very
slender nucleus of thought; and so he has elaborated this
highly-wrought production, which his pupils in error are lost in the
admiration of;--no doubt, because their deadness on the vital points
deprives them of the power of feeling the distinction between beauty
and the reverse:--but which is ridiculous, and of no value at all in
the judgment of those, whose hearts' insight is not dimmed with any
soil of unbelief. How in the world can it contribute to the proof (as
he hopes) of what he says and the establishment of the truth of his
speculations, to adopt these absurd devices in his forms of speech,
this new-fangled and peculiar arrangement, this fussy conceit, and this
conceited fussiness, which works with no enthusiasm for any previous
model? For it would be indeed difficult to discover who amongst all
those who have been celebrated for their eloquence he has had his eye
on, in bringing himself to this pitch; for he is like those who produce
effects upon the stage, adapting his argument to the tune of his
rhythmical phrases, as they their song to their castenets, by means of
parallel sentences of equal length, of similar sound and similar
ending. Such, amongst many other faults, are the nerveless quaverings
and the meretricious tricks of his Introduction; and one might fancy
him bringing them all out, not with an unimpassioned action, but with
stamping of the feet and sharp snapping of the fingers declaiming to
the time thus beaten, and then remarking that there was no need of
other arguments and a second performance after that.
__________________________________________________________________

[63] Photius reports very much the same as to his style, i.e. he shows
a `prodigious ostentation:' uses `words difficult to pronounce, and
abounding in many consonants, and that in a poetic, or rather a
dithyrambic style:' he has `periods inordinately long:' he is
`obscure,' and seeks `to hide by this very obscurity whatever is weak
in his perceptions and conceptions, which indeed is often.' He `attacks
others for their logic, and is very fond of using logic himself:' but
`as he had taken up this science late in life, and had not gone very
deeply into it, he is often found making mistakes.' The book of
Eunomius which Photius had read is still extant: it is his
`Apologeticus' in 28 sections, and has been published by Canisius
(Lectiones Antiquae, I. 172 ff.). His ektheois tes tisteos, presented
to the emperor Theodosius in the year 383, is also extant. This last is
found in the Codex Theodosius and in the mss. which Livineius of Ghent
used for his Greek and Latin edition of Gregory, 1574: it follows the
Books against Eunomius. His `Apologia Apologiae,' which he wrote in
answer to Basil's 5 (or 3) books against him, is not extant: nor the
deuteros logos which Gregory answered in his second 12th Book. Most of
the quotations, then, from Eunomius, in these books of Gregory cannot
be verified, in the case of a doubtful reading, &c.
__________________________________________________________________

S:4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little
seriousness about vital points.

In these and such like antics I allow him to have the advantage; and to
his heart's content he may revel in his victory there. Most willingly I
forego such a competition, which can attract those only who seek
renown; if indeed any renown comes from indulging in such methods of
argumentation, considering that Paul [64] , that genuine minister of
the Word, whose only ornament was truth, both disdained himself to
lower his style to such prettinesses, and instructs us also, in a noble
and appropriate exhortation, to fix our attention on truth alone. What
need indeed for one who is fair in the beauty of truth to drag in the
paraphernalia of a decorator for the production of a false artificial
beauty? Perhaps for those who do not possess truth it may be an
advantage to varnish their falsehoods with an attractive style, and to
rub into the grain of their argument a curious polish. When their error
is taught in far-fetched language and decked out with all the
affectations of style, they have a chance of being plausible and
accepted by their hearers. But those whose only aim is simple truth,
unadulterated by any misguiding foil, find the light of a natural
beauty emitted from their words.

But now that I am about to begin the examination of all that he has
advanced, I feel the same difficulty as a farmer does, when the air is
calm; I know not how to separate his wheat from his chaff; the waste,
in fact, and the chaff in this pile of words is so enormous, that it
makes one think that the residue of facts and real thoughts in all that
he has said is almost nil. It would be the worse for speed and very
irksome, it would even be beside our object, to go into the whole of
his remarks in detail; we have not the means for securing so much
leisure so as wantonly to devote it to such frivolities; it is the
duty, I think, of a prudent workman not to waste his strength on
trifles, but on that which will clearly repay his toil.

As to all the things, then, in his Introduction, how he constitutes
himself truth's champion, and fixes the charge of unbelief upon his
opponents, and declares that an abiding and indelible hatred for them
has sunk into his soul, how he struts in his `new discoveries,' though
he does not tell us what they are, but says only that an examination of
the debateable points in them was set on foot, a certain `legal' trial
which placed on those who were daring to act illegally the necessity of
keeping quiet, or to quote his own words in that Lydian style of
singing which he has got, "the bold law-breakers--in open courts--were
forced to be quiet;" (he calls this a "proscription" of the conspiracy
against him, whatever may be meant by that term);--all this wearisome
business I pass by as quite unimportant. On the other hand, all his
special pleading for his heretical conceits may well demand our close
attention. Our own interpreter of the principles of divinity followed
this course in his Treatise; for though he had plenty of ability to
broaden out his argument, he took the line of dealing only with vital
points, which he selected from all the blasphemies of that heretical
book [65] , and so narrowed the scope of the subject.

If, however, any one desires that our answer should exactly correspond
to the array of his arguments, let him tell us the utility of such a
process. What gain would it be to my readers if I were to solve the
complicated riddle of his title, which he proposes to us at the very
commencement, in the manner of the sphinx of the tragic stage; namely
this `New Apology for the Apology,' and all the nonsense which he
writes about that; and if I were to tell the long tale of what he
dreamt? I think that the reader is sufficiently wearied with the petty
vanity about this newness in his title already preserved in Eunomius'
own text, and with the want of taste displayed there in the account of
his own exploits, all his labours and his trials, while he wandered
over every land and every sea, and was `heralded' through the whole
world. If all that had to be written down over again,--and with
additions, too, as the refutations of these falsehoods would naturally
have to expand their statement,--who would be found of such an iron
hardness as not to be sickened at this waste of labour? Suppose I was
to write down, taking word by word, an explanation of that mad story of
his; suppose I were to explain, for instance, who that Armenian was on
the shores of the Euxine, who had annoyed him at first by having the
same name as himself, what their lives were like, what their pursuits,
how he had a quarrel with that Armenian because of the very likeness of
their characters, then in what fashion those two were reconciled, so as
to join in a common sympathy with that winning and most glorious
Aetius, his master (for so pompous are his praises); and after that,
what was the plot devised against himself, by which they brought him to
trial on the charge of being surpassingly popular: suppose, I say, I
was to explain all that, should I not appear, like those who catch
opthalmia themselves from frequent contact with those who are already
suffering so, to have caught myself this malady of fussy
circumstantiality? I should be following step by step each detail of
his twaddling story; finding out who the "slaves released to liberty"
were, what was "the conspiracy [66] of the initiated" and "the calling
out [67] of hired slaves," what `Montius and Gallus, and Domitian,' and
`false witnesses,' and `an enraged Emperor,' and `certain sent into
exile' have to do with the argument. What could be more useless than
such tales for the purpose of one who was not wishing merely to write a
narrative, but to refute the argument of him who had written against
his heresy? What follows in the story is still more profitless; I do
not think that the author himself could peruse it again without
yawning, though a strong natural affection for his offspring does
possess every father. He pretends to unfold there his exploits and his
sufferings; the style rears itself into the sublime, and the legend
swells into the tones of tragedy.
__________________________________________________________________

[64] Cf. 1 Corinth. ii. 1-8.

[65] that heretical book, i.e. the first `Apology' of Eunomius in 28
parts: a translation of it is given in Whiston's Eunomianismus
Redivivus.

[66] schesin.

[67] taxin. We have no context to explain these allusions, the treatise
of Eunomius being lost, which Gregory is now answering, i.e. the
Apologia Apologiae.
__________________________________________________________________

S:5. His peculiar caricature of the bishops, Eustathius of Armenia and
Basil of Galatia, is not well drawn.

But, not to linger longer on these absurdities in the very act of
declining to mention them, and not to soil this book by forcing my
subject through all his written reminiscences, like one who urges his
horse through a slough and so gets covered with its filth, I think it
is best to leap over the mass of his rubbish with as high and as speedy
a jump as my thoughts are capable of, seeing that a quick retreat from
what is disgusting is a considerable advantage; and let us hasten on
[68] to the finale of his story, lest the bitterness of his own words
should trickle into my book. Let Eunomius have the monopoly of the bad
taste in such words as these, spoken of God's priests [69] ,
"curmudgeon squires, and beadles, and satellites, rummaging about, and
not suffering the fugitive to carry on his concealment," and all the
other things which he is not ashamed to write of grey-haired priests.
Just as in the schools for secular learning [70] , in order to exercise
the boys to be ready in word and wit, they propose themes for
declamation, in which the person who is the subject of them is
nameless, so does Eunomius make an onset at once upon the facts
suggested, and lets loose the tongue of invective, and without saying
one word as to any actual villainies, he merely works up against them
all the hackneyed phrases of contempt, and every imaginable term of
abuse: in which, besides, incongruous ideas are brought together, such
as a `dilettante soldier,' `an accursed saint,' `pale with fast, and
murderous with hate,' and many such like scurrilities; and just like a
reveller in the secular processions shouts his ribaldry, when he would
carry his insolence to the highest pitch, without his mask on, so does
Eunomius, without an attempt to veil his malignity, shout with brazen
throat the language of the waggon. Then he reveals the cause why he is
so enraged; `these priests took every precaution that many should not'
be perverted to the error of these heretics; accordingly he is angry
that they could not stay at their convenience in the places they liked,
but that a residence was assigned them by order of the then governor of
Phrygia, so that most might be secured from such wicked neighbours; his
indignation at this bursts out in these words; `the excessive severity
of our trials,' `our grievous sufferings,' `our noble endurance of
them,' `the exile from our native country into Phrygia.' Quite so: this
Oltiserian [71] might well be proud of what occurred, putting an end as
it did to all his family pride, and casting such a slur upon his race
that that far-renowned Priscus, his grandfather, from whom he gets
those brilliant and most remarkable heirlooms, "the mill, and the
leather, and the slaves' stores," and the rest of his inheritance in
Chanaan [72] , would never have chosen this lot, which now makes him so
angry. It was to be expected that he would revile those who were the
agents of this exile. I quite understand his feeling. Truly the authors
of these misfortunes, if such there be or ever have been, deserve the
censures of these men, in that the renown of their former lives is
thereby obscured, and they are deprived of the opportunity of
mentioning and making much of their more impressive antecedents; the
great distinctions with which each started in life; the professions
they inherited from their fathers; the greater or the smaller marks of
gentility of which each was conscious, even before they became so
widely known and valued that even emperors numbered them amongst their
acquaintance, as he now boasts in his book, and that all the higher
governments were roused about them and the world was filled with their
doings.
__________________________________________________________________

[68] Reading pros te to peras.

[69] This must be the `caricature' of the (Greek) Summary above.
Eustathius of Sebasteia, the capital of Armenia, and the Galatian
Basil, of Ancyra (Angora), are certainly mentioned, c. 6 (end). Twice
did these two, once Semi-Arians, oppose Aetius and Eunomius, before
Constantius, at Byzantium. On the second occasion, however (Sozomen, H.
E. iv. 23, Ursacius and Valens arrived with the proscription of the
Homoousion from Ariminum: it was then that "the world groaned to find
itself Arian" (Jerome). The `accursed saint' `pale with fast,' i.e.
Eustathius, in his Armenian monastery, gave Basil the Great a model for
his own.

[70] ton exothen logon.

[71] Oltiseris was probably the district, as Corniaspa was the village,
in which Eunomius was born. It is a Celtic word: and probably suggests
his half-Galatian extraction.

[72] This can be no other than the district Chammanene, on the east
bank of the Halys, where Galatia and Cappadocia join.
__________________________________________________________________

S:6. A notice of Aetius, Eunomius' master in heresy, and of Eunomius
himself, describing the origin and avocations of each.

Verily this did great damage to our declamation-writer, or rather to
his patron and guide in life, Aetius; whose enthusiasm indeed appears
to me to have aimed not so much at the propagation of error as to the
securing a competence for life. I do not say this as a mere surmise of
my own, but I have heard it from the lips of those who knew him well. I
have listened to Athanasius, the former bishop of the Galatians, when
he was speaking of the life of Aetius; Athanasius was a man who valued
truth above all things; and he exhibited also the letter of George of
Laodicaea, so that a number might attest the truth of his words. He
told us that originally Aetius did not attempt to teach his monstrous
doctrines, but only after some interval of time put forth these
novelties as a trick to gain his livelihood; that having escaped from
serfdom in the vineyard to which he belonged,--how, I do not wish to
say, lest I should be thought to be entering on his history in a bad
spirit,--he became at first a tinker, and had this grimy trade of a
mechanic quite at his fingers' end, sitting under a goat's-hair tent,
with a small hammer, and a diminutive anvil, and so earned a precarious
and laborious livelihood. What income, indeed, of any account could be
made by one who mends the shaky places in coppers, and solders holes
up, and hammers sheets of tin to pieces, and clamps with lead the legs
of pots? We were told that a certain incident which befell him in this
trade necessitated the next change in his life. He had received from a
woman belonging to a regiment a gold ornament, a necklace or a
bracelet, which had been broken by a blow, and which he was to mend:
but he cheated the poor creature, by appropriating her gold trinket,
and giving her instead one of copper, of the same size, and also of the
same appearance, owing to a gold-wash which he had imparted to its
surface; she was deceived by this for a time, for he was clever enough
in the tinker's, as in other, arts to mislead his customers with the
tricks of trade; but at last she detected the rascality, for the wash
got rubbed off the copper; and, as some of the soldiers of her family
and nation were roused to indignation, she prosecuted the purloiner of
her ornament. After this attempt he of course underwent a cheating
thief's punishment; and then left the trade, swearing that it was not
his deliberate intention, but that business tempted him to commit this
theft. After this he became assistant to a certain doctor from amongst
the quacks, so as not to be quite destitute of a livelihood; and in
this capacity he made his attack upon the obscurer households and on
the most abject of mankind. Wealth came gradually from his plots
against a certain Armenius, who being a foreigner was easily cheated,
and, having been induced to make him his physician, had advanced him
frequent sums of money; and he began to think that serving under others
was beneath him, and wanted to be styled a physician himself.
Henceforth, therefore, he attended medical congresses, and consorting
with the wrangling controversialists there became one of the ranters,
and, just as the scales were turning, always adding his own weight to
the argument, he got to be in no small request with those who would buy
a brazen voice for their party contests.

But although his bread became thereby well buttered he thought he ought
not to remain in such a profession; so he gradually gave up the
medical, after the tinkering. Arius, the enemy of God, had already sown
those wicked tares which bore the Anomaeans as their fruit, and the
schools of medicine resounded then with the disputes about that
question. Accordingly Aetius studied the controversy, and, having laid
a train of syllogisms from what he remembered of Aristotle, he became
notorious for even going beyond Arius, the father of the heresy, in the
novel character of his speculations; or rather he perceived the
consequences of all that Arius had advanced, and so got this character
of a shrewd discoverer of truths not obvious; revealing as he did that
the Created, even from things non-existent, was unlike the Creator who
drew Him out of nothing.

With such propositions he tickled ears that itched for these novelties;
and the Ethiopian Theophilus [73] becomes acquainted with them. Aetius
had already been connected with this man on some business of Gallus;
and now by his help creeps into the palace. After Gallus [74] had
perpetrated the tragedy with regard to Domitian the procurator and
Montius, all the other participators in it naturally shared his ruin;
yet this man escapes, being acquitted from being punished along with
them. After this, when the great Athanasius had been driven by Imperial
command from the Church of Alexandria, and George the Tarbasthenite was
tearing his flock, another change takes place, and Aetius is an
Alexandrian, receiving his full share amongst those who fattened at the
Cappadocian's board; for he had not omitted to practice his flatteries
on George. George was in fact from Chanaan himself, and therefore felt
kindly towards a countryman: indeed he had been for long so possessed
with his perverted opinions as actually to dote upon him, and was prone
to become a godsend for Aetius, whenever he liked.

All this did not escape the notice of his sincere admirer, our
Eunomius. This latter perceived that his natural father--an excellent
man, except that he had such a son--led a very honest and respectable
life certainly, but one of laborious penury and full of countless
toils. (He was one of those farmers who are always bent over the
plough, and spend a world of trouble over their little farm; and in the
winter, when he was secured from agricultural work, he used to carve
out neatly the letters of the alphabet for boys to form syllables with,
winning his bread with the money these sold for.) Seeing all this in
his father's life, he said goodbye to the plough and the mattock and
all the paternal instruments, intending never to drudge himself like
that; then he sets himself to learn Prunicus' skill [75] of short-hand
writing, and having perfected himself in that he entered at first, I
believe, the house of one of his own family, receiving his board for
his services in writing; then, while tutoring the boys of his host, he
rises to the ambition of becoming an orator. I pass over the next
interval, both as to his life in his native country and as to the
things and the company in which he was discovered at Constantinople.

Busied as he was after this `about the cloke and the purse,' he saw it
was all of little avail, and that nothing which he could amass by such
work was adequate to the demands of his ambition. Accordingly he threw
up all other practices, and devoted himself solely to the admiration of
Aetius; not, perhaps, without some calculation that this absorbing
pursuit which he selected might further his own devices for living. In
fact, from the moment he asked for a share in a wisdom so profound, he
toiled not thenceforward, neither did he spin; for he is certainly
clever in what he takes in hand, and knows how to gain the more
emotional portion of mankind. Seeing that human nature, as a rule,
falls an easy prey to pleasure, and that its natural inclination in the
direction of this weakness is very strong, descending from the sterner
heights of conduct to the smooth level of comfort, he becomes with a
view of making the largest number possible of proselytes to his
pernicious opinions very pleasant indeed to those whom he is
initiating; he gets rid of the toilsome steep of virtue altogether,
because it is not a persuasive to accept his secrets. But should any
one have the leisure to inquire what this secret teaching of theirs is,
and what those who have been duped to accept this blighting curse utter
without any reserve, and what in the mysterious ritual of initiation
they are taught by the reverend hierophant, the manner of baptisms [76]
, and the `helps of nature,' and all that, let him question those who
feel no compunction in letting indecencies pass their lips; we shall
keep silent. For not even though we are the accusers should we be
guiltless in mentioning such things, and we have been taught to
reverence purity in word as well as deed, and not to soil our pages
with equivocal stories, even though there be truth in what we say.

But we mention what we then heard (namely that, just as Aristotle's
evil skill supplied Aetius with his impiety, so the simplicity of his
dupes secured a fat living for the well-trained pupil as well as for
the master) for the purpose of asking some questions. What after all
was the great damage done him by Basil on the Euxine, or by Eustathius
in Armenia, to both of whom that long digression in his story harks
back? How did they mar the aim of his life? Did they not rather feed up
his and his companion's freshly acquired fame? Whence came their wide
notoriety, if not through the instrumentality of these men, supposing,
that is, that their accuser is speaking the truth? For the fact that
men, themselves illustrious, as our writer owns, deigned to fight with
those who had as yet found no means of being known naturally gave the
actual start to the ambitious thoughts of those who were to be pitted
against these reputed heroes; and a veil was thereby thrown over their
humble antecedents. They in fact owed their subsequent notoriety to
this,--a thing detestable indeed to a reflecting mind which would never
choose to rest fame upon an evil deed, but the acme of bliss to
characters such as these. They tell of one in the province of Asia,
amongst the obscurest and the basest, who longed to make a name in
Ephesus; some great and brilliant achievement being quite beyond his
powers never even entered his mind; and yet, by hitting upon that which
would most deeply injure the Ephesians, he made his mark deeper than
the heroes of the grandest actions; for there was amongst their public
buildings one noticeable for its peculiar magnificence and costliness;
and he burnt this vast structure to the ground, showing, when men came
to inquire after the perpetration of this villany into its mental
causes, that he dearly prized notoriety, and had devised that the
greatness of the disaster should secure the name of its author being
recorded with it. The secret motive [77] of these two men is the same
thirst for publicity; the only difference is that the amount of
mischief is greater in their case. They are marring, not lifeless
architecture, but the living building of the Church, introducing, for
fire, the slow canker of their teaching. But I will defer the doctrinal
question till the proper time comes.
__________________________________________________________________

[73] Probably the `Indian' Theophilus, who afterwards helped to
organize the Anomoean schism in the reign of Jovian.

[74] Gallus, Caesar 350-354, brother of Julian, not a little influenced
by Aetius, executed by Constantius at Flanon in Dalmatia. During his
short reign at Antioch, Domitian, who was sent to bring him to Italy,
and his quaestor Montius were dragged to death through the streets by
the guards of the young Caesar.

[75] The same phrase occurs again: Refutation of Eunomius' Second
Essay, p. 844: hoi te prounikou sophi& 139; engumnasthentes; ex ekeines
gar dokei moi tes paraskeues ta eiremena proenenochenai; In the last
word there is evidently a pun on prounikou; propheres, in the secondary
sense of `precocious,' is used by Iamblichus and Porphyry, and
prounikos appears to have had the same meaning. We might venture,
therefore, to translate `that knowing trick' of short-hand: but why
Prunicus is personified, if it is personified, as in the Gnostic
Prunicos Sophia, does not appear. See Epiphanius Haeres. 253 for the
feminine Proper name. The other possible explanation is that given in
the margin of the Paris Edition, and is based on Suidas, i.e. Prunici
sunt cursores celeres; hic pro celer scriba. Hesychius also says of the
word; hoi misthou komizontes ta onia apo tes agoras, hous tines
paidarionas kalousin, dromeis, tracheis, oxeis, eukinetoi, gorgoi,
misthotoi. Here such `porter's' skill, easy going and superficial, is
opposed to the more laborious task of tilling the soil.

[76] For the baptisms of Eunomius, compare Epiphanius Haer. 765. Even
Arians who were not Anomoeans he rebaptized. The `helps of nature' may
possibly refer to the `miracles' which Philostorgius ascribes both to
Aetius and Eunomius. Sozomen (vi. 26) says, "Eunomius introduced, it is
said, a mode of discipline contrary to that of the Church, and
endeavoured to disguise the innovation under the cloak of a grave and
severe deportment."...His followers "do not applaud a virtuous course
of life...so much as skill in disputation and the power of triumphing
in debates."

[77] hupothesis.
__________________________________________________________________

S:7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made
was not impeached.

Let us see for a moment now what kind of truth is dealt with by this
man, who in his Introduction complains that it is because of his
telling the truth that he is hated by the unbelievers; we may well make
the way he handles truth outside doctrine teach us a test to apply to
his doctrine itself. "He that is faithful in that which is least is
faithful also in much, and he that is unjust in the least is unjust
also in much." Now, when he is beginning to write this "apology for the
apology" (that is the new and startling title, as well as subject, of
his book) he says that we must look for the cause of this very
startling announcement nowhere else but in him who answered that first
treatise of his. That book was entitled an Apology; but being given to
understand by our master-theologian that an apology can only come from
those who have been accused of something, and that if a man writes
merely from his own inclination his production is something else than
an apology, he does not deny--it would be too manifestly absurd-- [78]
that an apology requires a preceding accusation; but he declares that
his `apology' has cleared him from very serious accusations in the
trial which has been instituted against him. How false this is, is
manifest from his own words. He complained that "many heavy sufferings
were inflicted on him by those who had condemned him"; we may read that
in his book.

But how could he have suffered so, if his `apology' cleared him of
these charges? If he successfully adopted an apology to escape from
these, that pathetic complaint of his is a hypocritical pretence; if on
the other hand he really suffered as he says, then, plainly, he
suffered because he did not clear himself by an apology; for every
apology, to be such, has to secure this end, namely, to prevent the
voting power from being misled by any false statements. Surely he will
not now attempt to say that at the time of the trial he produced his
apology, but not being able to win over the jury lost the case to the
prosecution. For he said nothing at the time of the trial `about
producing his apology;' nor was it likely that he would, considering
that he distinctly states in his book that he refused to have anything
to do with those ill-affected and hostile dicasts. "We own," he says,
"that we were condemned by default: there was a packed [79] panel of
evil-disposed persons where a jury ought to have sat." He is very
labored here, and has his attention diverted by his argument, I think,
or he would have noticed that he has tacked on a fine solecism to his
sentence. He affects to be imposingly Attic with his phrase `packed
panel;' but the correct in language use these words, as those familiar
with the forensic vocabulary know, quite differently to our new
Atticist.

A little further on he adds this; "If he thinks that, because I would
have nothing to do with a jury who were really my prosecutors he can
argue away my apology, he must be blind to his own simplicity." When,
then, and before whom did our caustic friend make his apology? He had
demurred to the jury because they were `foes,' and he did not utter one
word about any trial, as he himself insists. See how this strenuous
champion of the true, little by little, passes over to the side of the
false, and, while honouring truth in phrase, combats it in deed. But it
is amusing to see how weak he is even in seconding his own lie. How can
one and the same man have `cleared himself by an apology in the trial
which was instituted against him,' and then have `prudently kept
silence because the court was in the hands of the foe?' Nay, the very
language he uses in the preface to his Apology clearly shows that no
court at all was opened against him. For he does not address his
preface to any definite jury, but to certain unspecified persons who
were living then, or who were afterwards to come into the world; and I
grant that to such an audience there was need of a very vigorous
apology, not indeed in the manner of the one he has actually written,
which requires another still to bolster it up, but a broadly
intelligible one [80] , able to prove this special point, viz., that he
was not in the possession of his usual reason when he wrote this,
wherein he rings [81] the assembly-bell for men who never came, perhaps
never existed, and speaks an apology before an imaginary court, and
begs an imperceptible jury not to let numbers decide between truth and
falsehood, nor to assign the victory to mere quantity. Verily it is
becoming that he should make an apology of that sort to jurymen who are
yet in the loins of their fathers, and to explain to them how he came
to think it right to adopt opinions which contradict universal belief,
and to put more faith in his own mistaken fancies than in those who
throughout the world glorify Christ's name.

Let him write, please, another apology in addition to this second; for
this one is not a correction of mistakes made about him, but rather a
proof of the truth of those charges. Every one knows that a proper
apology aims at disproving a charge; thus a man who is accused of theft
or murder or any other crime either denies the fact altogether, or
transfers the blame to another party, or else, if neither of these is
possible, he appeals to the charity or to the compassion of those who
are to vote upon his sentence. But in his book he neither denies the
charge, nor shifts it on some one else, nor has recourse to an appeal
for mercy, nor promises amendment for the future; but he establishes
the charge against him by an unusually labored demonstration. This
charge, as he himself confesses, really amounted to an indictment for
profanity, nor did it leave the nature of this undefined, but
proclaimed the particular kind; whereas his apology proves this species
of profanity to be a positive duty, and instead of removing the charge
strengthens it. Now, if the tenets of our Faith had been left in any
obscurity, it might have been less hazardous to attempt novelties; but
the teaching of our master-theologian is now firmly fixed in the souls
of the faithful; and so it is a question whether the man who shouts out
contradictions of that about which all equally have made up their minds
is defending himself against the charges made, or is not rather drawing
down upon him the anger of his hearers, and making his accusers still
more bitter. I incline to think the latter. So that if there are, as
our writer tells us, both hearers of his apology and accusers of his
attempts upon the Faith, let him tell us, how those accusers can
possibly compromise [82] the matter now, or what sort of verdict that
jury must return, now that his offence has been already proved by his
own `apology.'
__________________________________________________________________

[78] The me is redundant and owing to ouk.

[79] Eisphresanton. A word used in Aristophanes of `letting into
court,' probably a technical word: it is a manifest derivation from
eisphorein. What the solecism is, is not clear; Gretser thinks that
Eunomius meant it for eispedan

[80] genikes.

[81] sunekrotei. The word has this meaning in Origen. In Philo (de Vita
Mosis, p. 476, l. 48, quoted by Viger.), it has another meaning,
sunekrotoun allos allon, me apokamnein, i.e. `cheered.'

[82] kathuphesousin. This is the reading of the Venetian ms. The word
bears the same forensic sense as the Latin praevaricari. The common
reading is kathubrisousin
__________________________________________________________________

S:8. Facts show that the terms of abuse which he has employed against
Basil are more suitable for himself.

But these remarks are by the way, and come from our not keeping close
to our argument. We had to inquire not how he ought to have made his
apology, but whether he had ever made one at all. But now let us return
to our former position, viz., that he is convicted by his own
statements. This hater of falsehood first of all tells us that he was
condemned because the jury which was assigned him defied the law, and
that he was driven over sea and land and suffered much from the burning
sun and the dust. Then in trying to conceal his falsehood he drives out
one nail with another nail, as the proverb says, and puts one falsehood
right by cancelling it with another. As every one knows as well as he
does that he never uttered one word in court, he declares that he
begged to be let off coming into a hostile court and was condemned by
default. Could there be a plainer case than this of a man contradicting
both the truth and himself? When he is pressed about the title of his
book, he makes his trial the constraining cause of this `apology;' but
when he is pressed with the fact that he spoke not one word to the
jury, he denies that there was any trial and says that he declined [83]
such a jury. See how valiantly this doughty champion of the truth
fights against falsehood! Then he dares to call our mighty Basil `a
malicious rascal and a liar;' and besides that, `a bold ignorant
parvenu [84] ,' `no deep divine,' and he adds to his list of abusive
terms, `stark mad,' scattering an infinity of such words over his
pages, as if he imagined that his own bitter invectives could outweigh
the common testimony of mankind, who revere that great name as though
he were one of the saints of old. He thinks in fact that he, if no one
else, can touch with calumny one whom calumny has never touched; but
the sun is not so low in the heavens that any one can reach him with
stones or any other missiles; they will but recoil upon him who shot
them, while the intended target soars far beyond his reach. If any one,
again, accuses the sun of want of light, he has not dimmed the
brightness of the sunbeams with his scoffs; the sun will still remain
the sun, and the fault-finder will only prove the feebleness of his own
visual organs; and, if he should endeavour, after the fashion of this
`apology,' to persuade all whom he meets and will listen to him not to
give in to the common opinions about the sun, nor to attach more weight
to the experiences of all than to the surmises of one individual by
`assigning victory to mere quantity,' his nonsense will be wasted on
those who can use their eyes.

Let some one then persuade Eunomius to bridle his tongue, and not give
the rein to such wild talk, nor kick against the pricks in the insolent
abuse of an honoured name; but to allow the mere remembrance of Basil
to fill his soul with reverence and awe. What can he gain by this
unmeasured ribaldry, when the object of it will retain all that
character which his life, his words, and the general estimate of the
civilized world proclaims him to have possessed? The man who takes in
hand to revile reveals his own disposition as not being able, because
it is evil, to speak good things, but only "to speak from the abundance
of the heart," and to bring forth from that evil treasure-house. Now,
that his expressions are merely those of abuse quite divorced from
actual facts, can be proved from his own writings.
__________________________________________________________________

[83] apaxioi.

[84] parengrapton: for the vox nihili paragrapton. Oehler again has
adopted the reading of the Ven. ms.
__________________________________________________________________

S:9. In charging Basil with not defending his faith at the time of the
`Trials,' he lays himself open to the same charge.

He hints at a certain locality where this trial for heresy took place;
but he gives us no certain indication where it was, and the reader is
obliged to guess in the dark. Thither, he tells us, a congress of
picked representatives from all quarters was summoned; and he is at his
best here, placing before our eyes with some vigorous strokes the
preparation of the event which he pretends took place. Then, he says, a
trial in which he would have had to run for his very life was put into
the hands of certain arbitrators, to whom our Teacher and Master who
was present gave his charge [85] ; and as all the voting power was thus
won over to the enemies' side, he yielded the position [86] , fled from
the place, and hunted everywhere for some hearth and home; and he is
great, in this graphic sketch [87] , in arraigning the cowardice of our
hero; as any one who likes may see by looking at what he has written.
But I cannot stop to give specimens here of the bitter gall of his
utterances; I must pass on to that, for the sake of which I mentioned
all this.

Where, then, was that unnamed spot in which this examination of his
teachings was to take place? What was this occasion when the best then
were collected for a trial? Who were these men who hurried over land
and sea to share in these labours? What was this `expectant world that
hung upon the issue of the voting?' Who was `the arranger of the
trial?' However, let us consider that he invented all that to swell out
the importance of his story, as boys at school are apt to do in their
fictitious conversations of this kind; and let him only tell us who
that `terrible combatant' was whom our Master shrunk from encountering.
If this also is a fiction, let him be the winner again, and have the
advantage of his vain words. We will say nothing: in the useless fight
with shadows the real victory is to decline conquering in that. But if
he speaks of the events at Constantinople and means the assembly there,
and is in this fever of literary indignation at tragedies enacted
there, and means himself by that great and redoubtable athlete, then we
would display the reasons why, though present on the occasion, we did
not plunge into the fight.

Now let this man who upbraids that hero with his cowardice tell us
whether he went down into the thick of the fray, whether he uttered one
syllable in defence of his own orthodoxy, whether he made any vigorous
peroration, whether he victoriously grappled with the foe? He cannot
tell us that, or he manifestly contradicts himself, for he owns that by
his default he received the adverse verdict. If it was a duty to speak
at the actual time of the trial (for that is the law which he lays down
for us in his book), then why was he then condemned by default? If on
the other hand he did well in observing silence before such dicasts,
how arbitrarily [88] he praises himself, but blames us, for silence at
such a time! What can be more absurdly unjust than this! When two
treatises have been put forth since the time of the trial, he declares
that his apology, though written so very long after, was in time, but
reviles that which answered his own as quite too late! Surely he ought
to have abused Basil's intended counter-statement before it was
actually made; but this is not found amongst his other complaints.
Knowing as he did what Basil was going to write when the time of the
trial had passed away, why in the world did he not find fault with it
there and then? In fact it is clear from his own confession that he
never made that apology in the trial itself. I will repeat again his
words:--`We confess that we were condemned by default;' and he adds
why; `Evil-disposed persons had been passed as jurymen,' or rather, to
use his own phrase, `there was a packed panel of them where a jury
ought to have sat.' Whereas, on the other hand, it is clear from
another passage in his book that he attests that his apology was made
`at the proper time.' It runs thus:--"That I was urged to make this
apology at the proper time and in the proper manner from no pretended
reasons, but compelled to do so on behalf of those who went security
for me, is clear from facts and also from this man's words." He
adroitly twists his words round to meet every possible objection; but
what will he say to this? `It was not right to keep silent during the
trial.' Then why was Eunomius speechless during that same trial? And
why is his apology, coming as it did after the trial, in good time? And
if in good time, why is Basil's controversy with him not in good time?

But the remark of that holy father is especially true, that Eunomius in
pretending to make an apology really gave his teaching the support he
wished to give it; and that genuine emulator of Phineas' zeal,
destroying as he does with the sword of the Word every spiritual
fornicator, dealt in the `Answer to his blasphemy' a sword-thrust that
was calculated at once to heal a soul and to destroy a heresy. If he
resists that stroke, and with a soul deadened by apostacy will not
admit the cure, the blame rests with him who chooses the evil, as the
Gentile proverb says. So far for Eunomius' treatment of truth, and of
us: and now the law of former times, which allows an equal return on
those who are the first to injure, might prompt us to discharge on him
a counter-shower of abuse, and, as he is a very easy subject for this,
to be very liberal of it, so as to outdo the pain which he has
inflicted: for if he was so rich in insolent invective against one who
gave no chance for calumny, how many of such epithets might we not
expect to find for those who have satirized that saintly life? But we
have been taught from the first by that scholar of the Truth to be
scholars of the Gospel ourselves, and therefore we will not take an eye
for an eye, nor a tooth for a tooth; we know well that all the evil
that happens admits of being annihilated by its opposite, and that no
bad word and no bad deed would ever develope into such desperate
wickedness, if one good one could only be got in to break the
continuity of the vicious stream. Therefore the routine of insolence
and abusiveness is checked from repeating itself by long-suffering:
whereas if insolence is met with insolence and abuse with abuse, you
will but feed with itself this monster-vice, and increase it vastly.
__________________________________________________________________

[85] hupophonein

[86] Sozomen (vi. 26): "After his (Eunomius) elevation to the bishopric
of Cyzicus he was accused by his own clergy of introducing innovations.
Eudoxius obliged him to undergo a public trial and give an account of
his doctrines to the people: finding, however, no fault in him,
Eudoxius exhorted him to return to Cyzicus. He replied he could not
remain with people who regarded him with suspicion, and it is said
seized this opportunity to secede from communion."

[87] hupographe; or else `on the subject of Basil's charge.'

[88] tis he apoklerosis: this is a favourite word with Origen and
Gregory.
__________________________________________________________________

S:10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.

I therefore pass over everything else, as mere insolent mockery and
scoffing abuse, and hasten to the question of his doctrine. Should any
one say that I decline to be abusive only because I cannot pay him back
in his own coin, let such an one consider in his own case what
proneness there is to evil generally, what a mechanical sliding into
sin, dispensing with the need of any practice. The power of becoming
bad resides in the will; one act of wishing is often the sufficient
occasion for a finished wickedness; and this ease of operation is more
especially fatal in the sins of the tongue. Other classes of sins
require time and occasion and co-operation to be committed; but the
propensity to speak can sin when it likes. The treatise of Eunomius now
in our hands is sufficient to prove this; one who attentively considers
it will perceive the rapidity of the descent into sins in the matter of
phrases: and it is the easiest thing in the world to imitate these,
even though one is quite unpractised in habitual defamation. What need
would there be to labour in coining our intended insults into names,
when one might employ upon this slanderer his own phrases? He has
strung together, in fact, in this part of his work, every sort of
falsehood and evil-speaking, all moulded from the models which he finds
in himself; every extravagance is to be found in writing these. He
writes "cunning," "wrangling," "foe to truth," "high-flown [89] ,"
"charlatan," "combating general opinion and tradition," "braving facts
which give him the lie," "careless of the terrors of the law, of the
censure of men," "unable to distinguish the enthusiasm for truth from
mere skill in reasoning;" he adds, "wanting in reverence," "quick to
call names," and then "blatant," "full of conflicting suspicions,"
"combining irreconcileable arguments," "combating his own utterances,"
"affirming contradictories;" then, though eager to speak all ill of
him, not being able to find other novelties of invective in which to
indulge his bitterness, often in default of all else he reiterates the
same phrases, and comes round again a third and a fourth time and even
more to what he has once said; and in this circus of words he drives up
and then turns down, over and over again, the same racecourse of
insolent abuse; so that at last even anger at this shameless display
dies away from very weariness. These low unlovely street boys' jeers do
indeed provoke disgust rather than anger; they are not a whit better
than the inarticulate grunting of some old woman who is quite drunk.

Must we then enter minutely into this, and laboriously refute all his
invectives by showing that Basil was not this monster of his
imagination? If we did this, contentedly proving the absence of
anything vile and criminal in him, we should seem to join in insulting
one who was a `bright particular star' to his generation. But I
remember how with that divine voice of his he quoted the prophet [90]
with regard to him, comparing him to a shameless woman who casts her
own reproaches on the chaste. For whom do these reasonings of his
proclaim to be truth's enemy and in arms against public opinion? Who is
it who begs the readers of his book not `to look to the numbers of
those who profess a belief, or to mere tradition, or to let their
judgment be biassed so as to consider as trustworthy what is only
suspected to be the stronger side?' Can one and the same man write like
this, and then make those charges, scheming that his readers should
follow his own novelties at the very moment that he is abusing others
for opposing themselves to the general belief? As for `brazening out
facts which give him the lie, and men's censure,' I leave the reader to
judge to whom this applies; whether to one who by a most careful
self-restraint made sobriety and quietness and perfect purity the rule
of his own life as well as that of his entourage, or to one who advised
that nature should not be molested when it is her pleasure to advance
through the appetites of the body, not to thwart indulgence, nor to be
so particular as that in the training of our life; but that a
self-chosen faith should be considered sufficient for a man to attain
perfection. If he denies that this is his teaching, I and any
right-minded person would rejoice if he were telling the truth in such
a denial. But his genuine followers will not allow him to produce such
a denial, or their leading principles would be gone, and the platform
of those who for this reason embrace his tenets would fall to pieces.
As for shameless indifference to human censure, you may look at his
youth or his after life, and you would find him in both open to this
reproach. The two men's lives, whether in youth or manhood, tell a
widely-different tale.

Let our speech-writer, while he reminds himself of his youthful doings
in his native land, and afterwards at Constantinople, hear from those
who can tell him what they know of the man whom he slanders. But if any
would inquire into their subsequent occupations, let such a person tell
us which of the two he considers to deserve so high a reputation; the
man who ungrudgingly spent upon the poor his patrimony even before he
was a priest, and most of all in the time of the famine, during which
he was a ruler of the Church, though still a priest in the rank of
presbyters [91] ; and afterwards did not hoard even what remained to
him, so that he too might have made the Apostles' boast, `Neither did
we eat any man's bread for nought [92] ;' or, on the other hand, the
man who has made the championship of a tenet a source of income, the
man who creeps into houses, and does not conceal his loathsome
affliction by staying at home, nor considers the natural aversion which
those in good health must feel for such, though according to the law of
old he is one of those who are banished from the inhabited camp because
of the contagion of his unmistakeable [93] disease.

Basil is called `hasty' and `insolent,' and in both characters `a liar'
by this man who `would in patience and meekness educate those of a
contrary opinion to himself;' for such are the airs he gives himself
when he speaks of him, while he omits no hyperbole of bitter language,
when he has a sufficient opening to produce it. On what grounds, then,
does he charge him with this hastiness and insolence? Because `he
called me a Galatian, though I am a Cappadocian;' then it was because
he called a man who lived on the boundary in an obscure corner like
Corniaspine [94] a Galatian instead of an Oltiserian; supposing, that
is, that it is proved that he said this. I have not found it in my
copies; but grant it. For this he is to be called `hasty,' `insolent,'
all that is bad. But the wise know well that the minute charges of a
faultfinder furnish a strong argument for the righteousness of the
accused; else, when eager to accuse, he would not have spared great
faults and employed his malice on little ones. On these last he is
certainly great, heightening the enormity of the offence, and making
solemn reflections on falsehood, and seeing equal heinousness in it
whether in great or very trivial matters. Like the fathers of his
heresy, the scribes and Pharisees, he knows how to strain a gnat
carefully and to swallow at one gulp the hump-backed camel laden with a
weight of wickedness. But it would not be out of place to say to him,
`refrain from making such a rule in our system; cease to bid us think
it of no account to measure the guilt of a falsehood by the slightness
or the importance of the circumstances.' Paul telling a falsehood and
purifying himself after the manner of the Jews to meet the needs of
those whom he usefully deceived did not sin the same as Judas for the
requirement of his treachery putting on a kind and affable look. By a
falsehood Joseph in love to his brethren deceived them; and that too
while swearing `by the life of Pharaoh [95] ;' but his brethren had
really lied to him, in their envy plotting his death and then his
enslavement. There are many such cases: Sarah lied, because she was
ashamed of laughing: the serpent lied, tempting man to disobey and
change to a divine existence. Falsehoods differ widely according to
their motives. Accordingly we accept that general statement about man
which the Holy Spirit uttered by the Prophet [96] , `Every man is a
liar;' and this man of God, too, has not kept clear of falsehood,
having chanced to give a place the name of a neighbouring district,
through oversight or ignorance of its real name. But Eunomius also has
told a falsehood, and what is it? Nothing less than a misstatement of
Truth itself. He asserts that One who always is once was not; he
demonstrates that One who is truly a Son is falsely so called; he
defines the Creator to be a creature and a work; the Lord of the world
he calls a servant, and ranges the Being who essentially rules with
subject beings. Is the difference between falsehoods so very trifling,
that one can think it matters nothing whether the falsehood is palpable
[97] in this way or in that?
__________________________________________________________________

[89] sophistes

[90] Jeremiah iii. 3.

[91] eti en to klero ton presbuteron ierateuon

[92] 2 Thess. iii. 8.

[93] According to Ruffinus (Hist. Eccl. x. 25), his constitution was
poisoned with jaundice within and without.

[94] en anonumo tini Korniaspines eschati& 139;. Cf. mega chrema hu&
232;s (Herod.) for the use of this genitive. In the next sentence ei
anti, though it gives the sense translated in the text, is not so good
as he anti (i.e. eschatia), which Oehler suggests, but does not adopt.
With regard to Eunomius' birthplace, Sozomen and Philostorgius give
Dacora (which the former describes as on the slopes of Mt. Argaeus: but
that it must have been on the borders of Galatia and Cappadocia is
certain from what Gregory says here): `Probably Dacora was his paternal
estate: Oltiseris the village to which it belonged' (Dict. Christ.
Biog.; unless indeed Corniaspa, marked on the maps as a town where
Cappadocia, Galatia and Pontus join, was the spot, and Oltiseris the
district. Eunomius died at Dacora.

[95] Gen. xlii. 15.

[96] Psalm cxv. 11.

[97] epseusthai dokein.
__________________________________________________________________

S:11. The sophistry which he employs to prove our acknowledgment that
he had been tried, and that the confession of his faith had not been
unimpeached, is feeble.

He objects to sophistries in others; see the sort of care he takes
himself that his proofs shall be real ones. Our Master said, in the
book which he addressed to him, that at the time when our cause was
ruined, Eunomius won Cyzicus as the prize of his blasphemy. What then
does this detector of sophistry do? He fastens at once on that word
prize, and declares that we on our side confess that he made an
apology, that he won thereby, that he gained the prize of victory by
these efforts; and he frames his argument into a syllogism consisting
as he thinks of unanswerable propositions. But we will quote word for
word what he has written. `If a prize is the recognition and the crown
of victory, and a trial implies a victory, and, as also inseparable
from itself, an accusation, then that man who grants (in argument) the
prize must necessarily allow that there was a defence.' What then is
our answer to that? We do not deny that he fought this wretched battle
of impiety with a most vigorous energy, and that he went a very long
distance beyond his fellows in these perspiring efforts against the
truth; but we will not allow that he obtained the victory over his
opponents; but only that as compared with those who were running the
same as himself through heresy into error he was foremost in the number
of his lies and so gained the prize of Cyzicus in return for high
attainments in evil, beating all who for the same prize combated the
Truth; and that for this victory of blasphemy his name was blazoned
loud and clear when Cyzicus was selected for him by the umpires of his
party as the reward of his extravagance. This is the statement of our
opinion, and this we allowed; our contention now that Cyzicus was the
prize of a heresy, not the successful result of a defence, shews it. Is
this anything like his own mess of childish sophistries, so that he can
thereby hope to have grounds for proving the fact of his trial and his
defence? His method is like that of a man in a drinking bout, who has
made away with more strong liquor than the rest, and having then
claimed the pool from his fellow-drunkards should attempt to make this
victory a proof of having won some case in the law courts. That man
might chop the same sort of logic. `If a prize is the recognition and
the crown of victory, and a law-trial implies a victory and, as also
inseparable from itself, an accusation, then I have won my suit, since
I have been crowned for my powers of drinking in this bout.'

One would certainly answer to such a boaster that a trial in court is a
very different thing from a wine-contest, and that one who wins with
the glass has thereby no advantage over his legal adversaries, though
he get a beautiful chaplet of flowers. No more, therefore, has the man
who has beaten his equals in the advocacy of profanity anything to show
in having won the prize for that, that he has won a verdict too. The
testimony on our side that he is first in profanity is no plea for his
imaginary `apology.' If he did speak it before the court, and, having
so prevailed over his adversaries, was honoured with Cyzicus for that,
then he might have some occasion for using our own words against
ourselves; but as he is continually protesting in his book that he
yielded to the animus of the voters, and accepted in silence the
penalty which they inflicted, not even waiting for this hostile
decision, why does he impose upon himself and make this word prize into
the proof of a successful apology? Our excellent friend fails to
understand the force of this word prize; Cyzicus was given up to him as
the reward of merit for his extravagant impiety; and as it was his will
to receive such a prize, and he views it in the light of a victor's
guerdon, let him receive as well what that victory implies, viz. the
lion's share in the guilt of profanity. If he insists on our own words
against ourselves, he must accept both these consequences, or neither.
__________________________________________________________________

S:12. His charge of cowardice is baseless: for Basil displayed the
highest courage before the Emperor and his Lord-Lieutenants.

He treats our words so; and in the rest of his presumptuous statements
can there be shown to be a particle of truth? In these he calls him
`cowardly,' `spiritless,' `a shirker of severer labours,' exhausting
the list of such terms, and giving with laboured circumstantiality
every symptom of this cowardice: `the retired cabin, the door firmly
closed, the anxious fear of intruders, the voice, the look, the
tell-tale change of countenance,' everything of that sort, whereby the
passion of fear is shown. If he were detected in no other lie but this,
it alone would be sufficient to reveal his bent. For who does not know
how, during the time when the Emperor Valens was roused against the
churches of the Lord, that mighty champion of ours rose by his lofty
spirit superior to those overwhelming circumstances and the terrors of
the foe, and showed a mind which soared above every means devised to
daunt him? Who of the dwellers in the East, and of the furthest regions
of our civilized world did not hear of his combat with the throne
itself for the truth? Who, looking to his antagonist, was not in
dismay? For his was no common antagonist, possessed only of the power
of winning in sophistic juggles, where victory is no glory and defeat
is harmless; but he had the power of bending the whole Roman government
to his will; and, added to this pride of empire, he had prejudices
against our faith, cunningly instilled into his mind by Eudoxius [98]
of Germanicia [99] , who had won him to his side; and he found in all
those who were then at the head of affairs allies in carrying out his
designs, some being already inclined to them from mental sympathies,
while others, and they were the majority, were ready from fear to
indulge the imperial pleasure, and seeing the severity employed against
those who held to the Faith were ostentatious in their zeal for him. It
was a time of exile, confiscation, banishment, threats of fines, danger
of life, arrests, imprisonment, scourging; nothing was too dreadful to
put in force against those who would not yield to this sudden caprice
of the Emperor; it was worse for the faithful to be caught in God's
house than if they had been detected in the most heinous of crimes.

But a detailed history of that time would be too long; and would
require a separate treatment; besides, as the sufferings at that sad
season are known to all, nothing would be gained for our present
purpose by carefully setting them forth in writing. A second drawback
to such an attempt would be found to be that amidst the details of that
melancholy history we should be forced to make mention of ourselves;
and if we did anything in those struggles for our religion that
redounds to our honour in the telling, Wisdom commands us to leave it
to others to tell. "Let another man praise thee, and not thine own
mouth [100] ;" and it is this very thing that our omniscient friend has
not been conscious of in devoting the larger half of his book to
self-glorification.

Omitting, then, all that kind of detail, I will be careful only in
setting forth the achievement of our Master. The adversary whom he had
to combat was no less a person than the Emperor himself; that
adversary's second was the man who stood next him in the government;
his assistants to work out his will were the court. Let us take into
consideration also the point of time, in order to test and to
illustrate the fortitude of our own noble champion. When was it? The
Emperor was proceeding from Constantinople to the East elated by his
recent successes against the barbarians, and not in a spirit to brook
any obstruction to his will; and his lord-lieutenant directed his
route, postponing all administration of the necessary affairs of state
as long as a home remained to one adherent of the Faith, and until
every one, no matter where, was ejected, and others, chosen by himself
to outrage our godly hierarchy, were introduced instead. The Powers
then of the Propontis were moving in such a fury, like some dark cloud,
upon the churches; Bithynia was completely devastated; Galatia was very
quickly carried away by their stream; all in the intervening districts
had succeeded with them; and now our fold lay the next to be attacked.
What did our mighty Basil show like then, `that spiritless coward,' as
Eunomius calls him, `shrinking from danger, and trusting to a retired
cabin to save him?' Did he quail at this evil onset? Did he allow the
sufferings of previous victims to suggest to him that he should secure
his own safety? Did he listen to any who advised a slight yielding to
this rush of evils [101] , so as not to throw himself openly in the
path of men who were now veterans in slaughter? Rather we find that all
excess of language, all height of thought and word, falls short of the
truth about him. None could describe his contempt of danger, so as to
bring before the reader's eyes this new combat, which one might justly
say was waged not between man and man, but between a Christian's
firmness and courage on the one side, and a bloodstained power on the
other.

The lord-lieutenant kept appealing to the commands of the Emperor, and
rendering a power, which from its enormous strength was terrible
enough, more terrible still by the unsparing cruelty of its vengeance.
After the tragedies which he had enacted in Bithynia, and after Galatia
with characteristic fickleness had yielded without a struggle, he
thought that our country would fall a ready prey to his designs. Cruel
deeds were preluded by words proposing, with mingled threats and
promises, royal favours and ecclesiastical power to obedience, but to
resistance all that a cruel spirit which has got the power to work its
will can devise. Such was the enemy.

So far was our champion from being daunted by what he saw and heard,
that he acted rather like a physician or prudent councillor called in
to correct something that was wrong, bidding them repent of their
rashness and cease to commit murders amongst the servants of the Lord;
`their plans,' he said, `could not succeed with men who cared only for
the empire of Christ, and for the Powers that never die; with all their
wish to maltreat him, they could discover nothing, whether word or act,
that could pain the Christian; confiscation could not touch him whose
only possession was his Faith; exile had no terrors for one who walked
in every land with the same feelings, and looked on every city as
strange because of the shortness of his sojourn in it, yet as home,
because all human creatures are in equal bondage with himself; the
endurance of blows, or tortures, or death, if it might be for the
Truth, was an object of fear not even to women, but to every Christian
it was the supremest bliss to suffer the worst for this their hope, and
they were only grieved that nature allowed them but one death, and that
they could devise no means of dying many times in this battle for the
Truth [102] .'

When he thus confronted their threats, and looked beyond that imposing
power, as if it were all nothing, then their exasperation, just like
those rapid changes on the stage when one mask after another is put on,
turned with all its threats into flattery; and the very man whose
spirit up to then had been so determined and formidable adopted the
most gentle and submissive of language; `Do not, I beg you, think it a
small thing for our mighty emperor to have communion with your people,
but be willing to be called his master too: nor thwart his wish; he
wishes for this peace, if only one little word in the written Creed is
erased, that of Homoousios.' Our master answers that it is of the
greatest importance that the emperor should be a member of the Church;
that is, that he should save his soul, not as an emperor, but as a mere
man; but a diminution of or addition to the Faith was so far from his
(Basil's) thoughts, that he would not change even the order of the
written words. That was what this `spiritless coward, who trembles at
the creaking of a door,' said to this great ruler, and he confirmed his
words by what he did; for he stemmed in his own person this imperial
torrent of ruin that was rushing on the churches, and turned it aside;
he in himself was a match for this attack, like a grand immoveable rock
in the sea, breaking the huge and surging billow of that terrible
onset.

Nor did his wrestling stop there; the emperor himself succeeds to the
attack, exasperated because he did not get effected in the first
attempt all that he wished. Just, accordingly, as the Assyrian effected
the destruction of the temple of the Israelites at Jerusalem by means
of the cook Nabuzardan, so did this monarch of ours entrust his
business to one Demosthenes, comptroller of his kitchen, and chief of
his cooks [103] , as to one more pushing than the rest, thinking
thereby to succeed entirely in his design. With this man stirring the
pot, and with one of the blasphemers from Illyricum, letters in hand,
assembling the authorities with this end in view, and with Modestus
[104] kindling passion to a greater heat than in the previous
excitement, every one joined the movement of the Emperor's anger,
making his fury their own, and yielding to the temper of authority; and
on the other hand all felt their hopes sink at the prospect of what
might happen. That same lord-lieutenant re-enters on the scene;
intimidations worse than the former are begun; their threats are thrown
out; their anger rises to a still higher pitch; there is the tragic
pomp of trial over again, the criers, the apparitors, the lictors, the
curtained bar, things which naturally daunt even a mind which is
thoroughly prepared; and again we see God's champion amidst this combat
surpassing even his former glory. If you want proofs, look at the
facts. What spot, where there are churches, did not that disaster
reach? What nation remained unreached by these heretical commands? Who
of the illustrious in any Church was not driven from the scene of his
labours? What people escaped their despiteful treatment? It reached all
Syria, and Mesopotamia up to the frontier, Phoenicia, Palestine,
Arabia, Egypt, the Libyan tribes to the boundaries of the civilized
world; and all nearer home, Pontus, Cilicia, Lycia, Lydia, Pisidia,
Pamphylia, Caria, the Hellespont, the islands up to the Propontis
itself; the coasts of Thrace, as far as Thrace extends, and the
bordering nations as far as the Danube. Which of these countries
retained its former look, unless any were already possessed with the
evil? The people of Cappadocia alone felt not these afflictions of the
Church, because our mighty champion saved them in their trial.

Such was the achievement of this `coward' master of ours; such was the
success of one who `shirks all sterner toil.' Surely it is not that of
one who `wins renown amongst poor old women, and practises to deceive
the sex which naturally falls into every snare,' and `thinks it a great
thing to be admired by the criminal and abandoned;' it is that of one
who has proved by deeds his soul's fortitude, and the unflinching and
noble manliness of his spirit. His success has resulted in the
salvation of the whole country, the peace of our Church, the pattern
given to the virtuous of every excellence, the overthrow of the foe,
the upholding of the Faith, the confirmation of the weaker brethren,
the encouragement of the zealous, everything that is believed to belong
to the victorious side; and in the commemoration of no other events but
these do hearing and seeing unite in accomplished facts; for here it is
one and the same thing to relate in words his noble deeds and to show
in facts the attestation of our words, and to confirm each by the
other--the record from what is before our eyes, and the facts from what
is being said.
__________________________________________________________________

[98] Afterwards of Antioch, and then 8th Bishop of Constantinople
(360-370), one of the most influential of all the Arians. He it was who
procured for Eunomius the bishopric of Cyzicus (359). (The latter must
indeed have concealed his views on that occasion, for Constantius hated
the Anomoeans).

[99] A town of Commagene.

[100] Proverbs xxvii. 2.

[101] `The metropolitan remained unshaken. The rough threats of
Modestus succeeded no better than the fatherly counsel of Enippius.'
Gwatkins Arians.

[102] Other words of Basil, before Modestus at Caesarea, are also
recorded; "I cannot worship any created thing, being as I am God's
creation, and having been bidden to be a God."

[103] This cook is compared to Nabuzardan by Gregory Naz. also (Orat.
xliii. 47). Cf. also Theodoret, iv. 19, where most of these events are
recorded. The former says that `Nabuzardan threatened Basil when
summoned before him with the machaira of his trade, but was sent back
to his kitchen fire.'

[104] Modestus, the Lord Lieutenant or Count of the East, had
sacrificed to the images under Julian, and had been re-baptized as an
Arian.
__________________________________________________________________

S:13. Resume of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.

But somehow our discourse has swerved considerably from the mark; it
has had to turn round and face each of this slanderer's insults. To
Eunomius indeed it is no small advantage that the discussion should
linger upon such points, and that the indictment of his offences
against man should delay our approach to his graver sins. But it is
profitless to abuse for hastiness of speech one who is on his trial for
murder; (because the proof of the latter is sufficient to get the
verdict of death passed, even though hastiness of speech is not proved
along with it); just so it seems best to subject to proof his blasphemy
only, and to leave his insults alone. When his heinousness on the most
important points has been detected, his other delinquencies are proved
potentially without going minutely into them. Well then; at the head of
all his argumentations stands this blasphemy against the definitions of
the Faith--both in his former work and in that which we are now
criticizing--and his strenuous effort to destroy and cancel and
completely upset all devout conceptions as to the Only-Begotten Son of
God and the Holy Spirit. To show, then, how false and inconsistent are
his arguments against these doctrines of the truth, I will first quote
word for word his whole statement, and then I will begin again and
examine each portion separately. "The whole account of our doctrines is
summed up thus; there is the Supreme and Absolute Being, and another
Being existing by reason of the First, but after It [105] though before
all others; and a third Being not ranking with either of these, but
inferior to the one, as to its cause, to the other, as to the energy
which produced it: there must of course be included in this account the
energies that follow each Being, and the names germane to these
energies. Again, as each Being is absolutely single, and is in fact and
thought one, and its energies are bounded by its works, and its works
commensurate with its energies, necessarily, of course, the energies
which follow these Beings are relatively greater and less, some being
of a higher, some of a lower order; in a word, their difference amounts
to that existing between their works: it would in fact not be lawful to
say that the same energy produced the angels or stars, and the heavens
or man: but a pious mind would conclude that in proportion as some
works are superior to and more honourable than others, so does one
energy transcend another, because sameness of energy produces sameness
of work, and difference of work indicates difference of energy. These
things being so, and maintaining an unbroken connexion in their
relation to each other, it seems fitting for those who make their
investigation according to the order germane to the subject, and who do
not insist on mixing and confusing all together, in case of a
discussion being raised about Being, to prove what is in course of
demonstration, and to settle the points in debate, by the primary
energies and those attached to the Beings, and again to explain by the
Beings when the energies are in question, yet still to consider the
passage from the first to the second the more suitable and in all
respects the more efficacious of the two."

Such is his blasphemy systematized! May the Very God, Son of the Very
God, by the leading of the Holy Spirit, direct our discussion to the
truth! We will repeat his statements one by one. He asserts that the
"whole account of his doctrines is summed up in the Supreme and
Absolute Being, and in another Being existing by reason of the First,
but after It though before all others, and in a third Being not ranking
with either of these but inferior to the one as to its cause, to the
other as to the energy." The first point, then, of the unfair dealings
in this statement to be noticed is that in professing to expound the
mystery of the Faith, he corrects as it were the expressions in the
Gospel, and will not make use of the words by which our Lord in
perfecting our faith conveyed that mystery to us: he suppresses the
names of `Father, Son and Holy Ghost,' and speaks of a `Supreme and
Absolute Being' instead of the Father, of `another existing through it,
but after it' instead of the Son, and of `a third ranking with neither
of these two' instead of the Holy Ghost. And yet if those had been the
more appropriate names, the Truth Himself would not have been at a loss
to discover them, nor those men either, on whom successively devolved
the preaching of the mystery, whether they were from the first
eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word, or, as successors to these,
filled the whole world with the Evangelical doctrines, and again at
various periods after this defined in a common assembly the ambiguities
raised about the doctrine; whose traditions are constantly preserved in
writing in the churches. If those had been the appropriate terms, they
would not have mentioned, as they did, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,
granting indeed it were pious or safe to remodel at all, with a view to
this innovation, the terms of the faith; or else they were all ignorant
men and uninstructed in the mysteries, and unacquainted with what he
calls the appropriate names--those men who had really neither the
knowledge nor the desire to give the preference to their own
conceptions over what had been handed down to us by the voice of God.
__________________________________________________________________

[105] there is the Supreme and Absolute Being, and another Being
existing through the First, but after It. The language of this
exposition of Eunomius is Aristotelian: but the contents nevertheless
are nothing more nor less than Gnosticism, as Rupp well points out
(Gregors v. Nyssa Leben und Meinungen, p. 132 sq.). Arianism, he says,
is nothing but the last attempt of Gnosticism to force the doctrine of
emanations into Christian theology, clothing that doctrine on this
occasion in a Greek dress. It was still an oriental heresy, not a Greek
heresy like Pelagianism in the next century. Rupp gives two reasons why
Arianism may be identified with Gnosticism. 1. Arianism holds the Logos
as the highest being after the Godhead, i.e. as the prototokos tes
ktiseos, and as merely the mediator between God and Man: just as it was
the peculiar aim of Gnosticism to bridge over the gulf between the
Creator and the Created by means of intermediate beings (the
emanations). 2. Eunomius and his master adopted that very system of
Greek philosophy which had always been the natural ally of Gnosticism:
i.e. Aristotle is strong in divisions and differences, weak in
`identifications:' he had marked with a clearness never attained before
the various stages upwards of existencies in the physical world: and
this is just what Gnosticism, in its wish to exhibit all things
according to their relative distances from the 'Agennetos, wanted.
Eunomius has in fact in this formula of his translated all the terms of
Scripture straight into those of Aristotle: he has changed the
ethical-physical of Christianity into the purely physical; pneuma e.g.
becomes ousia: and by thus banishing the spiritual and the moral he has
made his 'Agennetos as completely `single' and incommunicable as the to
proton kinoun akineton (Arist. Metaph. XII. 7).
__________________________________________________________________

S:14. He did wrong, when mentioning the Doctrines of Salvation, in
adopting terms of his own choosing instead of the traditional terms
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

The reason for this invention of new words I take to be manifest to
every one--namely: that every one, when the words father and son are
spoken, at once recognizes the proper and natural relationship to one
another which they imply. This relationship is conveyed at once by the
appellations themselves. To prevent it being understood of the Father,
and the Only-begotten Son, he robs us of this idea of relationship
which enters the ear along with the words, and abandoning the inspired
terms, expounds the Faith by means of others devised to injure the
truth.

One thing, however, that he says is true: that his own teaching, not
the Catholic teaching, is summed up so. Indeed any one who reflects can
easily see the impiety of his statement. It will not be out of place
now to discuss in detail what his intention is in ascribing to the
being of the Father alone the highest degree of that which is supreme
and proper, while not admitting that the being of the Son and of the
Holy Ghost is supreme and proper. For my part I think that it is a
prelude to his complete denial of the `being' of the Only-begotten and
of the Holy Ghost, and that this system of his is secretly intended to
effect the setting aside of all real belief in their personality, while
in appearance and in mere words confessing it. A moment's reflection
upon his statement will enable any one to perceive that this is so. It
does not look like one who thinks that the Only-begotten and the Holy
Ghost really exist in a distinct personality to be very particular
about the names with which he thinks the greatness of Almighty God
should be expressed. To grant the fact [106] , and then go into minute
distinctions about the appropriate phrases [107] would be indeed
consummate folly: and so in ascribing a being that is in the highest
degree supreme and proper only to the Father, he makes us surmise by
this silence respecting the other two that (to him) they do not
properly exist. How can that to which a proper being is denied be said
to really exist? When we deny proper being to it, we must perforce
affirm of it all the opposite terms. That which cannot be properly said
is improperly said, so that the demonstration of its not being properly
said is a proof of its not really subsisting: and it is at this that
Eunomius seems to aim in introducing these new names into his teaching.
For no one can say that he has strayed from ignorance into some silly
fancy of separating, locally, the supreme from that which is below, and
assigning to the Father as it were the peak of some hill, while he
seats the Son lower down in the hollows. No one is so childish as to
conceive of differences in space, when the intellectual and spiritual
is under discussion. Local position is a property of the material: but
the intellectual and immaterial is confessedly removed from the idea of
locality. What, then, is the reason why he says that the Father alone
has supreme being? For one can hardly think it is from ignorance that
he wanders off into these conceptions, being one who, in the many
displays he makes, claims to be wise, even "making himself overwise,"
as the Holy Scripture forbids us to do [108] .
__________________________________________________________________

[106] i.e. of the equality of Persons.

[107] i.e. for the Persons.

[108] Eccles. vii. 16.
__________________________________________________________________

S:15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and
supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs
is improperly spoken of, and is inferior.

But at all events he will allow that this supremacy of being betokens
no excess of power, or of goodness, or of anything of that kind. Every
one knows that, not to mention those whose knowledge is supposed to be
very profound; viz., that the personality of the Only-begotten and of
the Holy Ghost has nothing lacking in the way of perfect goodness,
perfect power, and of every quality like that. Good, as long as it is
incapable of its opposite, has no bounds to its goodness: its opposite
alone can circumscribe it, as we may see by particular examples.
Strength is stopped only when weakness seizes it; life is limited by
death alone; darkness is the ending of light: in a word, every good is
checked by its opposite, and by that alone. If then he supposes that
the nature of the Only-begotten and of the Spirit can change for the
worse, then he plainly diminishes the conception of their goodness,
making them capable of being associated with their opposites. But if
the Divine and unalterable nature is incapable of degeneracy, as even
our foes allow, we must regard it as absolutely unlimited in its
goodness: and the unlimited is the same as the infinite. But to suppose
excess and defect in the infinite and unlimited is to the last degree
unreasonable: for how can the idea of infinitude remain, if we posited
increase and loss in it? We get the idea of excess only by a comparison
of limits: where there is no limit, we cannot think of any excess.
Perhaps, however, this was not what he was driving at, but he assigns
this superiority only by the prerogative of priority in time, and, with
this idea only, declares the Father's being to be alone the supreme
one. Then he must tell us on what grounds he has measured out more
length of life to the Father, while no distinctions of time whatever
have been previously conceived of in the personality of the Son.

And yet supposing for a moment, for the sake of argument, that this was
so, what superiority does the being which is prior in time have over
that which follows, on the score of pure being, that he can say that
the one is supreme and proper, and the other is not? For while the
lifetime of the elder as compared with the younger is longer, yet his
being has neither increase nor decrease on that account. This will be
clear by an illustration. What disadvantage, on the score of being, as
compared with Abraham, had David who lived fourteen generations after?
Was any change, so far as humanity goes, effected in the latter? Was he
less a human being, because he was later in time? Who would be so
foolish as to assert this? The definition of their being is the same
for both: the lapse of time does not change it. No one would assert
that the one was more a man for being first in time, and the other less
because he sojourned in life later; as if humanity had been exhausted
on the first, or as if time had spent its chief power upon the
deceased. For it is not in the power of time to define for each one the
measures of nature, but nature abides self-contained, preserving
herself through succeeding generations: and time has a course of its
own, whether surrounding, or flowing by, this nature, which remains
firm and motionless within her own limits. Therefore, not even
supposing, as our argument did for a moment, that an advantage were
allowed on the score of time, can they properly ascribe to the Father
alone the highest supremacy of being: but as there is really no
difference whatever in the prerogative of time, how could any one
possibly entertain such an idea about these existencies which are
pre-temporal? Every measure of distance that we could discover is
beneath the divine nature: so no ground is left for those who attempt
to divide this pre-temporal and incomprehensible being by distinctions
of superior and inferior.

We have no hesitation either in asserting that what is dogmatically
taught by them is an advocacy of the Jewish doctrine, setting forth, as
they do, that the being of the Father alone has subsistence, and
insisting that this only has proper existence, and reckoning that of
the Son and the Spirit among non-existencies, seeing that what does not
properly exist can be said nominally only, and by an abuse of terms, to
exist at all. The name of man, for instance, is not given to a portrait
representing one, but to so and so who is absolutely such, the original
of the picture, and not the picture itself; whereas the picture is in
word only a man, and does not possess absolutely the quality ascribed
to it, because it is not in its nature that which it is called. In the
case before us, too, if being is properly ascribed to the Father, but
ceases when we come to the Son and the Spirit, it is nothing short of a
plain denial of the message of salvation. Let them leave the church and
fall back upon the synagogues of the Jews, proving, as they do, the
Son's non-existence in denying to Him proper being. What does not
properly exist is the same thing as the non-existent.

Again, he means in all this to be very clever, and has a poor opinion
of those who essay to write without logical force. Then let him tell
us, contemptible though we are, by what sort of skill he has detected a
greater and a less in pure being. What is his method for establishing
that one being is more of a being than another being,--taking being in
its plainest meaning, for he must not bring forward those various
qualities and properties, which are comprehended in the conception of
the being, and gather round it, but are not the subject itself? Shade,
colour, weight, force or reputation, distinctive manner, disposition,
any quality thought of in connection with body or mind, are not to be
considered here: we have to inquire only whether the actual subject of
all these, which is termed absolutely the being, differs in degree of
being from another. We have yet to learn that of two known existencies,
which still exist, the one is more, the other less, an existence. Both
are equally such, as long as they are in the category of existence, and
when all notions of more or less value, more or less force, have been
excluded.

If, then, he denies that we can regard the Only-begotten as completely
existing,--for to this depth his statement seems to lead,--in
withholding from Him a proper existence, let him deny it even in a less
degree. If, however, he does grant that the Son subsists in some
substantial way--we will not quarrel now about the particular way--why
does he take away again that which he has conceded Him to be, and prove
Him to exist not properly, which is tantamount, as we have said, to not
at all? For as humanity is not possible to that which does not possess
the complete connotation of the term `man,' and the whole conception of
it is cancelled in the case of one who lacks any of the properties, so
in every thing whose complete and proper existence is denied, the
partial affirmation of its existence is no proof of its subsisting at
all; the demonstration, in fact, of its incomplete being is a
demonstration of its effacement in all points. So that if he is
well-advised, he will come over to the orthodox belief, and remove from
his teaching the idea of less and of incompleteness in the nature of
the Son and the Spirit: but if he is determined to blaspheme, and
wishes for some inscrutable reason thus to requite his Maker and God
and Benefactor, let him at all events part with his conceit of
possessing some amount of showy learning, unphilosophically piling, as
he does, being over being, one above the other, one proper, one not
such, for no discoverable reason. We have never heard that any of the
infidel philosophers have committed this folly, any more than we have
met with it in the inspired writings, or in the common apprehension of
mankind.

I think that from what has been said it will be clear what is the aim
of these newly-devised names. He drops them as the base of operations
or foundation-stone of all this work of mischief to the Faith: once he
can get the idea into currency that the one Being alone is supreme and
proper in the highest degree, he can then assail the other two, as
belonging to the inferior and not regarded as properly Being. He shows
this especially in what follows, where he is discussing the belief in
the Son and the Holy Spirit, and does not proceed with these names, so
as to avoid bringing before us the proper characteristic of their
nature by means of those appellations: they are passed over unnoticed
by this man who is always telling us that minds of the hearers are to
be directed by the use of appropriate names and phrases. Yet what name
could be more appropriate than that which has been given by the Very
Truth? He sets his views against the Gospel, and names not the Son, but
`a Being existing through the First, but after It though before all
others.' That this is said to destroy the right faith in the
Only-begotten will be made plainer still by his subsequent arguments.
Still there is only a moderate amount of mischief in these words: one
intending no impiety at all towards Christ might sometimes use them: we
will therefore omit at present all discussion about our Lord, and
reserve our reply to the more open blasphemies against Him. But on the
subject of the Holy Spirit the blasphemy is plain and unconcealed: he
says that He is not to be ranked with the Father or the Son, but is
subject to both. I will therefore examine as closely as possible this
statement.
__________________________________________________________________

S:16. Examination of the meaning of `subjection:' in that he says that
the nature of the Holy Spirit is subject to that of the Father and the
Son. It is shewn that the Holy Spirit is of an equal, not inferior,
rank to the Father and the Son.

Let us first, then, ascertain the meaning of this word `subjection' in
Scripture. To whom is it applied? The Creator, honouring man in his
having been made in His own image, `hath placed' the brute creation `in
subjection under his feet;' as great David relating this favour (of
God) exclaimed in the Psalms [109] : "He put all things," he says,
"under his feet," and he mentions by name the creatures so subjected.
There is still another meaning of `subjection' in Scripture. Ascribing
to God Himself the cause of his success in war, the Psalmist says [110]
, "He hath put peoples and nations in subjection under our feet," and
"He that putteth peoples in subjection under me." This word is often
found thus in Scripture, indicating a victory. As for the future
subjection of all men to the Only-begotten, and through Him to the
Father, in the passage where the Apostle with a profound wisdom speaks
of the Mediator between God and man as subject to the Father, implying
by that subjection of the Son who shares humanity the actual
subjugation of mankind--we will not discuss it now, for it requires a
full and thorough examination. But to take only the plain and
unambiguous meaning of the word subjection, how can he declare the
being of the Spirit to be subject to that of the Son and the Father? As
the Son is subject to the Father, according to the thought of the
Apostle? But in this view the Spirit is to be ranked with the Son, not
below Him, seeing that both Persons are of this lower rank. This was
not his meaning? How then? In the way the brute creation is subject to
the rational, as in the Psalm? There is then as great a difference as
is implied in the subjection of the brute creation, when compared to
man. Perhaps he will reject this explanation as well. Then he will have
to come to the only remaining one, that the Spirit, at first in the
rebellious ranks, was afterwards forced by a superior Force to bend to
a Conqueror.

Let him choose which he likes of these alternatives: whichever it is I
do not see how he can avoid the inevitable crime of blasphemy: whether
he says the Spirit is subject in the manner of the brute creation, as
fish and birds and sheep, to man, or were to fetch Him a captive to a
superior power after the manner of a rebel. Or does he mean neither of
these ways, but uses the word in a different signification altogether
to the scripture meaning? What, then, is that signification? Does he
lay down that we must rank Him as inferior and not as equal, because He
was given by our Lord to His disciples third in order? By the same
reasoning he should make the Father inferior to the Son, since the
Scripture often places the name of our Lord first, and the Father
Almighty second. "I and My Father," our Lord says. "The grace of our
Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God [111] ," and other passages
innumerable which the diligent student of Scripture testimonies might
collect: for instance, "there are differences of gifts, but it is the
same Spirit: and there are differences of administration, but it is the
same Lord: and there are differences of operations, but it is the same
God." According to this, then, let the Almighty Father, who is
mentioned third, be made `subject' to the Son and the Spirit. However
we have never yet heard of a philosophy such as this, which relegates
to the category of the inferior and the dependent that which is
mentioned second or third only for some particular reason of sequence:
yet that is what our author wants to do, in arguing to show that the
order observed in the transmission of the Persons amounts to
differences of more and less in dignity and nature. In fact he rules
that sequence in point of order is indicative of unlikeness of nature:
whence he got this fancy, what necessity compelled him to it, is not
clear. Mere numerical rank does not create a different nature: that
which we would count in a number remains the same in nature whether we
count it or not. Number is a mark only of the mere quantity of things:
it does not place second those things only which have an inferior
natural value, but it makes the sequence of the numerical objects
indicated in accordance with the intention of those who are counting.
`Paul and Silvanus and Timotheus' are three persons mentioned according
to a particular intention. Does the place of Silvanus, second and after
Paul, indicate that he was other than a man? Or is Timothy, because he
is third, considered by the writer who so ranks him a different kind of
being? Not so. Each is human both before and after this arrangement.
Speech, which cannot utter the names of all three at once, mentions
each separately according to an order which commends itself, but unites
them by the copula, in order that the juncture of the names may show
the harmonious action of the three towards one end.

This, however, does not please our new dogmatist. He opposes the
arrangement of Scripture. He separates off that equality with the
Father and the Son of His proper and natural rank and connexion which
our Lord Himself pronounces, and numbers Him with `subjects': he
declares Him to be a work of both Persons [112] , of the Father, as
supplying the cause of His constitution, of the Only-begotten, as of
the artificer of His subsistence: and defines this as the ground of His
`subjection,' without as yet unfolding the meaning of `subjection.'
__________________________________________________________________

[109] Psalm viii. 6-8.

[110] Psalm xlvii. 3 (LXX.).

[111] John x. 30; 2 Cor. xiii. 13.

[112] he declares Him to be a work of both Persons. With regard to
Gregory's own belief as to the procession of the Holy Spirit, it may be
said once for all that there is hardly anything (but see p. 99, note 5)
clear about it to be found in his writings. The question, in fact,
remained undecided until the 9th century, the time of the schism of the
East and West. But here, as in other points, Origen had approached the
nearest to the teaching of the West: for he represents the procession
as from Father and Son, just as often as from one Person or the other.
Athanasius does certainly say that the Spirit `unites the creation to
the Son, and through the Son to the Father,' but with him this
expression is not followed up: while in the Roman Church it led to
doctrine. For why does the Holy Spirit unite the creation with God
continuously and perfectly? Because, to use Bossuet's words,
"proceeding from the Father and the Son He is their love and eternal
union." Neither Basil, nor Gregory Nazianzen, nor Chrysostom, have
anything definite about the procession of the Third Person.
__________________________________________________________________

S:17. Discussion as to the exact nature of the `energies' which, this
man declares, `follow' the being of the Father and of the Son.

Then he says "there must of course be included in this account the
energies that accompany each Being, and the names appropriate to these
energies." Shrouded in such a mist of vagueness, the meaning of this is
far from clear: but one might conjecture it is as follows. By the
energies of the Beings, he means those powers which have produced the
Son and the Holy Spirit, and by which the First Being made the Second,
and the Second the Third: and he means that the names of the results
produced have been provided in a manner appropriate to those results.
We have already exposed the mischief of these names, and will again,
when we return to that part of the question, should additional
discussion of it be required.

But it is worth a moment's while now to consider how energies `follow'
beings: what these energies are essentially: whether different to the
beings which they `follow,' or part of them, and of their inmost
nature: and then, if different, how and whence they arise: if the same,
how they have got cut off from them, and instead of co-existing
`follow' them externally only. This is necessary, for we cannot learn
all at once from his words whether some natural necessity compels the
`energy,' whatever that may be, to `follow' the being, the way heat and
vapour follow fire, and the various exhalations the bodies which
produce them. Still I do not think that he would affirm that we should
consider the being of God to be something heterogeneous and composite,
having the energy inalienably contained in the idea of itself, like an
`accident' in some subject-matter: he must mean that the beings,
deliberately and voluntarily moved, produce by themselves the desired
result. But, if this be so, who would style this free result of
intention as one of its external consequences? We have never heard of
such an expression used in common parlance in such cases; the energy of
the worker of anything is not said to `follow' that worker. We cannot
separate one from the other and leave one behind by itself: but, when
one mentions the energy, one comprehends in the idea that which is
moved with the energy, and when one mentions the worker one implies at
once the unmentioned energy.

An illustration will make our meaning clearer. We say a man works in
iron, or in wood, or in anything else. This single expression conveys
at once the idea of the working and of the artificer, so that if we
withdraw the one, the other has no existence. If then they are thus
thought of together, i.e. the energy and he who exercises it, how in
this case can there be said to "follow" upon the first being the energy
which produces the second being, like a sort of go-between to both, and
neither coalescing with the nature of the first, nor combining with the
second: separated from the first because it is not its very nature, but
only the exercise of its nature, and from that which results afterwards
because it does not therein reproduce a mere energy, but an active
being.
__________________________________________________________________

S:18. He has no reason for distinguishing a plurality of beings in the
Trinity. He offers no demonstration that it is so.

Let us examine the following as well. He calls one Being the work of
another, the second of the first, and the third of the second. On what
previous demonstration does this statement rest: what proofs does he
make use of, what method, to compel belief in the succeeding Being as a
result of the preceding? For even if it were possible to draw an
analogy for this from created things, such conjecturing about the
transcendent from lower existences would not be altogether sound,
though the error in arguing from natural phenomena to the
incomprehensible might then be pardonable. But as it is, none would
venture to affirm that, while the heavens are the work of God, the sun
is that of the heavens, and the moon that of the sun, and the stars
that of the moon, and other created things that of the stars: seeing
that all are the work of One: for there is one God and Father of all,
of Whom are all things. If anything is produced by mutual transmission,
such as the race of animals, not even here does one produce another,
for nature runs on through each generation. How then, when it is
impossible to affirm it of the created world, can he declare of the
transcendent existencies that the second is a work of the first, and so
on? If, however, he is thinking of animal generation, and fancies that
such a process is going on also amongst pure existences, so that the
older produces the younger, even so he fails to be consistent: for such
productions are of the same type as their progenitors: whereas he
assigns to the members of his succession strange and uninherited
qualities: and thus displays a superfluity of falsehood, while striving
to strike truth with both hands at once, in a clever boxer's fashion.
In order to show the inferior rank and diminution in intrinsic value of
the Son and Holy Spirit, he declares that "one is produced from
another;" in order that those who understand about mutual generation
might entertain no idea of family relationship here: he contradicts the
law of nature by declaring that "one is produced from another," and at
the same time exhibiting the Son as a bastard when compared with His
Father's nature.

But one might find fault with him, I think, before coming to all this.
If, that is, any one else, previously unaccustomed to discussion and
unversed in logical expression, delivered his ideas in this chance
fashion, some indulgence might be shown him for not using the
recognized methods for establishing his views. But considering that
Eunomius has such an abundance of this power, that he can advance by
his `irresistible' method [113] of proof even into the supra-natural,
how can he be ignorant of the starting-point from which this
`irresistible' perception of a hidden truth takes its rise in all these
logical excursions. Every one knows that all such arguing must start
from plain and well-known truths, to compel belief through itself in
still doubtful truths: and that none of these last can be grasped
without the guidance of what is obvious leading us towards the unknown.
If on the other hand that which is adopted to start with for the
illustration of this unknown is at variance with universal belief, it
will be a long time before the unknown will receive any illustration
from it.

The whole controversy, then, between the Church and the Anomoeans turns
on this: Are we to regard the Son and the Holy Spirit as belonging to
created or uncreated existence? Our opponent declares that to be the
case which all deny: he boldly lays it down, without looking about for
any proof, that each being is the work of the preceding being. What
method of education, what school of thought can warrant him in this, it
is difficult to see. Some axiom that cannot be denied or assailed must
be the beginning of every process of proof; so as for the unknown
quantity to be demonstrated from what has been assumed, being
legitimately deduced by intervening syllogisms. The reasoner,
therefore, who makes what ought to be the object of inquiry itself a
premiss of his demonstration is only proving the obscure by the
obscure, and illusion by illusion. He is making `the blind lead the
blind,' for it is a truly blind and unsupported statement to say that
the Creator and Maker of all things is a creature made: and to this
they link on a conclusion that is also blind: namely, that the Son is
alien in nature, unlike in being to the Father, and quite devoid of His
essential character. But of this enough. Where his thought is nakedly
blasphemous, there we too can defer its refutation. We must now return
to consider his words which come next in order.
__________________________________________________________________

[113] kataleptikes ephodou--he katalepsis. These words are taken from
the Stoic logic, and refer to the Stoic view of the standard of truth.
To the question, How are true perceptions distinguished from false
ones, the Stoics answered, that a true perception is one which
represents a real object as it really is. To the further question, How
may it be known that a perception faithfully represents a reality, they
replied by pointing to a relative not an absolute test--the degree of
strength with which certain perceptions force themselves upon our
notice. Some of our perceptions are of such a kind that they at once
oblige us to bestow on them assent. Such perceptions produce in us that
strength of conviction which the Stoics call a conception. Whenever a
perception forces itself upon us in this irresistible form, we are no
longer dealing with a fiction of the imagination but with something
real. The test of irresistibility (katalepsis) was, in the first place,
understood to apply to sensations from without, such sensations,
according to the Stoic view, alone supplying the material for
knowledge. An equal degree of certainty was, however, attached to terms
deduced from originally true data, either by the universal and natural
exercise of thought, or by scientific processes of proof. It is
katalepseis obtained in this last way that Gregory refers to, and
Eunomius was endeavouring to create in the supra-natural world.
__________________________________________________________________

S:19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is `single' is only
verbal.

"Each Being has, in fact and in conception, a nature unmixed, single,
and absolutely one as estimated by its dignity; and as the works are
bounded by the energies of each operator, and the energies by the
works, it is inevitable that the energies which follow each Being are
greater in the one case than the other, some being of the first, others
of the second rank." The intention that runs through all this, however
verbosely expressed, is one and the same; namely, to establish that
there is no connexion between the Father and the Son, or between the
Son and the Holy Ghost, but that these Beings are sundered from each
other, and possess natures foreign and unfamiliar to each other, and
differ not only in that, but also in magnitude and in subordination of
their dignities, so that we must think of one as greater than the
other, and presenting every other sort of difference.

It may seem to many useless to linger over what is so obvious, and to
attempt a discussion of that which to them is on the face of it false
and abominable and groundless: nevertheless, to avoid even the
appearance of having to let these statements pass for want of
counter-arguments, we will meet them with all our might. He says, "each
being amongst them is unmixed, single, and absolutely one, as estimated
by its dignity, both in fact and in conception." Then premising this
very doubtful statement as an axiom and valuing his own `ipse dixit' as
a sufficient substitute for any proof, he thinks he has made a point.
"There are three Beings:" for he implies this when he says, `each being
amongst them:' he would not have used these words, if he meant only
one. Now if he speaks thus of the mutual difference between the Beings
in order to avoid complicity with the heresy of Sabellius, who applied
three titles to one subject, we would acquiesce in his statement: nor
would any of the Faithful contradict his view, except so far as he
seems to be at fault in his names, and his mere form of expression in
speaking of `beings' instead of `persons:' for things that are
identical on the score of being will not all agree equally in
definition on the score of personality. For instance, Peter, James, and
John are the same viewed as beings, each was a man: but in the
characteristics of their respective personalities, they were not alike.
If, then, he were only proving that it is not right to confound the
Persons, and to fit all the three names on to one Subject, his `saying'
would be, to use the Apostle's words, `faithful, and worthy of all
acceptation [114] .' But this is not his object: he speaks so, not
because he divides the Persons only from each other by their recognized
characteristics, but because he makes the actual substantial being of
each different from that of the others, or rather from itself: and so
he speaks of a plurality of beings with distinctive differences which
alienate them from each other. I therefore declare that his view is
unfounded, and lacks a principle: it starts from data that are not
granted, and then it constructs by mere logic a blasphemy upon them. It
attempts no demonstration that could attract towards such a conception
of the doctrine: it merely contains the statement of an unproved
impiety, as if it were telling us a dream. While the Church teaches
that we must not divide our faith amongst a plurality of beings, but
must recognize no difference of being in three Subjects or Persons,
whereas our opponents posit a variety and unlikeness amongst them as
Beings, this writer confidently assumes as already proved what never
has been, and never can be, proved by argument: maybe he has not even
yet found hearers for his talk: or he might have been informed by one
of them who was listening intelligently that every statement which is
made at random, and without proof, is `an old woman's tale,' and
powerless to prove the question, in itself, unaided by any plea
whatever fetched from the Scriptures, or from human reasonings. So much
for this.

But let us still scrutinize his words. He declares each of these
Beings, whom he has shadowed forth in his exposition, to be single and
absolutely one. We believe that the most boorish and simple-minded
would not deny that the Divine Nature, blessed and transcendent as it
is, was `single.' That which is viewless, formless, and sizeless,
cannot be conceived of as multiform and composite. But it will be
clear, upon the very slightest reflection, that this view of the
supreme Being as `simple,' however finely they may talk of it, is quite
inconsistent with the system which they have elaborated. For who does
not know that, to be exact, simplicity in the case of the Holy Trinity
admits of no degrees. In this case there is no mixture or conflux of
qualities to think of; we comprehend a potency without parts and
composition; how then, and on what grounds, could any one perceive
there any differences of less and more. For he who marks differences
there must perforce think of an incidence of certain qualities in the
subject. He must in fact have perceived differences in largeness and
smallness therein, to have introduced this conception of quantity into
the question: or he must posit abundance or diminution in the matter of
goodness, strength, wisdom, or of anything else that can with reverence
be associated with God: and neither way will he escape the idea of
composition. Nothing which possesses wisdom or power or any other good,
not as an external gift, but rooted in its nature, can suffer
diminution in it; so that if any one says that he detects Beings
greater and smaller in the Divine Nature, he is unconsciously
establishing a composite and heterogeneous Deity, and thinking of the
Subject as one thing, and the quality, to share in which constitutes as
good that which was not so before, as another. If he had been thinking
of a Being really single and absolutely one, identical with goodness
rather than possessing it, he would not be able to count a greater and
a less in it at all. It was said, moreover, above that good can be
diminished by the presence of evil alone, and that where the nature is
incapable of deteriorating, there is no limit conceived of to the
goodness: the unlimited, in fact, is not such owing to any relation
whatever, but, considered in itself, escapes limitation. It is, indeed,
difficult to see how a reflecting mind can conceive one infinite to be
greater or less than another infinite. So that if he acknowledges the
supreme Being to be `single' and homogenous, let him grant that it is
bound up with this universal attribute of simplicity and infinitude.
If, on the other hand, he divides and estranges the `Beings' from each
other, conceiving that of the Only-begotten as another than the
Father's, and that of the Spirit as another than the Only-begotten,
with a `more' and `less' in each case, let him be exposed now as
granting simplicity in appearance only to the Deity, but in reality
proving the composite in Him.

But let us resume the examination of his words in order. "Each Being
has in fact and conception a nature unmixed, single, and absolutely
one, as estimated by its dignity." Why "as estimated by its dignity?"
If he contemplates the Beings in their common dignity, this addition is
unnecessary and superfluous, and dwells upon that which is obvious:
although a word so out of place might be pardoned, if it was any
feeling of reverence which prompted him not to reject it. But here the
mischief really is not owing to a mistake about a phrase (that might be
easily set right): but it is connected with his evil designs. He says
that each of the three beings is `single, as estimated by its dignity,'
in order that, on the strength of his previous definitions of the
first, second, and third Being, the idea of their simplicity also may
be marred. Having affirmed that the being of the Father alone is
`Supreme' and `Proper,' and having refused both these titles to that of
the Son and of the Spirit, in accordance with this, when he comes to
speak of them all as `simple,' he thinks it his duty to associate with
them the idea of simplicity in proportion only to their essential
worth, so that the Supreme alone is to be conceived of as at the height
and perfection of simplicity, while the second, in proportion to its
declension from supremacy, receives also a diminished measure of
simplicity, and in the case of the third Being also, there is as much
variation from the perfect simplicity, as the amount of worth is
lessened in the extremes: whence it results that the Father's being is
conceived as of pure simplicity, that of the Son as not so flawless in
simplicity, but with a mixture of the composite, that of the Holy
Spirit as still increasing in the composite, while the amount of
simplicity is gradually lessened. Just as imperfect goodness must be
owned to share in some measure in the reverse disposition, so imperfect
simplicity cannot escape being considered composite.
__________________________________________________________________

[114] 1 Timothy i. 15.
__________________________________________________________________

S:20. He does wrong in assuming, to account for the existence of the
Only-Begotten, an `energy' that produced Christ's Person.

That such is his intention in using these phrases will be clear from
what follows, where he more plainly materializes and degrades our
conception of the Son and of the Spirit. "As the energies are bounded
by the works, and the works commensurate with the energies, it
necessarily follows that these energies which accompany these Beings
are relatively greater and less, some being of a higher, some of a
lower order." Though he has studiously wrapt the mist of his
phraseology round the meaning of this, and made it hard for most to
find out, yet as following that which we have already examined it will
easily be made clear. "The energies," he says, "are bounded by the
works." By `works' he means the Son and the Spirit, by `energies' the
efficient powers by which they were produced, which powers, he said a
little above, `follow' the Beings. The phrase `bounded by' expresses
the balance which exists between the being produced and the producing
power, or rather the `energy' of that power, to use his own word
implying that the thing produced is not the effect of the whole power
of the operator, but only of a particular energy of it, only so much of
the whole power being exerted as is calculated to be likely to be equal
to effect that result. Then he inverts his statement: "and the works
are commensurate with the energies of the operators." The meaning of
this will be made clearer by an illustration. Let us think of one of
the tools of a shoemaker: i.e., a leather-cutter. When it is moved
round upon that from which a certain shape has to be cut, the part so
excised is limited by the size of the instrument, and a circle of such
a radius will be cut as the instrument possesses of length, and, to put
the matter the other way, the span of the instrument will measure and
cut out a corresponding circle. That is the idea which our theologian
has of the divine person of the Only-begotten. He declares that a
certain `energy' which `follows' upon the first Being produced, in the
fashion of such a tool, a corresponding work, namely our Lord: this is
his way of glorifying the Son of God, Who is even now glorified in the
glory of the Father, and shall be revealed in the Day of Judgment. He
is a `work commensurate with the producing energy.' But what is this
energy which `follows' the Almighty and is to be conceived of prior to
the Only-begotten, and which circumscribes His being? A certain
essential Power, self-subsisting, which works its will by a spontaneous
impulse. It is this, then, that is the real Father of our Lord. And why
do we go on talking of the Almighty as the Father, if it was not He,
but an energy belonging to the things which follow Him externally that
produced the Son: and how can the Son be a son any longer, when
something else has given Him existence according to Eunomius, and He
creeps like a bastard (may our Lord pardon the expression!) into
relationship with the Father, and is to be honoured in name only as a
Son? How can Eunomius rank our Lord next after the Almighty at all,
when he counts Him third only, with that mediating `energy' placed in
the second place? The Holy Spirit also according to this sequence will
be found not in the third, but in the fifth place, that `energy' which
follows the Only-Begotten, and by which the Holy Spirit came into
existence necessarily intervening between them.

Thereby, too, the creation of all things by the Son [115] will be found
to have no foundation: another personality, prior to Him, has been
invented by our neologian, to which the authorship of the world must be
referred, because the Son Himself derives His being according to them
from that `energy.' If, however, to avoid such profanities, he makes
this `energy' which produced the Son into something unsubstantial, he
will have to explain to us how non-being can `follow' being, and how
what is not a substance can produce a substance: for, if he did that,
we shall find an unreality following God, the non-existent author of
all existence, the radically unsubstantial circumscribing a substantial
nature, the operative force of creation contained, in the last resort,
in the unreal. Such is the result of the teaching of this theologian
who affirms of the Lord Artificer of heaven and earth and of all the
Creation, the Word of God Who was in the beginning, through Whom are
all things, that He owes His existence to such a baseless entity or
conception as that unnameable `energy' which he has just invented, and
that He is circumscribed by it, as by an enclosing prison of unreality.
He who `gazes into the unseen' cannot see the conclusion to which his
teaching tends. It is this: if this `energy' of God has no real
existence, and if the work that this unreality produces is also
circumscribed by it, it is quite clear that we can only think of such a
nature in the work, as that which is possessed by this fancied producer
of the work: in fact, that which is produced from and is contained by
an unreality can itself be conceived of as nothing else but a
non-entity. Opposites, in the nature of things, cannot be contained by
opposites: such as water by fire, life by death, light by darkness,
being by non-being. But with all his excessive cleverness he does not
see this: or else he consciously shuts his eyes to the truth.

Some necessity compels him to see a diminution in the Son, and to
establish a further advance in this direction in the case of the Holy
Ghost. "It necessarily follows," he says, "that these energies which
accompany these Beings are relatively greater and less." This
compelling necessity in the Divine nature, which assigns a greater and
a less, has not been explained to us by Eunomius, nor as yet can we
ourselves understand it. Hitherto there has prevailed with those who
accept the Gospel in its plain simplicity the belief that there is no
necessity above the Godhead to bend the Only-begotten, like a slave, to
inferiority. But he quite overlooks this belief, though it was worth
some consideration; and he dogmatizes that we must conceive of this
inferiority. But this necessity of his does not stop there: it lands
him still further in blasphemy: as our examination in detail has
already shewn. If, that is, the Son was born, not from the Father, but
from some unsubstantial `energy,' He must be thought of as not merely
inferior to the Father, and this doctrine must end in pure Judaism.
This necessity, when followed out, exhibits the product of a non-entity
as not merely insignificant, but as something which it is a perilous
blasphemy even for an accuser to name. For as that which has its birth
from an existence necessarily exists, so that which is evolved from the
non-existent necessarily does the very contrary. When anything is not
self-existent, how can it generate another?

If, then, this energy which `follows' the Deity, and produces the Son,
has no existence of its own, no one can be so blind as not to see the
conclusion, and that his aim is to deny our Saviour's deity: and if the
personality of the Son is thus stolen by their doctrine from the Faith,
with nothing left of it but the name, it will be a long time before the
Holy Ghost, descended as He will be from a lineage of unrealities, will
be believed in again. The energy which `follows' the Deity has no
existence of its own: then common sense requires the product of this to
be unreal: then a second unsubstantial energy follows this product:
then it is declared that the Holy Ghost is formed by this energy: so
that their blasphemy is plain enough: it consists in nothing less than
in denying that after the Ingenerate God there is any real existence:
and their doctrine advances into shadowy and unsubstantial fictions,
where there is no foundation of any actual subsistence. In such
monstrous conclusions does their teaching strand the argument.
__________________________________________________________________

[115] There is of course reference here to John i. 3: and Eunomius is
called just below the `new theologian,' with an allusion of S. John,
who was called by virtue of this passage essentially ho theologos
__________________________________________________________________

S:21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish
unbelief.

But let us assume that this is not so: for they allow, forsooth, in
theoretic kindness towards humanity, that the Only-begotten and the
Holy Spirit have some personal existence: and if, in allowing this,
they had granted too the consequent conceptions about them, they would
not have been waging battle about the doctrine of the Church, nor cut
themselves off from the hope of Christians. But if they have lent an
existence to the Son and the Spirit, only to furnish a material on
which to erect their blasphemy, perhaps it might have been better for
them, though it is a bold thing to say, to abjure the Faith and
apostatize to the Jewish religion, rather than to insult the name of
Christian by this mock assent. The Jews at all events, though they have
persisted hitherto in rejecting the Word, carry their impiety only so
far as to deny that Christ has come, but to hope that He will come: we
do not hear from them any malignant or destructive conception of the
glory of Him Whom they expect. But this school of the new circumcision
[116] , or rather of "the concision," while they own that He has come,
resemble nevertheless those who insulted our Lord's bodily presence by
their wanton unbelief. They wanted to stone our Lord: these men stone
Him with their blasphemous titles. They urged His humble and obscure
origin, and rejected His divine birth before the ages: these men in the
same way deny His grand, sublime, ineffable generation from the Father,
and would prove that He owes His existence to a creation, just as the
human race, and all that is born, owe theirs. In the eyes of the Jews
it was a crime that our Lord should be regarded as Son of the Supreme:
these men also are indignant against those who are sincere in making
this confession of Him. The Jews thought to honour the Almighty by
excluding the Son from equal reverence: these men, by annihilating the
glory of the Son, think to bestow more honour on the Father. But it
would be difficult to do justice to the number and the nature of the
insults which they heap upon the Only-begotten: they invent an `energy'
prior to the personality of the Son and say that He is its work and
product: a thing which the Jews hitherto have not dared to say. Then
they circumscribe His nature, shutting Him off within certain limits of
the power which made Him: the amount of this productive energy is a
sort of measure within which they enclose Him: they have devised it as
a sort of cloak to muffle Him up in. We cannot charge the Jews with
doing this.
__________________________________________________________________

[116] this school of the new circumcision. This accusation is somewhat
discounted by Gregory's comparison of Eunomius elsewhere to Bardesanes
and Marcion, to the Manichees, to Nicholaus, to Philo (see Book XI.
691, 704, VI. 607, and especially VII. 645), and by his putting him
down a scholar of Plato. But a momentary advantage, calculated in
accordance with the character and capacities of the great mass of
Gregory's audience, could not be lost. The lessons of Libanius, the
rhetorician, had not been thrown away on Gregory.
__________________________________________________________________

S:22. He has no right to assert a greater and less in the Divine being.
A systematic statement of the teaching of the Church.

Then they discover in His being a certain shortness in the way of
deficiency, though they do not tell us by what method they measure that
which is devoid of quantity and size: they are able to find out exactly
by how much the size of the Only-begotten falls short of perfection,
and therefore has to be classed with the inferior and imperfect: much
else they lay down, partly by open assertion, partly by underhand
inference: all the time making their confession of the Son and the
Spirit a mere exercise-ground for their unbelieving spirit. How, then,
can we fail to pity them more even than the condemned Jews, when views
never ventured upon by the latter are inferred by the former? He who
makes the being of the Son and of the Spirit comparatively less, seems,
so far as words go perhaps, to commit but a slight profanity: but if
one were to test his view stringently it will be found the height of
blasphemy. Let us look into this, then, and let indulgence be shown me,
if, for the sake of doctrine, and to place in a clear light the lie
which they have demonstrated, I advance into an exposition of our own
conception of the truth.

Now the ultimate division of all being is into the Intelligible and the
Sensible. The Sensible world is called by the Apostle broadly "that
which is seen." For as all body has colour, and the sight apprehends
this, he calls this world by the rough and ready name of "that which is
seen," leaving out all the other qualities, which are essentially
inherent in its framework. The common term, again, for all the
intellectual world, is with the Apostle "that which is not seen [117]
:" by withdrawing all idea of comprehension by the senses he leads the
mind on to the immaterial and intellectual. Reason again divides this
"which is not seen" into the uncreate and the created, inferentially
comprehending it: the uncreate being that which effects the Creation,
the created that which owes its origin and its force to the uncreate.
In the Sensible world, then, is found everything that we comprehend by
our organs of bodily sense, and in which the differences of qualities
involve the idea of more and less, such differences consisting in
quantity, quality, and the other properties.

But in the Intelligible world,--that part of it, I mean, which is
created,--the idea of such differences as are perceived in the Sensible
cannot find a place: another method, then, is devised for discovering
the degrees of greater and less. The fountain, the origin, the supply
of every good is regarded as being in the world that is uncreate, and
the whole creation inclines to that, and touches and shares the Highest
Existence only by virtue of its part in the First Good: therefore it
follows from this participation in the highest blessings varying in
degree according to the amount of freedom in the will that each
possesses, that the greater and less in this creation is disclosed
according to the proportion of this tendency in each [118] . Created
intelligible nature stands on the borderline between good and the
reverse, so as to be capable of either, and to incline at pleasure to
the things of its choice, as we learn from Scripture; so that we can
say of it that it is more or less in the heights of excellence only in
proportion to its removal from the evil and its approach to the good.
Whereas [119] uncreate intelligible nature is far removed from such
distinctions: it does not possess the good by acquisition, or
participate only in the goodness of some good which lies above it: in
its own essence it is good, and is conceived as such: it is a source of
good, it is simple, uniform, incomposite, even by the confession of our
adversaries. But it has distinction within itself in keeping with the
majesty of its own nature, but not conceived of with regard to
quantity, as Eunomius supposes: (indeed the man who introduces the
notion of less of good into any of the things believed to be in the
Holy Trinity must admit thereby some admixture of the opposite quality
in that which fails of the good: and it is blasphemous to imagine this
in the case either of the Only-begotten, or of the Holy Spirit): we
regard it as consummately perfect and incomprehensibly excellent yet as
containing clear distinctions within itself which reside in the
peculiarities of each of the Persons: as possessing invariableness by
virtue of its common attribute of uncreatedness, but differentiated by
the unique character of each Person. This peculiarity contemplated in
each sharply and clearly divides one from the other: the Father, for
instance, is uncreate and ungenerate as well: He was never generated
any more than He was created. While this uncreatedness is common to Him
and the Son, and the Spirit, He is ungenerate as well as the Father.
This is peculiar and uncommunicable, being not seen in the other
Persons. The Son in His uncreatedness touches the Father and the
Spirit, but as the Son and the Only-begotten He has a character which
is not that of the Almighty or of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit by
the uncreatedness of His nature has contact with the Son and Father,
but is distinguished from them by His own tokens. His most peculiar
characteristic is that He is neither of those things which we
contemplate in the Father and the Son respectively. He is simply,
neither as ungenerate [120] , nor as only-begotten: this it is that
constitutes His chief peculiarity. Joined to the Father by His
uncreatedness, He is disjoined from Him again by not being `Father.'
United to the Son by the bond of uncreatedness, and of deriving His
existence from the Supreme, He is parted again from Him by the
characteristic of not being the Only-begotten of the Father, and of
having been manifested by means of the Son Himself. Again, as the
creation was effected by the Only-begotten, in order to secure that the
Spirit should not be considered to have something in common with this
creation because of His having been manifested by means of the Son, He
is distinguished from it by His unchangeableness, and independence of
all external goodness. The creation does not possess in its nature this
unchangeableness, as the Scripture says in the description of the fall
of the morning star, the mysteries on which subject are revealed by our
Lord to His disciples: "I saw Satan falling like lightning from heaven
[121] ." But the very attributes which part Him from the creation
constitute His relationship to the Father and the Son. All that is
incapable of degenerating has one and the same definition of
"unchangeable."

Having stated thus much as a preface we are in a position to discuss
the rest of our adversaries' teaching. "It necessarily follows," he
says in his system of the Son and the Spirit, "that the Beings are
relatively greater and less." Let us then inquire what is the meaning
of this necessity of difference. Does it arise from a comparison formed
from measuring them one with another in some material way, or from
viewing them on the spiritual ground of more or less of moral
excellence, or on that of pure being? But in the case of this last it
has been shown by competent thinkers that it is impossible to conceive
of any difference whatever, if one abstracts being from attributes and
properties, and looks at it according to its bare definition. Again, to
conceive of this difference as consisting in the case of the
Only-begotten and the Spirit in the intensity or abatement of moral
excellence, and in consequence to hint that their nature admits of
change in either direction, so as to be equally capable of opposites,
and to be placed in a borderland between moral beauty and its
opposite--that is gross profanity. A man who thinks this will be
proving that their nature is one thing in itself, and becomes something
else by virtue of its participation in this beauty or its opposite: as
happens with iron for example: if it is approached some time to the
fire, it assumes the quality of heat while remaining iron: if it is put
in snow or ice, it changes its quality to the mastering influence, and
lets the snow's coldness pass into its pores.

Now just as we cannot name the material of the iron from the quality
now to be observed upon it (for we do not give the name of fire or ice
to that which is tempered with either of these), so the moment we grant
the view of these heretics, that in the case [122] of the Life-giving
Power good does not reside in It essentially, but is imparted to it
only, it will become impossible to call it properly good: such a
conception of it will compel us to regard it as something different, as
not eternally exhibiting the good, as not in itself to be classed
amongst genuine goods, but as such that the good is at times not in it,
and is at times not likely to be in it. If these existences become good
only by sharing in a something superior to themselves, it is plain that
before this participation they were not good, and if, being other than
good, they were then coloured by the influence of good they must
certainly, if again isolated from this, be considered other than good:
so that, if this heresy prevails, the Divine Nature cannot be
apprehended as transmissive of good, but rather as itself needing
goodness: for how can one impart to another that which he does not
himself possess? If it is in a state of perfection, no abatement of
that can be conceived, and it is absurd to talk of less of perfection.
If on the other hand its participation of good is an imperfect one, and
this is what they mean by `less,' mark the consequence that anything in
that state can never help an inferior, but will be busied in satisfying
its own want: so that, according to them, Providence is a fiction, and
so is the judgment and the Dispensation of the Only-begotten, and all
the other works believed to be done, and still doing by Him: for He
will necessarily be employed in taking care of His own good, and must
abandon the supervision of the Universe [123] .

If, then, this surmise is to have its way, namely, that our Lord is not
perfected in every kind of good, it is very easy to see the conclusion
of the blasphemy. This being so, our faith is vain, and our preaching
vain; our hopes, which take their substance from our faith, are
unsubstantial. Why are they baptized into Christ [124] , if He has no
power of goodness of His own? God forgive me for saying it! Why do they
believe in the Holy Ghost, if the same account is given of Him? How are
they regenerate [125] by baptism from their mortal birth, if the
regenerating Power does not possess in its own nature infallibility and
independence? How can their `vile body' be changed, while they think
that He who is to change it Himself needs change, i.e. another to
change Him? For as long as a nature is in defect as regards the good,
the superior existence exerts upon this inferior one a ceaseless
attraction towards itself: and this craving for more will never stop:
it will be stretching out to something not yet grasped: the subject of
this deficiency will be always demanding a supply, always altering into
the grander nature, and yet will never touch perfection, because it
cannot find a goal to grasp, and cease its impulse upward. The First
Good is in its nature infinite, and so it follows of necessity that the
participation in the enjoyment of it will be infinite also, for more
will be always being grasped, and yet something beyond that which has
been grasped will always be discovered, and this search will never
overtake its Object, because its fund is as inexhaustible as the growth
of that which participates in it is ceaseless [126] .

Such, then, are the blasphemies which emerge from their making
differences between the Persons as to the good. If on the other hand
the degrees of more or less are to be understood in this case in some
material sense, the absurdity of this surmise will be obvious at once,
without examination in detail. Ideas of quality and distance, weight
and figure, and all that goes to complete the notion of a body, will
perforce be introduced along with such a surmise into the view of the
Divine Nature: and where a compound is assumed, there the dissolution
also of that compound must be admitted. A teaching so monstrous, which
dares to discover a smaller and a larger in what is sizeless and not
concrete lands us in these and suchlike conclusions, a few samples only
of which are here indicated: nor indeed would it be easy to unveil all
the mischief that lurks beneath it. Still the shocking absurdity that
results from their blasphemous premiss will be clear from this brief
notice. We now proceed to their next position, after a short defining
and confirmation of our own doctrine. For an inspired testimony is a
sure test of the truth of any doctrine: and so it seems to me that ours
may be well guaranteed by a quotation from the divine words.

In the division of all existing things, then, we find these
distinctions. There is, as appealing to our perceptions, the Sensible
world: and there is, beyond this, the world which the mind, led on by
objects of sense, can view: I mean the Intelligible: and in this we
detect again a further distinction into the Created and the Uncreate:
to the latter of which we have defined the Holy Trinity to belong, to
the former all that can exist or can be thought of after that. But in
order that this statement may not be left without a proof, but may be
confirmed by Scripture, we will add that our Lord was not created, but
came forth from the Father, as the Word with His own lips attests in
the Gospel, in a manner of birth or of proceeding ineffable and
mysterious: and what truer witness could be found than this constant
declaration of our Lord all through the Gospel, that the Very Father
was a father, not a creator, of Himself, and that He was not a work of
God, but Son of God? Just as when He wished to name His connexion with
humanity according to the flesh, He called that phase of his being Son
of Man, indicating thereby His kinship according to the nature of the
flesh with her from whom He was born, so also by the title of Son he
expresses His true and real relationship to the Almighty, by that name
of Son showing this natural connexion: no matter if there are some who,
for the contradiction of the truth, do take literally and without any
explanation, words used with a hidden meaning in the dark form of
parable, and adduce the expression `created,' put into the mouth of
Wisdom by the author of the Proverbs [127] , to support their perverted
views. They say, in fact, that "the Lord created me" is a proof that
our Lord is a creature, as if the Only-begotten Himself in that word
confessed it. But we need not heed such an argument. They do not give
reasons why we must refer that text to our Lord at all: neither will
they be able to show that the idea of the word in the Hebrew leads to
this and no other meaning, seeing that the other translators have
rendered it by "possessed" or "constituted:" nor, finally, even if this
was the idea in the original text, would its real meaning be so plain
and on the surface: for these proverbial discourses do not show their
aim at once, but rather conceal it, revealing it only by an indirect
import, and we may judge of the obscurity of this particular passage
from its context where he says, "When He set His throne upon the winds
[128] ," and all the similar expressions. What is God's throne? Is it
material or ideal? What are the winds? Are they these winds so familiar
to us, which the natural philosophers tell us are formed from vapours
and exhalations: or are they to be understood in another way not
familiar to man, when they are called the bases of His throne? What is
this throne of the immaterial, incomprehensible, and formless Deity?
Who could possibly understand all this in a literal sense?
__________________________________________________________________

[117] Colossians i. 16.

[118] i.e. according as each inclines more or less to the First Good.

[119] uncreate intelligible nature is far removed from such
distinctions. This was the impregnable position that Athanasius had
taken up. To admit that the Son is less than the Father, and the Spirit
less than the Son, is to admit the law of emanation such as hitherto
conceived, that is, the gradual and successive degradation of God's
substance; which had conducted oriental heretics as well as the
Neoplatonists to a sort of pantheistic polytheism. Arius had indeed
tried to resist this tendency so far as to bring back divinity to the
Supreme Being; but it was at the expense of the divinity of the Son,
Who was with him just as much a created Intermediate between God and
man, as one of the AEons: and Aetius and Eunomius treated the Holy
Ghost also as their master had treated the Son. But Arianism tended at
once to Judaism and, in making creatures adorable, to Greek polytheism.
There was only one way of cutting short the phantasmagoria of divine
emanations, without having recourse to the contradictory hypothesis of
Arius: and that was to reject the law of emanation, as hitherto
accepted, altogether. Far from admitting that the Supreme Being is
always weakening and degrading Himself in that which emanates from Him,
Athanasius lays down the principle that He produces within Himself
nothing but what is perfect, and first, and divine: and all that is not
perfect is a work of the Divine Will, which draws it out of nothing
(i.e. creates it), and not out of the Divine Substance. This was the
crowning result of the teaching of Alexandria and Origen. See Denys (De
la Philosophie d'Origene, p. 432, Paris, 1884).

[120] But He is not begotten. Athanasian Creed.

[121] Luke x. 18.

[122] tes zoopoiou dunameos.

[123] tou pantos. It is worth while to mention, once for all, the
distinction in the names used by the Stoics for the world, which had
long since passed from them into the common parlance. Including the
Empty, the world is called to pan, without it, holon (to holon, ta hola
frequently occurs with the Stoics). The pan, it was said, is neither
material nor immaterial, since it consists of both.

[124] Ti gar baptizontai eis Christon. This throws some light on the
much discussed passage, `Why are these baptized for the dead?' Gregory
at all events seems here to take it to mean, `Why are they baptized in
the name of a dead Christ?' as he is adopting partially S. Paul's
words, 1 Cor. xv. 29; as well as Heb. xi. 1 above.

[125] anagennontai

[126] Cf. Gregory's theory of human perfection; De anima et
Resurrectione, p. 229, 230. `The All-creating Wisdom fashioned these
souls, these receptacles with free wills, as vessels as it were, for
this very purpose, that there should be some capacities able to receive
His blessings, and become continually larger with the inpouring of the
stream. Such are the wonders that the participation in the Divine
blessings works; it makes him into whom they come larger and more
capacious....The fountain of blessings wells up unceasingly, and the
partaker's nature, finding nothing superfluous and without a use in
that which it receives, makes the whole influx an enlargement of its
own proportions....It is likely, therefore, that this bulk will mount
to a magnitude wherein no limit checks the growth.

[127] Proverbs viii. 22 (LXX). For another discussion of this passage,
see Book II. ch. 10 (beginning) with note.

[128] Proverbs viii. 27 (LXX).
__________________________________________________________________

S:23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by
Scripture passages.

It is therefore clear that these are metaphors, which contain a deeper
meaning than the obvious one: so that there is no reason from them that
any suspicion that our Lord was created should be entertained by
reverent inquirers, who have been trained according to the grand words
of the evangelist, that "all things that have been made were made by
Him" and "consist in Him." "Without Him was not anything made that was
made." The evangelist would not have so defined it if he had believed
that our Lord was one among the things made. How could all things be
made by Him and in Him consist, unless their Maker possessed a nature
different from theirs, and so produced, not Himself, but them? If the
creation was by Him, but He was not by Himself, plainly He is something
outside the creation. And after the evangelist has by these words so
plainly declared that the things that were made were made by the Son,
and did not pass into existence by any other channel, Paul [129]
follows and, to leave no ground at all for this profane talk which
numbers even the Spirit amongst the things that were made, he mentions
one after another all the existencies which the evangelist's words
imply: just as David in fact, after having said that "all things" were
put in subjection to man, adds each species which that "all"
comprehends, that is, the creatures on land, in water, and in air, so
does Paul the Apostle, expounder of the divine doctrines, after saying
that all things were made by Him, define by numbering them the meaning
of "all." He speaks of "the things that are seen [130] " and "the
things that are not seen:" by the first he gives a general name to all
things cognizable by the senses, as we have seen: by the latter he
shadows forth the intelligible world.

Now about the first there is no necessity of going into minute detail.
No one is so carnal, so brutelike, as to imagine that the Spirit
resides in the sensible world. But after Paul has mentioned "the things
that are not seen" he proceeds (in order that none may surmise that the
Spirit, because He is of the intelligible and immaterial world, on
account of this connexion subsists therein) to another most distinct
division into the things that have been made in the way of creation,
and the existence that is above creation. He mentions the several
classes of these created intelligibles: " [131] thrones," "dominions,"
"principalities," "powers," conveying his doctrine about these unseen
influences in broadly comprehensive terms: but by his very silence he
separates from his list of things created that which is above them. It
is just as if any one was required to name the sectional and inferior
officers in some army, and after he had gone through them all, the
commanders of tens, the commanders of hundreds, the captains and the
colonels [132] , and all the other names given to the authorities over
divisions, omitted after all to speak of the supreme command which
extended over all the others: not from deliberate neglect, or from
forgetfulness, but because when required or intending to name only the
several ranks which served under it, it would have been an insult to
include this supreme command in the list of the inferior. So do we find
it with Paul, who once in Paradise was admitted to mysteries, when he
had been caught up there, and had become a spectator of the wonders
that are above the heavens, and saw and heard "things which it is not
lawful for a man to utter [133] ." This Apostle proposes to tell us of
all that has been created by our Lord, and he gives them under certain
comprehensive terms: but, having traversed all the angelic and
transcendental world, he stops his reckoning there, and refuses to drag
down to the level of creation that which is above it. Hence there is a
clear testimony in Scripture that the Holy Spirit is higher than the
creation. Should any one attempt to refute this, by urging that neither
are the Cherubim mentioned by Paul, that they equally with the Spirit
are left out, and that therefore this omission must prove either that
they also are above the creation, or that the Holy Spirit is not any
more than they to be believed above it, let him measure the full intent
of each name in the list: and he will find amongst them that which from
not being actually mentioned seems, but only seems, omitted. Under
"thrones" he includes the Cherubim, giving them this Greek name, as
more intelligible than the Hebrew name for them. He knew that "God sits
upon the Cherubim:" and so he calls these Powers the thrones of Him who
sits thereon. In the same way there are included in the list Isaiah's
Seraphim [134] , by whom the mystery of the Trinity was luminously
proclaimed, when they uttered that marvellous cry "Holy," being
awestruck with the beauty in each Person of the Trinity. They are named
under the title of "powers" both by the mighty Paul, and by the prophet
David. The latter says, "Bless ye the Lord all ye His powers, ye
ministers of His that do His pleasure [135] :" and Isaiah instead of
saying "Bless ye" has written the very words of their blessing, "Holy,
Holy, Holy, Lord God of hosts: the whole earth is full of His glory"
and he has revealed by what one of the Seraphim did (to him) that these
powers are ministers that do God's pleasure, effecting the `purging of
sin' according to the will of Him Who sent them: for this is the
ministry of these spiritual beings, viz., to be sent forth for the
salvation of those who are being saved.

That divine Apostle perceived this. He understood that the same matter
is indicated under different names by the two prophets, and he took the
best known of the two words, and called those Seraphim "powers:" so
that no ground is left to our critics for saying that any single one of
these beings is omitted equally with the Holy Ghost from the catalogue
of creation. We learn from the existences detailed by Paul that while
some existences have been mentioned, others have been passed over: and
while he has taken count of the creation in masses as it were, he has
(elsewhere) mentioned as units those things which are conceived of
singly. For it is a peculiarity of the Holy Trinity that it is to be
proclaimed as consisting of individuals: one Father, one Son, one Holy
Ghost: whereas those existences aforesaid are counted in masses,
"dominions," "principalities," "lordships," "powers," so as to exclude
any suspicion that the Holy Ghost was one of them. Paul is wisely
silent upon our mysteries; he understands how, after having heard those
unspeakable words in paradise, to refrain from proclaiming those
secrets when he is making mention of lower beings.

But these foes of the truth rush in upon the ineffable; they degrade
the majesty of the Spirit to the level of the creation; they act as if
they had never heard that the Word of God, when confiding to His
disciples the secret of knowing God, Himself said that the life of
[136] the regenerate was to be completed in them and imparted in the
name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and, thereby ranking the Spirit
with the Father and Himself, precluded Him from being confused with the
creation. From both, therefore, we may get a reverential and proper
conception with regard to Him: from Paul's omitting the Spirit's
existence in the mention of the creation, and from our Lord's joining
the Spirit with His Father and Himself in mentioning the life-giving
power. Thus does our reason, under the guidance of the Scripture, place
not only the Only-begotten but the Holy Spirit as well above the
creation, and prompt us in accordance with our Saviour's command to
contemplate Him by faith in the blessed world of life giving and
uncreated existence: and so this unit, which we believe in, above
creation, and sharing in the supreme and absolutely perfect nature,
cannot be regarded as in any way a `less,' although this teacher of
heresy attempt to curtail its infinitude by introducing the idea of
degrees, and thus contracting the divine perfection by defining a
greater and a less as residing in the Persons.
__________________________________________________________________

[129] in the Canon. (Oehler's stopping is here at fault, i.e. he begins
a new paragraph with 'Ekdechetai ton logon touton ho Paulos). We need
not speculate whether Gregory was aware that the Epistle to the
Colossians (quoted below) is an earlier `Gospel' than S. John's.

[130] Coloss. i. 16.

[131] Coloss. i. 16.

[132] taxiarchas kai lochagous, hekatontarchous te kai chiliarchous.
The difference between the two pairs seems to be the difference between
`non-commissioned' and `commissioned' officers.

[133] 2 Corinth. xii. 4.

[134] Isaiah vi. 6, 7.

[135] Psalm ciii. 21.

[136] tois anagennomenois
__________________________________________________________________

S:24. His elaborate account of degrees and differences in `works' and
`energies' within the Trinity is absurd.

Now let us see what he adds, as the consequence of this. After saying
that we must perforce regard the Being as greater and less and that
while [137] the ones, by virtue of a pre-eminent magnitude and value,
occupy a leading place, the others must be detruded to a lower place,
because their nature and their value is secondary, he adds this; "their
difference amounts to that existing between their works: it would in
fact be impious to say that the same energy produced the angels or the
stars, and the heavens or man; but one would positively maintain about
this, that in proportion as some works are older and more honourable
than others, so does one energy transcend another, because sameness of
energy produces sameness of work, and difference of work indicates
difference of energy."

I suspect that their author himself would find it difficult to tell us
what he meant when he wrote those words. Their thought is obscured by
the rhetorical mud, which is so thick that one can hardly see beyond
any clue to interpret them. "Their difference amounts to that existing
between their works" is a sentence which might be suspected of coming
from some Loxias of pagan story, mystifying his hearers. But if we may
make a guess at the drift of his observations here by following out
those which we have already examined, this would be his meaning, viz.,
that if we know the amount of difference between one work and another,
we shall know the amount of that between the corresponding energies.
But what "works" he here speaks of, it is impossible to discover from
his words. If he means the works to be observed in the creation, I do
not see how this hangs on to what goes before. For the question was
about Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: what occasion was there, then, for
one thinking rationally to inquire one after another into the nature of
earth, and water, and air, and fire, and the different animals, and to
distinguish some works as older and more honourable than others, and to
speak of one energy as transcending another? But if he calls the
Only-begotten and the Holy Spirit "works," what does he mean by the
"differences" of the energies which produce these works: and what are
[138] those wonderful energies of this writer which transcend the
others? He has neither explained the particular way in which he means
them to "transcend" each other; nor has he discussed the nature of
these energies: but he has advanced in neither direction, neither
proving so far their real subsistence, nor their being some
unsubstantial exertion of a will. Throughout it all his meaning hangs
suspended between these two conceptions, and oscillates from one to the
other. He adds that "it would be impious to say that the same energy
produced the angels or the stars, and the heavens or man." Again we ask
what necessity there is to draw this conclusion from his previous
remarks? I do not see that it is proved any more [139] because the
energies vary amongst themselves as much as the works do, and because
the works are not all from the same source but are stated by him to
come from different sources. As for the heavens and each angel, star,
and man, or anything else understood by the word "creation," we know
from Scripture that they are all the work of One: whereas in their
system of theology the Son and the Spirit are not the work of one and
the same, the Son being the work of the energy which `follows' the
first Being, and the Spirit the further work of that work. What the
connexion, then, is between that statement and the heavens, man, angel,
star, which he drags in, must be revealed by himself, or some one whom
he has initiated into his profound philosophy. The blasphemy intended
by his words is plain enough, but the way the profanity is stated is
inconsistent with itself. To suppose that within the Holy Trinity there
is a difference as wide as that which we can observe between the
heavens which envelope the whole creation, and one single man or the
star which shines in them, is openly profane: but still the connexion
of such thoughts and the pertinence of such a comparison is a mystery
to me, and I suspect also to its author himself. If indeed his account
of the creation were of this sort, viz., that while the heavens were
the work of some transcendent energy each star in them was the result
of an energy accompanying the heavens, and that then an angel was the
result of that star, and a man of that angel, his argument would then
have consisted in a comparison of similar processes, and might have
somewhat confirmed his doctrine. But since he grants that it was all
made by One (unless he wishes to contradict Scripture downright), while
he describes the production of the Persons after a different fashion,
what connexion is there between this newly imported view and what went
before?

But let it be granted to him that this comparison does have some
connexion with proving variation amongst the Beings (for this is what
he desires to establish); still let us see how that which follows hangs
on to what he has just said, `In proportion as one work is prior to
another and more precious than it, so would a pious mind affirm that
one energy transcends another.' If in this he alludes to the sensible
world, the statement is a long way from the matter in hand. There is no
necessity whatever that requires one whose subject is theological to
philosophize about the order in which the different results achieved in
the world-making are to come, and to lay down that the energies of the
Creator are higher and lower analogously to the magnitude of each thing
then made. But if he speaks of the Persons themselves, and means by
works that are `older and more honourable' those `works' which he has
just fashioned in his own creed, that is, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,
it would be perhaps better to pass over in silence such an abominable
view, than to create even the appearance of its being an argument by
entangling ourselves with it. For can a `more honourable' be discovered
where there is not a less honourable? If he can go so far, and with so
light a heart, in profanity as to hint that the expression and the idea
`less precious' can be predicated of anything whatever which we believe
of the Trinity, then it were well to stop our ears, and get as quickly
as possible out of hearing of such wickedness, and the contagion of
reasoning which will be transfused into the heart, as from a vessel
full of uncleanness.

Can any one dare to speak of the divine and supreme Being in such a way
that a less degree of honour in comparison is proved by the argument.
"That all," says the evangelist, "may honour the Son, as they honour
the Father. [140] " This utterance (and such an utterance is a law to
us) makes a law of this equality in honour: yet this man annuls both
the law and its Giver, and apportions to the One more, to the Other
less of honour, by some occult method for measuring its extra abundance
which he has discovered. By the custom of mankind the differences of
worth are the measure of the amount of honour which each in authority
receives; so that inferiors do not approach the lower magistracies in
the same guise exactly as they do the sovereign, and the greater or
less display of fear or reverence on their part indicates the greater
or the less worshipfulness in the objects of it: in fact we may
discover, in this disposition of inferiors, who are the specially
honourable; when, for instance, we see some one feared beyond his
neighbours, or the recipient of more reverence than the rest. But in
the case of the divine nature, because every perfection in the way of
goodness is connoted with the very name of God, we cannot discover, at
all events as we look at it, any ground for degrees of honour. Where
there is no greater and smaller in power, or glory, or wisdom, or love,
or of any other imaginable good whatever, but the good which the Son
has is the Father's also, and all that is the Father's is seen in the
Son, what possible state of mind can induce us to show the more
reverence in the case of the Father? If we think of royal power and
worth the Son is King: if of a judge, `all judgment is committed to the
Son [141] :' if of the magnificent office of Creation, `all things were
made by Him [142] :' if of the Author of our life, we know the True
Life came down as far as our nature: if of our being taken out of
darkness, we know He is the True Light, who weans us from darkness: if
wisdom is precious to any, Christ is God's power and Wisdom [143] .

Our very souls, then, being disposed so naturally and in proportion to
their capacity, and yet so miraculously, to recognize so many and great
wonders in Christ, what further excess of honour is left us to pay
exclusively to the Father, as inappropriate to the Son? Human reverence
of the Deity, looked at in its plainest meaning, is nothing else but an
attitude of love towards Him, and a confession of the perfections in
Him: and I think that the precept `so ought the Son to be honoured as
the Father [144] ,' is enjoined by the Word in place of love. For the
Law commands that we pay to God this fitting honour by loving Him with
all our heart and strength and here is the equivalent of that love, in
that the Word as Lawgiver thus says, that the Son ought to be honoured
as the Father.

It was this kind of honour that the great David fully paid, when he
confessed to the Lord in a prelude [145] of his psalmody that he loved
the Lord, and told all the reasons for his love, calling Him his "rock"
and "fortress," and "refuge," and "deliverer," and "God-helper," and
"hope," and "buckler," and "horn of salvation," and "protector." If the
Only-begotten Son is not all these to mankind, let the excess of honour
be reduced to this extent as this heresy dictates: but if we have
always believed Him to be, and to be entitled to, all this and even
more, and to be equal in every operation and conception of the good to
the majesty of the Father's goodness, how can it be pronounced
consistent, either not to love such a character, or to slight it while
we love it? No one can say that we ought to love Him with all our heart
and strength, but to honour Him only with half. If, then, the Son is to
be honoured with the whole heart in rendering to Him all our love, by
what device can anything superior to His honour be discovered, when
such a measure of honour is paid Him in the coin of love as our whole
heart is capable of? Vainly, therefore, in the case of Beings
essentially honourable, will any one dogmatize about a superior honour,
and by comparison suggest an inferior honour.

Again; only in the case of the creation is it true to speak of
`priority.' The sequence of works was there displayed in the order of
the days; and the heavens may be said to have preceded by so much the
making of man, and that interval may be measured by the interval of
days. But in the divine nature, which transcends all idea of time and
surpasses all reach of thought, to talk of a "prior" and a "later" in
the honours of time is a privilege only of this new-fangled philosophy.
In short he who declares the Father to be `prior' to the subsistence of
the Son declares nothing short of this, viz., that the Son is later
than the things made by the Son [146] (if at least it is true to say
that all the ages, and all duration of time was created after the Son,
and by the Son).
__________________________________________________________________

[137] tas men, i.e. Housios. Eunomius' Arianism here degenerates into
mere Emanationism: but even in this system the Substances were living:
it is best on the whole to translate ousia `being,' and this, as a
rule, is adhered to throughout.

[138] kakeinai hai energeiai autai.

[139] to parellachthai, k.t.l. This is Oehler's emendation for the
faulty reading to of the editions.

[140] John v. 23.

[141] John v. 22; i. 3.

[142] John v. 22; i. 3.

[143] 1 Cor. i. 24. "Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God."

[144] John v. 23. The Gospel enjoins honour and means love: the Law
enjoins love and means honour.

[145] a prelude. See Psalm vii. 1 and Psalm xviii. 1, "fortress,"
krataioma; stereoma, LXX.

[146] The meaning is that, if the Son is later (in time) than the
Father, then time must have already existed for this comparison to be
made; i.e. the Son is later than time as well as the Father. This
involves a contradiction.
__________________________________________________________________

S:25. He who asserts that the Father is `prior' to the Son with any
thought of an interval must perforce allow that even the Father is not
without beginning.

But more than this: what exposes still further the untenableness of
this view is, that, besides positing a beginning in time of the Son's
existence, it does not, when followed out, spare the Father even, but
proves that He also had his beginning in time. For any recognizing mark
that is presupposed for the generation of the Son must certainly define
as well the Father's beginning.

To make this clear, it will be well to discuss it more carefully. When
he pronounces that the life of the Father is prior to that of the Son,
he places a certain interval between the two; now, he must mean, either
that this interval is infinite, or that it is included within fixed
limits. But the principle of an intervening mean will not allow him to
call it infinite; he would annul thereby the very conception of Father
and Son and the thought of anything connecting them, as long as this
infinite were limited on neither side, with no idea of a Father cutting
it short above, nor that of a Son checking it below. The very nature of
the infinite is, to be extended in either direction, and to have no
bounds of any kind.

Therefore if the conception of Father and Son is to remain firm and
immoveable, he will find no ground for thinking this interval is
infinite: his school must place a definite interval of time between the
Only-begotten and the Father. What I say, then, is this: that this view
of theirs will bring us to the conclusion that the Father is not from
everlasting, but from a definite point in time. I will convey my
meaning by familiar illustrations; the known shall make the unknown
clear. When we say, on the authority of the text of Moses, that man was
made the fifth day after the heavens, we tacitly imply that before
those same days the heavens did not exist either; a subsequent event
goes to define, by means of the interval which precedes it, the
occurrence also of a previous event. If this example does not make our
contention plain, we can give others. We say that `the Law given by
Moses was four hundred and thirty years later than the Promise to
Abraham.' If after traversing, step by step upwards [147] , the
anterior time we reach this end of that number of years, we firmly
grasp as well the fact that, before that date, God's Promise was not
either. Many such instances could be given, but I decline to be minute
and wearisome.

Guided, then, by these examples, let us examine the question before us.
Our adversaries conceive of the existences of Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit as involving elder and younger, respectively. Well then; if, at
the bidding of this heresy, we journey up beyond the generation of the
Son, and approach that intervening duration which the mere fancy of
these dogmatists supposes between the Father and the Son, and then
reach that other and supreme point of time by which they close that
duration, there we find the life of the Father fixed as it were upon an
apex; and thence we must necessarily conclude that before it the Father
is not to be believed to have existed always.

If you still feel difficulties about this, let us again take an
illustration. It shall be that of two rulers, one shorter than the
other. If we fit the bases of the two together we know from the tops
the extra length of the one; from the end of the lesser lying alongside
of it we measure this excess, supplementing the deficiency of the
shorter ruler by a calculation, and so bringing it up to the end of the
longer; a cubit for instance, or whatever be the distance of the one
end from the other. So, if there is, as our adversaries say, an excess
of some kind in the Father's life as compared with the Son's, it must
needs consist in some definite interval of duration: and they will
allow that this interval of excess cannot be in the future, for that
Both are imperishable, even the foes of the truth will grant. No; they
conceive of this difference as in the past, and instead of equalizing
the life of the Father and the Son there, they extend the conception of
the Father by an interval of living. But every interval must be bounded
by two ends: and so for this interval which they have devised we must
grasp the two points by which the ends are denoted. The one portion
takes its beginning, in their view, from the Son's generation; and the
other portion must end in some other point, from which the interval
starts, and by which it limits itself. What this is, is for them to
tell us; unless, indeed, they are ashamed of the consequences of their
own assumptions.

It admits not of a doubt, then, that they will not be able to find at
all the other portion, corresponding to the first portion of their
fancied interval, except they were to suppose some beginning of their
Ungenerate, whence the middle, that connects with the generation of the
Son, may be conceived of as starting. We affirm, then, that when he
makes the Son later than the Father by a certain intervening extension
of life, he must grant a fixed beginning to the Father's existence
also, regulated by this same interval of his devising; and thus their
much-vaunted "Ungeneracy" of the Father will be found to be undermined
by its own champions' arguments; and they will have to confess that
their Ungenerate God did once not exist, but began from a
starting-point: indeed, that which has a beginning of being is not
inoriginate. But if we must at all risks confess this absence of
beginning in the Father, let not such exactitude be displayed in fixing
for the life of the Son a point which, as the term of His existence,
must cut Him off from the life on the other side of it; let it suffice
on the ground of causation only to conceive of the Father as before the
Son; and let not the Father's life be thought of as a separate and
peculiar one before the generation of the Son, lest we should have to
admit the idea inevitably associated with this of an interval before
the appearance of the Son which measures the life of Him Who begot Him,
and then the necessary consequence of this, that a beginning of the
Father's life also must be supposed by virtue of which their fancied
interval may be stayed in its upward advance so as to set a limit and a
beginning to this previous life of the Father as well: let it suffice
for us, when we confess the `coming from Him,' to admit also, bold as
it may seem, the `living along with Him;' for we are led by the written
oracles to such a belief. For we have been taught by Wisdom to
contemplate the brightness [148] of the everlasting light in, and
together with, the very everlastingness of that primal light, joining
in one idea the brightness and its cause, and admitting no priority.
Thus shall we save the theory of our Faith, the Son's life not failing
in the upward view, and the Father's everlastingness being not trenched
upon by supposing any definite beginning for the Son.
__________________________________________________________________

[147] step by step upwards. di' analuseos. This does not seem to be
used in the Platonic (dialectic) sense, but in the N.T. sense of
"return" or "retrogression," cf. Luke xii. 36. Gregory elsewhere De
Hom. Opif. xxv.), uses analuein in this sense: speaking of the three
examples of Christ's power of raising from the dead, he says, `you
see...all these equally at the command of one and the same voice
returning (analuontas) to life.' 'Analusis thus also came to mean
"death," as a `return.' Cf. Ecclesiastes xi. 7.

[148] brightness. Heb. i. 3, apaugasma tes doxes.
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S:26. It will not do to apply this conception, as drawn out above, of
the Father and Son to the Creation, as they insist on doing: but we
must contemplate the Son apart with the Father, and believe that the
Creation had its origin from a definite point.

But perhaps some of the opponents of this will say, `The Creation also
has an acknowledged beginning; and yet the things in it are not
connected in thought with the everlastingness of the Father, and it
does not check, by having a beginning of its own, the infinitude of the
divine life, which is the monstrous conclusion this discussion has
pointed out in the case of the Father and the Son. One therefore of two
things must follow. Either the Creation is everlasting; or, it must be
boldly admitted, the Son is later in time (than the Father). The
conception of an interval in time will lead to monstrous conclusions,
even when measured from the Creation up to the Creator.'

One who demurs so, perhaps from not attending closely to the meaning of
our belief, fights against it with alien comparisons which have nothing
to do with the matter in hand. If he could point to anything above
Creation which has its origin marked by any interval of time, and it
were acknowledged possible by all to think of any time-interval as
existing before Creation, he might have occasion for endeavouring to
destroy by such attacks that everlastingness of the Son which we have
proved above. But seeing that by all the suffrages of the faithful it
is agreed that, of all things that are, part is by creation, and part
before creation, and that the divine nature is to be believed uncreate
(although within it, as our faith teaches, there is a cause, and there
is a subsistence produced, but without separation, from the cause),
while the creation is to be viewed in an extension of distances,--all
order and sequence of time in events can be perceived only in the ages
(of this creation), but the nature pre-existent to those ages escapes
all distinctions of before and after, because reason cannot see in that
divine and blessed life the things which it observes, and that
exclusively, in creation. The creation, as we have said, comes into
existence according to a sequence of order, and is commensurate with
the duration of the ages, so that if one ascends along the line of
things created to their beginning, one will bound the search with the
foundation of those ages. But the world above creation, being removed
from all conception of distance, eludes all sequence of time: it has no
commencement of that sort: it has no end in which to cease its advance,
according to any discoverable method of order. Having traversed the
ages and all that has been produced therein, our thought catches a
glimpse of the divine nature, as of some immense ocean, but when the
imagination stretches onward to grasp it, it gives no sign in its own
case of any beginning; so that one who after inquiring with curiosity
into the `priority' of the ages tries to mount to the source of all
things will never be able to make a single calculation on which he may
stand; that which he seeks will always be moving on before, and no
basis will be offered him for the curiosity of thought.

It is clear, even with a moderate insight into the nature of things,
that there is nothing by which we can measure the divine and blessed
Life. It is not in time, but time flows from it; whereas the creation,
starting from a manifest beginning, journeys onward to its proper end
through spaces of time; so that it is possible, as Solomon somewhere
[149] says, to detect in it a beginning, an end, and a middle; and mark
the sequence of its history by divisions of time. But the supreme and
blessed life has no time-extension accompanying its course, and
therefore no span nor measure. Created things are confined within the
fitting measures, as within a boundary, with due regard to the good
adjustment of the whole by the pleasure of a wise Creator; and so,
though human reason in its weakness cannot reach the whole way to the
contents of creation, yet still we do not doubt that the creative power
has assigned to all of them their limits and that they do not stretch
beyond creation. But this creative power itself, while circumscribing
by itself the growth of things, has itself no circumscribing bounds; it
buries in itself every effort of thought to mount up to the source of
God's life, and it eludes the busy and ambitious strivings to get to
the end of the Infinite. Every discursive effort of thought to go back
beyond the ages will ascend only so far as to see that that which it
seeks can never be passed through: time and its contents seem the
measure and the limit of the movement and the working of human thought,
but that which lies beyond remains outside its reach; it is a world
where it may not tread, unsullied by any object that can be
comprehended by man. No form, no place, no size, no reckoning of time,
or anything else knowable, is there: and so it is inevitable that our
apprehensive faculty, seeking as it does always some object to grasp,
must fall back from any side of this incomprehensible existence, and
seek in the ages and in the creation which they hold its kindred and
congenial sphere.

All, I say, with any insight, however moderate, into the nature of
things, know that the world's Creator laid time and space as a
background to receive what was to be; on this foundation He builds the
universe. It is not possible that anything which has come or is now
coming into being by way of creation can be independent of space or
time. But the existence which is all-sufficient, everlasting,
world-enveloping, is not in space, nor in time: it is before these, and
above these in an ineffable way; self-contained, knowable by faith
alone; immeasurable by ages; without the accompaniment of time; seated
and resting in itself, with no associations of past or future, there
being nothing beside and beyond itself, whose passing can make
something past and something future. Such accidents are confined to the
creation, whose life is divided with time's divisions into memory and
hope. But within that transcendent and blessed Power all things are
equally present as in an instant: past and future are within its
all-encircling grasp and its comprehensive view.

This is the Being in which, to use the words of the Apostle, all things
are formed; and we, with our individual share in existence, live and
move, and have our being [150] . It is above beginning, and presents no
marks of its inmost nature: it is to be known of only in the
impossibility of perceiving it. That indeed is its most special
characteristic, that its nature is too high for any distinctive
attribute. A very different account to the Uncreate must be given of
Creation: it is this very thing that takes it out of all comparison and
connexion with its Maker; this difference, I mean, of essence, and this
admitting a special account explanatory of its nature which has nothing
in common with that of Him who made it. The Divine nature is a stranger
to these special marks in the creation: It leaves beneath itself the
sections of time, the `before' and the `after,' and the ideas of space:
in fact `higher' cannot properly be said of it at all. Every conception
about that uncreate Power is a sublime principle, and involves the idea
of what is proper in the highest degree [151] .

We have shewn, then, by what we have said that the Only-begotten and
the Holy Spirit are not to be looked for in the creation but are to be
believed above it; and that while the creation may perhaps by the
persevering efforts of ambitious seekers be seized in its own
beginning, whatever that may be, the supernatural will not the more for
that come within the realm of knowledge, for no mark before the ages
indicative of its nature can be found. Well, then, if in this uncreate
existence those wondrous realities, with their wondrous names of
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are to be in our thoughts, how can we
imagine, of that pre-temporal world, that which our busy, restless
minds perceive in things here below by comparing one of them with
another and giving it precedence by an interval of time? For there,
with the Father, unoriginate, ungenerate, always Father, the idea of
the Son as coming from Him yet side by side with Him is inseparably
joined; and through the Son and yet with Him, before any vague and
unsubstantial conception comes in between, the Holy Spirit is found at
once in closest union; not subsequent in existence to the Son, as if
the Son could be thought of as ever having been without the Spirit; but
Himself also owning the same cause of His being, i.e. the God over all,
as the Only-begotten Light, and having shone forth in that very Light,
being divisible neither by duration nor by an alien nature from the
Father or from the Only-begotten. There are no intervals in that
pre-temporal world: and difference on the score of being there is none.
It is not even possible, comparing the uncreate with the uncreated, to
see differences; and the Holy Ghost is uncreate, as we have before
shewn.

This being the view held by all who accept in its simplicity the
undiluted Gospel, what occasion was there for endeavouring to dissolve
this fast union of the Son with the Father by means of the creation, as
if it were necessary to suppose either that the Son was from
everlasting along with the creation, or that He too, equally with it,
was later? For the generation of the Son does not fall within time
[152] , any more than the creation was before time: so that it can in
no kind of way be right to partition the indivisible, and to insert, by
declaring that there was a time when the Author of all existence was
not, this false idea of time into the creative Source of the Universe.

Our previous contention, therefore, is true, that the everlastingness
of the Son is included, along with the idea of His birth, in the
Father's ungeneracy; and that, if any interval were to be imagined
dividing the two, that same interval would fix a beginning for the life
of the Almighty;--a monstrous supposition. But there is nothing to
prevent the creation, being, as it is, in its own nature something
other than its Creator and in no point trenching on that pure
pre-temporal world, from having, in our belief, a beginning of its own,
as we have said. To say that the heavens and the earth and other
contents of creation were out of things which are not, or, as the
Apostle says, out of "things not seen, [153] " inflicts no dishonour
upon the Maker of this universe; for we know from Scripture that all
these things are not from everlasting nor will remain for ever. If on
the other hand it could be believed that there is something in the Holy
Trinity which does not coexist with the Father, if following out this
heresy any thought could be entertained of stripping the Almighty of
the glory of the Son and Holy Ghost, it would end in nothing else than
in a God manifestly removed from every deed and thought that was good
and godlike. But if the Father, existing before the ages, is always in
glory, and the pre-temporal Son is His glory, and if in like manner the
Spirit of Christ is the Son's glory, always to be contemplated along
with the Father and the Son, what training could have led this man of
learning to declare that there is a `before' in what is timeless, and a
`more honourable' in what is all essentially honourable, and
preferring, by comparisons, the one to the other, to dishonour the
latter by this partiality? The term in opposition [154] to the more
honourable makes it clearer still whither he is tending.
__________________________________________________________________

[149] Compare Eccles. iii. 1-11; and viii. 5, "and a wise man's heart
discerneth both time and judgment."

[150] Acts xvii. 28; Col. i. 17.

[151] kai ton tou kuriotatou logon epechei;

[152] The generation of the Son does not fall within time. On this
"eternal generation" Denys (De la Philosophie d'Origene, p. 452) has
the following remarks, illustrating the probable way that Athanasians
would have dealt with Eunomius: "If we do not see how God's
indivisibility remains in the co-existence of the three Persons, we can
throw the blame of this difficulty upon the feebleness of our reason:
while it is a manifest contradiction to admit at one and the same time
the simplicity of the Uncreated, and some change or inequality within
His Being. I know that the defenders of the orthodox belief might be
troubled with their adversaries' argument. (Eunom. Apol. 22.) `If we
admit that the Son, the energy creative of the world, is equal to the
Father, it amounts to admitting that He is the actual energy of the
Father in Creation, and that this energy is equal to His essence. But
that is to return to the mistake of the Greeks who identified His
essence and His energy, and consequently made the world coexist with
God.' A serious difficulty, certainly, and one that has never yet been
solved, nor will be; as all the questions likewise which refer to the
Uncreated and Created, to eternity and time. It is true we cannot
explain how God's eternally active energy does prolong itself
eternally. But what is this difficulty compared with those which, with
the hypothesis of Eunomius, must be swallowed? We must suppose, so,
that the 'Agennetos, since His energy is not eternal, became in a given
place and moment, and that He was at that point the Gennetos. We must
suppose that this activity communicated to a creature that privilege of
the Uncreated which is most incommunicable, viz. the power of creating
other creatures. We must suppose that these creatures, unconnected as
they are with the 'Agennetos (since He has not made them), nevertheless
conceive of and see beyond their own creator a Being, who cannot be
anything to them. [This direct intuition on our part of the Deity was a
special tenet of Eunomius.] Finally we must suppose that these
creatures, seeing that Eunomius agrees with orthodox believers that the
end of this world will be but a commencement, will enter into new
relations with this 'Agennetos, when the Son shall have submitted all
things to the Father."

[153] Heb. xi. 1; 2 Cor. iv. 18.

[154] antidiastole
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S:27. He falsely imagines that the same energies produce the same
works, and that variation in the works indicates variation in the
energies.

Of the same strain is that which he adds in the next paragraph; "the
same energies producing sameness of works, and different works
indicating difference in the energies as well." Finely and irresistibly
does this noble thinker plead for his doctrine. "The same energies
produce sameness of works." Let us test this by facts. The energy of
fire is always one and the same; it consists in heating: but what sort
of agreement do its results show? Bronze melts in it; mud hardens; wax
vanishes: while all other animals are destroyed by it, the salamander
is preserved alive [155] ; tow burns, asbestos is washed by the flames
as if by water; so much for his `sameness of works from one and the
same energy.' How too about the sun? Is not his power of warming always
the same; and yet while he causes one plant to grow, he withers
another, varying the results of his operation in accordance with the
latent force of each. `That on the rock' withers; `that in deep earth'
yields an hundredfold. Investigate Nature's work, and you will learn,
in the case of those bodies which she produces artistically, the amount
of accuracy there is in his statement that `sameness of energy effects
sameness of result.' One single operation is the cause of conception,
but the composition of that which is effected internally therein is so
varied that it would be difficult for any one even to count all the
various qualities of the body. Again, imbibing the milk is one single
operation on the part of the infant, but the results of its being
nourished so are too complex to be all detailed. While this food passes
from the channel of the mouth into the secretory ducts [156] , the
transforming power of Nature forwards it into the several parts
proportionately to their wants; for by digestion she divides its sum
total into the small change of multitudinous differences, and into
supplies congenial to the subject matter with which she deals; so that
the same milk goes to feed arteries, veins, brain and its membranes,
marrow, bones, nerves [157] , sinews, tendons, flesh, surface,
cartilages, fat, hair, nails, perspiration, vapours, phlegm, bile, and
besides these, all useless superfluities deriving from the same source.
You could not name either an organ, whether of motion or sensation, or
anything else making up the body's bulk, which was not formed (in spite
of startling differences) from this one and selfsame operation of
feeding. If one were to compare the mechanic arts too it will be seen
what is the scientific value of his statement; for there we see in them
all the same operation, I mean the movement of the hands; but what have
the results in common? What has building a shrine to do with a coat,
though manual labour is employed on both? The house-breaker and the
well-digger both move their hands: the mining of the earth, the murder
of a man are results of the motion of the hands. The soldier slays the
foe, and the husbandman wields the fork which breaks the clod, with his
hands. How, then, can this doctrinaire lay it down that the `same
energies produce sameness of work?' But even if we were to grant that
this view of his had any truth in it, the essential union of the Son
with the Father, and of the Holy Spirit with the Son, is yet again more
fully proved. For if there existed any variation in their energies, so
that the Son worked His will in a different manner to the Father, then
(on the above supposition) it would be fair to conjecture, from this
variation, a variation also in the beings which were the result of
these varying energies. But if it is true that the manner of the
Father's working is likewise the manner always of the Son's, both from
our Lord's own words and from what we should have expected a
priori--(for the one is not unbodied while the other is embodied, the
one is not from this material, the other from that, the one does not
work his will in this time and place, the other in that time and place,
nor is there difference of organs in them producing difference of
result, but the sole movement of their wish and of their will is
sufficient, seconded in the founding of the universe by the power that
can create anything)--if, I say, it is true that in all respects the
Father from Whom are all things, and the Son by Whom are all things in
the actual form of their operation work alike, then how can this man
hope to prove the essential difference between the Son and the Holy
Ghost by any difference and separation between the working of the Son
and the Father? The very opposite, as we have just seen, is proved to
be the case [158] ; seeing that there is no manner of difference
contemplated between the working of the Father and that of the Son; and
so that there is no gulf whatever between the being of the Son and the
being of the Spirit, is shewn by the identity of the power which gives
them their subsistence; and our pamphleteer himself confirms this; for
these are his words verbatim: "the same energies producing sameness of
works." If sameness of works is really produced by likeness of
energies, and if (as they say) the Son is the work of the Father and
the Spirit the work of the Son, the likeness in manner [159] of the
Father's and the Son's energies will demonstrate the sameness of these
beings who each result from them.

But he adds, "variation in the works indicates variation in the
energies." How, again, is this dictum of his corroborated by facts?
Look, if you please, at plain instances. Is not the `energy' of
command, in Him who embodied the world and all things therein by His
sole will, a single energy? "He spake and they were made. He commanded
and they were created." Was not the thing commanded in every case alike
given existence: did not His single will suffice to give subsistence to
the nonexistent? How, then, when such vast differences are seen coming
from that one energy of command, can this man shut his eyes to
realities, and declare that the difference of works indicates
difference of energies? If our dogmatist insists on this, that
difference of works implies difference of energies, then we should have
expected the very contrary to that which is the case; viz., that
everything in the world should be of one type. Can it be that he does
see here a universal likeness, and detects unlikeness only between the
Father and the Son?

Let him, then, observe, if he never did before, the dissimilarity
amongst the elements of the world, and how each thing that goes to make
up the framework of the whole hangs on to its natural opposite. Some
objects are light and buoyant, others heavy and gravitating; some are
always still, others always moving; and amongst these last some move
unchangingly on one plan [160] , as the heaven, for instance, and the
planets, whose courses all revolve the opposite way to the universe,
others are transfused in all directions and rush at random, as air and
sea for instance, and every substance which is naturally penetrating
[161] . What need to mention the contrasts seen between heat and cold,
moist and dry, high and low position? As for the numerous
dissimilarities amongst animals and plants, on the score of figure and
size, and all the variations of their products and their qualities, the
human mind would fail to follow them.
__________________________________________________________________

[155] is preserved alive; xoogoneitai. This is the LXX., not the
classical use, of the word. Cf. Exod. i. 17; Judges viii. 19, &c. It is
reproduced in the speech of S. Stephen, Acts vii. 19: cf. Luke xvii.
33, "shall preserve (his life)."

[156] apokritikous, active, so, the Medical writers. The Latin is `in
meatus destinato descendit' takes it passive (apokritikous).

[157] neura. So since Galen's time: not `tendon.'

[158] Punctuating paraskeuazetai, epeide, k.t.l. instead of a full
stop, as Oehler.

[159] Gregory replaces `sameness' (in the case of the energies in
Eunomius argument) by `likeness' since the Father and the Son could not
be said to be the same, and their energies, therefore, are not
identical but similar.

[160] epi to hen.

[161] ugras.
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S:28. He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of
harmonious natures existing side by side.

But this man of science still declares that varied works have energies
as varied to produce them. Either he knows not yet the nature of the
Divine energy, as taught by Scripture,--`All things were made by the
word of His command,'--or else he is blind to the differences of
existing things. He utters for our benefit these inconsiderate
statements, and lays down the law about divine doctrines, as if he had
never yet heard that anything that is merely asserted,--where no
entirely undeniable and plain statement is made about the matter in
hand, and where the asserter says on his own responsibility that which
a cautious listener cannot assent to,--is no better than a telling of
dreams or of stories over wine. Little then as this dictum of his fits
facts, nevertheless,--like one who is deluded by a dream into thinking
that he sees one of the objects of his waking efforts, and who grasps
eagerly at this phantom and with eyes deceived by this visionary desire
thinks that he holds it,--he with this dreamlike outline of doctrines
before him imagines that his words possess force, and insists upon
their truth, and essays by them to prove all the rest. It is worth
while to give the passage. "These being so, and maintaining an unbroken
connexion in their relation to each other, it seems fitting for those
who make their investigation according to the order germane to the
subject, and who do not insist on mixing and confusing all together, in
case of a discussion being raised about Being, to prove what is in
course of demonstration, and to settle the points in debate, by the
primary energies and those attached to the Beings, and again to explain
by the Being when the energies are in question." I think the actual
phrases of his impiety are enough to prove how absurd is this teaching.
If any one had to give a description of the way some disease mars a
human countenance, he would explain it better by actually unbandaging
the patient, and there would be then no need of words when the eye had
seen how he looked. So some mental eye might discern the hideous
mutilation wrought by this heresy: its mere perusal might remove the
veil. But since it is necessary, in order to make the latent mischief
of this teaching clear to the many, to put the finger of demonstration
upon it, I will again repeat each word. "This being so." What does this
dreamer mean? What is `this?' How has it been stated? "The Father's
being is alone proper and in the highest degree supreme; consequently
the next being is dependent, and the third more dependent still." In
such words he lays down the law. But why? Is it because an energy
accompanies the first being, of which the effect and work, the
Only-begotten, is circumscribed by the sphere of this producing cause?
Or because these Beings are to be thought of as of greater or less
extent, the smaller included within and surrounded by the larger, like
casks put one inside the other, inasmuch as he detects degrees of size
within Beings that are illimitable? Or because differences of products
imply differences of producers, as if it were impossible that different
effects should be produced by similar energies? Well, there is no one
whose mental faculties are so steeped in sleep as to acquiesce directly
after hearing such statements in the following assertion, "these being
so, and maintaining an unbroken connexion in their relation to one
another." It is equal madness to say such things, and to hear them
without any questioning. They are placed in a `series' and `an
unalterable relation to each other,' and yet they are parted from each
other by an essential unlikeness! Either, as our own doctrine insists,
they are united in being, and then they really preserve an unalterable
relation to each other; or else they stand apart in essential
unlikeness, as he fancies. But what series, what relationship that is
unalterable can exist with alien entities? And how can they present
that `order germane to the matter' which according to him is to rule
the investigation? Now if he had an eye only on the doctrine of the
truth, and if the order in which he counts the differences was only
that of the attributes which Faith sees in the Holy Trinity,--an order
so `natural' and `germane' that the Persons cannot be confounded, being
divided as Persons, though united in their being--then he would not
have been classed at all amongst our enemies, for he would mean the
very same doctrine that we teach. But, as it is, he is looking in the
very contrary direction, and he makes the order which he fancies there
quite inconceivable. There is all the difference in the world between
the accomplishment of an act of the will, and that of a mechanical law
of nature. Heat is inherent in fire, splendour in the sunbeam, fluidity
in water, downward tendency in a stone, and so on. But if a man builds
a house, or seeks an office, or puts to sea with a cargo, or attempts
anything else which requires forethought and preparation to succeed, we
cannot say in such a case that there is properly a rank or order
inherent in his operations: their order in each case will result as an
after consequence of the motive which guided his choice, or the utility
of that which he achieves. Well, then; since this heresy parts the Son
from any essential relationship with the Father, and adopts the same
view of the Spirit as estranged from any union with the Father or the
Son, and since also it affirms throughout that the Son is the work of
the Father, and the Spirit the work of the Son, and that these works
are the results of a purpose, not of nature, what grounds has he for
declaring that this work of a will is an `order inherent in the
matter,' and what is the drift of this teaching, which makes the
Almighty the manufacturer of such a nature as this in the Son and the
Holy Spirit, where transcendent beings are made such as to be inferior
the one to the other? If such is really his meaning, why did he not
clearly state the grounds he has for presuming in the case of the
Deity, that smallness of result will be evidence of all the greater
power? But who really could ever allow that a cause that is great and
powerful is to be looked for in this smallness of results? As if God
was unable to establish His own perfection in anything that comes from
Him [162] ! And how can he attribute to the Deity the highest
prerogative of supremacy while he exhibits His power as thus falling
short of His will? Eunomius certainly seems to mean that perfection was
not even proposed as the aim of God's work, for fear the honour and
glory of One to Whom homage is due for His superiority might be thereby
lessened. And yet is there any one so narrow-minded as to reckon the
Blessed Deity Himself as not free from the passion of envy? What
plausible reason, then, is left why the Supreme Deity should have
constituted such an `order' in the case of the Son and the Spirit? "But
I did not mean that `order' to come from Him," he rejoins. But whence
else, if the beings to which this `order' is connatural are not
essentially related to each other? But perhaps he calls the inferiority
itself of the being of the Son and of the Spirit this `connatural
order.' But I would beg of him to tell me the reason of this very
thing, viz., why the Son is inferior on the score of being, when both
this being and energy are to be discovered in the same characteristics
and attributes. If on the other hand there is not to be the same [163]
definition of being and energy, and each is to signify something
different, why does he introduce a demonstration of the thing in
question by means of that which is quite different from it? It would
be, in that case, just as if, when it was debated with regard to man's
own being whether he were a risible animal, or one capable of being
taught to read, some one was to adduce the building of a house or ship
on the part of a mason or a shipwright as a settling of the question,
insisting on the skilful syllogism that we know beings by operations,
and a house and a ship are operations of man. Do we then learn, most
simple sir, by such premisses, that man is risible as well as
broad-nailed? Some one might well retort; `whether man possesses motion
and energy was not the question: it was, what is the energizing
principle itself; and that I fail to learn from your way of deciding
the question.' Indeed, if we wanted to know something about the nature
of the wind, you would not give a satisfactory answer by pointing to a
heap of sand or chaff raised by the wind, or to dust which it
scattered: for the account to be given of the wind is quite different:
and these illustrations of yours would be foreign to the subject. What
ground, then, has he for attempting to explain beings by their
energies, and making the definition of an entity out of the resultants
of that entity.

Let us observe, too, what sort of work of the Father it is by which the
Father's being, according to him, is to be comprehended. The Son most
certainly, he will say, if he says as usual. But this Son of yours,
most learned sir, is commensurate in your scheme only with the energy
which produced Him, and indicates that alone, while the Object of our
search still keeps in the dark, if, as you yourself confess, this
energy is only one amongst the things which `follow [164] ' the first
being. This energy, as you say, extends itself into the work which it
produces, but it does not reveal therein even its own nature, but only
so much of it as we can get a glimpse of in that work. All the
resources of a smith are not set in motion to make a gimlet; the skill
of that artisan only operates so far as is adequate to form that tool,
though it could fashion a large variety of other tools. Thus the limit
of the energy is to be found in the work which it produces. But the
question now is not about the amount of the energy, but about the being
of that which has put forth the energy. In the same way, if he asserts
that he can perceive the nature of the Only-begotten in the Spirit
(Whom he styles the work of an energy which `follows' the Son), his
assertion has no foundation; for here again the energy, while it
extends itself into its work, does not reveal therein the nature either
of itself or of the agent who exerts it.

But let us yield in this; grant him that beings are known in their
energies. The First being is known through His work; and this Second
being is revealed in the work proceeding from Him. But what, my learned
friend, is to show this Third being? No such work of this Third is to
be found. If you insist that these beings are perceived by their
energies, you must confess that the Spirit's nature is imperceptible;
you cannot infer His nature from any energy put forth by Him to carry
on the continuity. Show some substantiated work of the Spirit, through
which you think you have detected the being of the Spirit, or all your
cobweb will collapse at the touch of Reason. If the being is known by
the subsequent energy, and substantiated energy of the Spirit there is
none, such as ye say the Father shows in the Son, and the Son in the
Spirit, then the nature of the Spirit must be confessed unknowable and
not be apprehended through these; there is no energy conceived of in
connexion with a substance to show even a side glimpse of it. But if
the Spirit eludes apprehension, how by means of that which is itself
imperceptible can the more exalted being be perceived? If the Son's
work, that is, the Spirit according to them, is unknowable, the Son
Himself can never be known; He will be involved in the obscurity of
that which gives evidence of Him: and if the being of the Son in this
way is hidden, how can the being who is most properly such and most
supreme be brought to light by means of the being which is itself
hidden; this obscurity of the Spirit is transmitted by retrogression
[165] through the Son to the Father; so that in this view, even by our
adversaries' confession, the unknowableness of the Fathers being is
clearly demonstrated. How, then, can this man, be his eye ever so `keen
to see unsubstantial entities,' discern the nature of the unseen and
incomprehensible by means of itself; and how can he command us to grasp
the beings by means of their works, and their works again from them?
__________________________________________________________________

[162] en panti to ex autou.

[163] Reading hautos; instead of Oehler's autos.

[164] only one thing amongst the things which follow, &c. The Latin
translation is manifestly wrong here, "si recte a te assertum est, iis
etiam quae ad primam substantiam sequuntur aliquam operationem inesse."
The Greek is eiper he energeia ton parepomenon tis einai te prote ousia
memarturetai

[165] kata analuoin. So Plutarch, ii. 76 E. and see above (cap. 25,
note 6.).
__________________________________________________________________

S:29. He vainly thinks that the doubt about the energies is to be
solved by the beings, and reversely.

Now let us see what comes next. `The doubt about the energies is to be
solved by the beings.' What way is there of bringing this man out of
his vain fancies down to common sense? If he thinks that it is possible
thus to solve doubts about the energies by comprehending the beings
themselves, how, if these last are not comprehended, can he change this
doubt to any certainty? If the being has been comprehended, what need
to make the energy of this importance, as if it was going to lead us to
the comprehension of the being. But if this is the very thing that
makes an examination of the energy necessary, viz., that we may be
thereby guided to the understanding of the being that exerts it, how
can this as yet unknown nature solve the doubt about the energy? The
proof of anything that is doubted must be made by means of well-known
truths; but when there is an equal uncertainty about both the objects
of our search, how can Eunomius say that they are comprehended by means
of each other, both being in themselves beyond our knowledge? When the
Father's being is under discussion, he tells us that the question may
be settled by means of the energy which follows Him and of the work
which this energy accomplishes; but when the inquiry is about the being
of the Only-begotten, whether Eunomius calls Him an energy or a product
of the energy (for he does both), then he tells us that the question
may be easily solved by looking at the being of His producer!
__________________________________________________________________

S:30. There is no Word of God that commands such investigations: the
uselessness of the philosophy which makes them is thereby proved.

I should like also to ask him this. Does he mean that energies are
explained by the beings which produced them only in the case of the
Divine Nature, or does he recognize the nature of the produced by means
of the being of the producer with regard to anything whatever that
possesses an effective force? If in the case of the Divine Nature only
he holds this view, let him show us how he settles questions about the
works of God by means of the nature of the Worker. Take an undoubted
work of God,--the sky, the earth, the sea, the whole universe. Let it
be the being of one of these that, according to our supposition, is
being enquired into, and let `sky' be the subject fixed for our
speculative reasoning. It is a question what the substance of the sky
is; opinions have been broached about it varying widely according to
the lights of each natural philosopher. How will the contemplation of
the Maker of the sky procure a solution of the question, immaterial,
invisible, formless, ungenerate, everlasting, incapable of decay and
change and alteration, and all such things, as He is. How will anyone
who entertains this conception of the Worker be led on to the knowledge
of the nature of the sky? How will he get an idea of a thing which is
visible from the Invisible, of the perishable from the imperishable, of
that which has a date for its existence from that which never had any
generation, of that which has duration but for a time from the
everlasting; in fact, of the object of his search from everything which
is the very opposite to it. Let this man who has accurately probed the
secret of things tell us how it is possible that two unlike things
should be known from each other.
__________________________________________________________________

S:31. The observations made by watching Providence are sufficient to
give us the knowledge of sameness of Being.

And yet, if he could see the consequences of his own statements, he
would be led on by them to acquiesce in the doctrine of the Church. For
if the maker's nature is an indication of the thing made, as he
affirms, and if, according to his school, the Son is something made by
the Father, anyone who has observed the Father's nature would have
certainly known thereby that of the Son; if, I say, it is true that the
worker's nature is a sign of that which he works. But the
Only-begotten, as they say, of the Father's unlikeness, will be
excluded from operating through Providence. Eunomius need not trouble
any more about His being generated, nor force out of that another proof
of the son's unlikeness. The difference of purpose will itself be
sufficient to bring to light His alien nature. For the First Being is,
even by our opponents' confession, one and single, and necessarily His
will must be thought of as following the bent of His nature; but
Providence shows that purpose is good, and so the nature from which
that purpose comes is shown to be good also. So the Father alone works
good; and the Son does not purpose the same things as He, if we adopt
the assumptions of our adversary; the difference then, of their nature
will be clearly attested by this variation of their purposes. But if,
while the Father is provident for the Universe, the Son is equally
provident for it (for `what He sees the Father doing that also the Son
does'), this sameness of their purposes exhibits a communion of nature
in those who thus purpose the same things. Why, then, is all mention of
Providence omitted by him, as if it would not help us at all to that
which we are searching for. Yet many familiar examples make for our
view of it. Anyone who has gazed on the brightness of fire and
experienced its power of warming, when he approaches another such
brightness and another such warmth, will assuredly be led on to think
of fire; for his senses through the medium of these similar phaenomena
will conduct him to the fact of a kindred element producing both;
anything that was not fire could not work on all occasions like fire.
Just so, when we perceive a similar and equal amount of providential
power in the Father and in the Son, we make a guess by means of what
thus comes within the range of our knowledge about things which
transcend our comprehension; we feel that causes of an alien nature
cannot be detected in these equal and similar effects. As the observed
phenomena are to each other, so will the subjects of those phenomena
be: if the first are opposed to each other, we must reckon the revealed
entities to be so too; if the first are alike, so too must those others
be. Our Lord said allegorically that their fruit is the sign of the
characters of trees, meaning that it does not belie that character,
that the bad is not attached to the good tree, nor the good to the bad
tree;--"by their fruits ye shall know them;"--so when the fruit,
Providence, presents no difference, we detect a single nature from
which that fruit has sprung, even though the trees be different from
which the fruit is put forth. Through that, then, which is cognizable
by our apprehension, viz., the scheme or Providence visible in the Son
in the same way as in the Father, the common likeness of the
Only-begotten and the Father is placed beyond a doubt; and it is the
identity of the fruits of Providence by which we know it.
__________________________________________________________________

S:32. His dictum that `the manner of the likeness must follow the
manner of the generation' is unintelligible.

But to prevent such a thought being entertained, and pretending to be
forced somehow away from it, he says that he withdraws from all these
results of Providence, and goes back to the manner of the Son's
generation, because "the manner of His likeness must follow the manner
of His generation." What an irresistible proof! How forcibly does this
verbiage compel assent! What skill and precision there is in the
wording of this assertion! Then, if we know the manner of the
generation, we shall know by that the manner of the likeness. Well,
then; seeing that all, or at all events most, animals born by
parturition have the same manner of generation, and, according to their
logic, the manner of likeness follows this manner of generation, these
animals, following as they do the same model in their production, will
resemble entirely those similarly generated; for things that are like
the same thing are like one another. If, then, according to the view of
this heresy, the manner of the generation makes every thing generated
just like itself, and it is a fact that this manner does not vary at
all in diversified kinds of animals but remains the same in the
greatest part of them, we shall find that this sweeping and unqualified
assertion of his establishes, by virtue of this similarity of birth, a
mutual resemblance between men, dogs, camels, mice, elephants,
leopards, and every other animal which Nature produces in the same
manner. Or does he mean, not, that things brought into the world in a
similar way are all like each other, but that each one of them is like
that being only which is the source of its life. But if so, he ought to
have declared that the child is like the parent, not that the "manner
of the likeness" resembles the "manner of the generation." But this,
which is so probable in itself, and is observed as a fact in Nature,
that the begotten resembles the begetter, he will not admit as a truth;
it would reduce his whole argumentation to a proof of the contrary of
what he intended. If he allowed the offspring to be like the parent,
his laboured store of arguments to prove the unlikeness of the Beings
would be refuted as evanescent and groundless.

So he says "the manner of the likeness follows the manner of the
generation." This, when tested by the exact critic of the meaning of
any idea [166] , will be found completely unintelligible. It is plainly
impossible to say what a "manner of generation" can mean. Does it mean
the figure of the parent, or his impulse, or his disposition; or the
time, or the place, or the completing of the embryo by conception; or
the generative receptacles; or nothing of that kind, but something else
of the things observed in `generation.' It is impossible to find out
what he means. The impropriety and vagueness of the word "manner"
causes perplexity as to its signification here; every possible one is
equally open to our surmises, and presents as well an equal want of
connexion with the subject before us. So also with this phrase of his
"manner of likeness;" it is devoid of any vestige of meaning, if we fix
our attention on the examples familiarly known to us. For the thing
generated is not to be likened there to the kind or the manner of its
birth. Birth consists, in the case of animal birth, in a separation of
body from body, in which the animal perfectly moulded in the womb is
brought forth; but the thing born is a man, or horse, or cow, or
whatever it may chance to be in its existence through birth. How,
therefore, the "manner of the likeness of the offspring follows the
manner of its generation" must be left to him, or to some pupil of his
in midwifery, to explain. Birth is one thing: the thing born is
another: they are different ideas altogether. No one with any sense
would deny that what he says is perfectly untrue in the case of animal
births. But if he calls the actual making and the actual fashioning a
"manner of the generation," which the "manner of the likeness" of the
thing produced is to "follow," even so his statement is removed from
all likelihood, as we shall see from some illustrations. Iron is
hammered out by the blows of the artificer into some useful instrument.
How, then, the outline of its edge, if such there happen to be, can be
said to be similar to the hand of the worker, or to the manner of its
fashioning, to the hammers, for instance, and the coals and the bellows
and the anvil by means of which he has moulded it, no one could
explain. And what can be said in one case fits all, where there is any
operation producing a result; the thing produced cannot be said to be
like the "manner of its generation." What has the shape of a garment
got to do with the spool, or the rods, or the comb, or with the form of
the weaver's instruments at all? What has an actual seat got to do with
the working of the blocks; or any finished production with the build of
him who achieved it?--But I think even our opponents would allow that
this rule of his is not in force in sensible and material instances.

It remains to see whether it contributes anything further to the proof
of his blasphemy. What, then, was he aiming at? The necessity of
believing in accordance with their being in the likeness or unlikeness
of the Son to the Father; and, as we cannot know about this being from
considerations of Providence, the necessity of having recourse to the
"manner of the generation," whereby we may know, not indeed whether the
Begotten is like the Begetter (absolutely), but only a certain "manner
of likeness" between them; and as this manner is a secret to the many,
the necessity of going at some length into the being of the Begetter.
Then has he forgotten his own definitions about the beings having to be
known from their works? But this begotten being, which he calls the
work of the supreme being, has as yet no light thrown upon it
(according to him); so how can its nature be dealt with? And how can he
"mount above this lower and therefore more directly comprehensible
thing," and so cling to the absolute and supreme being? Again, he
always throughout his discourse lays claim to an accurate knowledge of
the divine utterances; yet here he pays them scant reverence, ignoring
the fact that it is not possible to approach to a knowledge of the
Father except through the Son. "No man knoweth the Father, save the
Son, and he to whomsoever the Son shall reveal Him [167] ." Yet
Eunomius, while on every occasion, where he can insult our devout and
God-adoring conceptions of the Son, he asserts in plain words the Son's
inferiority, establishes His superiority unconsciously in this device
of his for knowing the Deity; for he assumes that the Father's being
lends itself the more readily to our comprehension, and then attempts
to trace and argue out the Son's nature from that.
__________________________________________________________________

[166] ennoias logon.

[167] Matt. xi. 27.
__________________________________________________________________

S:33. He declares falsely that `the manner of the generation is to be
known from the intrinsic worth of the generator'.

He goes back, for instance, to the begetting being, and from thence
takes a survey of the begotten; "for," says he, "the manner of the
generation is to be known from the intrinsic worth of the generator."
Again, we find this bold unqualified generalization of his causing the
thought of the inquirer to be dissipated in every possible direction;
it is the nature of such general statements, to extend in their
meanings to every instance, and allow nothing to escape their sweeping
assertion. If then `the manner of the generation is to be known from
the intrinsic worth of the generator,' and there are many differences
in the worth of generators according to their many classifications
[168] to be found (for one may be born Jew, Greek, barbarian, Scythian,
bond, free), what will be the result? Why, that we must expect to find
as many "manners of generation" as there are differences in intrinsic
worth amongst the generators; and that their birth will not be
fulfilled with all in the same way, but that their nature will vary
with the worth of the parent, and that some peculiar manner of birth
will be struck out for each, according to these varying estimations.
For a certain inalienable worth is to be observed in the individual
parent; the distinction, that is, of being better or worse off
according as there has fallen to each race, estimation, religion,
nationality, power, servitude, wealth, poverty, independence,
dependence, or whatever else constitutes the life-long differences of
worth. If then "the manner of the generation" is shown by the intrinsic
worth of the parent, and there are many differences in worth, we shall
inevitably find, if we follow this opinion-monger, that the manners of
generation are various too; in fact, this difference of worth will
dictate to Nature the manner of the birth.

But if he should not [169] admit that such worth is natural, because
they can be put in thought outside the nature of their subject, we will
not oppose him. But at all events he will agree to this; that man's
existence is separated by an intrinsic character from that of brutes.
Yet the manner of birth in these two cases presents no variation in
intrinsic character; nature brings man and the brute into the world in
just the same way, i.e. by generation. But if he apprehends this native
dignity only in the case of the most proper and supreme existence, let
us see what he means then. In our view, the `native dignity' of God
consists in godhead itself, wisdom, power, goodness, judgment, justice,
strength, mercy, truth, creativeness, domination, invisibility,
everlastingness, and every other quality named in the inspired writings
to magnify his glory; and we affirm that everyone of them is properly
and inalienably found in the Son, recognizing difference only in
respect of unoriginateness; and even that we do not exclude the Son
from, according to all its meanings. But let no carping critic attack
this statement as if we were attempting to exhibit the Very Son as
ungenerate; for we hold that one who maintains that is no less impious
than an Anomoean. But since the meanings of `origin' are various, and
suggest many ideas, there are some of them in which the title
`unoriginate' is not inapplicable to the Son [170] . When, for
instance, this word has the meaning of `deriving existence from no
cause whatever,' then we confess that it is peculiar to the Father; but
when the question is about `origin' in its other meanings (since any
creature or time or order has an origin), then we attribute the being
superior to origin to the Son as well, and we believe that that whereby
all things were made is beyond the origin of creation, and the idea of
time, and the sequence of order. So He, Who on the ground of His
subsistence is not without an origin, possessed in every other view an
undoubted unoriginateness; and while the Father is unoriginate and
Ungenerate, the Son is unoriginate in the way we have said, though not
ungenerate.

What, then, is that native dignity of the Father which he is going to
look at in order to infer thereby the `manner of the generation.' "His
not being generated, most certainly," he will reply. If, then, all
those names with which we have learnt to magnify God's glory are
useless and meaningless to you, Eunomius, the mere going through the
list of such expressions is a gratuitous and superfluous task; none of
these other words, you say, expresses the intrinsic worth of the God
over all. But if there is a peculiar force fitting our conceptions of
the Deity in each of these words, the intrinsic dignities of God must
plainly be viewed in connexion with this list, and the likeness of the
two beings will be thereby proved; if, that is, the characters
inalienable from the beings are an index of the subjects of those
characters. The characters of each being are found to be the same; and
so the identity on the score of being of the two subjects of these
identical dignities is shown most clearly. For if the variation in a
single name is to be held to be the index of an alien being, how much
more should the identity of these countless names avail to prove
community of nature!

What, then, is the reason why the other names should all be neglected,
and generation be indicated by the means of one alone? Why do they
pronounce this `Ungeneracy' to be the only intrinsic character in the
Father, and thrust all the rest aside? It is in order that they may
establish their mischievous mode [171] of unlikeness of Father and Son,
by this contrast as regards the begotten. But we shall find that this
attempt of theirs, when we come to test it in its proper place, is
equally feeble, unfounded, and nugatory as the preceding attempts.

Still, that all his reasonings point this way, is shown by the sequel,
in which he praises himself for having fittingly adopted this method
for the proof of his blasphemy, and yet for not having all at once
divulged his intention, nor shocked the unprepared hearer with his
impiety, before the concatenation of his delusive argument was
complete, nor displayed this Ungeneracy as God's being in the early
part of his discourse, nor to weary us with talk about the difference
of being. The following are his exact words: "Or was it right, as Basil
commands, to begin with the thing to be proved, and to assert
incoherently that the Ungeneracy is the being, and to talk about the
difference or the sameness of nature?" Upon this he has a long
intervening tirade, made up of scoffs and insulting abuse (such being
the weapons which this thinker uses to defend his own doctrines), and
then he resumes the argument, and turning upon his adversary, fixes
upon him, forsooth, the blame of what he is saying, in these words;
"For your party, before any others, are guilty of this offence; having
partitioned out this same being between Begetter and Begotten; and so
the scolding you have given is only a halter not to be eluded which you
have woven for your own necks; justice, as might have been expected,
records in your own words a verdict against yourselves. Either you
first conceive of the beings as sundered, and independent of each other
[172] ; and then bring down one of them, by generation, to the rank of
Son, and contend that One who exists independently nevertheless was
made by means of the Other existence; and so lay yourselves open to
your own reproaches: for to Him whom you imagine as without generation
you ascribe a generation by another:--or else you first allow one
single causeless being, and then marking this out by an act of
causation into Father and Son, you declare that this non-generated
being came into existence by means of itself."
__________________________________________________________________

[168] 'Epinoia is the opposite of ennoia, `the intuitive idea.' It
means an "afterthought," and, with the notion of unnecessary addition,
a `conceit.' Here it is applied to conventional, or not purely natural
difference. See Introduction to Book XIII. for the fuller meaning of
'Epinoia.

[169] me dechoito. This use of the optative, where the subjunctive with
ean might have been expected, is one of the few instances in Gregory's
Greek of declension from Classic usage; in the latter, when ei with the
optative does denote subjective possibility, it is only when the
condition is conceived of as of frequent repetition, e.g. 1 Peter iii.
14. The optative often in this Greek of the fourth century invades the
province of the subjunctive.

[170] me apemphainein

[171] See Note on 'Agennetos, p. 100.

[172] anarchos.
__________________________________________________________________

S:34. The Passage where he attacks the `Omoousion, and the contention
in answer to it.

I will omit to speak of the words which occur before this passage which
has been quoted. They contain merely shameless abuse of our Master and
Father in God, and nothing bearing on the matter in hand. But on the
passage itself, as he advances by the device of this terrible dilemma a
double-edged refutation, we cannot be silent; we must accept the
intellectual challenge, and fight for the Faith with all the power we
have, and show that the formidable two-edged sword which he has
sharpened is feebler than a make-believe in a scene-painting.

He attacks the community of substance with two suppositions; he says
that we either name as Father and as Son two independent principles
drawn out parallel to each other, and then say that one of these
existencies is produced by the other existence: or else we say that one
and the same essence is conceived of, participating in both names in
turn, both being [173] Father, and becoming Son, and itself produced in
generation from itself. I put this in my own words, thereby not
misinterpreting his thought, but only correcting the tumid exaggeration
of its expression, in such a way as to reveal his meaning by clearer
words and afford a comprehensive view of it. Having blamed us for want
of polish and for having brought to the controversy an insufficient
amount of learning, he decks out his own work in such a glitter of
style, and passes the nail [174] , to use his own phrase, so often over
his own sentences, and makes his periods so smart with this elaborate
prettiness, that he captivates the reader at once with the attractions
of language; such amongst many others is the passage we have just
recited by way of preface. We will, by leave, again recite it. "And so
the scolding you have given is only a halter, not to be eluded, which
you have woven for your own necks; justice, as might have been
expected, records in your own words a verdict against yourselves."

Observe these flowers of the old Attic; what polished brilliance of
diction plays over his composition; what a delicate and subtle charm of
style is in bloom there! However, let this be as people think. Our
course requires us again to turn to the thought in those words; let us
plunge once more into the phrases of this pamphleteer. "Either you
conceive of the beings as separated and independent of each other, and
then bring down one of them, by generation, to the rank of Son, and
contend that One who exists independently nevertheless was made by
means of the Other existence." That is enough for the present. He says,
then, that we preach [175] two causeless Beings. How can this man, who
is always accusing us of levelling and confusing, assert this from our
believing, as we do, in a single substance of Both. If two natures,
alien to each other on the score of their being, were preached by our
Faith, just as it is preached by the Anomoean school, then there would
be good reason for thinking that this distinction of natures led to the
supposition of two causeless beings. But if, as is the case, we
acknowledge one nature with the differences of Person, if, while the
Father is believed in, the Son also is glorified, how can such a Faith
be misrepresented by our opponents as preaching Two First Causes? Then
he says, `of these two causes, one is lowered' by us `to the rank of
Son.' Let him point out one champion of such a doctrine; whether he can
convict any single person of talking like this, or only knows of such a
doctrine as taught anywhere at all in the Church, we will hold our
peace. For who is so wild in his reasonings, and so bereft of
reflection as, after speaking of Father and Son, to imagine in spite of
that two ungenerate beings: and then again to suppose that the One of
them has come into being by means of the Other? Besides, what logical
necessity does he show for pushing our teaching towards such
suppositions? By what arguments does he show that such an absurdity
must result from it? If indeed he adduced one single article of our
Faith, and then, whether as a quibble or with a real force of
demonstration, made this criticism upon it, there might have been some
reason for his doing so with a view to invalidate that article. But
when there is not, and never can be such a doctrine in the Church, when
neither a teacher of it nor a hearer of it is to be found, and the
absurdity cannot be shown, either, to be the strict logical consequence
of anything, I cannot understand the meaning of his fighting thus with
shadows. It is just as if some phenzy-struck person supposed himself to
be grappling with an imaginary combatant, and then, having with great
efforts thrown himself down, thought that it was his foe who was lying
there; our clever pamphleteer is in the same state; he feigns
suppositions which we know nothing about, and he fights with the
shadows which are sketched by the workings of his own brain.

For I challenge him to say why a believer in the Son as having come
into being from the Father must advance to the opinion that there are
two First Causes; and let him tell us who is most guilty of this
establishment of two First Causes; one who asserts that the Son is
falsely so named, or one who insists that, when we call Him that, the
name represents a reality? The first, rejecting a real generation of
the Son, and affirming simply that He exists, would be more open to the
suspicion of making Him a First Cause, if he exists indeed, but not by
generation: whereas the second, making the representative sign of the
Person of the Only-begotten to consist in subsisting generatively from
the Father, cannot by any possibility be drawn into the error of
supposing the Son to be Ungenerate. And yet as long as, according to
you thinkers, the non-generation of the Son by the Father is to be
held, the Son Himself will be properly called Ungenerate in one of the
many meanings of the Ungenerate; seeing that, as some things come into
existence by being born and others by being fashioned, nothing prevents
our calling one of the latter, which does not subsist by generation, an
Ungenerate, looking only to the idea of generation; and this your
account, defining, as it does, our Lord to be a creature, does
establish about Him. So, my very learned sirs, it is in your view, not
ours, when it is thus followed out, that the Only-begotten can be named
Ungenerate: and you will find that "justice,"--whatever you mean by
that,--records in your own words [176] a verdict against us.

It is easy also to find mud in his words after that to cast upon this
execrable teaching. For the other horn of his dilemma partakes in the
same mental delusion; he says, "or else you first allow one single
causeless being, and then marking this out by an act of generation into
Father and Son, you declare that this non-generated being came into
existence by means of itself." What is this new and marvellous story?
How is one begotten by oneself, having oneself for father, and becoming
one's own son? What dizziness and delusion is here? It is like
supposing the roof to be turning down below one's feet, and the floor
above one's head; it is like the mental state of one with his senses
stupified with drink, who shouts out persistently that the ground does
not stand still beneath, and that the walls are disappearing, and that
everything he sees is whirling round and will not keep still. Perhaps
our pamphleteer had such a tumult in his soul when he wrote; if so, we
must pity him rather than abhor him. For who is so out of hearing of
our divine doctrine, who is so far from the mysteries of the Church, as
to accept such a view as this to the detriment of the Faith. Rather, it
is hardly enough to say, that no one ever dreamed of such an absurdity
to its detriment. Why, in the case of human nature, or any other entity
falling within the grasp of the senses who, when he hears of a
community of substance, dreams either that all things that are compared
together on the ground of substance are without a cause or beginning,
or that something comes into existence out of itself, at once producing
and being produced by itself?

The first man, and the man born from him, received their being in a
different way; the latter by copulation, the former from the moulding
of Christ Himself; and yet, though they are thus believed to be two,
they are inseparable in the definition of their being, and are not
considered as two beings, without beginning or cause, running parallel
to each other; nor can the existing one be said to be generated by the
existing one, or the two be ever thought of as one in the monstrous
sense that each is his own father, and his own son; but it is because
the one and the other was a man that the two have the same definition
of being; each was mortal, reasoning, capable of intuition and of
science. If, then, the idea of humanity in Adam and Abel does not vary
with the difference of their origin, neither the order nor the manner
of their coming into existence making any difference in their nature,
which is the same in both, according to the testimony of every one in
his senses, and no one, not greatly needing treatment for insanity,
would deny it; what necessity is there that against the divine nature
we should admit this strange thought? Having heard of Father and Son
from the Truth, we are taught in those two subjects the oneness of
their nature; their natural relation to each other expressed by those
names indicates that nature; and so do Our Lord's own words. For when
He said, "I and My Father are one [177] ," He conveys by that
confession of a Father exactly the truth that He Himself is not a first
cause, at the same time that He asserts by His union with the Father
their common nature; so that these words of His secure our faith from
the taint of heretical error on either side: for Sabellius has no
ground for his confusion of the individuality of each Person, when the
Only-begotten has so distinctly marked Himself off from the Father in
those words, "I and My Father;" and Arius finds no confirmation of his
doctrine of the strangeness of either nature to the other, since this
oneness of both cannot admit distinction in nature. For that which is
signified in these words by the oneness of Father and Son is nothing
else but what belongs to them on the score of their actual being; all
the other moral excellences which are to be observed in them as over
and above [178] their nature may without error be set down as shared in
by all created beings. For instance, Our Lord is called merciful and
pitiful by the prophet [179] , and He wills us to be and to be called
the same; "Be ye therefore merciful [180] ," and "Blessed are the
merciful [181] ," and many such passages. If, then, any one by
diligence and attention has modelled himself according to the divine
will, and become kind and pitiful and compassionate, or meek and lowly
of heart, such as many of the saints are testified to have become in
the pursuit of such excellences, does it follow that they are therefore
one with God, or united to Him by virtue of any one of them? Not so.
That which is not in every respect the same, cannot be `one' with him
whose nature thus varies from it. Accordingly, a man becomes `one' with
another, when in will, as our Lord says, they are `perfected into one
[182] ,' this union of wills being added to the connexion of nature. So
also the Father and Son are one, the community of nature and the
community of will running, in them, into one. But if the Son had been
joined in wish only to the Father, and divided from Him in His nature,
how is it that we find Him testifying to His oneness with the Father,
when all the time He was sundered from Him in the point most proper to
Him of all?
__________________________________________________________________

[173] Reading ousan for ousian of Oehler and Migne.

[174] exouuchizei

[175] presbeuein. So Lucian. Diog. Laert., and Origen passim.

[176] your own words, i.e. not ours, as you say. The Codex of Turin has
tois hemeterois, and hemin above: but Oehler has wisely followed that
of Venice. Eunomius had said of Basil's party (S:34) `justice records
in your own words a verdict against yourselves.' `No,' Gregory answers;
`your words (interpreting our doctrine) alone lend themselves to that.'
But to change kath' hemon of the Codd. also to kath' humon would supply
a still better sense.

[177] John x. 30.

[178] osa epitheoreitai te phusei.

[179] Psalm ciii. 8.

[180] Luke vi. 36.

[181] Matthew v. 7.

[182] John xvii. 23. "I in them, and thou in Me, that they may be
perfected into one." (R.V.)
__________________________________________________________________

S:35. Proof that the Anomoean teaching tends to Manichaeism.

We hear our Lord saying. "I and My Father are one," and we are taught
in that utterance the dependence of our Lord on a cause, and yet the
absolute identity of the Son's and the Father's nature; we do not let
our idea about them be melted down into One Person, but we keep
distinct the properties of the Persons, while, on the other hand, not
dividing in the Persons the oneness of their substance; and so the
supposition of two diverse principles in the category of Cause is
avoided, and there is no loophole for the Manichaean heresy to enter.
For the created and the uncreate are as diametrically opposed to each
other as their names are; and so if the two are to be ranked as First
Causes, the mischief of Manichaeism will thus under cover be brought
into the Church. I say this, because my zeal against our antagonists
makes me scrutinize their doctrine very closely. Now I think that none
would deny that we were bringing this scrutiny very near the truth,
when we said, that if the created be possessed of equal power with the
uncreate, there will be some sort of antagonism between these things of
diverse nature, and as long as neither of them fails in power, the two
will be brought into a certain state of mutual discord for we must
perforce allow that will corresponds with, and is intimately joined to
nature; and that if two things are unlike in nature, they will be so
also in will. But when power is adequate in both, neither will flag in
the gratification of its wish; and if the power of each is thus equal
to its wish, the primacy will become a doubtful point with the two: and
it will end in a drawn battle from the inexhaustibleness of their
powers. Thus will the Manichaean heresy creep in, two opposite
principles appearing with counter claims in the category of Cause,
parted and opposed by reason of difference both in nature and in will.
They will find, therefore, that assertion of diminution (in the Divine
being) is the beginning of Manichaeism; for their teaching organizes a
discord within that being, which comes to two leading principles, as
our account of it has shewn; namely the created and the uncreated.

But perhaps most will blame this as too strong a reductio ad absurdum,
and will wish that we had not put it down at all along with our other
objections. Be it so; we will not contradict them. It was not our
impulse, but our adversaries themselves, that forced us to carry our
argument into such minuteness of results. But if it is not right to
argue thus, it was more fitting still that our opponents' teaching,
which gave occasion to such a refutation, should never have been heard.
There is only one way of suppressing the answer to bad teaching, and
that is, to take away the subject-matter to which a reply has to be
made. But what would give me most pleasure would be to advise those,
who are thus disposed, to divest themselves a little of the spirit of
rivalry, and not be such exceedingly zealous combatants on behalf of
the private opinions with which they have become possessed, and
convinced that the race is for their (spiritual) life, to attend to its
interests only, and to yield the victory to Truth. If, then, one were
to cease from this ambitious strife, and look straight into the actual
question before us, he would very soon discover the flagrant absurdity
of this teaching.

For let us assume as granted what the system of our opponents demands,
that the having no generation is Being, and in like manner again that
generation is admitted into Being. If, then, one were to follow out
carefully these statements in all their meaning, even this way the
Manichaean heresy will be reconstructed seeing that the Manichees are
wont to take as an axiom the oppositions of good and bad, light and
darkness, and all such naturally antagonistic things. I think that any
who will not be satisfied with a superficial view of the matter will be
convinced that I say true. Let us look at it thus. Every subject has
certain inherent characteristics, by means of which the specialty of
that underlying nature is known. This is so, whether we are
investigating the animal kingdom, or any other. The tree and the animal
are not known by the same marks; nor do the characteristics of man
extend in the animal kingdom to the brutes; nor, again, do the same
symptoms indicate life and death; in every case, without exception, as
we have said, the distinction of subjects resists any effort to confuse
them and run one into another; the marks upon each thing which we
observe cannot be communicated so as to destroy that distinction. Let
us follow this out in examining our opponents' position. They say that
the state of having no generation is Being; and they likewise make the
having generation Being. But just as a man and a stone have not the
same marks (in defining the essence of the animate and that of the
inanimate you would not give the same account of each), so they must
certainly grant that one who is non-generated is to be known by
different signs to the generated. Let us then survey those peculiar
qualities of the non-generated Deity, which the Holy Scriptures teach
us can be mentioned and thought of, without doing Him an irreverence.

What are they? I think no Christian is ignorant that He is good, kind,
holy, just and hallowed, unseen and immortal, incapable of decay and
change and alteration, powerful, wise, beneficent, Master, Judge, and
everything like that. Why lengthen our discussion by lingering on
acknowledged facts? If, then, we find these qualities in the ungenerate
nature, and the state of having been generated is contrary [183] in its
very conception to the state of having not been generated, those who
define these two states to be each of them Being, must perforce
concede, that the characteristic marks of the generated being,
following this opposition existing between the generated and
non-generated, must be contrary to the marks observable in the
non-generated being; for if they were to declare the marks to be the
same, this sameness would destroy the difference between the two beings
who are the subject of these observations. Differing things must be
regarded as possessing differing marks; like things are to be known by
like signs. If, then, these men testify to the same marks in the
Only-begotten, they can conceive of no difference whatever in the
subject of the marks. But if they persist in their blasphemous
position, and maintain in asserting the difference of the generated and
the non-generated the variation of the natures, it is readily seen what
must result: viz., that, as in following out the opposition of the
names, the nature of the things which those names indicate must be
considered to be in a state of contrariety to itself, there is every
necessity that the qualities observed in each should be drawn out
opposite each other; so that those qualities should be applied to the
Son which are the reverse of those predicated of the Father, viz., of
divinity, holiness, goodness, imperishability, eternity, and of every
other quality that represents God to the devout mind; in fact, every
negation [184] of these, every conception that ranks opposite to the
good, must be considered as belonging to the generated nature.

To ensure clearness, we must dwell upon this point. As the peculiar
phaenomena of heat and cold--which are themselves by nature opposed to
each other (let us take fire and ice as examples of each), each being
that which the other is not--are at variance with each other, cooling
being the peculiarity of ice, heating of fire; so if in accordance with
the antithesis expressed by the names, the nature revealed by those
names is parted asunder, it is not to be admitted that the faculties
attending these natural "subcontraries [185] " are like each other, any
more than cooling can belong to fire, or burning to ice. If, then,
goodness is inseparable from the idea of the non-generated nature, and
that nature is parted on the ground of being, as they declare, from the
generated nature, the properties of the former will be parted as well
from those of the latter: so that if the good is found in the first,
the quality set against the good is to be perceived in the last. Thus,
thanks to our clever systematizers, Manes lives again with his parallel
line of evil in array over against the good, and his theory of opposite
powers residing in opposite natures.

Indeed, if we are to speak the truth boldly, without any reserve,
Manes, who for having been the first, they say, to venture to entertain
the Manichaean view, gave his name to that heresy, may fairly be
considered the less offensive of the two. I say this, just as if one
had to choose between a viper and an asp for the most affection towards
man; still, if we consider, there is some difference between brutes
[186] . Does not a comparison of doctrines show that those older
heretics are less intolerable than these? Manes thought he was pleading
on the side of the Origin of Good, when he represented that Evil could
derive thence none of its causes; so he linked the chain of things
which are on the list of the bad to a separate Principle, in his
character of the Almighty's champion, and in his pious aversion to put
the blame of any unjustifiable aberrations upon that Source of Good;
not perceiving, with his narrow understanding, that it is impossible
even to conceive of God as the fashioner of evil, or on the other hand,
of any other First Principle besides Him. There might be a long
discussion on this point, but it is beside our present purpose. We
mentioned Manes' statements only in order to show, that he at all
events thought it his duty to separate evil from anything to do with
God. But the blasphemous error with regard to the Son, which these men
systematize, is much more terrible. Like the others, they explain the
existence of evil by a contrariety in respect of Being; but when they
declare, besides this, that the God of the universe is actually the
Maker of this alien production, and say that this "generation" formed
by Him into a substance possesses a nature foreign to that of its
Maker, they exhibit therein more of impiety than the aforesaid sect;
for they not only give a personal existence to that which in its nature
is opposed to good, but they say that a Good Deity is the Cause of
another Deity who in nature diverges from His; and they all but openly
exclaim in their teaching, that there is in existence something
opposite to the nature of the good, deriving its personality from the
good itself. For when we know the Father's substance to be good, and
therefore find that the Son's substance, owing to its being unlike the
Father's in its nature (which is the tenet of this heresy), is amongst
the contrary predicables, what is thereby proved? Why, not only that
the opposite to the good subsists, but that this contrary comes from
the good itself. I declare this to be more horrible even than the
irrationality of the Manichees.

But if they repudiate this blasphemy from their system, though it is
the logical carrying out of their teaching, and if they say that the
Only-begotten has inherited the excellences of the Father, not as being
really His Son, but--so does it please these misbelievers--as receiving
His personality by an act of creation, let us look into this too, and
see whether such an idea can be reasonably entertained. If, then, it
were granted that it is as they think, viz., that the Lord of all
things has not inherited as being a true Son, but that He rules a
kindred of created things, being Himself made and created, how will the
rest of creation accept this rule and not rise in revolt, being thus
thrust down from kinship to subjection and condemned, though not a whit
behind Him in natural prerogative (both being created), to serve and
bend beneath a kinsman after all. That were like a usurpation, viz. not
to assign the command to a superiority of Being, but to divide a
creation that retains by right of nature equal privileges into slaves
and a ruling power, one part in command, the other in subjection; as
if, as the result of an arbitrary distribution [187] , these same
privileges had been piled at random on one who after that distribution
got preferred to his equals. Even man did not share his honour with the
brutes, before he received his dominion over them; his prerogative of
reason gave him the title to command; he was set over them, because of
a variance of his nature in the direction of superiority. And human
governments experience such quickly-repeated revolutions for this very
reason, that it is impracticable that those to whom nature has given
equal rights should be excluded from power, but her impulse is instinct
in all to make themselves equal with the dominant party, when all are
of the same blood.

How, too, will it be true that "all things were made by Him," if it is
true that the Son Himself is one of the things made? Either He must
have made Himself, for that text to be true, and so this
unreasonableness which they have devised to harm our Faith will recoil
with all its force upon themselves; or else, if this is absurdly
unnatural, that affirmation that the whole creation was made by Him
will be proved to have no ground to stand on. The withdrawal of one
makes "all" a false statement. So that, from this definition of the Son
as a created being, one of two vicious and absurd alternatives is
inevitable; either that He is not the Author of all created things,
seeing that He, who, they insist, is one of those works, must be
withdrawn from the "all;" or else, that He is exhibited as the maker of
Himself, seeing that the preaching that `without Him was not anything
(made) that was made' is not a lie. So much for their teaching.
__________________________________________________________________

[183] hupenantios, i.e. as logical "contraries" differ from each other.
This is not an Aristotelian, but a Neo-Platonic use of the word (i.e.
Ammonius, a.d. 390, &c.). It occurs so again in this Book frequently.

[184] apemphainonta

[185] hupenantion

[186] plen all' epeide esti kai en theriois kriois.

[187] arbitrary distribution, apokleroseos: kat' apoklerosin "at
random," is also used by Sextus Empiric. (a.d. 200), Clem. Alex., and
Greg Naz.
__________________________________________________________________

S:36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.

But if a man keeps steadfast to the sound doctrine, and believes that
the Son is of the nature which is divine without admixture, he will
find everything in harmony with the other truths of his religion, viz.,
that Our Lord is the maker of all things, that He is King of the
universe, set above it not by an arbitrary act of capricious power, but
ruling by virtue of a superior nature; and besides this, he will find
that the one First Cause [188] , as taught by us, is not divided by any
unlikeness of substance into separate first causes, but one Godhead,
one Cause, one Power over all things is believed in, that Godhead being
discoverable by the harmony existing between these like beings, and
leading on the mind through one like to another like, so that the Cause
of all things, which is Our Lord, shines in our hearts by means of the
Holy Spirit; (for it is impossible, as the Apostle says, that the Lord
Jesus can be truly known, "except by the Holy Spirit [189] "); and then
all the Cause beyond, which is God over all, is found through Our Lord,
Who is the Cause of all things; nor, indeed, is it possible to gain an
exact knowledge of the Archetypal Good, except as it appears in the
(visible) image of that invisible. But then, after passing that summit
of theology, I mean the God over all, we turn as it were back again in
the racecourse of the mind, and speed through conjoint and kindred
ideas from the Father, through the Son, to the Holy Ghost. For once
having taken our stand on the comprehension of the Ungenerate Light, we
perceive [190] that moment from that vantage ground the Light that
streams from Him, like the ray co-existent with the sun, whose cause
indeed is in the sun, but whose existence is synchronous with the sun,
not being a later addition, but appearing at the first sight of the sun
itself: or rather (for there is no necessity to be slaves to this
similitude, and so give a handle to the critics to use against our
teaching by reason of the inadequacy of our image), it will not be a
ray of the sun that we shall perceive, but another sun blazing forth,
as an offspring, out of the Ungenerate sun, and simultaneously with our
conception of the First, and in every way like him, in beauty, in
power, in lustre, in size, in brilliance, in all things at once that we
observe in the sun. Then again, we see yet another such Light after the
same fashion sundered by no interval of time from that offspring Light,
and while shining forth by means of It yet tracing the source of its
being to the Primal Light; itself, nevertheless, a Light shining in
like manner as the one first conceived of, and itself a source of light
and doing all that light does. There is, indeed, no difference between
one light and another light, qua light, when the one shows no lack or
diminution of illuminating grace, but by its complete perfection forms
part of the highest light of all, and is beheld along with the Father
and the Son, though counted after them, and by its own power gives
access to the light that is perceived in the Father and Son to all who
are able to partake of it. So far upon this.
__________________________________________________________________

[188] One First Cause, monarchias. In a notable passage on the Greeks
who came up to the Feast (John xii. 20), Cyril (Catena, p. 307), uses
the same word. "Such, seeing that some of the Jews' customs did not
greatly differ from their own, as far as related to the manner of
sacrifice, and the belief in a One first Cause...came up with them to
worship," &c. Philo had already used the word so (De Charit.).
Athanasius opposes it to polutheia (Quaest. ad Antioch. I.).

[189] 1 Cor. xii. 3.

[190] enoesamen: aorist of instantaneous action.
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S:37. Defence of S. Basil's statement, attacked by Eunomius, that the
terms `Father' and `The Ungenerate' can have the same meaning.

The stream of his abuse is very strong; insolence is at the bottom of
every principle he lays down; and vilification is put by him in the
place of any demonstration of doubtful points so let us briefly discuss
the many misrepresentations about the word Ungenerate with which he
insults our Teacher himself and his treatise. He has quoted the
following words of our Teacher: "For my part I should be inclined to
say that this title of the Ungenerate, however fitting it may seem to
express our ideas, yet, as nowhere found in Scripture and as forming
the alphabet of Eunomius' blasphemy, may very well be suppressed, when
we have the word Father meaning the same thing; for One who essentially
and alone is Father comes from none else; and that which comes from
none else is equivalent to the Ungenerate." Now let us hear what proof
he brings of the `folly' of these words: "Overhastiness and shameless
dishonesty prompt him to put this dose of words [191] anomalously used
into his attempts; he turns completely round, because his judgment is
wavering and his powers of reasoning are feeble." Notice how
well-directed that blow is; how skilfully, with all his mastery of
logic, he takes Basil's words to pieces and puts a conception more
consistent with piety in their place! "Anomalous in phrase," "hasty and
dishonest in judgment," "wavering and turning round from feebleness of
reasoning." Why this? what has exasperated this man, whose own judgment
is so firm and reasoning so sound? What is it that he most condemns in
Basil's words? Is it, that he accepts the idea of the Ungenerate, but
says that the actual word, as misused by those who pervert it, should
be suppressed? Well; is the Faith in jeopardy only as regards words and
outward expressions, and need we take no account of the correctness of
the thought beneath? Or does not the Word of Truth rather exhort us
first to have a heart pure from evil thoughts, and then, for the
manifestation of the soul's emotions, to use any words that can express
these secrets of the mind, without any minute care about this or that
particular sound? For the speaking in this way or in that is not the
cause of the thought within us; but the hidden conception of the heart
supplies the motive for such and such words; "for from the abundance of
the heart the mouth speaketh." We make the words interpret the thought;
we do not by a reverse process gather [192] the thought from the words.
Should both be at hand, a man may certainly be ready in both, in clever
thinking and clever expression; but if the one should be wanting, the
loss to the illiterate is slight, if the knowledge in his soul is
perfect in the direction of moral goodness. "This people honoureth me
with their lips, but their heart is far from me [193] ." What is the
meaning of that? That the right attitude of the soul towards the truth
is more precious than the propriety of phrases in the sight of God, who
hears the "groanings that cannot be uttered." Phrases can be used in
opposite senses; the tongue readily serving, at his will, the intention
of the speaker; but the disposition of the soul, as it is, so is it
seen by Him Who sees all secrets. Why, then, does he deserve to be
called "anomalous," and "hasty," and "dishonest," for bidding us
suppress all in the term Ungenerate which can aid in their blasphemy
those who transgress the Faith, while minding and welcoming all the
meaning in the word which can be reverently held. If indeed he had said
that we ought not to think of the Deity as Ungenerate, there might have
been some occasion for these and even worse terms of abuse to be used
against him. But if he falls in with the general belief of the faithful
and admits this, and then pronounces an opinion well worthy of the
Master's mind [194] , viz., "Refrain from the use of the word, for into
it, and from it, the subverting heresy is fetched," and bids us cherish
the idea of an ungenerate Deity by means of other names,--therein he
does not deserve their abuse. Are we not taught by the Truth Himself to
act so, and not to cling even to things exceeding precious, if any of
them tend to mischief? When He thus bids us to cut away the right eye
or foot or hand, if so be that one of them offends, what else does He
imply by this figure, than that He would have anything, however
fair-seeming, if it leads a man by an inconsiderate use to evil, remain
inoperative and out of use, assuring us that it is better for us to be
saved by amputation of the parts which led to sin, than to perish by
retaining them?

What, too, does Paul, the follower of Christ, say? He, too, in his deep
wisdom teaches the same. He, who declares that "everything is good, and
nothing to be rejected, if it be received with thanks [195] ," on some
occasions, because of the `conscience of the weak brother,' puts some
things back from the number which he has accepted, and commands us to
decline them. "If," he says, "meat make my brother to offend, I will
eat no flesh while the world standeth [196] ." Now this is just what
our follower of Paul did. He saw that the deceiving power of those who
try to teach the inequality of the Persons was increased by this word
Ungenerate, taken in their mischievous, heretical sense, and so he
advised that, while we cherish in our souls a devout consciousness of
this ungenerate Deity, we should not show any particular love for the
actual word, which was the occasion of sin to the reprobate; for that
the title of Father, if we follow out all that it implies, will suggest
to us this meaning of not having been generated. For when we hear the
word Father, we think at once of the Author of all beings; for if He
had some further cause transcending Himself, He would not have been
called thus of proper right Father; for that title would have had to be
transferred higher, to this pre-supposed Cause. But if He Himself is
that Cause from which all comes, as the Apostle says, it is plain that
nothing can be thought of beyond His existence. But this is to believe
in that existence not having been generated. But this man, who claims
that even the Truth shall not be considered more persuasive than
himself, will not acquiesce in this; he loudly dogmatizes against it;
he jeers at the argument.
__________________________________________________________________

[191] i.e. pater, agennetos

[192] Putting a full stop at sunageiromen. Oehler otherwise.

[193] Isaiah xxix. 13; Matthew xv. 8.

[194] the Master's mind. "But whoso shall offend one of these little
ones which believe in Me, it were better for him that a millstone were
hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the
sea." Matth. xviii. 6; Mark ix. 42.

[195] 1 Tim. iv. 4 (R.V.)

[196] 1 Cor. viii. 13.
__________________________________________________________________

S:38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms.

Let us, if you please, examine his irrefragable syllogisms, and his
subtle transpositions [197] of the terms in his own false premisses, by
which he hopes to shake that argument; though, indeed, I fear lest the
miserable quibbling in what he says may in a measure raise a prejudice
also against the remarks that would correct it. When striplings
challenge to a fight, men get more blame for pugnaciousness in closing
with such foes, than honour for their show of victory. Nevertheless,
what we want to say is this. We think, indeed, that the things said by
him, with that well-known elocution now familiar to us, only for the
sake of being insolent, are better buried in silence and oblivion; they
may suit him; but to us they afford only an exercise for much-enduring
patience. Nor would it be proper, I think, to insert his ridiculous
expressions in the midst of our own serious controversy, and so to make
this zeal for the truth evaporate in coarse, vulgar laughter; for
indeed to be within hearing, and to remain unmoved, is an
impossibility, when he says with such sublime and magnificient
verbosity, "Where additional words amount to additional blasphemy, it
is by half as much more tranquillizing to be silent than to speak." Let
those laugh at these expressions who know which of them are fit to be
believed, and which only to be laughed at; while we scrutinize the
keenness of those syllogisms with which he tries to tear our system to
pieces.

He says, "If `Father' is the same in meaning as `Ungenerate,' and words
which have the same meaning naturally have in every respect the same
force, and Ungenerate signifies by their confession that God comes from
nothing, it follows necessarily that Father signifies the fact of God
being of none, and not the having generated the Son." Now what is this
logical necessity which prevents the having generated a Son being
signified by the title "Father," if so be that that same title does in
itself express to us as well the absence of beginning in the Father?
If, indeed, the one idea was totally destructive of the other, it would
certainly follow, from the very nature of contradictories [198] , that
the affirming of the one would involve the denial of the other. But if
there is nothing in the world to prevent the same Existence from being
Father and also Ungenerate, when we try to think, under this title of
Father, of the quality of not having been generated as one of the ideas
implied in it, what necessity prevents the relation to a Son being any
longer marked by the word Father? Other names which express mutual
relationship are not always confined to those ideas of relationship;
for instance, we call the emperor [199] autocrat and masterless, and we
call the same the ruler of his subjects; and, while it is quite true
that the word emperor signifies also the being masterless, it is not
therefore necessary that this word, because signifying autocratic and
unruled, must cease to imply the having power over inferiors; the word
emperor, in fact, is midway between these two conceptions, and at one
time indicates masterlessness, at another the ruling over lower orders.
In the case before us, then, if there is some other Father conceivable
besides the Father of Our Lord, let these men who boast of their
profound wisdom show him to us, and then we will agree with him that
the idea of the Ungenerate cannot be represented by the title "Father."
But if the First Father has no cause transcending His own state, and
the subsistence of the Son is invariably implied in the title of
Father, why do they try to scare us, as if we were children, with these
professional twistings of premisses, endeavouring to persuade or rather
to decoy us into the belief that, if the property of not having been
generated is acknowledged in the title of Father, we must sever from
the Father any relation with the Son.

Despising, then, this silly superficial attempt of theirs, let us
manfully own our belief in that which they adduce as a monstrous
absurdity, viz., that not only does the `Father' mean the same as
Ungenerate and that this last property establishes the Father as being
of none, but also that the word `Father' introduces with itself the
notion of the Only-begotten, as a relative bound to it. Now the
following passage, which is to be found in the treatise of our Teacher,
has been removed from the context by this clever and invincible
controversialist; for, by suppressing that part which was added by
Basil by way of safeguard, he thought he would make his own reply a
much easier task. The passage runs thus verbatim. "For my part I should
be inclined to say that this title of the Ungenerate, however readily
it may seem to fall in with our own ideas, yet, as nowhere found in
Scripture, and as forming the alphabet of Eunomius' blasphemy, may very
well be suppressed, when we have the word Father meaning the same
thing, in addition to [200] its introducing with itself, as a relative
bound to it, the notion of the Son." This generous champion of the
truth, with innate good feeling [201] , has suppressed this sentence
which was added by way of safeguard, I mean, "in addition to
introducing with itself, as a relative bound to it, the notion of the
Son;" after this garbling, he comes to close quarters with what
remains, and having severed the connection of the living whole [202] ,
and thus made it, as he thinks, a more yielding and assailable victim
of his logic, he misleads his own party with the frigid and feeble
paralogism, that "that which has a common meaning, in one single point,
with something else retains that community of meaning in every possible
point;" and with this he takes their shallow intelligences by storm.
For while we have only affirmed that the word Father in a certain
signification yields the same meaning as Ungenerate, this man makes the
coincidence of meanings complete in every point, quite at variance
therein with the common acceptation of either word; and so he reduces
the matter to an absurdity, pretending that this word Father can no
longer denote any relation to the Son, if the idea of not having been
generated is conveyed by it. It is just as if some one, after having
acquired two ideas about a loaf,--one, that it is made of flour, the
other, that it is food to the consumer--were to contend with the person
who told him this, using against him the same kind of fallacy as
Eunomius does, viz., that `the being made of flour is one thing, but
the being food is another; if, then, it is granted that the loaf is
made of flour, this quality in it can no longer strictly be called
food.' Such is the thought in Eunomius' syllogism; "if the not having
been generated is implied by the word Father, this word can no longer
convey the idea of having generated the Son." But I think it is time
that we, in our turn, applied to this argument of his that
magnificently rounded period of his own (already quoted). In reply to
such words, it would be suitable to say that he would have more claim
to be considered in his sober senses, if he had put the limit to such
argumentative safeguards at absolute silence. For "where additional
words amount to additional blasphemy," or, rather, indicate that he has
utterly lost his reason, it is not only "by half as much more," but by
the whole as much more "tranquillizing to be silent than to speak."

But perhaps a man would be more easily led into the true view by
personal illustrations; so let us leave this looking backwards and
forwards and this twisting of false premisses [203] , and discuss the
matter in a less learned and more popular way. Your father, Eunomius,
was certainly a human being; but the same person was also the author of
your being. Did you, then, ever use in his case too this clever quibble
which you have employed; so that your own `father,' when once he
receives the true definition of his being, can no longer mean, because
of being a `man,' any relationship to yourself; `for he must be one of
two things, either a man, or Eunomius' father?'--Well, then, you must
not use the names of intimate relationship otherwise than in accordance
with that intimate meaning. Yet, though you would indict for libel any
one who contemptuously scoffed against yourself, by means of such an
alteration of meanings, are you not afraid to scoff against God; and
are you safe when you laugh at these mysteries of our faith? As `your
father' indicates relationship to yourself, and at the same time
humanity is not excluded by that term, and as no one in his sober
senses instead of styling him who begat you `your father' would render
his description by the word `man,' or, reversely, if asked for his
genus and answering `man,' would assert that that answer prevented him
from being your father; so in the contemplation of the Almighty a
reverent mind would not deny that by the title of Father is meant that
He is without generation, as well as that in another meaning it
represents His relationship to the Son. Nevertheless Eunomius, in open
contempt of truth, does assert that the title cannot mean the `having
begotten a son' any longer, when once the word has conveyed to us the
idea of `never having been generated.'

Let us add the following illustration of the absurdity of his
assertions. It is one that all must be familiar with, even mere
children who are being introduced under a grammar-tutor to the study of
words. Who, I say, does not know that some nouns are absolute and out
of all relation, others express some relationship. Of these last,
again, there are some which incline, according to the speaker's wish,
either way; they have a simple intention in themselves, but can be
turned so as to become nouns of relation. I will not linger amongst
examples foreign to our subject. I will explain from the words of our
Faith itself.

God is called Father and King and other names innumerable in Scripture.
Of these names one part can be pronounced absolutely, i.e. simply as
they are, and no more: viz.. "imperishable," "everlasting," "immortal,"
and so on. Each of these, without our bringing in another thought,
contains in itself a complete thought about the Deity. Others express
only relative usefulness; thus, Helper, Champion, Rescuer, and other
words of that meaning; if you remove thence the idea of one in need of
the help, all the force expressed by the word is gone. Some, on the
other hand, as we have said, are both absolute, and are also amongst
the words of relation; `God,' for instance, and `good,' and many other
such. In these the thought does not continue always within the
absolute. The Universal God often becomes the property of him who calls
upon Him; as the Saints teach us, when they make that independent Being
their own. `The Lord God is Holy;' so far there is no relation; but
when one adds the Lord Our God, and so appropriates the meaning in a
relation towards oneself, then one causes the word to be no longer
thought of absolutely. Again; "Abba, Father" is the cry of the Spirit;
it is an utterance free from any partial reference. But we are bidden
to call the Father in heaven, `Our Father;' this is the relative use of
the word. A man who makes the Universal Deity his own, does not dim His
supreme dignity; and in the same way there is nothing to prevent us,
when we point out the Father and Him who comes from Him, the Firstborn
before all creation, from signifying by that title of Father at one and
the same time the having begotten that Son, and also the not being from
any more transcendent Cause. For he who speaks of the First Father
means Him who is presupposed before all existence, Whose is the beyond
[204] . This is He, Who has nothing previous to Himself to behold, no
end in which He shall cease. Whichever way we look, He is equally
existing there for ever; He transcends the limit of any end, the idea
of any beginning, by the infinitude of His life; whatever be His title,
eternity must be implied with it.

But Eunomius, versed as he is in the contemplation of that which eludes
thought, rejects this view of unscientific minds; he will not admit a
double meaning in the word `Father,' the one, that from Him are all
things and in the front of all things the Only-begotten Son, the other,
that He Himself has no superior Cause. He may scorn the statement; but
we will brave his mocking laugh, and repeat what we have said already,
that the `Father' is the same as that Ungenerate One, and both
signifies the having begotten the Son, and represents the being from
nothing.

But Eunomius, contending with this statement of ours, says (the very
contrary now of what he said before), "If God is Father because He has
begotten the Son, and `Father' has the same meaning as Ungenerate, God
is Ungenerate because He has begotten the Son, but before He begat Him
He was not Ungenerate." Observe his method of turning round; how he
pulls his first quibble to pieces, and turns it into the very opposite,
thinking even so to entrap us in a conclusion from which there is no
escape. His first syllogism presented the following absurdity, "If
`Father' means the coming from nothing, then necessarily it will no
longer indicate the having begotten the Son." But this last syllogism,
by turning (a premiss) into its contrary, threatens our faith with
another absurdity. How, then, does he pull to pieces his former
conclusion [205] ? "If He is `Father' because He has begotten a Son."
His first syllogism gave us nothing like that; on the contrary, its
logical inference purported to show that if the Father's not having
been generated was meant by the word Father, that word could not mean
as well the having begotten a Son [206] . Thus his first syllogism
contained no intimation whatever that God was Father because He had
begotten a Son. I fail to understand what this argumentative and
shrewdly professional reversal means.

But let us look to the thought in it below the words. `If God is
Ungenerate because He has begotten a Son, He was not Ungenerate before
He begat Him.' The answer to that is plain; it consists in the simple
statement of the Truth that `the word Father means both the having
begotten a Son, and also that the Begetter is not to be thought of as
Himself coming from any cause.' If you look at the effect, the Person
of the Son is revealed in the word Father; if you look for a previous
Cause, the absence of any beginning in the Begetter is shown by that
word. In saying that `Before He begat a Son, the Almighty was not
Ungenerate,' this pamphleteer lays himself open to a double charge;
i.e. of misrepresentation of us, and of insult to the Faith. He
attacks, as if there was no mistake about it, something which our
Teacher never said, neither do we now assert, viz., that the Almighty
became in process of time a Father, having been something else before.
Moreover in ridiculing the absurdity of this fancied doctrine of ours,
he proclaims his own wildness as to doctrine. Assuming that the
Almighty was once something else, and then by an advance became
entitled to be called Father, he would have it that before this He was
not Ungenerate either, since Ungeneracy is implied in the idea of
Father. The folly of this hardly needs to be pointed out; it will be
abundantly clear to anyone who reflects. If the Almighty was something
else before He became Father, what will the champions of this theory
say, if they were asked in what state they propose to contemplate Him?
What name are they going to give Him in that stage of existence; child,
infant, babe, or youth? Will they blush at such flagrant absurdity, and
say nothing like that, and concede that He was perfect from the first?
Then how can He be perfect, while as yet unable to become Father? Or
will they not deprive Him of this power, but say only that it was not
fitting that there should be Fatherhood simultaneously with His
existence. But if it was not good nor fitting that He should be from
the very beginning Father of such a Son, how did He go on to acquire
that which was not good?

But, as it is, it is good and fitting to God's majesty that He should
become Father of such a Son. So they will make out that at the
beginning He had no share in this good thing, and as long as He did not
have this Son they must assert (may God forgive me for saying it!) that
He had no Wisdom, nor Power, nor Truth, nor any of the other glories
which from various points of view the Only-begotten Son is and is
called.

But let all this fall on the heads of those who started it. We will
return whence we digressed. He says, "if God is Father because of
having begotten a Son, and if Father means the being Ungenerate, then
God was not this last, before He begat." Now if he could speak here as
it is customary to speak about human life, where it is inconceivable
that any should acquire possession of many accomplishments all at once,
instead of winning each of the objects sought after in a certain order
and sequence of time--if I say we could reason like that in the case of
the Almighty, so that we could say He possessed His Ungeneracy at one
time, and after that acquired His power, and then His imperishability,
and then His Wisdom, and advancing so became Father, and after that
Just and then Everlasting, and so came into all that enters into the
philosophical conception of Him, in a certain sequence--then it would
not be so manifestly absurd to think that one of His names has
precedence of another name, and to talk of His being first Ungenerate,
and after that having become Father.

As it is, however, no one is so earth-bound in imagination, so
uninitiated in the sublimities of our Faith, as to fail, when once he
has apprehended the Cause of the universe, to embrace in one collective
and compact whole all the attributes which piety can give to God; and
to conceive instead of a primal and a later attribute, and of another
in between, supervening in a certain sequence. It is not possible, in
fact, to traverse in thought one amongst those attributes and then
reach another, be it a reality or a conception, which is to transcend
the first in antiquity. Every name of God, every sublime conception of
Him, every utterance or idea that harmonizes with our general ideas
with regard to Him, is linked in closest union with its fellow; all
such conceptions are massed together in our understanding into one
collective and compact whole namely, His Fatherhood, and Ungeneracy,
and Power, and Imperishability, and Goodness, and Authority, and
everything else. You cannot take one of these and separate it in
thought from the rest by any interval of time, as if it preceded or
followed something else; no sublime or adorable attribute in Him can be
discovered, which is not simultaneously expressed in His
everlastingness. Just, then, as we cannot say that God was ever not
good, or powerful, or imperishable, or immortal, in the same way it is
a blasphemy not to attribute to Him Fatherhood always, and to say that
that came later. He Who is truly Father is always Father; if eternity
was not included in this confession, and if a foolishly preconceived
idea curtailed and checked retrospectively our conception of the
Father, true Fatherhood could no longer be properly predicated of Him,
because that preconceived idea about the Son would cancel the
continuity and eternity of His Fatherhood. How could that which He is
now called be thought of something which came into existence subsequent
to these other attributes? If being first Ungenerate He then became
Father, and received that name, He was not always altogether what He is
now called. But that which the God now existing is He always is; He
does not become worse or better by any addition, He does not become
altered by taking something from another source. He is always identical
with Himself. If, then, He was not Father at first, He was not Father
afterwards. But if He is confessed to be Father (now), I will recur to
the same argument, that, if He is so now, He always was so; and that if
He always was, He always will be. The Father therefore is always
Father; and seeing that the Son must always be thought of along with
the Father (for the title of father cannot be justified unless there is
a son to make it true), all that we contemplate in the Father is to be
observed also in the Son. "All that the Father hath is the Son's; and
all that is the Son's the Father hath." The words are, `The Father hath
that which is the Son's [207] ,' and so a carping critic will have no
authority for finding in the contents of the word "all" the ungeneracy
of the Son, when it is said that the Son has all that the Father has,
nor on the other hand the generation of the Father, when all that is
the Son's is to be observed in the Father. For the Son has all the
things of the Father; but He is not Father: and again, all the things
of the Son are to be observed in the Father, but He is not a Son.

If, then, all that is the Father's is in the Only-begotten, and He is
in the Father, and the Fatherhood is not dissociated from the `not
having been generated,' I for my part cannot see what there is to think
of in connexion with the Father, by Himself, that is parted by any
interval so as to precede our apprehension of the Son. Therefore we may
boldly encounter the difficulties started in that quibbling syllogism;
we may despise it as a mere scare to frighten children, and still
assert that God is Holy, and Immortal, and Father, and Ungenerate, and
Everlasting, and everything all at once; and that, if it could be
supposed possible that you could withhold one of these attributes which
devotion assigns to Him, all would be destroyed along with that one.
Nothing, therefore, in Him is older or younger; else He would be found
to be older or younger than Himself. If God is not all His attributes
always, but something in Him is, and something else only becoming,
following some order of sequence (we must remember God is not a
compound; whatever He is is the whole of Him), and if according to this
heresy He is first Ungenerate and afterwards becomes Father, then,
seeing that we cannot think of Him in connexion with a heaping together
of qualities, there is no alternative but that the whole of Him must be
both older and younger than the whole of Him, the former by virtue of
His Ungeneracy, the latter by virtue of His Fatherhood. But if, as the
prophet says of God [208] , He "is the same," it is idle to say that
before He begat He was not Himself Ungenerate; we cannot find either of
these names, the Father and the Ungenerate One, parted from the other;
the two ideas rise together, suggested by each other, in the thoughts
of the devout reasoner. God is Father from everlasting, and everlasting
Father, and every other term that devotion assigns to Him is given in a
like sense, the mensuration and the flow of time having no place, as we
have said, in the Eternal.

Let us now see the remaining results of his expertness in dealing with
words; results, which he himself truly says, are at once ridiculous and
lamentable. Truly one must laugh outright at what he says, if a deep
lament for the error that steeps his soul were not more fitting.
Whereas Father, as we teach, includes, according to one of its
meanings, the idea of the Ungenerate, he transfers the full
signification of the word Father to that of the Ungenerate, and
declares "If Father is the same as Ungenerate, it is allowable for us
to drop it, and use Ungenerate instead; thus, the Ungenerate of the Son
is Ungenerate; for as the Ungenerate is Father of the Son, so reversely
the Father is Ungenerate of the Son." After this a feeling of
admiration for our friend's adroitness steals over me, with the
conviction that the many-sided subtlety of his theological training is
quite beyond the capacity of most. What our Teacher said was embraced
in one short sentence, to the effect that it was possible that by the
title `Father' the Ungeneracy could be signified; but Eunomius' words
depend for their number not on the variety of the thoughts, but on the
way that anything within the circuit of similar names can be turned
about [209] . As the cattle that run blindfold round to turn the mill
remain with all their travel in the same spot, so does he go round and
round the same topic, and never leaves it. Once he said, ridiculing us,
that `Father' does not signify the having begotten, but the being from
nothing. Again he wove a similar dilemma, "If Father signifies
Ungeneracy, before He begat He was not ungenerate." Then a third time
he resorts to the same trick. "It is allowable for us to drop Father,
and to use Ungenerate instead;" and then directly he repeats the logic
so often vomited. "For as the Ungenerate is Father of the Son, so
reversely the Father is Ungenerate of the Son." How often he returns to
his vomit; how often he blurts it out again! Shall we not, then, annoy
most people, if we drag about our argument in company with this foolish
display of words? It would be perhaps more decent to be silent in a
case like this; still, lest any one should think that we decline
discussion because we are weak in pleas, we will answer thus to what he
has said. `You have no authority, Eunomius, for calling the Father the
Ungenerate of the Son, even though the title Father does signify that
the Begetter was from no cause Himself. For as, to take the example
already cited, when we hear the word `Emperor' we understand two
things, both that the one who is pre-eminent in authority is subject to
none, and also that he controls his inferiors, so the title Father
supplies us with two ideas about the Deity, one relating to His Son,
the other to His being dependent on no preconceivable cause. As, then,
in the case of `Emperor' we cannot say that because the two things are
signified by that term, viz., the ruling over subjects and the not
having any to take precedence of him, there is any justification for
speaking of the `Unruled of subjects,' instead of the `Ruler of the
nation,' or allowing so much, that we may use such a juxtaposition of
words, in imitation of king of a nation, as kingless of a nation, in
the same way when `Father' indicates a Son, and also represents the
idea of the Ungenerate, we may not unduly transfer this latter meaning,
so as to attach this idea of the Ungenerate fast to a paternal
relationship, and absurdly say `the Ungenerate is Ungenerate of the
Son.'

He treads on the ground of truth, he thinks, after such utterances; he
has exposed the absurdity of his adversaries' position; how boastfully
he cries, "And what sane thinker, pray, ever yet wanted the natural
thought to be suppressed, and welcomed the paradoxical?" No sane
thinker, most accomplished sir; and therefore our argument neither,
which teaches that while the term Ungenerate does suit our thoughts,
and we ought to guard it in our hearts intact, yet the term Father is
an adequate substitute for the one which you have perverted, and leads
the mind in that direction. Remember the words which you yourself
quoted; Basil did not `want the natural thought to be suppressed, and
welcome the paradoxical,' as you phrase it; but he advised us to avoid
all danger by suppressing the mere word Ungenerate, that is, the
expression in so many syllables, as one which had been evilly
interpreted, and besides was not to be found in Scripture; as for its
meaning he declares that it does most completely suit our thoughts.

Thus far for our statement. But this reviler of all quibblers, who
completely arms his own argument with the truth, and arraigns our sins
in logic, does not blush in any of his arguing on doctrines to indulge
in very pretty quibbles; on a par with those exquisite jokes which are
cracked to make people laugh at dessert. Reflect on the weight of
reasoning displayed in that complicated syllogism; which I will now
again repeat. "If `Father' is the same as Ungenerate, it is allowable
for us to drop it, and use Ungenerate instead; thus, the Ungenerate is
Ungenerate of the Son; for as the Ungenerate is Father of the Son, so,
reversely, the Father is Ungenerate of the Son." Well, this is very
like another case such as the following. Suppose some one were to state
the right and sound view about Adam; namely, that it mattered not
whether we called him "father of mankind" or "the first man formed by
God" (for both mean the same thing), and then some one else, belonging
to Eunomius' school of reasoners, were to pounce upon this statement,
and make the same complication out of it, viz.: If "first man formed by
God" and "father of mankind" are the same things, it is allowable for
us to drop the word "father" and use "first formed" instead; and say
that Adam was the "first formed," instead of the "father," of Abel; for
as the first formed was the father of a son, so, reversely, that father
is the first formed of that son. If this had been said in a tavern,
what laughter and applause would have broken from the tippling circle
over so fine and exquisite a joke! These are the arguments on which our
learned theologian leans; when he assails our doctrine, he really needs
himself a tutor and a stick to teach him that all the things which are
predicated of some one do not necessarily, in their meaning, have
respect to one single object; as is plain from the aforesaid instance
of Abel and Adam. That one and the same Adam is Abel's father and also
God's handiwork is a truth; nevertheless it does not follow that,
because he is both, he is both with respect to Abel. So the designation
of the Almighty as Father has both the special meaning of that word,
i.e., the having begotten a son, and also that of there being no
preconceivable cause of the Very Father; nevertheless it does not
follow that when we mention the Son we must speak of the Ungenerate,
instead of the Father, of that Son; nor, on the other hand, if the
absence of beginning remains unexpressed in reference to the Son, that
we must banish from our thoughts about God that attribute of
Ungeneracy. But he discards the usual acceptations, and like an actor
in comedy, makes a joke of the whole subject, and by dint of the oddity
of his quibbles makes the questions of our faith ridiculous. Again I
must repeat his words: "If Father is the same as Ungenerate, it is
allowable for us to drop it, and use Ungenerate instead; thus, the
Ungenerate is Ungenerate of the Son; for as the Ungenerate is Father of
the Son, so, reversely, the Father is Ungenerate of the Son." But let
us turn the laugh against him, by reversing his quibble; thus: If
Father is not the same as Ungenerate, the Son of the Father will not be
Son of the Ungenerate; for having relation to the Father only, he will
be altogether alien in nature to that which is other than Father, and
does not suit that idea; so that, if the Father is something other than
the Ungenerate, and the title Father does not comprehend that meaning,
the Son, being One, cannot be distributed between these two
relationships, and be at the same time Son both of the Father and of
the Ungenerate; and, as before it was an acknowledged absurdity to
speak of the Deity as Ungenerate of the Son, so in this converse
proposition it will be found an absurdity just as great to call the
Only-begotten Son of the Ungenerate. So that he must choose one of two
things; either the Father is the same as the Ungenerate (which is
necessary in order that the Son of the Father may be Son of the
Ungenerate as well); and then our doctrine has been ridiculed by him
without reason; or, the Father is something different to the
Ungenerate, and the Son of the Father is alienated from all
relationship to the Ungenerate. But then, if it is thus to hold that
the Only-begotten is not the Son of the Ungenerate, logic inevitably
points to a "generated Father;" for that which exists, but does not
exist without generation, must have a generated substance. If, then,
the Father, being according to these men other than Ungenerate, is
therefore generated, where is their much talked of Ungeneracy? Where is
that basis and foundation of their heretical castle-building? The
Ungenerate, which they thought just now that they grasped, has eluded
them, and vanished quite beneath the action of a few barren syllogisms;
their would-be demonstration of the Unlikeness, like a mere dream about
something, slips away at the touch of criticism, and takes its flight
along with this Ungenerate.

Thus it is that whenever a falsehood is welcomed in preference to the
truth, it may indeed flourish for a little through the illusion which
it creates, but it will soon collapse; its own methods of proof will
dissolve it. But we bring this forward only to raise a smile at the
very pretty revenge we might take on their Unlikeness. We must now
resume the main thread of our discourse.
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[197] Transpositions of the terms in his own false premises; ton
sophismaton antistrophas. The same as "the professional twisting of
premisses," and "the hooking backward and forward and twisting of
premisses" below. The terms Father and 'Agennetos are transposed or
twisted into each other's place in this `irrefragable syllogism.' It is
`a reductio ad absurdum' thus:-- Father means 'Agennetos (Basil's
premiss), .: 'Agennetos means Father. The fallacy of Eunomius consists
in making `Father' universal in his own premiss, when it was only
particular in Basil's. "'Agennetos means the whole contents of the word
Father," which therefore cannot mean having generated a son. It is a
False Conversion. This Conversion or antiotrophe is illustrated in
Aristotle's Analytics, Prior. I. iii. 3. It is legitimate thus:-- Some
B is A .: Some A is (some) B.

[198] kata ten ton antikeimenon phusin. If 'Agennetos means not having
a son, then to affirm `God is always 'Agennetos' is even to deny (its
logical contradictory) `God once had a Son.'

[199] ton basilea.

[200] pros to. Cod. Ven., surely better than the common pros to, which
Oehler has in his text.

[201] eleutheria; late Greek, for eleutheriotes

[202] "the living whole." somatos: this is the radical meaning of soma,
and also the classical. Viger. (Idiom. p. 143 note) distinguishes four
meanings under this. 1. Safety. 2. Individuality. 3. Living presence.
4. Life: and adduces instances of each from the Attic orators.

[203] to katenkulomenon tes ton suphismaton plokes. See c. 38, note 7.
The false premisses in the syllogisms have been-- 1. Father (partly)
means 'Agennetos Things which mean the same in part, mean the same in
all (false premiss). .: Father means 'Agennetos (false). 2. Father
means 'Agennetos (false). 'Agennetos does not mean `having a Son.' .:
Father does not mean `having a Son' (false).

[204] enedeixato, hou to epekeina. This is the reading of the Turin
Cod., and preferable to that of the Paris edition.

[205] The first syllogism was-- `Father' means the `coming from
nothing;' (`Coming from nothing' does not mean `begetting a Son') .:
Father does not mean begetting a Son. He "pulls to pieces" this
conclusion by taking its logical `contrary' as the first premiss of his
second syllogism; thus-- Father means begetting a Son; (Father means
'Agennetos) .: 'Agennetos means begetting a Son. From which it follows
that before that begetting the Almighty was not 'Agennetos The
conclusion of the last syllogism also involves the contrary of the 2nd
premiss of the first. It is to be noticed that both syllogisms are
aimed at Basil's doctrine, `Father' means `coming from nothing.'
Eunomius strives to show that, in both, such a premiss leads to an
absurdity. But Gregory ridicules both for contradicting each other.

[206] to men me dunasthai. The negative, absent in Oehler, is recovered
from the Turin Cod.

[207] John xvi. 15. Oehler conjectures these words (,'Echei ho pater)
are to be repeated; and thus obtains a good sense, which the common
reading, ho pater eipon, does not give.

[208] Psalm cii. 27.

[209] en te periodo kai anastrophe ton homoion rhematon.
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S:39. Answer to the question he is always asking, "Can He who is be
begotten?"

Eunomius does not like the meaning of the Ungenerate to be conveyed by
the term Father, because he wants to establish that there was a time
when the Son was not. It is in fact a constant question amongst his
pupils, "How can He who (always) is be begotten?" This comes, I take
it, of not weaning oneself from the human application of words, when we
have to think about God. But let us without bitterness at once expose
the actual falseness of this `arriere pensee' of his [210] , stating
first our conclusions upon the matter.

These names have a different meaning with us, Eunomius; when we come to
the transcendent energies they yield another sense. Wide, indeed, is
the interval in all else that divides the human from the divine;
experience cannot point here below to anything at all resembling in
amount what we may guess at and imagine there. So likewise, as regards
the meaning of our terms, though there may be, so far as words go, some
likeness between man and the Eternal, yet the gulf between these two
worlds is the real measure of the separation of meanings. For instance,
our Lord calls God a `man' that was a `householder' in the parable
[211] ; but though this title is ever so familiar to us, will the
person we think of and the person there meant be of the same
description; and will our `house' be the same as that large house, in
which, as the Apostle says, there are the vessels of gold, and those of
silver [212] , and those of the other materials which are recounted? Or
will not those rather be beyond our immediate apprehension and to be
contemplated in a blessed immortality, while ours are earthern, and to
dissolve to earth? So in almost all the other terms there is a
similarity of names between things human and things divine, revealing
nevertheless underneath this sameness a wide difference of meanings. We
find alike in both worlds the mention of bodily limbs and senses; as
with us, so with the life of God, which all allow to be above sense,
there are set down in order fingers and arm and hand, eye and eyelids,
hearing, heart, feet and sandals, horses, cavalry, and chariots; and
other metaphors innumerable are taken from human life to illustrate
symbolically divine things. As, then, each one of these names has a
human sound, but not a human meaning, so also that of Father, while
applying equally to life divine and human, hides a distinction between
the uttered meanings exactly proportionate to the difference existing
between the subjects of this title. We think of man's generation one
way; we surmise of the divine generation in another. A man is born in a
stated time; and a particular place must be the receptacle of his life;
without it it is not in nature that he should have any concrete
substance: whence also it is inevitable that sections of time are found
enveloping his life; there is a Before, and With, and After him. It is
true to say of any one whatever of those born into this world that
there was a time when he was not, that he is now, and again there will
be time when he will cease to exist; but into the Eternal world these
ideas of time do not enter; to a sober thinker they have nothing akin
to that world. He who considers what the divine life really is will get
beyond the `sometime,' the `before,' and the `after,' and every mark
whatever of this extension in time; he will have lofty views upon a
subject so lofty; nor will he deem that the Absolute is bound by those
laws which he observes to be in force in human generation.

Passion precedes the concrete existence of man; certain material
foundations are laid for the formation of the living creature; beneath
it all is Nature, by God's will, with her wonder-working, putting
everything under contribution for the proper proportion of nutrition
for that which is to be born, taking from each terrestrial element the
amount necessary for the particular case, receiving the co-operation of
a measured time, and as much of the food of the parents as is necessary
for the formation of the child: in a word Nature, advancing through all
these processes by which a human life is built up, brings the
non-existent to the birth; and accordingly we say that, non-existent
once, it now is born; because, at one time not being, at another it
begins to be. But when it comes to the Divine generation the mind
rejects this ministration of Nature, and this fulness of time in
contributing to the development, and everything else which our argument
contemplated as taking place in human generation; and he who enters on
divine topics with no carnal conceptions will not fall down again to
the level of any of those debasing thoughts, but seeks for one in
keeping with the majesty of the thing to be expressed; he will not
think of passion in connexion with that which is passionless, or count
the Creator of all Nature as in need of Nature's help, or admit
extension in time into the Eternal life; he will see that the Divine
generation is to be cleared of all such ideas, and will allow to the
title `Father' only the meaning that the Only-begotten is not Himself
without a source, but derives from That the cause of His being; though,
as for the actual beginning of His subsistence, he will not calculate
that, because he will not be able to see any sign of the thing in
question. `Older' and `younger' and all such notions are found to
involve intervals of time; and so, when you mentally abstract time in
general, all such indications are got rid of along with it.

Since, then, He who is with the Father, in some inconceivable category,
before the ages admits not of a `sometime,' He exists by generation
indeed, but nevertheless He never begins to exist. His life is neither
in time, nor in place. But when we take away these and all suchlike
ideas in contemplating the subsistence of the Son, there is only one
thing that we can even think of as before Him--i.e. the Father. But the
Only-begotten, as He Himself has told us, is in the Father, and so,
from His nature, is not open to the supposition that He ever existed
not. If indeed the Father ever was not, the eternity of the Son must be
cancelled retrospectively in consequence of this nothingness of the
Father: but if the Father is always, how can the Son ever be
non-existent, when He cannot be thought of at all by Himself apart from
the Father, but is always implied silently in the name Father. This
name in fact conveys the two Persons equally; the idea of the Son is
inevitably suggested by that word. When was it, then, that the Son was
not? In what category shall we detect His non-existence? In place?
There is none. In time? Our Lord was before all times; and if so, when
was He not? And if He was in the Father, in what place was He not? Tell
us that, ye who are so practised in seeing things out of sight. What
kind of interval have your cogitations given a shape to? What vacancy
in the Son, be it of substance or of conception, have you been able to
think of, which shows the Father's life, when drawn out in parallel, as
surpassing that of the Only-begotten? Why, even of men we cannot say
absolutely that any one was not, and then was born. Levi, many
generations before his own birth in the flesh, was tithed by
Melchisedech; so the Apostle says, "Levi also, who receiveth tithes,
payed tithes (in Abraham)," [213] adding the proof, "for he was yet in
the loins of his father, when" Abraham met the priest of the Most High.
If, then, a man in a certain sense is not, and is then born, having
existed beforehand by virtue of kinship of substance in his progenitor,
according to an Apostle's testimony, how as to the Divine life do they
dare to utter the thought that He was not, and then was begotten? For
He `is in the Father,' as our Lord has told us; "I am in the Father,
and the Father in Me [214] ," each of course being in the other in two
different senses; the Son being in the Father as the beauty of the
image is to be found in the form from which it has been outlined; and
the Father in the Son, as that original beauty is to be found in the
image of itself. Now in all hand-made images the interval of time is a
point of separation between the model and that to which it lends its
form; but there the one cannot be separated from the other, neither the
"express image" from the "Person," to use the Apostle's words [215] ,
nor the "brightness" from the "glory" of God, nor the representation
from the goodness; but when once thought has grasped one of these, it
has admitted the associated Verity as well. "Being," he says (not
becoming), "the brightness of His glory [216] ;" so that clearly we may
rid ourselves for ever of the blasphemy which lurks in either of those
two conceptions; viz., that the Only-begotten can be thought of as
Ungenerate (for he says "the brightness of His glory," the brightness
coming from the glory, and not, reversely, the glory from the
brightness); or that He ever began to be. For the word "being" is a
witness that interprets to us the Son's continuity and eternity and
superiority to all marks of time.

What occasion, then, had our foes for proposing for the damage of our
Faith that trifling question, which they think unanswerable and, so, a
proving of their own doctrine, and which they are continually asking,
namely, `whether One who is can be generated.' We may boldly answer
them at once, that He who is in the Ungenerate was generated from Him,
and does derive His source from Him. `I live by the Father [217] :' but
it is impossible to name the `when' of His beginning. When there is no
intermediate matter, or idea, or interval of time, to separate the
being of the Son from the Father, no symbol can be thought of, either,
by which the Only-begotten can be unlinked from the Father's life, and
shewn to proceed from some special source of His own. If, then, there
is no other principle that guides the Son's life, if there is nothing
that a devout mind can contemplate before (but not divided from) the
subsistence of the Son, but the Father only; and if the Father is
without beginning or generation, as even our adversaries admit, how can
He who can be contemplated only within the Father, who is without
beginning, admit Himself of a beginning?

What harm, too, does our Faith suffer from our admitting those
expressions of our opponents which they bring forward against us as
absurd, when they ask `whether He which is can be begotten?' We do not
assert that this can be so in the sense in which Nicodemus put his
offensive question [218] , wherein he thought it impossible that one
who was in existence could come to a second birth: but we assert that,
having His existence attached to an Existence which is always and is
without beginning, and accompanying every investigator into the
antiquities of time, and forestalling the curiosity of thought as it
advances into the world beyond, and intimately blended as He is with
all our conceptions of the Father, He has no beginning of His existence
any more than He is Ungenerate: but He was both begotten and was,
evincing on the score of causation generation from the Father, but by
virtue of His everlasting life repelling any moment of non-existence.

But this thinker in his exceeding subtlety contravenes this statement;
he sunders the being of the Only-begotten from the Father's nature, on
the ground of one being Generated, the other Ungenerate; and although
there are such a number of names which with reverence may be applied to
the Deity, and all of them suitable to both Persons equally, he pays no
attention to anyone of them, because these others indicate that in
which Both participate; he fastens on the name Ungenerate, and that
alone; and even of this he will not adopt the usual and approved
meaning; he revolutionizes the conception of it, and cancels its common
associations. Whatever can be the reason of this? For without some very
strong one he would not wrest language away from its accepted meaning,
and innovate [219] by changing the signification of words. He knows
perfectly well that if their meaning was confined to the customary one
he would have no power to subvert the sound doctrine; but that if such
terms are perverted from their common and current acceptation, he will
be able to spoil the doctrine along with the word. For instance (to
come to the actual words which he misuses), if, according to the common
thinking of our Faith he had allowed that God was to be called
Ungenerate only because He was never generated, the whole fabric of his
heresy would have collapsed, with the withdrawal of his quibbling about
this Ungenerate. If, that is, he was to be persuaded, by following out
the analogy of almost all the names of God in use for the Church, to
think of the God over all as Ungenerate, just as He is invisible, and
passionless, and immaterial; and if he was agreed that in every one of
these terms there was signified only that which in no way belongs to
God--body, for instance, and passion and colour, and derivation from a
cause--then, if his view of the case had been like that, his party's
tenet of the Unlikeness would lose its meaning; for in all else (except
the Ungeneracy) that is conceived concerning the God of all even these
adversaries allow the likeness existing between the Only-begotten and
the Father. But to prevent this, he puts the term Ungenerate in front
of all these names indicating God's transcendent nature; and he makes
this one a vantage-ground from which he may sweep down upon our Faith;
he transfers the contrariety between the actual expressions `Generated'
and `Ungenerate' to the Persons themselves to whom these words apply;
and thereby, by this difference between the words he argues by a
quibble for a difference between the Beings; not agreeing with us that
Generated is to be used only because the Son was generated, and
Ungenerate because the Father exists without having been generated; but
affirming that he thinks the former has acquired existence by having
been generated; though what sort of philosophy leads him to such a view
I cannot understand. If one were to attend to the mere meanings of
those words by themselves, abstracting in thought those Persons for
whom the names are taken to stand, one would discover the
groundlessness of these statements of theirs. Consider, then, not that,
in consequence of the Father being a conception prior to the Son (as
the Faith truly teaches), the order of the names themselves must be
arranged so as to correspond with the value and order of that which
underlies them; but regard them alone by themselves, to see which of
them (the word, I repeat, not the Reality which it represents) is to be
placed before the other as a conception of our mind; which of the two
conveys the assertion of an idea, which the negation of the same; for
instance (to be clear, I think similar pairs of words will give my
meaning), Knowledge, Ignorance--Passion, Passionlessness--and suchlike
contrasts, which of them possess priority of conception before the
others? Those which posit the negation, or those which posit the
assertion of the said quality? I take it the latter do so. Knowledge,
anger, passion, are conceived of first; and then comes the negation of
these ideas. And let no one, in his excess of devotion [220] , blame
this argument, as if it would put the Son before the Father. We are not
making out that the Son is to be placed in conception before the
Father, seeing that the argument is discriminating only the meanings of
`Generated,' and `Ungenerate.' So Generation signifies the assertion of
some reality or some idea; while Ungeneracy signifies its negation; so
that there is every reason that Generation must be thought of first.
Why, then, do they insist herein on fixing on the Father the second, in
order of conception, of these two names; why do they keep on thinking
that a negation can define and can embrace the whole substance of the
term in question, and are roused to exasperation against those who
point out the groundlessness of their arguments?
__________________________________________________________________

[210] auto to peplasmenon tes huponoias.

[211] the parable, i.e. of the Tares. Matthew xiii. 27: cf. v. 52.

[212] 2 Tim. ii. 20.

[213] Heb. vii. 9, 10; Genesis xiv. 18.

[214] John x. 38.

[215] Heb. i.

[216] Heb. i. 3. (on, not genomenos).

[217] John iv. 57.

[218] John iii. 4.

[219] xenizei, intrans. N.T. Polyb. Lucian.

[220] ethelothreskeias, "will worship."
__________________________________________________________________

S:40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements
after Basil has confuted him.

For notice how bitter he is against one who did detect the rottenness
and weakness of his work of mischief; how he revenges himself all he
can, and that is only by abuse and vilification: in these, however, he
possesses abundant ability. Those who would give elegance of style to a
discourse have a way of filling out the places that want rhythm with
certain conjunctive particles [221] , whereby they introduce more
euphony and connexion into the assembly of their phrases; so does
Eunomius garnish his work with abusive epithets in most of his
passages, as though he wished to make a display of this overflowing
power of invective. Again we are `fools,' again we `fail in correct
reasoning,' and `meddle in the controversy without the preparation
which its importance requires,' and `miss the speaker's meaning.' Such,
and still more than these, are the phrases used of our Master by this
decorous orator. But perhaps after all there is good reason in his
anger; and this pamphleteer is justly indignant. For why should Basil
have stung him by thus exposing the weakness of this teaching of his?
Why should he have uncovered to the sight of the simpler brethren the
blasphemy veiled beneath his plausible sophistries? Why should he not
have let silence cover the unsoundness of this view? Why gibbet the
wretched man, when he ought to have pitied him, and kept the veil over
the indecency of his argument? He actually finds out and makes a
spectacle of one who has somehow got to be admired amongst his private
pupils for cleverness and shrewdness! Eunomius had said somewhere in
his works that the attribute of being ungenerate "follows" the deity.
Our Master remarked upon this phrase of his that a thing which
"follows" must be amongst the externals, whereas the actual Being is
not one of these, but indicates the very existence of anything, so far
as it does exist. Then this gentle yet unconquerable opponent is
furious, and pours along a copious stream of invective, because our
Master, on hearing that phrase, apprehended the sense of it as well.
But what did he do wrong, if he firmly insisted only upon the meaning
of your own writings. If indeed he had seized illogically on what was
said, all that you say would be true, and we should have to ignore what
he did; but seeing that you are blushing at his reproof, why do you not
erase the word from your pamphlet, instead of abusing the reprover?
`Yes, but he did not understand the drift of the argument. Well, how do
we do wrong, if being human, we guessed at the meaning from your actual
words, having no comprehension of that which was buried in your heart?
It is for God to see the inscrutable, and to inspect the characters of
that which we have no means of comprehending, and to be cognizant of
unlikeness [222] in the invisible world. We can only judge by what we
hear.
__________________________________________________________________

[221] conjunctive particles, sundesmoi. In Aristotle's Poetics (xx. 6),
these are reckoned as one of the 8 `parts of speech.' The term
sundesmos is illustrated by the examples men, etoi, de, which leaves no
doubt that it includes at all events conjunctions and particles. Its
general character is defined in his Rhetoric iii. 12, 4: "It makes many
(sentences) one." Harris (Hermes ii. c. 2), thus defines a conjunction,
"A part of speech devoid of signification itself, but so formed as to
help signification by making two or more significant sentences to be
one significant sentence," a definition which manifestly comes from
Aristotle. The comparison here seems to be between these constantly
recurring particles, themselves `devoid of signification,' in an
`elegant' discourse, and the perpetually used epithets, "fools," &c.,
which, though utterly meaningless, serve to connect his dislocated
paragraphs. The `assembly' (sunaxis, always of the synagogue or the
Communion. See Suicer) of his words is brought, it is ironically
implied, into some sort of harmony by these means.

[222] A hit at the Anomoeans. `Your subtle distinctions, in the
invisible world of your own mind, between the meanings of "following"
are like the unlikenesses which you see between the Three Persons.'
__________________________________________________________________

S:41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it
follows.

He first says, "the attribute of being ungenerate follows the Deity."
By that we understood him to mean that this Ungeneracy is one of the
things external to God. Then he says, "Or rather this Ungeneracy is His
actual being." We fail to understand the `sequitur' of this; we notice
in fact something very queer and incongruous about it. If Ungeneracy
follows God, and yet also constitutes His being, two beings will be
attributed to one and the same subject in this view; so that God will
be in the same way as He was before and has always been believed to be
[223] , but besides that will have another being accompanying, which
they style Ungeneracy, quite distinct from Him Whose `following' it is,
as our Master puts it. Well, if he commands us to think so, he must
pardon our poverty of ideas, in not being able to follow out such
subtle speculations.

But if he disowns this view, and does not admit a double being in the
Deity, one represented by the godhead, the other by the ungeneracy, let
our friend, who is himself neither `rash' nor `malignant,' prevail upon
himself not to be over partial to invective while these combats for the
truth are being fought, but to explain to us, who are so wanting in
culture, how that which follows is not one thing and that which leads
another, but how both coalesce into one; for, in spite of what he says
in defence of his statement, the absurdity of it remains; and the
addition of that handful of words [224] does not correct, as he
asserts, the contradiction in it. I have not yet been able to see that
any explanation at all is discoverable in them. But we will give what
he has written verbatim. "We say, `or rather the Ungeneracy is His
actual being,' without meaning to contract into the being [225] that
which we have proved to follow it, but applying `follow' to the title,
but is to the being." Accordingly when these things are taken together,
the whole resulting argument would be, that the title Ungenerate
follows, because to be Ungenerate is His actual being. But what
expounder of this expounding shall we get? He says "without meaning to
contract into the being that which we have proved to follow it."
Perhaps some of the guessers of riddles might tell us that by `contract
into' he means `fastening together.' But who can see anything
intelligible or coherent in the rest? The results of `following'
belong, he tells us, not to the being, but to the title. But, most
learned sir, what is the title? Is it in discord with the being, or
does it not rather coincide with it in the thinking? If the title is
inappropriate to the being, then how can the being be represented by
the title; but if, as he himself phrases it, the being is fittingly
defined by the title of Ungenerate, how can there be any parting of
them after that? You make the name of the being follow one thing and
the being itself another. And what then is the `construction of the
entire view?' "The title Ungenerate follows God, seeing that He Himself
is Ungenerate." He says that there `follows' God, Who is something
other than that which is Ungenerate, this very title. Then how can he
place the definition of Godhead within the Ungeneracy? Again, he says
that this title `follows' God as existing without a previous
generation. Who will solve us the mystery of such riddles? `Ungenerate'
preceding and then following; first a fittingly attached title of the
being, and then following like a stranger! What, too, is the cause or
this excessive flutter about this name; he gives to it the whole
contents of godhead [226] ; as if there will be nothing wanting in our
adoration, if God be so named; and as if the whole system of our faith
will be endangered, if He is not? Now, if a brief statement about this
should not be deemed superfluous and irrelevant, we will thus explain
the matter.
__________________________________________________________________

[223] hos einai men ton Theon kata tauton hos einai pote(infinitive by
attraction to preceding) kai einai pepisteutai

[224] euarithmeton rhematon. But it is possible that the true reading
may be euruthmon, alluding to the `rhythm' in the form of abuse with
which Eunomius connected his arguments (preceding section).

[225] ouk eis to einai sunairountes

[226] He gives to it the whole contents of godhead. It was the central
point in Eunomius' system that by the 'Agennesia we can comprehend the
Divine Nature; he trusts entirely to the Aristotelian divisions
(logical) and sub-divisions. A mere word (gennetos) was thus allowed to
destroy the equality of the Son. It was almost inevitable, therefore,
that his opponent, as a defender of the Homoousion, should occasionally
fall back so far upon Plato, as to maintain that opposites are joined
and are identical with each other, i.e. that gennesis and agennesia are
not truly opposed to each other. Another method of combating this
excessive insistence on the physical and logical was, to bring forward
the ethical realities; and this Gregory does constantly throughout this
treatise. We are to know God by Wisdom, and Truth, and Righteousness.
Only occasionally (as in the next section) does he speak of the
`eternity' of God: and here only because Eunomius has obliged him, and
in order to show that the idea is made up of two negations, and nothing
more.
__________________________________________________________________

S:42. Explanation of `Ungenerate,' and a `study' of Eternity.

The eternity of God's life, to sketch it in mere outline, is on this
wise. He is always to be apprehended as in existence; He admits not a
time when He was not, and when He will not be. Those who draw a
circular figure in plane geometry from a centre to the distance of the
line of circumference tell us there is no definite beginning to their
figure; and that the line is interrupted by no ascertained end any more
than by any visible commencement: they say that, as it forms a single
whole in itself with equal radii on all sides, it avoids giving any
indication of beginning or ending. When, then, we compare the Infinite
being to such a figure, circumscribed though it be, let none find fault
with this account; for it is not on the circumference, but on the
similarity which the figure bears to the Life which in every direction
eludes the grasp, that we fix our attention when we affirm that such is
our intuition of the Eternal. From the present instant, as from a
centre and a "point," we extend thought in all directions, to the
immensity of that Life. We find that we are drawn round uninterruptedly
and evenly, and that we are always following a circumference where
there is nothing to grasp; we find the divine life returning upon
itself in an unbroken continuity, where no end and no parts can be
recognized. Of God's eternity we say that which we have heard from
prophecy [227] ; viz.. that God is a king "of old," and rules for ages,
and for ever, and beyond. Therefore we define Him to be earlier than
any beginning, and exceeding any end. Entertaining, then, this idea of
the Almighty, as one that is adequate, we express it by two titles;
i.e., `Ungenerate' and `Endless' represent this infinitude and
continuity and ever-lastingness of the Deity. If we adopted only one of
them for our idea, and if the remaining one was dropped, our meaning
would be marred by this omission; for it is impossible with either one
of them singly [228] to express the notion residing in each of the two;
but when one speaks of the `endless,' only the absence as regards an
end has been indicated, and it does not follow that any hint has been
given about a beginning; while, when one speaks of the `Unoriginate
[229] ,' the fact of being beyond a beginning has been expressed, but
the case as regards an end has been left quite doubtful.

Seeing, then, that these two titles equally help to express the
eternity of the divine life, it is high time to inquire why our friends
cut in two the complete meaning of this eternity, and declare that the
one meaning, which is the negation of beginning, constitutes God's
being (instead of merely forming part of the definition of eternity
[230] ), while they consider the other, which is the negation of end,
as amongst the externals of that being. It is difficult to see the
reason for thus assigning the negation of beginning to the realm of
being, while they banish the negation of end outside that realm. The
two are our conceptions of the same thing; and, therefore, either both
should be admitted to the definition of being, or, if the one is to be
judged inadmissible, the other should be rejected also. If, however,
they are determined thus to divide the thought of eternity, and to make
the one fall within the realm of that being, and to reckon the other
with the non-realities of Deity (for the thoughts which they adopt on
this subject are grovelling, and, like birds who have shed their
feathers, they are unable to soar into the sublimities of theology), I
would advise them to reverse their teaching, and to count the unending
as being, overlooking the unoriginate rather, and assigning the palm to
that which is future and excites hope, rather than to that which is
past and stale. Seeing, I say (and I speak thus owing to their
narrowness of spirit, and lower the discussion to the level of a
child's conception), the past period of his life is nothing to him who
has lived it, and all his interest is centred on the future and on that
which can be looked forward to, that which has no end will have more
value than that which has no beginning. So let our thoughts upon the
divine nature be worthy and exalted ones; or else, if they are going to
judge of it according to human tests, let the future be more valued by
them than the past, and let them confine the being of the Deity to
that, since time's lapse sweeps away with it all existence in the past,
whereas expected existence gains substance from our hope [231] .

Now I broach these ridiculously childish suggestions as to children
sitting in the market-place and playing [232] ; for when one looks into
the grovelling earthliness of their heretical teaching it is impossible
to help falling into a sort of sportive childishness. It would be
right, however, to add this to what we have said, viz., that, as the
idea of eternity is completed only by means of both (as we have already
argued), by the negation of a beginning and also by that of an end, if
they confine God's being to the one, their definition of this being
will be manifestly imperfect and curtailed by half; it is thought of
only by the absence of beginning, and does not contain the absence of
end within itself as an essential element. But if they do combine both
negations, and so complete their definition of the being of God,
observe, again, the absurdity that is at once apparent in this view; it
will be found, after all their efforts, to be at variance not only with
the Only-begotten, but with itself. The case is clear and does not
require much dwelling upon. The idea of a beginning and the idea of an
end are opposed each to each; the meanings of each differ as widely as
the other diametric oppositions [233] , where there is no half-way
proposition below [234] . If any one is asked to define `beginning,' he
will not give a definition the same as that of end; but will carry his
definition of it to the opposite extremity. Therefore also the two
contraries [235] of these will be separated from each other by the same
distance of opposition; and that which is without beginning, being
contrary to that which is to be seen by a beginning, will be a very
different thing from that which is endless, or the negation of end. If,
then, they import both these attributes into the being of God, I mean
the negations of end and of beginning, they will exhibit this Deity of
theirs as a combination of two contradictory and discordant things,
because the contrary ideas to beginning and end reproduce on their side
also the contradiction existing between beginning and end. Contraries
of contradictories are themselves contradictory of each other. In fact,
it is always a true axiom, that two things which are naturally opposed
to two things mutually opposite are themselves opposed to each other;
as we may see by example. Water is opposed to fire; therefore also the
forces destructive of these are opposed to each other; if moistness is
apt to extinguish fire, and dryness is apt to destroy water, the
opposition of fire to water is continued in those qualities themselves
which are contrary to them; so that dryness is plainly opposed to
moistness. Thus, when beginning and end have to be placed
(diametrically) opposite each other [236] , the terms contrary to these
also contradict each other in their meaning, I mean, the negations of
end and of beginning. Well, then, if they determine that one only of
these negations is indicative of the being (to repeat my former
assertion), they will bear evidence to half only of God's existence,
confining it to the absence of beginning, and refusing to extend it to
the absence of end; whereas, if they import both into their definition
of it, they will actually exhibit it so as a combination of
contradictions in the way that has been said; for these two negations
of beginning and of end, by virtue of the contradiction existing
between beginning and end, will part it asunder. So their Deity will be
found to be a sort of patchwork compound, a conglomerate of
contradictions.

But there is not, neither shall there be, in the Church of God a
teaching such as that, which can make One who is single and incomposite
not only multiform and patchwork, but also the combination of
opposites. The simplicity of the True Faith assumes God to be that
which He is, viz., incapable of being grasped by any term, or any idea,
or any other device of our apprehension, remaining beyond the reach not
only of the human but of the angelic and of all supramundane
intelligence, unthinkable, unutterable, above all expression in words,
having but one name that can represent His proper nature, the single
name of being `Above every name [237] '; which is granted to the
Only-begotten also, because "all that the Father hath is the Son's."
The orthodox theory allows these words, I mean "Ungenerate," "Endless,"
to be indicative of God's eternity, but not of His being; so that
"Ungenerate" means that no source or cause lies beyond Him, and
"Endless" means that His kingdom will be brought to a standstill in no
end. "Thou art the same," the prophet says, "and Thy years shall not
fail [238] ," showing by "art" that He subsists out of no cause, and by
the words following, that the blessedness of His life is ceaseless and
unending.

But, perhaps, some one amongst even very religious people will pause
over these investigations of ours upon God's eternity, and say that it
will be difficult from what we have said for the Faith in the
Only-begotten to escape unhurt. Of two unacceptable doctrines, he will
say, our account [239] must inevitably be brought into contact with
one. Either we shall make out that the Son is Ungenerate, which is
absurd; or else we shall deny Him Eternity altogether, a denial which
that fraternity of blasphemers make their specialty. For if Eternity is
characterized by having no beginning and end, it is inevitable either
that we must be impious and deny the Son Eternity, or that we must be
led in our secret thoughts about Him into the idea of Ungeneracy. What,
then, shall we answer? That if, in conceiving of the Father before the
Son on the single score of causation, we inserted any mark of time
before the subsistence of the Only-begotten, the belief which we have
in the Son's eternity might with reason be said to be endangered. But,
as it is, the Eternal nature, equally in the case of the Father's and
the Son's life, and, as well, in what we believe about the Holy Ghost,
admits not of the thought that it will ever cease to be; for where time
is not, the "when" is annihilated with it. And if the Son, always
appearing with the thought of the Father, is always found in the
category of existence, what danger is there in owning the Eternity of
the Only-begotten, Who "hath neither beginning of days, nor end of life
[240] ." For as He is Light from Light, Life from Life, Good from Good,
and Wise, Just, Strong, and all else in the same way, so most certainly
is He Eternal from Eternal.

But a lover of controversial wrangling catches up the argument, on the
ground that such a sequence would make Him Ungenerate from Ungenerate.
Let him, however, cool his combative heart, and insist upon the proper
expressions, for in confessing His `coming from the Father' he has
banished all ideas of Ungeneracy as regards the Only-begotten; and
there will be then no danger in pronouncing Him Eternal and yet not
Ungenerate. On the one hand, because the existence of the Son is not
marked by any intervals of time, and the infinitude of His life flows
back before the ages and onward beyond them in an all-pervading tide,
He is properly addressed with the title of Eternal; again, on the other
hand, because the thought of Him as Son in fact and title gives us the
thought of the Father as inalienably joined to it, He thereby stands
clear of an ungenerate existence being imputed to Him, while He is
always with a Father Who always is, as those inspired words of our
Master expressed it, "bound by way of generation to His Father's
Ungeneracy." Our account of the Holy Ghost will be the same also; the
difference is only in the place assigned in order. For as the Son is
bound to the Father, and, while deriving existence from Him, is not
substantially after Him, so again the Holy Spirit is in touch with the
Only-begotten, Who is conceived of as before the Spirit's subsistence
only in the theoretical light of a cause [241] . Extensions in time
find no admittance in the Eternal Life; so that, when we have removed
the thought of cause, the Holy Trinity in no single way exhibits
discord with itself; and to It is glory due.
__________________________________________________________________

[227] from prophecy. Psalm x. 16. Basileusei Kurios eis ton ai& 242;na,
kai eis ton ai& 242;na tou ai& 242;nos; Psalm xxix. 10. kathieitai
Kurios basileus eis ton ai& 242;na; Psalm lxxiv. 12. ;;O de theos
basileus hemon pro ai& 242;nos.

[228] henos tinos touton.

[229] anarchon.

[230] ou peri to aidion theoreisthai

[231] Cf. Heb. xi. 1, of faith, elpizomenon hupostasis pragmaton

[232] Luke vii. 32.

[233] kata diametron allelois antikeimenon, i.e. Contradictories in
Logic.

[234] As in A or E, both of which have the Particular below them (I or
O) as a half-way to the contrary Universal. Thus-- A I E
All men are mortal. Some men are mortal. No men are mortal.
E O A No men are mortal. Some men are not mortal. All men are mortal.
But between A and O, E and I, there is no half-way.

[235] Beginning (Contraries) Beginningless. Endless (Contraries)
Ending.

[236] hupenantios diakeimenon. The same term has been used to express
the opposition between Ungenerate and Generated: so that it means both
Oppositions, i.e. Contraries and Contradictories.

[237] Philip. ii. 9. onoma to huper pan onoma.

[238] Psalm cii. 27.

[239] Adopting ho logos from the Venice Cod. (heni pantos ho logos
sunenechthesetai). The verb cannot be impersonal: and tis above, the
only available nominative, does not suit the sense very well. Gregory
constructs this scheme of Opposition after the analogy of Logical
Opposition. Beginning is not so opposed to Beginning-less, as it is to
Ending, because with the latter there is no half-way, i.e. no word of
definition in common.

[240] Heb. vii. 3.

[241] ton tes aitias logon. This is much more probably the meaning,
because of before above, than "on the score of the different kind of
causation" (Non omne quod procedat nascitur, quamvis omne procedat quod
nascitur. S. August.). It is a direct testimony to the `Filioque'
belief. "The Spirit comes forth with the Word, not begotten with Him,
but being with and accompanying and proceeding from Him." Theodoret.
Serm. II.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

Book II.

S:1. The second book declares the Incarnation of God the Word, and the
faith delivered by the Lord to His disciples, and asserts that the
heretics who endeavour to overthrow this faith and devise other
additional names are of their father the devil.

The Christian Faith, which in accordance with the command of our Lord
has been preached to all nations by His disciples, is neither of men,
nor by men, but by our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, Who being the Word,
the Life, the Light, the Truth, and God, and Wisdom, and all else that
He is by nature, for this cause above all was made in the likeness of
man, and shared our nature, becoming like us in all things, yet without
sin. He was like us in all things, in that He took upon Him manhood in
its entirety with soul and body, so that our salvation was accomplished
by means of both:--He, I say, appeared on earth and "conversed with men
[242] ," that men might no longer have opinions according to their own
notions about the Self-existent, formulating into a doctrine the hints
that come to them from vague conjectures, but that we might be
convinced that God has truly been manifested in the flesh, and believe
that to be the only true "mystery of godliness [243] ," which was
delivered to us by the very Word and God, Who by Himself spake to His
Apostles, and that we might receive the teaching concerning the
transcendent nature of the Deity which is given to us, as it were,
"through a glass darkly [244] " from the older Scriptures,--from the
Law, and the Prophets, and the Sapiential Books, as an evidence of the
truth fully revealed to us, reverently accepting the meaning of the
things which have been spoken, so as to accord in the faith set forth
by the Lord of the whole Scriptures [245] , which faith we guard as we
received it, word for word, in purity, without falsification, judging
even a slight divergence from the words delivered to us an extreme
blasphemy and impiety. We believe, then, even as the Lord set forth the
Faith to His Disciples, when He said, "Go, teach all nations, baptizing
them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost
[246] ." This is the word of the mystery whereby through the new birth
from above our nature is transformed from the corruptible to the
incorruptible, being renewed from "the old man," "according to the
image of Him who created [247] " at the beginning the likeness to the
Godhead. In the Faith then which was delivered by God to the Apostles
we admit neither subtraction, nor alteration, nor addition, knowing
assuredly that he who presumes to pervert the Divine utterance by
dishonest quibbling, the same "is of his father the devil," who leaves
the words of truth and "speaks of his own," becoming the father of a
lie [248] . For whatsoever is said otherwise than in exact accord with
the truth is assuredly false and not true.
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[242] Bar. iii. 37.

[243] 1 Tim. iii. 16.

[244] 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

[245] This is perhaps the force of ton holon: "the Lord of the Old
Covenant as well as of the New." But ton holon may mean simply "the
Universe."

[246] S. Matt. xxviii. 19.

[247] Cf. Col. iii. 10

[248] Cf. S. John viii. 44.
__________________________________________________________________

S:2. Gregory then makes an explanation at length touching the eternal
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

Since then this doctrine is put forth by the Truth itself, it follows
that anything which the inventors of pestilent heresies devise besides
to subvert this Divine utterance,--as, for example, calling the Father
"Maker" and "Creator" of the Son instead of "Father," and the Son a
"result," a "creature," a "product," instead of "Son," and the Holy
Spirit the "creature of a creature," and the "product of a product,"
instead of His proper title the "Spirit," and whatever those who fight
against God are pleased to say of Him,--all such fancies we term a
denial and violation of the Godhead revealed to us in this doctrine.
For once for all we have learned from the Lord, through Whom comes the
transformation of our nature from mortality to immortality,--from Him,
I say, we have learned to what we ought to look with the eyes of our
understanding,--that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. We
say that it is a terrible and soul-destroying thing to misinterpret
these Divine utterances and to devise in their stead assertions to
subvert them,--assertions pretending to correct God the Word, Who
appointed that we should maintain these statements as part of our
faith. For each of these titles understood in its natural sense becomes
for Christians a rule of truth and a law of piety. For while there are
many other names by which Deity is indicated in the Historical Books,
in the Prophets and in the Law, our Master Christ passes by all these
and commits to us these titles as better able to bring us to the faith
about the Self-Existent, declaring that it suffices us to cling to the
title, "Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," in order to attain to the
apprehension of Him Who is absolutely Existent, Who is one and yet not
one. In regard to essence He is one, wherefore the Lord ordained that
we should look to one Name: but in regard to the attributes indicative
of the Persons, our belief in Him is distinguished into belief in the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost [249] ; He is divided without
separation, and united without confusion. For when we hear the title
"Father" we apprehend the meaning to be this, that the name is not
understood with reference to itself alone, but also by its special
signification indicates the relation to the Son. For the term "Father"
would have no meaning apart by itself, if "Son" were not connoted by
the utterance of the word "Father." When, then, we learnt the name
"Father" we were taught at the same time, by the selfsame title, faith
also in the Son. Now since Deity by its very nature is permanently and
immutably the same in all that pertains to its essence, nor did it at
any time fail to be anything that it now is, nor will it at any future
time be anything that it now is not, and since He Who is the very
Father was named Father by the Word, and since in the Father the Son is
implied,--since these things are so, we of necessity believe that He
Who admits no change or alteration in His nature was always entirely
what He is now, or, if there is anything which He was not, that He
assuredly is not now. Since then He is named Father by the very Word,
He assuredly always was Father, and is and will be even as He was. For
surely it is not lawful in speaking of the Divine and unimpaired
Essence to deny that what is excellent always belonged to It. For if He
was not always what He now is, He certainly changed either from the
better to the worse or from the worse to the better, and of these
assertions the impiety is equal either way, whichever statement is made
concerning the Divine nature. But in fact the Deity is incapable of
change and alteration. So, then, everything that is excellent and good
is always contemplated in the fountain of excellency. But "the
Only-begotten God, Who is in the bosom of the Father [250] " is
excellent, and beyond all excellency:--mark you, He says, "Who is in
the bosom of the Father," not "Who came to be" there.

Well then, it has been demonstrated by these proofs that the Son is
from all eternity to be contemplated in the Father, in Whom He is,
being Life and Light and Truth, and every noble name and conception--to
say that the Father ever existed by Himself apart from these attributes
is a piece of the utmost impiety and infatuation. For if the Son, as
the Scripture saith, is the Power of God, and Wisdom, and Truth, and
Light, and Sanctification, and Peace, and Life, and the like, then
before the Son existed, according to the view of the heretics, these
things also had no existence at all. And if these things had no
existence they must certainly conceive the bosom of the Father to have
been devoid of such excellences. To the end, then, that the Father
might not be conceived as destitute of the excellences which are His
own, and that the doctrine might not run wild into this extravagance,
the right faith concerning the Son is necessarily included in our
Lord's utterance with the contemplation of the eternity of the Father.
And for this reason He passes over all those names which are employed
to indicate the surpassing excellence of the Divine nature [251] , and
delivers to us as part of our profession of faith the title of "Father"
as better suited to indicate the truth, being a title which, as has
been said, by its relative sense connotes with itself the Son, while
the Son, Who is in the Father, always is what He essentially is, as has
been said already, because the Deity by Its very nature does not admit
of augmentation. For It does not perceive any other good outside of
Itself, by participation in which It could acquire any accession, but
is always immutable, neither casting away what It has, nor acquiring
what It has not: for none of Its properties are such as to be cast
away. And if there is anything whatsoever blessed, unsullied, true and
good, associated with Him and in Him, we see of necessity that the good
and holy Spirit must belong to Him [252] , not by way of accretion.
That Spirit is indisputably a princely Spirit [253] , a quickening
Spirit, the controlling and sanctifying force of all creation, the
Spirit that "worketh all in all" as He wills [254] . Thus we conceive
no gap between the anointed Christ and His anointing, between the King
and His sovereignty, between Wisdom and the Spirit of Wisdom, between
Truth and the Spirit of Truth, between Power and the Spirit of Power,
but as there is contemplated from all eternity in the Father the Son,
Who is Wisdom and Truth, and Counsel, and Might, and Knowledge, and
Understanding, so there is also contemplated in Him the Holy Spirit,
Who is the Spirit of Wisdom, and of Truth, and of Counsel, and of
Understanding, and all else that the Son is and is called. For which
reason we say that to the holy disciples the mystery of godliness was
committed in a form expressing at once union and distinction,--that we
should believe on the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the
Holy Ghost. For the differentiation of the subsistences [255] makes the
distinction of Persons [256] clear and free from confusion, while the
one Name standing in the forefront of the declaration of the Faith
clearly expounds to us the unity of essence of the Persons [257] Whom
the Faith declares,--I mean, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the
Holy Spirit. For by these appellations we are taught not a difference
of nature, but only the special attributes that mark the subsistences
[258] , so that we know that neither is the Father the Son, nor the Son
the Father, nor the Holy Spirit either the Father or the Son, and
recognize each by the distinctive mark of His Personal Subsistence
[259] , in illimitable perfection, at once contemplated by Himself and
not divided from that with Which He is connected.
__________________________________________________________________

[249] Or, somewhat more literally, "He admits of distinction into
belief in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, being divided," &c.

[250] S. John i. 18

[251] That nature which transcends our conceptions (huperkeimene).

[252] Or "be conjoined with such attribute:" auto probably refers, like
peri auton kai en auto just above, to Theos or to Theion, but it may
conceivably refer to ei ti makarion, k.t.l.

[253] hegemonikon. Cf. Ps. li. 12 in LXX. (Spiritus principalis in
Vulg., "free spirit" in the "Authorised" Version, and in the
Prayer-book Version).

[254] Cf. 1 Cor. xii. 6.

[255] hupostaseon

[256] prosopon

[257] prosopon

[258] hupostaseon

[259] hupostaseon
__________________________________________________________________

S:3. Gregory proceeds to discuss the relative force of the unnameable
name of the Holy Trinity and the mutual relation of the Persons, and
moreover the unknowable character of the essence, and the condescension
on His part towards us, His generation of the Virgin, and His second
coming, the resurrection from the dead and future retribution.

What then means that unnameable name concerning which the Lord said,
"Baptizing them into the name," and did not add the actual significant
term which "the name" indicates? We have concerning it this notion,
that all things that exist in the creation are defined by means of
their several names. Thus whenever a man speaks of "heaven" he directs
the notion of the hearer to the created object indicated by this name,
and he who mentions "man" or some animal, at once by the mention of the
name impresses upon the hearer the form of the creature, and in the
same way all other things, by means of the names imposed upon them, are
depicted in the heart of him who by hearing receives the appellation
imposed upon the thing. The uncreated Nature alone, which we
acknowledge in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit,
surpasses all significance of names. For this cause the Word, when He
spoke of "the name" in delivering the Faith, did not add what it
is,--for how could a name be found for that which is above every
name?--but gave authority that whatever name our intelligence by pious
effort be enabled to discover to indicate the transcendent Nature, that
name should be applied alike to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, whether it
be "the Good" or "the Incorruptible," whatever name each may think
proper to be employed to indicate the undefiled Nature of Godhead. And
by this deliverance the Word seems to me to lay down for us this law,
that we are to be persuaded that the Divine Essence is ineffable and
incomprehensible: for it is plain that the title of Father does not
present to us the Essence, but only indicates the relation to the Son.
It follows, then, that if it were possible for human nature to be
taught the essence of God, He "Who will have all men to be saved and to
come to the knowledge of the truth [260] " would not have suppressed
the knowledge upon this matter. But as it is, by saying nothing
concerning the Divine Essence, He showed that the knowledge thereof is
beyond our power, while when we have learnt that of which we are
capable, we stand in no need of the knowledge beyond our capacity, as
we have in the profession of faith in the doctrine delivered to us what
suffices for our salvation. For to learn that He is the absolutely
existent, together with Whom, by the relative force of the term, there
is also declared the majesty of the Son, is the fullest teaching of
godliness; the Son, as has been said, implying in close union with
Himself the Spirit of Life and Truth, inasmuch as He is Himself Life
and Truth.

These distinctions being thus established, while we anathematize all
heretical fancies in the sphere of divine doctrines, we believe, even
as we were taught by the voice of the Lord, in the Name of the Father
and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, acknowledging together with this
faith also the dispensation that has been set on foot on behalf of men
by the Lord of the creation. For He "being in the form of God thought
it not robbery to be equal with God, but made Himself of no reputation,
and took upon Him the form of a servant [261] ," and being incarnate in
the Holy Virgin redeemed us from death "in which we were held," "sold
under sin [262] ," giving as the ransom for the deliverance of our
souls His precious blood which He poured out by His Cross, and having
through Himself made clear for us the path of the resurrection [263]
from the dead, shall come in His own time in the glory of the Father to
judge every soul in righteousness, when "all that are in the graves
shall hear His voice, and shall come forth, they that have done good
unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the
resurrection of damnation [264] ." But that the pernicious heresy that
is now being sown broadcast by Eunomius may not, by falling upon the
mind of some of the simpler sort and being left without investigation,
do harm to guileless faith, we are constrained to set forth the
profession which they circulate and to strive to expose the mischief of
their teaching.
__________________________________________________________________

[260] 1 Tim. ii. 4.

[261] Phil. ii. 6.

[262] Or, "in which we were held by sin, being sold." The reference is
to Rom. vii. 7 and 14, but with the variation of hupo tes hamartias,
for hupo ten hamartian, and a change in the order of the words.

[263] A similar phrase is to be found in Book V. With both may be
compared the language of the Eucharistic Prayer in the Liturgy of S.
Basil (where the context corresponds to some extent with that of either
passage in S. Gregory):--kai anastas te trite hemera, kai hodopoiesas
pase sarki ten ek nekron anastasin, k.t.l.

[264] S. John v. 29
__________________________________________________________________

S:4. He next skilfully confutes the partial, empty and blasphemous
statement of Eunomius on the subject of the absolutely existent.

Now the wording of their doctrine is as follows: "We believe in the one
and only true God, according to the teaching of the Lord Himself, not
honouring Him with a lying title (for He cannot lie), but really
existent, one God in nature and in glory, who is without beginning,
eternally, without end, alone." Let not him who professes to believe in
accordance with the teaching of the Lord pervert the exposition of the
faith that was made concerning the Lord of all to suit his own fancy,
but himself follow the utterance of the truth. Since then, the
expression of the Faith comprehends the name of the Father and of the
Son and of the Holy Ghost, what agreement has this construction of
theirs to show with the utterances of the Lord, so as to refer such a
doctrine to the teaching of those utterances? They cannot manage to
show where in the Gospels the Lord said that we should believe on "the
one and only true God:" unless they have some new Gospel. For the
Gospels which are read in the churches continuously from ancient times
to the present day, do not contain this saying which tells us that we
should believe in or baptize into "the one and only true God," as these
people say, but "in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the
Holy Ghost." But as we were taught by the voice of the Lord, this we
say, that the word "one" does not indicate the Father alone, but
comprehends in its significance the Son with the Father, inasmuch as
the Lord said, "I and My Father are one [265] ." In like manner also
the name "God" belongs equally to the Beginning in which the Word was,
and to the Word Who was in the Beginning. For the Evangelist tells us
that "the Word was with God, and the Word was God [266] ." So that when
Deity is expressed the Son is included no less than the Father.
Moreover, the true cannot be conceived as something alien from and
unconnected with the truth. But that the Lord is the Truth no one at
all will dispute, unless he be one estranged from the truth. If, then,
the Word is in the One, and is God and Truth, as is proclaimed in the
Gospels, on what teaching of the Lord does he base his doctrine who
makes use of these distinctive terms? For the antithesis is between
"only" and "not only," between "God" and "no God," between "true" and
"untrue." If it is with respect to idols that they make their
distinction of phrases, we too agree. For the name of "deity" is given,
in an equivocal sense, to the idols of the heathen, seeing that "all
the gods of the heathen are demons," and in another sense marks the
contrast of the one with the many, of the true with the false, of those
who are not Gods with Him who is God [267] . But if the contrast is one
with the Only-begotten God [268] , let our sages learn that truth has
its opposite only in falsehood, and God in one who is not God. But
inasmuch as the Lord Who is the Truth is God, and is in the Father and
is one relatively to the Father [269] , there is no room in the true
doctrine for these distinctions of phrases. For he who truly believes
in the One sees in the One Him Who is completely united with Him in
truth, and deity, and essence, and life, and wisdom, and in all
attributes whatsoever: or, if he does not see in the One Him Who is all
these it is in nothing that he believes. For without the Son the Father
has neither existence nor name, any more than the Powerful without
Power, or the Wise without Wisdom. For Christ is "the Power of God and
the Wisdom of God [270] ;" so that he who imagines he sees the One God
apart from power, truth, wisdom, life, or the true light, either sees
nothing at all or else assuredly that which is evil. For the withdrawal
of the good attributes becomes a positing and origination of evil.

"Not honouring Him," he says, "with a lying title, for He cannot lie."
By that phrase I pray that Eunomius may abide, and so bear witness to
the truth that it cannot lie. For if he would be of this mind, that
everything that is uttered by the Lord is far removed from falsehood,
he will of course be persuaded that He speaks the truth Who says, "I am
in the Father, and the Father in Me [271] ,"--plainly, the One in His
entirety, in the Other in His entirety, the Father not superabounding
in the Son, the Son not being deficient in the Father,--and Who says
also that the Son should be honoured as the Father is honoured [272] ,
and "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father [273] ," and "no man
knoweth the Father save the Son [274] ," in all which passages there is
no hint given to those who receive these declarations as genuine, of
any variation [275] of glory, or of essence, or anything else, between
the Father and the Son.

"Really existent," he says, "one God in nature and in glory." Real
existence is opposed to unreal existence. Now each of existing things
is really existent in so far as it is; but that which, so far as
appearance and suggestion go, seems to be, but is not, this is not
really existent, as for example an appearance in a dream or a man in a
picture. For these and such like things, though they exist so far as
appearance is concerned, have not real existence. If then they
maintain, in accordance with the Jewish opinion, that the Only-begotten
God does not exist at all, they are right in predicating real existence
of the Father alone. But if they do not deny the existence of the Maker
of all things, let them be content not to deprive of real existence Him
Who is, Who in the Divine appearance to Moses gave Himself the name of
Existent, when He said, "I am that I am [276] :" even as Eunomius in
his later argument agrees with this, saying that it was He Who appeared
to Moses. Then he says that God is "one in nature and in glory."
Whether God exists without being by nature God, he who uses these words
may perhaps know: but if it be true that he who is not by nature God is
not God at all, let them learn from the great Paul that they who serve
those who are not Gods do not serve God [277] ." But we "serve the
living and true God," as the Apostle says [278] : and He Whom we serve
is Jesus the Christ [279] . For Him the Apostle Paul even exults in
serving, saying, "Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ [280] ." We then, who
no longer serve them which by nature are no Gods [281] , have come to
the knowledge of Him Who by nature is God, to Whom every knee boweth
"of things in heaven and things in earth and things under the earth
[282] ." But we should not have been His servants had we not believed
that this is the living and true God, to Whom "every tongue maketh
confession that Jesus is Lord to the glory of God the Father [283] ."

"God," he says, "Who is without beginning, eternally, without end,
alone." Once more "understand, ye simple ones," as Solomon says, "his
subtlety [284] ," lest haply ye be deceived and fall headlong into the
denial of the Godhead of the Only-begotten Son. That is without end
which admits not of death and decay: that, likewise, is called
everlasting which is not only for a time. That, therefore, which is
neither everlasting nor without end is surely seen in the nature which
is perishable and mortal. Accordingly he who predicates "unendingness"
of the one and only God, and does not include the Son in the assertion
of "unendingness" and "eternity," maintains by such a proposition, that
He Whom he thus contrasts with the eternal and unending is perishable
and temporary. But we, even when we are told that God "only hath
immortality [285] ," understand by "immortality" the Son. For life is
immortality, and the Lord is that life, Who said, "I am the Life [286]
." And if He be said to dwell "in the light that no man can approach
unto [287] ," again we make no difficulty in understanding that the
true Light, unapproachable by falsehood, is the Only-begotten, in Whom
we learn from the Truth itself that the Father is [288] . Of these
opinions let the reader choose the more devout, whether we are to think
of the Only-begotten in a manner worthy of the Godhead, or to call Him,
as heresy prescribes, perishable and temporary.
__________________________________________________________________

[265] S. John x. 30

[266] S. John i. 1

[267] Or, possibly, "and the contrast he makes between the one and the
many, &c. is irrelevant" (allos antidiairei): the quotation is from Ps.
xcvi. 6 (LXX.).

[268] Cf. S. John i. 18, reading (as S. Gregory seems to have done)
theos for hui& 231;s.

[269] kai hen pros ton patera ontos. It may be questioned whether the
text is sound: the phrase seems unusual; perhaps hen has been inserted
in error from the preceding clause kai en to patri ontos, and we should
read "is in the Father and is with the Father" (cf. the 2nd verse of
the 1st Epistle, and verses 1 and 2 of the Gospel of S. John).

[270] 1 Cor. i. 24.

[271] S. John xiv. 10

[272] Cf. S. John v. 23

[273] S. John xiv. 9

[274] S. Matt. xi. 27

[275] parallage (Cf. S. James i. 17).

[276] Or "I am He that is," Ex. iii. 14.

[277] The reference seems to be to Gal. iv. 8.

[278] 1 Thess. i. 10.

[279] There is perhaps a reference here to Col. iii. 24.

[280] Rom. i. 1.

[281] Cf. Gal. iv. 8

[282] Cf. Phil. ii. 10, 11.

[283] Cf. Phil. ii. 10, 11.

[284] Prov. viii. 5 (Septuagint).

[285] 1 Tim. vi. 16.

[286] S. John xiv. 6

[287] 1 Tim. vi. 16.

[288] S. John xiv. 11
__________________________________________________________________

S:5. He next marvellously overthrows the unintelligible statements of
Eunomius which assert that the essence of the Father is not separated
or divided, and does not become anything else.

"We believe in God," he tells us, "not separated as regards the essence
wherein He is one, into more than one, or becoming sometimes one and
sometimes another, or changing from being what He is, or passing from
one essence to assume the guise of a threefold personality: for He is
always and absolutely one, remaining uniformly and unchangeably the
only God." From these citations the discreet reader may well separate
first of all the idle words inserted in the statement without any
meaning from those which appear to have some sense, and afterwards
examine the meaning that is discoverable in what remains of his
statement, to ascertain whether it is compatible with due reverence
towards Christ.

The first, then, of the statements cited is completely divorced from
any intelligible meaning, good or bad. For what sense there is in the
words, "not separated, as regards the essence wherein He is one, into
more than one, or becoming sometimes one and sometimes another, or
changing from being what He is," Eunomius himself could not tell us,
and I do not think that any of his allies could find in the words any
shadow of meaning. When he speaks of Him as "not separated in regard to
the essence wherein He is one," he says either that He is not separated
from His own essence, or that His own essence is not divided from Him.
This unmeaning statement is nothing but a random combination of noise
and empty sound. And why should one spend time in the investigation of
these meaningless expressions? For how does any one remain in existence
when separated from his own essence? or how is the essence of anything
divided and displayed apart? Or how is it possible for one to depart
from that wherein he is, and become another, getting outside himself?
But he adds, "not passing from one essence to assume the guise of three
persons: for He is always and absolutely one, remaining uniformly and
unchangeably the only God." I think the absence of meaning in his
statement is plain to every one without a word from me: against this
let any one argue who thinks there is any sense or meaning in what he
says: he who has an eye to discern the force of words will decline to
involve himself in a struggle with unsubstantial shadows. For what
force has it against our doctrine to say "not separated or divided into
more than one as regards the essence wherein He is one, or becoming
sometimes one and sometimes another, or passing from one essence to
assume the guise of three persons?"--things that are neither said nor
believed by Christians nor understood by inference from the truths we
confess. For who ever said or heard any one else say in the Church of
God, that the Father is either separated or divided as regards His
essence, or becomes sometimes one, sometimes another, coming to be
outside Himself, or assumes the guise of three persons? These things
Eunomius says to himself, not arguing with us but stringing together
his own trash, mixing with the impiety of his utterances a great deal
of absurdity. For we say that it is equally impious and ungodly to call
the Lord of the creation a created being and to think that the Father,
in that He is, is separated or split up, or departs from Himself, or
assumes the guise of three persons, like clay or wax moulded in various
shapes.

But let us examine the words that follow: "He is always and absolutely
one, remaining uniformly and unchangeably the only God." If he is
speaking about the Father, we agree with him, for the Father is most
truly one, alone and always absolutely uniform and unchangeable, never
at any time present or future ceasing to be what He is. If then such an
assertion as this has regard to the Father, let him not contend with
the doctrine of godliness, inasmuch as on this point he is in harmony
with the Church. For he who confesses that the Father is always and
unchangeably the same, being one and only God, holds fast the word of
godliness, if in the Father he sees the Son, without Whom the Father
neither is nor is named. But if he is inventing some other God besides
the Father, let him dispute with the Jews or with those who are called
Hypsistiani, between whom and the Christians there is this difference,
that they acknowledge that there is a God Whom they term the Highest
[289] or Almighty, but do not admit that he is Father; while a
Christian, if he believe not in the Father, no Christian at all.
__________________________________________________________________

[289] hupsiston, whence the name of the sect.
__________________________________________________________________

S:6. He then shows the unity of the Son with the Father and Eunomius'
lack of understanding and knowledge in the Scriptures.

What he adds next after this is as follows:--"Having no sharer," he
says, "in His Godhead, no divider of His glory, none who has lot in His
power, or part in His royal throne: for He is the one and only God, the
Almighty, God of Gods, King of Kings, Lord of Lords." I know not to
whom Eunomius refers when he protests that the Father admits none to
share His Godhead with Himself. For if he uses such expressions with
reference to vain idols and to the erroneous conceptions of those who
worship them (even as Paul assures us that there is no agreement
between Christ and Belial, and no fellowship between the temple of God
and idols [290] ) we agree with him. But if by these assertions he
means to sever the Only-begotten God from the Godhead of the Father,
let him be informed that he is providing us with a dilemma that may be
turned against himself to refute his own impiety. For either he denies
the Only-begotten God to be God at all, that he may preserve for the
Father those prerogatives of deity which (according to him) are
incapable of being shared with the Son, and thus is convicted as a
transgressor by denying the God Whom Christians worship, or if he were
to grant that the Son also is God, yet not agreeing in nature with the
true God, he would be necessarily obliged to acknowledge that he
maintains Gods sundered from one another by the difference of their
natures. Let him choose which of these he will,--either to deny the
Godhead of the Son, or to introduce into his creed a plurality of Gods.
For whichever of these he chooses, it is all one as regards impiety:
for we who are initiated into the mystery of godliness by the Divinely
inspired words of the Scripture do not see between the Father and the
Son a partnership of Godhead, but unity, inasmuch as the Lord hath
taught us this by His own words, when He saith, "I and the Father are
one [291] ," and "he that hath seen Me hath seen the Father [292] ."
For if He were not of the same nature as the Father, how could He
either have had in Himself that which was different [293] ? or how
could He have shown in Himself that which was unlike, if the foreign
and alien nature did not receive the stamp of that which was of a
different kind from itself? But he says, "nor has He a divider of His
glory." Herein he speaks in accordance with the fact, even though he
does not know what he is saying: for the Son does not divide the glory
with the Father, but has the glory of the Father in its entirety, even
as the Father has all the glory of the Son. For thus He spake to the
Father "All Mine are Thine and Thine are Mine [294] ." Wherefore also
He says that He will appear on the Judgment Day "in the glory of the
Father [295] ," when He will render to every man according to his
works. And by this phrase He shows the unity of nature that subsists
between them. For as "there is one glory of the sun and another glory
of the moon [296] ," because of the difference between the natures of
those luminaries (since if both had the same glory there would not be
deemed to be any difference in their nature), so He Who foretold of
Himself that He would appear in the glory of the Father indicated by
the identity of glory their community of nature.

But to say that the Son has no part in His Father's royal throne argues
an extraordinary amount of research into the oracles of God on the part
of Eunomius, who, after his extreme devotion to the inspired
Scriptures, has not yet heard, "Seek those things which are above,
where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God [297] ," and many similar
passages, of which it would not be easy to reckon up the number, but
which Eunomius has never learnt, and so denies that the Son is
enthroned together with the Father. Again the phrase, "not having lot
in his power," we should rather pass by as unmeaning than confute as
ungodly. For what sense is attached to the term "having lot" is not
easy to discover from the common use of the word. Those cast lots, as
the Scripture tells us, for the Lord's vesture, who were unwilling to
rend His garment, but disposed to make it over to that one of their
number in whose favour the lot should decide [298] . They then who thus
cast lots among themselves for the "coat" may be said, perhaps, to
"have had lot" in it. But here in the case of the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as Their power resides in Their nature (for
the Holy Spirit breathes "where He listeth [299] ," and "worketh all in
all as He will [300] ," and the Son, by Whom all things were made,
visible and invisible, in heaven and in earth, "did all things
whatsoever He pleased [301] ," and "quickeneth whom He will [302] ,"
and the Father put "the times in His own power [303] ," while from the
mention of "times" we conclude that all things done in time are subject
to the power of the Father), if, I say, it has been demonstrated that
the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit alike are in a position of
power to do what They will, it is impossible to see what sense there
can be in the phrase "having lot in His power." For the heir of all
things, the maker of the ages [304] , He Who shines with the Father's
glory and expresses in Himself the Father's person, has all things that
the Father Himself has, and is possessor of all His power, not that the
right is transferred from the Father to the Son, but that it at once
remains in the Father and resides in the Son. For He Who is in the
Father is manifestly in the Father with all His own might, and He Who
has the Father in Himself includes all the power and might of the
Father. For He has in Himself all the Father, and not merely a part of
Him: and He Who has Him entirely assuredly has His power as well. With
what meaning, then, Eunomius asserts that the Father has "none who has
lot in His power," those perhaps can tell who are disciples of his
folly: one who knows how to appreciate language confesses that he
cannot understand phrases divorced from meaning. The Father, he says,
"has none Who has lot in His power." Why, who is there that says that
the Father and Son contend together for power and cast lots to decide
the matter? But the holy Eunomius comes as mediator between them and by
a friendly agreement without lot assigns to the Father the superiority
in power.

Mark, I pray you, the absurdity and childishness of this grovelling
exposition of his articles of faith. What! He Who "upholds all things
by the word of His power [305] ," Who says what He wills to be done,
and does what He wills by the very power of that command, He Whose
power lags not behind His will and Whose will is the measure of His
power (for "He spake the word and they were made, He commanded and they
were created [306] "), He Who made all things by Himself, and made them
consist in Himself [307] , without Whom no existing thing either came
into being or remains in being,--He it is Who waits to obtain His power
by some process of allotment! Judge you who hear whether the man who
talks like this is in his senses. "For He is the one and only God, the
Almighty," he says. If by the title of "Almighty" he intends the
Father, the language he uses is ours, and no strange language: but if
he means some other God than the Father, let our patron of Jewish
doctrines preach circumcision too, if he pleases. For the Faith of
Christians is directed to the Father. And the Father is all
these--Highest, Almighty, King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, and in a
word all terms of highest significance are proper to the Father. But
all that is the Father's is the Son's also; so that, on this
understanding [308] , we admit this phrase too. But if, leaving the
Father, he speaks of another Almighty, he is speaking the language of
the Jews or following the speculations of Plato,--for they say that
that philosopher also affirms that there exists on high a maker and
creator of certain subordinate gods. As then in the case of the Jewish
and Platonic opinions he who does not believe in God the Father is not
a Christian, even though in his creed he asserts an Almighty God, so
Eunomius also falsely pretends to the name of Christian, being in
inclination a Jew, or asserting the doctrines of the Greeks while
putting on the guise of the title borne by Christians. And with regard
to the next points he asserts the same account will apply. He says He
is "God of Gods." We make the declaration our own by adding the name of
the Father, knowing that the Father is God of Gods. But all that
belongs to the Father certainly belongs also to the Son. "And Lord of
Lords." The same account will apply to this. "And Most High over all
the earth." Yes, for whichever of the Three Persons you are thinking
of, He is Most High over all the earth, inasmuch as the oversight of
earthly things from on high is exercised alike by the Father, and the
Son, and the Holy Ghost. So, too, with what follows the words above,
"Most High in the heavens, Most High in the highest, Heavenly, true in
being what He is, and so continuing, true in words, true in works."
Why, all these things the Christian eye discerns alike in the Father,
the Son, and the Holy Ghost. If Eunomius does assign them to one only
of the Persons acknowledged in the creed, let him dare to call Him "not
true in words" Who has said, "I am the Truth [309] ," or to call the
Spirit of truth "not true in words," or let him refuse to give the
title of "true in works" to Him Who doeth righteousness and judgment,
or to the Spirit Who worketh all in all as He will. For if he does not
acknowledge that these attributes belong to the Persons delivered to us
in the creed, he is absolutely cancelling the creed of Christians. For
how shall any one think Him a worthy object of faith Who is false in
words and untrue in works.

But let us proceed to what follows. "Above all rule, subjection and
authority," he says. This language is ours, and belongs properly to the
Catholic Church,--to believe that the Divine nature is above all rule,
and that it has in subordination to itself everything that can be
conceived among existing things. But the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Ghost constitute the Divine nature. If he assigns this property to the
Father alone, and if he affirms Him alone to be free from variableness
and change, and if he says that He alone is undefiled, the inference
that we are meant to draw is plain, namely, that He who has not these
characteristics is variable, corruptible, subject to change and decay.
This, then, is what Eunomius asserts of the Son and the Holy Spirit:
for if he did not hold this opinion concerning the Son and the Spirit,
he would not have employed this opposition, contrasting the Father with
them. For the rest, brethren, judge whether, with these sentiments, he
is not a persecutor of the Christian faith. For who will allow it to be
right to deem that a fitting object of reverence which varies, changes,
and is subject to decay? So then the whole aim of one who flames such
notions as these,--notions by which he makes out that neither the Truth
nor the Spirit of Truth is undefiled, unvarying, or unchangeable,--is
to expel from the Church the belief in the Son and in the Holy Spirit.
__________________________________________________________________

[290] Cf. 2 Cor. vi. 15, 16.

[291] S. John x. 30

[292] S. John xiv. 9

[293] S. John xvii. 10.

[294] S. John xvii. 10.

[295] S. Mark viii. 38.

[296] 1 Cor. xv. 41.

[297] Col. iii. 1.

[298] Cf. S. John xix. 23, 24.

[299] S. John iii. 8

[300] Cf. 1 Cor. xii. 6 and 11.

[301] Ps. cxxxv. 6.

[302] S. John v. 21

[303] Acts i. 7.

[304] Cf. Heb. i. 2

[305] Heb. i. 3.

[306] Ps. cxlviii. 5, or xxxiii. 9 in LXX.

[307] Cf. Col. i. 16 and 17.

[308] "If this is so:" i.e. if Eunomius means his words in a Christian
sense.

[309] S. John xiv. 6
__________________________________________________________________

S:7. Gregory further shows that the Only-Begotten being begotten not
only of the Father, but also impassibly of the Virgin by the Holy
Ghost, does not divide the substance; seeing that neither is the nature
of men divided or severed from the parents by being begotten, as is
ingeniously demonstrated from the instances of Adam and Abraham.

And now let us see what he adds to his previous statements. "Not
dividing," he says, "His own essence by begetting, and being at once
begetter and begotten, at the same time Father and Son; for He is
incorruptible." Of such a kind as this, perhaps, is that of which the
prophet says, touching the ungodly, "They weave a spider's web [310] ."
For as in the cobweb there is the appearance of something woven, but no
substantiality in the appearance,--for he who touches it touches
nothing substantial, as the spider's threads break with the touch of a
finger,--just such is the unsubstantial texture of idle phrases. "Not
dividing His own essence by begetting and being at once begetter and
begotten." Ought we to give his words the name of argument, or to call
them rather a swelling of humours secreted by some dropsical inflation?
For what is the sense of "dividing His own essence by begetting, and
being at once begetter and begotten?" Who is so distracted, who is so
demented, as to make the statement against which Eunomius thinks he is
doing battle? For the Church believes that the true Father is truly
Father of His own Son, as the Apostle says, not of a Son alien from
Him. For thus he declares in one of his Epistles, "Who spared not His
own Son [311] ," distinguishing Him, by the addition of "own," from
those who are counted worthy of the adoption of sons by grace and not
by nature. But what says He who disparages this belief of ours? "Not
dividing His own essence by begetting, or being at once begetter and
begotten, at the same time Father and Son; for He is incorruptible."
Does one who hears in the Gospel that the Word was in the beginning,
and was God, and that the Word came forth from the Father, so befoul
the undefiled doctrine with these base and fetid ideas, saying "He does
not divide His essence by begetting?" Shame on the abomination of these
base and filthy notions! How is it that he who speaks thus fails to
understand that God when manifested in flesh did not admit for the
formation of His own body the conditions of human nature, but was born
for us a Child by the Holy Ghost and the power of the Highest; nor was
the Virgin subject to those conditions, nor was the Spirit diminished,
nor the power of the Highest divided? For the Spirit is entire, the
power of the Highest remained undiminished: the Child was born in the
fulness of our nature [312] , and did not sully the incorruption of His
mother. Then was flesh born of flesh without carnal passion: yet
Eunomius will not admit that the brightness of the glory is from the
glory itself, since the glory is neither diminished nor divided by
begetting the light. Again, the word of man is generated from his mind
without division, but God the Word cannot be generated from the Father
without the essence of the Father being divided! Is any one so witless
as not to perceive the irrational character of his position? "Not
dividing," quoth he, "His own essence by begetting." Why, whose own
essence is divided by begetting? For in the case of men essence means
human nature: in the case of brutes, it means, generically, brute
nature, but in the case of cattle, sheep, and all brute animals,
specifically, it is regarded according to the distinctions of their
kinds. Which, then, of these divides its own essence by the process of
generation? Does not the nature always remain undiminished in the case
of every animal by the succession of its posterity? Further a man in
begetting a man from himself does not divide his nature, but it remains
in its fulness alike in him who begets and in him who is begotten, not
split off and transferred from the one to the other, nor mutilated in
the one when it is fully formed in the other, but at once existing in
its entirety in the former and discoverable in its entirety in the
latter. For both before begetting his child the man was a rational
animal, mortal, capable of intelligence and knowledge, and also after
begetting a man endowed with such qualities: so that in him are shown
all the special properties of his nature; as he does not lose his
existence as a man by begetting the man derived from him, but remains
after that event what he was before without causing any diminution of
the nature derived from him by the fact that the man derived from him
comes into being.

Well, man is begotten of man, and the nature of the begetter is not
divided. Yet Eunomius does not admit that the Only-begotten God, Who is
in the bosom of the Father, is truly of the Father, for fear forsooth,
lest he should mutilate the inviolable nature of the Father by the
subsistence of the Only-begotten: but after saying "Not dividing His
essence by begetting," he adds, "Or being Himself begetter and
begotten, or Himself becoming Father and Son [313] ," and thinks by
such loose disjointed phrases to undermine the true confession of
godliness or to furnish some support to his own ungodliness, not being
aware that by the very means he uses to construct a reductio ad
absurdum he is discovered to be an advocate of the truth. For we too
say that He who has all that belongs to His own Father is all that He
is, save being Father, and that He who has all that belongs to the Son
exhibits in Himself the Son in His completeness, save being Son: so
that the reductio ad absurdum, which Eunomius here invents, turns out
to be a support of the truth, when the notion is expanded by us so as
to display it more clearly, under the guidance of the Gospel. For if
"he that hath seen the Son seeth the Father [314] " then the Father
begat another self, not passing out of Himself, and at the same time
appearing in His fulness in Him: so that from these considerations that
which seemed to have been uttered against godliness is demonstrated to
be a support of sound doctrine.

But he says, "Not dividing His own essence by begetting, and being at
once begetter and begotten, at the same time Father and Son; for He is
incorruptible." Most cogent conclusion! What do you mean, most sapient
sir? Because He is incorruptible, therefore He does not divide His own
essence by begetting the Son: nor does He beget Himself or be begotten
of Himself, nor become at the same time His own Father and His own Son
because He is incorruptible. It follows then, that if any one is of
corruptible nature he divides his essence by begetting, and is begotten
by himself, and begets himself, and is his own father and his own son,
because he is not incorruptible. If this is so, then Abraham, because
he was corruptible, did not beget Ishmael and Isaac, but begat himself
by the bondwoman and by his lawful wife or, to take the other
mountebank tricks of the argument, he divided his essence among the
sons who were begotten of him, and first, when Hagar bore him a son, he
was divided into two sections, and in one of the halves became Ishmael,
while in the other he remained half Abraham; and subsequently the
residue of the essence of Abraham being again divided took subsistence
in Isaac. Accordingly the fourth part of the essence of Abraham was
divided into the twin sons of Isaac, so that there was an eighth in
each of his grandchildren! How could one subdivide the eighth part,
cutting it small in fractions among the twelve Patriarchs, or among the
threescore and fifteen souls with whom Jacob went down into Egypt? And
why do I talk thus when I really ought to confute the folly of such
notions by beginning with the first man? For if it is a property of the
incorruptible only not to divide its essence in begetting, and if Adam
was corruptible, to whom the word was spoken, "Dust thou art and unto
dust shalt thou return [315] ," then, according to Eunomius' reasoning,
he certainly divided his essence, being cut up among those who were
begotten of him, and by reason of the vast number of his posterity (the
slice of his essence which is to be found in each being necessarily
subdivided according to the number of his progeny), the essence of Adam
is used up before Abraham began to subsist, being dispersed in these
minute and infinitesimal particles among the countless myriads of his
descendants, and the minute fragment of Adam that has reached Abraham
and his descendants by a process of division, is no longer discoverable
in them as a remnant of his essence, inasmuch as his nature has been
already used up among the countless myriads of those who were before
them by its division into infinitesimal fractions. Mark the folly of
him who "understands neither what he says nor whereof he affirms [316]
." For by saying "Since He is incorruptible" He neither divides His
essence nor begets Himself nor becomes His own father, he implicitly
lays it down that we must suppose all those things from which he
affirms that the incorruptible alone are free to be incidental to
generation in the case of every one who is subject to corruption.
Though there are many other considerations capable of proving the
inanity of his argument, I think that what has been said above is
sufficient to demonstrate its absurdity. But this has surely been
already acknowledged by all who have an eye for logical consistency,
that, when he asserted incorruptibility of the Father alone, he places
all things which are considered after the Father in the category of
corruptible, by virtue of opposition to the incorruptible, so as to
make out even the Son not to be free from corruption. If then he places
the Son in opposition to the incorruptible, he not only defines Him to
be corruptible, but also asserts of Him all those incidents from which
he affirms only the incorruptible to be exempt. For it necessarily
follows that, if the Father alone neither begets Himself nor is
begotten of Himself, everything which is not incorruptible both begets
itself and is begotten of itself, and becomes its own father and son,
shifting from its own proper essence to each of these relations. For if
to be incorruptible belongs to the Father alone, and if not to be the
things specified is a special property of the incorruptible, then, of
course, according to this heretical argument, the Son is not
incorruptible, and all these circumstances of course, find place about
Him,--to have His essence divided, to beget Himself and to be begotten
by Himself, to become Himself His own father and His own son.

Perhaps, however, it is waste of time to linger long over such follies.
Let us pass to the next point of his statement. He adds to what he had
already said, "Not standing in need, in the act of creation, of matter
or parts or natural instruments: for He stands in need of nothing."
This proposition, though Eunomius states it with a certain looseness of
phrase, we yet do not reject as inconsistent with godly doctrine. For
learning as we do that "He spake the word and they were made: He
commanded and they were created [317] ," we know that the Word is the
Creator of matter, by that very act also producing with the matter the
qualities of matter, so that for Him the impulse of His almighty will
was everything and instead of everything, matter, instrument, place,
time, essence, quality, everything that is conceived in creation. For
at one and the same time did He will that that which ought to be should
be, and His power, that produced all things that are, kept pace with
His will, turning His will into act. For thus the mighty Moses in the
record of creation instructs us about the Divine power, ascribing the
production of each of the objects that were manifested in the creation
to the words that bade them be. For "God said," he tells us, "Let there
be light, and there was light [318] :" and so about the rest, without
any mention either of matter or of any instrumental agency. Accordingly
the language of Eunomius on this point is not to be rejected. For God,
when creating all things that have their origin by creation, neither
stood in need of any matter on which to operate, nor of instruments to
aid Him in His construction: for the power and wisdom of God has no
need of any external assistance. But Christ is "the Power of God and
the Wisdom of God [319] ," by Whom all things were made and without
Whom is no existent thing, as John testifies [320] . If, then, all
things were made by Him, both visible and invisible, and if His will
alone suffices to effect the subsistence of existing things (for His
will is power), Eunomius utters our doctrine though with a loose mode
of expression [321] . For what instrument and what matter could He Who
upholds all things by the word of His power [322] need in upholding the
constitution of existing things by His almighty word? But if he
maintains that what we have believed to be true of the Only-begotten in
the case of the creation, is true also in the case of the Son--in the
sense that the Father created Him in like manner as the creation was
made by the Son,--then we retract our former statement, because such a
supposition is a denial of the Godhead of the Only-begotten. For we
have learnt from the mighty utterance of Paul that it is the
distinguishing feature of idolatry to worship and serve the creature
more than the Creator [323] , as well as from David, when He says
"There shall no new God be in thee: neither shalt thou worship any
alien God [324] ." We use this line and rule to arrive at the
discernment of the object of worship, so as to be convinced that that
alone is God which is neither "new" nor "alien." Since then we have
been taught to believe that the Only-begotten God is God, we
acknowledge, by our belief that He is God, that He is neither "new" or
"alien." If, then, He is God, He is not "new," and if He is not new, He
is assuredly eternal. Accordingly, neither is the Eternal "new," nor is
He Who is of the Father and in the bosom of the Father and Who has the
Father in Himself "alien" from true Deity. Thus he who severs the Son
from the nature of the Father either absolutely disallows the worship
of the Son, that he may not worship an alien God, or bows down before
an idol, making a creature and not God the object of his worship, and
giving to his idol the name of Christ.

Now that this is the meaning to which he tends in his conception
concerning the Only-begotten will become more plain by considering the
language he employs touching the Only-begotten Himself, which is as
follows. "We believe also in the Son of God, the Only-begotten God, the
first-born of all creation, very Son, not ungenerate, verily begotten
before the worlds, named Son not without being begotten before He
existed, coming into being before all creation, not uncreate." I think
that the mere reading of his exposition of his faith is quite
sufficient to render its impiety plain without any investigation on our
part. For though he calls Him "first-born," yet that he may not raise
any doubt in his readers' minds as to His not being created, he
immediately adds the words, "not uncreate," lest if the natural
significance of the term "Son" were apprehended by his readers, any
pious conception concerning Him might find place in their minds. It is
for this reason that after at first confessing Him to be Son of God and
Only-begotten God, he proceeds at once, by what he adds, to pervert the
minds of his readers from their devout belief to his heretical notions.
For he who hears the titles "Son of God" and "Only-begotten God" is of
necessity lifted up to the loftier kind of assertions respecting the
Son, led onward by the significance of these terms, inasmuch as no
difference of nature is introduced by the use of the title "God" and by
the significance of the term "Son." For how could He Who is truly the
Son of God and Himself God be conceived as something else differing
from the nature of the Father? But that godly conceptions may not by
these names be impressed beforehand on the hearts of his readers, he
forthwith calls Him "the first-born of all creation, named Son, not
without being begotten before He existed, coming into being before all
creation, not uncreate." Let us linger a little while, then, over his
argument, that the miscreant may be shown to be holding out his first
statements to people merely as a bait to induce them to receive the
poison that he sugars over with phrases of a pious tendency, as it were
with honey. Who does not know how great is the difference in
signification between the term "only-begotten" and "first-born?" For
"first-born" implies brethren, and "only-begotten" implies that there
are no other brethren. Thus the "first-born" is not "only-begotten,"
for certainly "first-born" is the first-born among brethren, while he
who is "only-begotten" has no brother: for if he were numbered among
brethren he would not be only-begotten. And moreover, whatever the
essence of the brothers of the first-born is, the same is the essence
of the first-born himself. Nor is this all that is signified by the
title, but also that the first-born and those born after him draw their
being from the same source, without the first-born contributing at all
to the birth of those that come after him: so that hereby [325] is
maintained the falsehood of that statement of John, which affirms that
"all things were made by Him [326] ." For if He is first-born, He
differs from those born after Him only by priority in time, while there
must be some one else by Whom the power to be at all is imparted alike
to Him and to the rest. But that we may not by our objections give any
unfair opponent ground for an insinuation that we do not receive the
inspired utterances of Scripture, we will first set before our readers
our own view about these titles, and then leave it to their judgment
which is the better.
__________________________________________________________________

[310] Is. lix. 5.

[311] Rom. viii. 32.

[312] This, or something like this, appears to be the force of holon.

[313] The quotation does not verbally correspond with Eunomius' words
as cited above.

[314] Cf. S. John xiv. 9

[315] Gen. iii. 19.

[316] Cf. 1 Tim. i. 7

[317] Ps. cxlviii. 5, or xxxiii. 9 in LXX.

[318] Gen. i. 3.

[319] 1 Cor. i. 24.

[320] Cf. S. John i. 3

[321] Reading en atonouse te lexei for enatonouse te lexei (the reading
of the Paris edition, which Oehler follows).

[322] Cf. Heb. i. 3. The quotation is not verbally exact.

[323] Cf. Rom. i. 26

[324] Ps. lxxxi. 10, LXX. The words prosphatos ("new") and allotrios
("alien") are both represented in the A.V. by "strange," and so in R.V.
The Prayer-book version expresses them by "strange" and "any other."
Both words are subsequently employed by Gregory in his argument.

[325] Hereby, i.e. by the use of the term prototokos as applicable to
the Divinity of the Son.

[326] S. John i. 3
__________________________________________________________________

S:8. He further very appositely expounds the meaning of the term
"Only-Begotten," and of the term "First born," four times used by the
Apostle.

The mighty Paul, knowing that the Only-begotten God, Who has the
pre-eminence in all things [327] , is the author and cause of all good,
bears witness to Him that not only was the creation of all existent
things wrought by Him, but that when the original creation of man had
decayed and vanished away [328] , to use his own language, and another
new creation was wrought in Christ, in this too no other than He took
the lead, but He is Himself the first-born of all that new creation of
men which is effected by the Gospel. And that our view about this may
be made clearer let us thus divide our argument. The inspired apostle
on four occasions employs this term, once as here, calling Him,
"first-born of all creation [329] ," another time, "the first-born
among many brethren [330] ," again, "first-born from the dead [331] ,"
and on another occasion he employs the term absolutely, without
combining it with other words, saying, "But when again He bringeth the
first-born into the world, He saith, And let all the angels of God
worship Him [332] ." Accordingly whatever view we entertain concerning
this title in the other combinations, the same we shall in consistency
apply to the phrase "first-born of all creation." For since the title
is one and the same it must needs be that the meaning conveyed is also
one. In what sense then does He become "the first-born among many
brethren?" in what sense does He become "the first-born from the dead?"
Assuredly this is plain, that because we are by birth flesh and blood,
as the Scripture saith, "He Who for our sakes was born among us and was
partaker of flesh and blood [333] ," purposing to change us from
corruption to incorruption by the birth from above, the birth by water
and the Spirit, Himself led the way in this birth, drawing down upon
the water, by His own baptism, the Holy Spirit; so that in all things
He became the first-born of those who are spiritually born again, and
gave the name of brethren to those who partook in a birth like to His
own by water and the Spirit. But since it was also meet that He should
implant in our nature the power of rising again from the dead, He
becomes the "first-fruits of them that slept [334] " and the
"first-born from the dead [335] ," in that He first by His own act
loosed the pains of death [336] , so that His new birth from the dead
was made a way for us also, since the pains of death, wherein we were
held, were loosed by the resurrection of the Lord. Thus, just as by
having shared in the washing of regeneration [337] He became "the
first-born among many brethren," and again by having made Himself the
first-fruits of the resurrection, He obtains the name of the
"first-born from the dead," so having in all things the pre-eminence,
after that "all old things," as the apostle says, "have passed away
[338] ," He becomes the first-born of the new creation of men in Christ
by the two-fold regeneration, alike that by Holy Baptism and that which
is the consequence of the resurrection from the dead, becoming for us
in both alike the Prince of Life [339] , the first-fruits, the
first-born. This first-born, then, hath also brethren, concerning whom
He speaks to Mary, saying, "Go and tell My brethren, I go to My Father
and your Father, and to My God and your God [340] ." In these words He
sums up the whole aim of His dispensation as Man. For men revolted from
God, and "served them which by nature were no gods [341] ," and though
being the children of God became attached to an evil father falsely so
called. For this cause the mediator between God and man [342] having
assumed the first-fruits of all human nature [343] , sends to His
brethren the announcement of Himself not in His divine character, but
in that which He shares with us, saying, "I am departing in order to
make by My own self that true Father, from whom you were separated, to
be your Father, and by My own self to make that true God from whom you
had revolted to be your God, for by that first-fruits which I have
assumed, I am in Myself presenting all humanity to its God and Father."

Since, then, the first-fruits made the true God to be its God, and the
good Father to be its Father, the blessing is secured for human nature
as a whole, and by means of the first-fruits the true God and Father
becomes Father and God of all men. Now "if the first-fruits be holy,
the lump also is holy [344] ." But where the first-fruits, Christ, is
(and the first-fruits is none other than Christ), there also are they
that are Christ's, as the apostle says. In those passages therefore
where he makes mention of the "first-born" in connexion with other
words, he suggests that we should understand the phrase in the way
which I have indicated: but where, without any such addition, he says,
"When again He bringeth the first-born into the world [345] ," the
addition of "again" asserts that manifestation of the Lord of all which
shall take place at the last day. For as "at the name of Jesus every
knee doth bow, of things in heaven and things in earth and things under
the earth [346] ," although the human name does not belong to the Son
in that He is above every name, even so He says that the First-born,
Who was so named for our sakes, is worshipped by all the supramundane
creation, on His coming again into the world, when He "shall judge the
world with righteousness and the people with equity [347] ." Thus the
several meanings of the titles "First-born" and "Only begotten" are
kept distinct by the word of godliness, its respective significance
being secured for each name. But how can he who refers the name of
"first-born" to the pre-temporal existence of the Son preserve the
proper sense of the term "Only-begotten"? Let the discerning reader
consider whether these things agree with one another, when the term
"first-born" necessarily implies brethren, and the term "Only-begotten"
as necessarily excludes the notion of brethren. For when the Scripture
says, "In the beginning was the Word [348] ," we understand the
Only-begotten to be meant, and when it adds "the Word was made flesh
[349] " we thereby receive in our minds the idea of the first-born, and
so the word of godliness remains without confusion, preserving to each
name its natural significance, so that in "Only-begotten" we regard the
pre-temporal, and by "the first-born of creation" the manifestation of
the pre-temporal in the flesh.
__________________________________________________________________

[327] Cf. Col. i. 18

[328] Cf. Heb. viii. 13, whence the phrase is apparently adapted.

[329] Col. i. 15.

[330] Rom. viii. 29.

[331] Col. i. 18 (cf. Rev. i. 5).

[332] Heb. i. 6.

[333] Cf. Heb. i. 14

[334] 1 Cor. xv. 20.

[335] Col. i. 18.

[336] Cf. Acts ii. 24. See note 2, p. 104, supra.

[337] The phrase is not verbally the same as in Tit. iii. 5.

[338] Cf. 2 Cor. v. 17

[339] Cf. Acts iii. 15

[340] Cf. S. John xx. 17: the quotation is not verbal.

[341] Cf. Gal. iv. 8

[342] Cf. 1 Tim. ii. 5

[343] The Humanity of Christ being regarded as this "first-fruits:"
unless this phrase is to be understood of the Resurrection, rather than
of the Incarnation, in which case the first-fruits will be His Body,
and analabon should be rendered by "having resumed."

[344] Rom. ix. 16. The reference next following may be to S. John xii.
26, or xiv. 3; or to Col. iii. 3.

[345] Heb. i. 6.

[346] Phil. ii. 10, 11.

[347] Cf. Ps. xcviii. 10.

[348] S. John i. 1

[349] S. John i. 14
__________________________________________________________________

S:9. Gregory again discusses the generation of the Only-Begotten, and
other different modes of generation, material and immaterial, and nobly
demonstrates that the Son is the brightness of the Divine glory, and
not a creature.

And now let us return once more to the precise statement of Eunomius.
"We believe also in the Son of God, the only begotten God, the
first-born of all creation, very Son, not Ungenerate, verily begotten
before the worlds." That he transfers, then, the sense of generation to
indicate creation is plain from his expressly calling Him created, when
he speaks of Him as "coming into being" and "not uncreate". But that
the inconsiderate rashness and want of training which shows itself in
the doctrines may be made manifest, let us omit all expressions of
indignation at his evident blasphemy, and employ in the discussion of
this matter a scientific division. For it would be well, I think, to
consider in a somewhat careful investigation the exact meaning of the
term "generation." That this expression conveys the meaning of existing
as the result of some cause is plain to all, and I suppose there is no
need to contend about this point: but since there are different modes
of existing as the result of a cause, this difference is what I think
ought to receive thorough explanation in our discussion by means of
scientific division. Of things which have come into being as the
results of some cause we recognize the following differences. Some are
the result of material and art, as the fabrics of houses and all other
works produced by means of their respective material, where some art
gives direction and conducts its purpose to its proper aim. Others are
the result of material and nature; for nature orders [350] the
generation of animals one from another, effecting her own work by means
of the material subsistence in the bodies of the parents; others again
are by material efflux. In these the original remains as it was before,
and that which flows from it is contemplated by itself, as in the case
of the sun and its beam, or the lamp and its radiance, or of scents and
ointments, and the quality given off from them. For these, while
remaining undiminished in themselves, have each accompanying them the
special and peculiar effect which they naturally produce, as the sun
his ray, the lamp its brightness, and perfumes the fragrance which they
engender in the air. There is also another kind of generation besides
these, where the cause is immaterial and incorporeal, but the
generation is sensible and takes place through the instrumentality of
the body; I mean the generation of the word by the mind. For the mind
being in itself incorporeal begets the word by means of sensible
instruments. So many are the differences of the term generation, which
we discover in a philosophic view of them, that is itself, so to speak,
the result of generation.

And now that we have thus distinguished the various modes of
generation, it will be time to remark how the benevolent dispensation
of the Holy Spirit, in delivering to us the Divine mysteries, imparts
that instruction which transcends reason by such methods as we can
receive. For the inspired teaching adopts, in order to set forth the
unspeakable power of God, all the forms of generation that human
intelligence recognizes, yet without including the corporeal senses
attaching to the words. For when it speaks of the creative power, it
gives to such an energy the name of generation, because its expression
must stoop to our low capacity; it does not, however, convey thereby
all that we include in creative generation, as time, place, the
furnishing of matter, the fitness of instruments, the design in the
things that come into being, but it leaves these, and asserts of God in
lofty and magnificent language the creation of all existent things,
when it says, "He spake the word and they were made [351] , He
commanded and they were created." Again when it interprets to us the
unspeakable and transcendent existence of the Only-begotten from the
Father, as the poverty of human intellect is incapable of receiving
doctrines which surpass all power of speech and thought, there too it
borrows our language and terms Him "Son,"--a name which our usage
assigns to those who are born of matter and nature. But just as
Scripture, when speaking of generation by creation, does not in the
case of God imply that such generation took place by means of any
material, affirming that the power of God's will served for material
substance, place, time and all such circumstances, even so here too,
when using the term Son, it rejects both all else that human nature
remarks in generation here below,--I mean affections and dispositions
and the co-operation of time, and the necessity of place,--and, above
all, matter, without all which natural generation here below does not
take place. But when all such material, temporal and local [352]
existence is excluded from the sense of the term "Son," community of
nature alone is left, and for this reason by the title "Son" is
declared, concerning the Only-begotten, the close affinity and
genuineness of relationship which mark His manifestation from the
Father. And since such a kind of generation was not sufficient to
implant in us an adequate notion of the ineffable mode of subsistence
of the Only-begotten, Scripture avails itself also of the third kind of
generation to indicate the doctrine of the Son's Divinity,--that kind,
namely, which is the result of material efflux, and speaks of Him as
the "brightness of glory [353] ," the "savour of ointment [354] ," the
"breath of God [355] ;" illustrations which in the scientific
phraseology we have adopted we ordinarily designate as material efflux.

But as in the cases alleged neither the birth of the creation nor the
force of the term "Son" admits time, matter, place, or affection, so
here too the Scripture employing only the illustration of effulgence
and the others that I have mentioned, apart from all material
conception, with regard to the Divine fitness of such a mode of
generation, shows that we must understand by the significance of this
expression, an existence at once derived from and subsisting with the
Father. For neither is the figure of breath intended to convey to us
the notion of dispersion into the air from the material from which it
is formed, nor is the figure of fragrance designed to express the
passing off of the quality of the ointment into the air, nor the figure
of effulgence the efflux which takes place by means of the rays from
the body of the sun: but as has been said in all cases, by such a mode
of generation is indicated this alone, that the Son is of the Father
and is conceived of along with Him, no interval intervening between the
Father and Him Who is of the Father. For since of His exceeding
loving-kindness the grace of the Holy Spirit so ordered that the divine
conceptions concerning the Only-begotten should reach us from many
quarters, and so be implanted in us, He added also the remaining kind
of generation,--that, namely, of the word from the mind. And here the
sublime John uses remarkable foresight. That the reader might not
through inattention and unworthy conceptions sink to the common notion
of "word," so as to deem the Son to be merely a voice of the Father, he
therefore affirms of the Word that He essentially subsisted in the
first and blessed nature Itself, thus proclaiming aloud, "In the
Beginning was the Word, and with God, and God, and Light, and Life
[356] ," and all that the Beginning is, the Word was also.

Since, then, these kinds of generation, those, I mean, which arise as
the result of some cause, and are recognized in our every-day
experience, are also employed by Holy Scripture to convey its teaching
concerning transcendent mysteries in such wise as each of them may
reasonably be transferred to the expression of divine conceptions, we
may now proceed to examine Eunomius' statement also, to find in what
sense he accepts the meaning of "generation." "Very Son," he says, "not
ungenerate, verily begotten before the worlds." One may, I think, pass
quickly over the violence done to logical sequence in his distinction,
as being easily recognizable by all. For who does not know that while
the proper opposition is between Father and Son, between generate and
ungenerate, he thus passes over the term "Father" and sets "ungenerate"
in opposition to "Son," whereas he ought, if he had any concern for
truth, to have avoided diverting his phrase from the due sequence of
relationship, and to have said, "Very Son, not Father"? And in this way
due regard would have been paid at once to piety and to logical
consistency, as the nature would not have been rent asunder in making
the distinction between the persons. But he has exchanged in his
statement of his faith the true and scriptural use of the term
"Father," committed to us by the Word Himself, and speaks of the
"Ungenerate" instead of the "Father," in order that by separating Him
from that close relationship towards the Son which is naturally
conceived of in the title of Father, he may place Him on a common level
with all created objects, which equally stand in opposition to the
"ungenerate [357] ." "Verily begotten," he says, "before the worlds."
Let him say of Whom He is begotten. He will answer, of course, "Of the
Father," unless he is prepared unblushingly to contradict the truth.
But since it is impossible to detach the eternity of the Son from the
eternal Father, seeing that the term "Father" by its very signification
implies the Son, for this reason it is that he rejects the title Father
and shifts his phrase to "ungenerate," since the meaning of this latter
name has no sort of relation or connection with the Son, and by thus
misleading his readers through the substitution of one term for the
other, into not contemplating the Son along with the Father, he opens
up a path for his sophistry, paving the way of impiety by slipping in
the term "ungenerate." For they who according to the ordinance of the
Lord believe in the Father, when they hear the name of the Father,
receive the Son along with Him in their thought, as the mind passes
from the Son to the Father, without treading on an unsubstantial vacuum
interposed between them. But those who are diverted to the title
"ungenerate" instead of Father, get a bare notion of this name,
learning only the fact that He did not at any time come into being, not
that He is Father. Still, even with this mode of conception, the faith
of those who read with discernment remains free from confusion. For the
expression "not to come into being" is used in an identical sense of
all uncreated nature: and Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are equally
uncreated. For it has ever been believed by those who follow the Divine
word that all the creation, sensible and supramundane, derives its
existence from the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. He who has
heard that "by the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the
host of them by the breath of His mouth [358] ," neither understands by
"word" mere utterance, nor by "breath" mere exhalation, but by what is
there said frames the conception of God the Word and of the Spirit of
God. Now to create and to be created are not equivalent, but all
existent things being divided into that which makes and that which is
made, each is different in nature from the other, so that neither is
that uncreated which is made, nor is that created which effects the
production of the things that are made. By those then who, according to
the exposition of the faith given us by our Lord Himself, have believed
in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, it is
acknowledged that each of these Persons is alike unoriginate [359] ,
and the meaning conveyed by "ungenerate" does no harm to their sound
belief: but to those who are dense and indefinite this term serves as a
starting-point for deflection from sound doctrine. For not
understanding the true force of the term, that "ungenerate" signifies
nothing more than "not having come into being," and that "not coming
into being" is a common property of all that transcends created nature,
they drop their faith in the Father, and substitute for "Father" the
phrase "ungenerate:" and since, as has been said, the Personal
existence of the Only-begotten is not connoted in this name, they
determine the existence of the Son to have commenced from some definite
beginning in time, affirming (what Eunomius here adds to his previous
statements) that He is called Son not without generation preceding His
existence.

What is this vain juggling with words? Is he aware that it is God of
Whom he speaks, Who was in the beginning and is in the Father, nor was
there any time when He was not? He knows not what he says nor whereof
he affirms [360] , but he endeavours, as though he were constructing
the pedigree of a mere man, to apply to the Lord of all creation the
language which properly belongs to our nature here below. For, to take
an example, Ishmael was not before the generation that brought him into
being, and before his birth there was of course an interval of time.
But with Him Who is "the brightness of glory [361] ," "before" and
"after" have no place: for before the brightness, of course neither was
there any glory, for concurrently with the existence of the glory there
assuredly beams forth its brightness; and it is impossible in the
nature of things that one should be severed from the other, nor is it
possible to see the glory by itself before its brightness. For he who
says thus will make out the glory in itself to be darkling and dim, if
the brightness from it does not shine out at the same time. But this is
the unfair method of the heresy, to endeavour, by the notions and terms
employed concerning the Only-begotten God, to displace Him from His
oneness with the Father. It is to this end they say, "Before the
generation that brought Him into being He was not Son:" but the "sons
of rams [362] ," of whom the prophet speaks,--are not they too called
sons after coming into being? That quality, then, which reason notices
in the "sons of rams," that they are not "sons of rams" before the
generation which brings them into being,--this our reverend divine now
ascribes to the Maker of the worlds and of all creation, Who has the
Eternal Father in Himself, and is contemplated in the eternity of the
Father, as He Himself says, "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me
[363] ." Those, however, who are not able to detect the sophistry that
lurks in his statement, and are not trained to any sort of logical
perception, follow these inconsequent statements and receive what comes
next as a logical consequence of what preceded. For he says, "coming
into being before all creation," and as though this were not enough to
prove his impiety, he has a piece of profanity in reserve in the phrase
that follows, when he terms the Son "not uncreate." In what sense then
does he call Him Who is not uncreate "very Son"? For if it is meet to
call Him Who is not uncreate "very Son," then of course the heaven is
"very Son;" for it too is "not uncreate." So the sun too is "very Son,"
and all that the creation contains, both small and great, are of course
entitled to the appellation of "very Son." And in what sense does He
call Him Who has come into being "Only-begotten"? For all things that
come into being are unquestionably in brotherhood with each other, so
far, I mean, as their coming into being is concerned. And from whom did
He come into being? For assuredly all things that have ever come into
being did so from the Son. For thus did John testify, saying, "All
things were made by Him [364] ." If then the Son also came into being,
according to Eunomius' creed, He is certainly ranked in the class of
things which have come into being. If then all things that came into
being were made by Him, and the Word is one of the things that came
into being, who is so dull as not to draw from these premises the
absurd conclusion that our new creed-monger makes out the Lord of
creation to have been His own work, in saying in so many words that the
Lord and Maker of all creation is "not uncreate"? Let him tell us
whence he has this boldness of assertion. From what inspired utterance?
What evangelist, what apostle ever uttered such words as these? What
prophet, what lawgiver, what patriarch, what other person of all who
were divinely moved by the Holy Ghost, whose voices are preserved in
writing, ever originated such a statement as this? In the tradition of
the faith delivered by the Truth we are taught to believe in Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit. If it were right to believe that the Son was
created, how was it that the Truth in delivering to us this mystery
bade us believe in the Son, and not in the creature? and how is it that
the inspired Apostle, himself adoring Christ, lays it down that they
who worship the creature besides the Creator are guilty of idolatry
[365] ? For, were the Son created, either he would not have worshipped
Him, or he would have refrained from classing those who worship the
creature along with idolaters, lest he himself should appear to be an
idolater, in offering adoration to the created. But he knew that He
Whom he adored was God over all [366] , for so he terms the Son in his
Epistle to the Romans. Why then do those who divorce the Son from the
essence of the Father, and call Him creature, bestow on Him in mockery
the fictitious title of Deity, idly conferring on one alien from true
Divinity the name of "God," as they might confer it on Bel or Dagon or
the Dragon? Let those, therefore, who affirm that He is created,
acknowledge that He is not God at all, that they may be seen to be
nothing but Jews in disguise, or, if they confess one who is created to
be God, let them not deny that they are idolaters.
__________________________________________________________________

[350] Reading oikonomei or oikodomei

[351] Or "were generated." The reference is to Ps. cxlviii. 5.

[352] diastematikes seems to include the idea of extension in time as
well as in space.

[353] Heb. i. 3.

[354] The reference may be to the Song of Solomon i. 3.

[355] Wisd. vii. 25.

[356] Cf. S. John i. 1 sqq.

[357] That is, by using as the terms of his antithesis, not "Son" and
"Father," but "Son" and "Ungenerate," he avoids suggesting relationship
between the two Persons, and does suggest that the Second Person stands
in the same opposition to the First Person in which all created objects
stand as contrasted with Him.

[358] Ps. xxxiii. 6.

[359] to me genesthai ti touton epises homologeitai. This may possibly
mean "it is acknowledged that each of those alternatives" (viz. that
that which comes into being is uncreate, and that that which creates
should itself be created) "is equally untrue." But this view would not
be confined to those who held the Catholic doctrine: the impossibility
of the former alternative, indeed, was insisted upon by the Arians as
an argument in their own favour.

[360] Cf. 1 Tim. i. 7

[361] Cf. Heb. i. 3

[362] Ps. cxiv. 4, in Septuagint.

[363] S. John xiv. 10

[364] S. John i. 3

[365] Rom. i. 25, where para ton ktisanta may be better translated
"besides the Creator," or "rather than the Creator," than as in the
A.V.

[366] Rom. ix. 5.
__________________________________________________________________

S:10. He explains the phrase "The Lord created Me," and the argument
about the origination of the Son, the deceptive character of Eunomius'
reasoning, and the passage which says, "My glory will I not give to
another," examining them from different points of view.

But of course they bring forward the passage in the book of Proverbs
which says, "The Lord created Me as the beginning of His ways, for His
works [367] ." Now it would require a lengthy discussion to explain
fully the real meaning of the passage: still it would be possible even
in a few words to convey to well-disposed readers the thought intended.
Some of those who are accurately versed in theology do say this, that
the Hebrew text does not read "created," and we have ourselves read in
more ancient copies "possessed" instead of "created." Now assuredly
"possession" in the allegorical language of the Proverbs marks that
slave Who for our sakes "took upon Him the form of a slave [368] ." But
if any one should allege in this passage the reading which prevails in
the Churches, we do not reject even the expression "created." For this
also in allegorical language is intended to connote the "slave," since,
as the Apostle tells us, "all creation is in bondage [369] ." Thus we
say that this expression, as well as the other, admits of an orthodox
interpretation. For He Who for our sakes became like as we are, was in
the last days truly created,--He Who in the beginning being Word and
God afterwards became Flesh and Man. For the nature of flesh is
created: and by partaking in it in all points like as we do, yet
without sin, He was created when He became man: and He was created
"after God [370] ," not after man, as the Apostle says, in a new manner
and not according to human wont. For we are taught that this "new man"
was created--albeit of the Holy Ghost and of the power of the
Highest--whom Paul, the hierophant of unspeakable mysteries, bids us to
"put on," using two phrases to express the garment that is to be put
on, saying in one place, "Put on the new man which after God is created
[371] ," and in another, "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ [372] ." For
thus it is that He, Who said "I am the Way [373] ," becomes to us who
have put Him on the beginning of the ways of salvation, that He may
make us the work of His own hands, new modelling us from the evil mould
of sin once more to His own image. He is at once our foundation before
the world to come, according to the words of Paul, who says, "Other
foundation can no man lay than that is laid [374] ," and it is true
that "before the springs of the waters came forth, before the mountains
were settled, before He made the depths, and before all hills, He
begetteth Me [375] ." For it is possible, according to the usage of the
Book of Proverbs, for each of these phrases, taken in a tropical sense,
to be applied to the Word [376] . For the great David calls
righteousness the "mountains of God [377] ," His judgments "deeps [378]
," and the teachers in the Churches "fountains," saying "Bless God the
Lord from the fountains of Israel [379] "; and guilelessness he calls
"hills," as he shows when he speaks of their skipping like lambs [380]
. Before these therefore is born in us He Who for our sakes was created
as man, that of these things also the creation may find place in us.
But we may, I think, pass from the discussion of these points, inasmuch
as the truth has been sufficiently pointed out in a few words to
well-disposed readers; let us proceed to what Eunomius says next.

"Existing in the Beginning," he says, "not without beginning." In what
fashion does he who plumes himself on his superior discernment
understand the oracles of God? He declares Him Who was in the beginning
Himself to have a beginning: and is not aware that if He Who is in the
beginning has a beginning, then the Beginning itself must needs have
another beginning. Whatever He says of the beginning he must
necessarily confess to be true of Him Who was in the beginning: for how
can that which is in the beginning be severed from the beginning? and
how can any one imagine a "was not" as preceding the "was"? For however
far one carries back one's thought to apprehend the beginning, one most
certainly understands as one does so that the Word which was in the
beginning (inasmuch as It cannot be separated from the beginning in
which It is) does not at any point of time either begin or cease its
existence therein. Yet let no one be induced by these words of mine to
separate into two the one beginning we acknowledge. For the beginning
is most assuredly one, wherein is discerned, indivisibly, that Word Who
is completely united to the Father. He who thus thinks will never leave
heresy a loophole to impair his piety by the novelty of the term
"ungenerate." But in Eunomius' next propositions his statements are
like bread with a large admixture of sand. For by mixing his heretical
opinions with sound doctrines, he makes uneatable even that which is in
itself nutritious, by the gravel which he has mingled with it. For he
calls the Lord "living wisdom," "operative truth," subsistent power,
and "life":--so far is the nutritious portion. But into these
assertions he instils the poison of heresy. For when he speaks of the
"life" as "generate" he makes a reservation by the implied opposition
to the "ungenerate" life, and does not affirm the Son to be the very
Life. Next he says:--"As Son of God, quickening the dead, the true
light, the light that lighteneth every man coming into the world [381]
, good, and the bestower of good things." All these things he offers
for honey to the simple-minded, concealing his deadly drug under the
sweetness of terms like these. For he immediately introduces, on the
heels of these statements, his pernicious principle, in the words "Not
partitioning with Him that begat Him His high estate, not dividing with
another the essence of the Father, but becoming by generation glorious,
yea, the Lord of glory, and receiving glory from the Father, not
sharing His glory with the Father, for the glory of the Almighty is
incommunicable, as He hath said, `My glory will I not give to another.
[382] '" These are his deadly poisons, which they alone can discover
who have their souls' senses trained so to do: but the mortal mischief
of the words is disclosed by their conclusion:--Receiving glory from
the Father, not sharing glory with the Father, for the glory of the
Almighty is incommunicable, as He hath said, `My glory will I not give
to another.' Who is that "other" to whom God has said that He will not
give His glory? The prophet speaks of the adversary of God, and
Eunomius refers the prophecy to the only begotten God Himself! For when
the prophet, speaking in the person of God, had said, "My glory will I
not give to another," he added, "neither My praise to graven images."
For when men were beguiled to offer to the adversary of God the worship
and adoration due to God alone, paying homage in the representations of
graven images to the enemy of God, who appeared in many shapes amongst
men in the forms furnished by idols, He Who healeth them that are sick,
in pity for men's ruin, foretold by the prophet the loving-kindness
which in the latter days He would show in the abolishing of idols,
saying, "When My truth shall have been manifested, My glory shall no
more be given to another, nor My praise bestowed upon graven images:
for men, when they come to know My glory, shall no more be in bondage
to them that by nature are no gods." All therefore that the prophet
says in the person of the Lord concerning the power of the adversary,
this fighter against God, refers to the Lord Himself, Who spake these
words by the prophet! Who among the tyrants is recorded to have been
such a persecutor of the faith as this? Who maintained such blasphemy
as this, that He Who, as we believe, was manifested in the flesh for
the salvation of our souls, is not very God, but the adversary of God,
who puts his guile into effect against men by the instrumentality of
idols and graven images? For it is what was said of that adversary by
the prophet that Eunomius transfers to the only-begotten God, without
so much as reflecting that it is the Only-begotten Himself Who spoke
these words by the prophet, as Eunomius himself subsequently confesses
when he says, "this is He Who spake by the prophets."

Why should I pursue this part of the subject in more detail? For the
words preceding also are tainted with the same profanity--"receiving
glory from the Father, not sharing glory with the Father, for the glory
of the Almighty God is incommunicable." For my own part, even had his
words referred to Moses who was glorified in the ministration of the
Law,--not even then should I have tolerated such a statement, even if
it be conceded that Moses, having no glory from within, appeared
completely glorious to the Israelites by the favour bestowed on him
from God. For the very glory that was bestowed on the lawgiver was the
glory of none other but of God Himself, which glory the Lord in the
Gospel bids all to seek, when He blames those who value human glory
highly and seek not the glory that cometh from God only [383] . For by
the fact that He commanded them to seek the glory that cometh from the
only God, He declared the possibility of their obtaining what they
sought. How then is the glory of the Almighty incommunicable, if it is
even our duty to ask for the glory that cometh from the only God, and
if, according to our Lord's word, "every one that asketh receiveth
[384] ?" But one who says concerning the Brightness of the Father's
glory, that He has the glory by having received it, says in effect that
the Brightness of the glory is in Itself devoid of glory, and needs, in
order to become Himself at last the Lord of some glory, to receive
glory from another. How then are we to dispose of the utterances of the
Truth,--one which tells us that He shall be seen in the glory of the
Father [385] , and another which says, "All things that the Father hath
are Mine [386] "? To whom ought the hearer to give ear? To him who
says, "He that is, as the Apostle says, the `heir of all things [387] '
that are in the Father, is without part or lot in His Father's glory";
or to Him Who declares that all things that the Father hath, He Himself
hath also? Now among the "all things," glory surely is included. Yet
Eunomius says that the glory of the Almighty is incommunicable. This
view Joel does not attest, nor yet the mighty Peter, who adopted, in
his speech to the Jews, the language of the prophet. For both the
prophet and the apostle say, in the person of God,--"I will pour out of
My Spirit upon all flesh [388] ." He then Who did not grudge the
partaking in His own Spirit to all flesh,--how can it be that He does
not impart His own glory to the only-begotten Son, Who is in the bosom
of the Father, Who has all things that the Father has? Perhaps one
should say that Eunomius is here speaking the truth, though not
intending it. For the term "impart" is strictly used in the case of one
who has not his glory from within, whose possession of it is an
accession from without, and not part of his own nature: but where one
and the same nature is observed in both Persons, He Who is as regards
nature all that the Father is believed to be stands in no need of one
to impart to Him each several attribute. This it will be well to
explain more clearly and precisely. He Who has the Father dwelling in
Him in His entirety--what need has He of the Father's glory, when none
of the attributes contemplated in the Father is withdrawn from Him?
__________________________________________________________________

[367] Prov. viii. 22 (LXX.). The versions of Aquila, Theodotion, and
Symmachus (to one or more of which perhaps S:9 refers), all render the
Hebrew by ektesato ("possessed"), not by ektise ("created"). But
Gregory may be referring to mss. of the LXX. version which read
ektesato. It is clear from what follows that Mr. Gwatkin is hardly
justified in his remark (Studies of Arianism, p. 69), that "the whole
discussion on Prov. viii. 22 (LXX.), Kurios ektise me, k.t.l., might
have been avoided by a glance at the original." The point of the
controversy might have been changed, but that would have been all.
Gregory seems to feel that ektesato requires an explanation, though he
has one ready.

[368] Phil. ii. 7.

[369] Rom. viii. 20-1.

[370] Eph. iv. 24.

[371] Eph. iv. 24.

[372] Rom. xiii. 14.

[373] S. John xiv. 6

[374] 1 Cor. iii. 11.

[375] Prov. viii. 23-25 (not quite verbal, from the LXX.).

[376] Or "to be brought into harmony with Christian doctrine"
(epharmosthenai to logo).

[377] Ps. xxxvi. 6.

[378] Ps. xxxvi. 6.

[379] Ps. lxviii. 26 (LXX.).

[380] Cf. Ps. cxiv. 6

[381] Cf. S. John i. 9

[382] Is. xlii. 8.

[383] Cf. S. John v. 44

[384] S. Matt. vii. 8

[385] S. Mark viii. 38.

[386] S. John xvi. 15

[387] Heb. i. 2.

[388] Joel ii. 28; Acts ii. 17.
__________________________________________________________________

S:11. After expounding the high estate of the Almighty, the Eternity of
the Son, and the phrase "being made obedient," he shows the folly of
Eunomius in his assertion that the Son did not acquire His sonship by
obedience.

What, moreover, is the high estate of the Almighty in which Eunomius
affirms that the Son has no share? Let those, then, who are wise in
their own eyes, and prudent in their own sight [389] , utter their
groundling opinions--they who, as the prophet says, "speak out of the
ground [390] ." But let us who reverence the Word and are disciples of
the Truth, or rather who profess to be so, not leave even this
assertion unsifted. We know that of all the names by which Deity is
indicated some are expressive of the Divine majesty, employed and
understood absolutely, and some are assigned with reference to the
operations over us and all creation. For when the Apostle says "Now to
the immortal, invisible, only wise God [391] ," and the like, by these
titles he suggests conceptions which represent to us the transcendent
power, but when God is spoken of in the Scriptures as gracious,
merciful, full of pity, true, good, Lord, Physician, Shepherd, Way,
Bread, Fountain, King, Creator, Artificer, Protector, Who is over all
and through all, Who is all in all, these and similar titles contain
the declaration of the operations of the Divine loving-kindness in the
creation. Those then who enquire precisely into the meaning of the term
"Almighty" will find that it declares nothing else concerning the
Divine power than that operation which controls created things and is
indicated by the word "Almighty," stands in a certain relation to
something. For as He would not be called a Physician, save on account
of the sick, nor merciful and gracious, and the like, save by reason of
one who stood in need of grace and mercy, so neither would He be styled
Almighty, did not all creation stand in need of one to regulate it and
keep it in being. As, then, He presents Himself as a Physician to those
who are in need of healing, so He is Almighty over one who has need of
being ruled: and just as "they that are whole have no need of a
physician [392] ," so it follows that we may well say that He Whose
nature contains in it the principle of unerring and unwavering
rectitude does not, like others, need a ruler over Him. Accordingly,
when we hear the name "Almighty," our conception is this, that God
sustains in being all intelligible things as well as all things of a
material nature. For this cause He sitteth upon the circle of the
earth, for this cause He holdeth the ends of the earth in His hand, for
this cause He "meteth out leaven with the span, and measureth the
waters in the hollow of His hand [393] "; for this cause He
comprehendeth in Himself all the intelligible creation, that all things
may remain in existence controlled by His encompassing power. Let us
enquire, then, Who it is that "worketh all in all." Who is He Who made
all things, and without Whom no existing thing does exist? Who is He in
Whom all things were created, and in Whom all things that are have
their continuance? In Whom do we live and move and have our being? Who
is He Who hath in Himself all that the Father hath? Does what has been
said leave us any longer in ignorance of Him Who is "God over all [394]
," Who is so entitled by S. Paul,--our Lord Jesus Christ, Who, as He
Himself says, holding in His hand "all things that the Father hath
[395] ," assuredly grasps all things in the all-containing hollow of
His hand and is sovereign over what He has grasped, and no man taketh
from the hand of Him Who in His hand holdeth all things? If, then, He
hath all things, and is sovereign over that which He hath, why is He
Who is thus sovereign over all things something else and not Almighty?
If heresy replies that the Father is sovereign over both the Son and
the Holy Spirit, let them first show that the Son and the Holy Spirit
are of mutable nature, and then over this mutability let them set its
ruler, that by the help implanted from above, that which is so
overruled may continue incapable of turning to evil. If, on the other
hand, the Divine nature is incapable of evil, unchangeable,
unalterable, eternally permanent, to what end does it stand in need of
a ruler, controlling as it does all creation, and itself by reason of
its immutability needing no ruler to control it? For this cause it is
that at the name of Christ "every knee boweth, of things in heaven, and
things in earth, and things under the earth [396] ." For assuredly
every knee would not thus bow, did it not recognize in Christ Him Who
rules it for its own salvation. But to say that the Son came into being
by the goodness of the Father is nothing else than to put Him on a
level with the meanest objects of creation. For what is there that did
not arrive at its birth by the goodness of Him Who made it? To what is
the formation of mankind ascribed? to the badness of its Maker, or to
His goodness? To what do we ascribe the generation of animals, the
production of plants and herbs? There is nothing that did not take its
rise from the goodness of Him Who made it. A property, then, which
reason discerns to be common to all things, Eunomius is so kind as to
allow to the Eternal Son! But that He did not share His essence or His
estate with the Father--these assertions and the rest of his verbiage I
have refuted in anticipation, when dealing with his statements
concerning the Father, and shown that he has hazarded them at random
and without any intelligible meaning. For not even in the case of us
who are born one of another is there any division of essence. The
definition expressive of essence remains in its entirety in each, in
him that begets and in him who is begotten, without admitting
diminution in him who begets, or augmentation in him who is begotten.
But to speak of division of estate or sovereignty in the case of Him
Who hath all things whatsoever that the Father hath, carries with it no
meaning, unless it be a demonstration of the propounder's impiety. It
would therefore be superfluous to entangle oneself in such discussions,
and so to prolong our treatise to an unreasonable length. Let us pass
on to what follows.

"Glorified," he says, "by the Father before the worlds." The word of
truth hath been demonstrated, confirmed by the testimony of its
adversaries. For this is the sum of our faith, that the Son is from all
eternity, being glorified by the Father: for "before the worlds" is the
same in sense as "from all eternity," seeing that prophecy uses this
phrase to set forth to us God's eternity, when it speaks of Him as "He
that is from before the worlds [397] ." If then to exist before the
worlds is beyond all beginning, he who confers glory on the Son before
the worlds, does thereby assert His existence from eternity before that
glory [398] : for surely it is not the non-existent, but the existent
which is glorified. Then he proceeds to plant for himself the seeds of
blasphemy against the Holy Spirit; not with a view to glorify the Son,
but that he may wantonly outrage the Holy Ghost. For with the intention
of making out the Holy Spirit to be part of the angelic host, he throws
in the phrase "glorified eternally by the Spirit, and by every rational
and generated being," so that there is no distinction between the Holy
Spirit and all that comes into being; if, that is, the Holy Spirit
glorifies the Lord in the same sense as all the other existences
enumerated by the prophet, "angels and powers, and the heaven of
heavens, and the water above the heavens, and all the things of earth,
dragons, deeps, fire and hail, snow and vapour, wind of the storm,
mountains and all hills, fruitful trees and all cedars, beasts and all
cattle, worms and feathered fowls [399] ." If, then, he says, that
along with these the Holy Spirit also glorifies the Lord, surely his
God-opposing tongue makes out the Holy Spirit Himself also to be one of
them.

The disjointed incoherencies which follow next, I think it well to pass
over, not because they give no handle at all to censure, but because
their language is such as might be used by the devout, if detached from
its malignant context. If he does here and there use some expressions
favourable to devotion it is just held out as a bait to simple souls,
to the end that the hook of impiety may be swallowed along with it. For
after employing such language as a member of the Church might use, he
subjoins, "Obedient with regard to the creation and production of all
things that are, obedient with regard to every ministration, not having
by His obedience attained Sonship or Godhead, but, as a consequence of
being Son and being generated as the Only-begotten God, showing Himself
obedient in words, obedient in acts." Yet who of those who are
conversant with the oracles of God does not know with regard to what
point of time it was said of Him by the mighty Paul, (and that once for
all), that He "became obedient [400] "? For it was when He came in the
form of a servant to accomplish the mystery of redemption by the cross,
Who had emptied Himself, Who humbled Himself by assuming the likeness
and fashion of a man, being found as man in man's lowly nature--then, I
say, it was that He became obedient, even He Who "took our infirmities
and bare our sicknesses [401] ," healing the disobedience of men by His
own obedience, that by His stripes He might heal our wound, and by His
own death do away with the common death of all men,--then it was that
for our sakes He was made obedient, even as He became "sin [402] " and
"a curse [403] " by reason of the dispensation on our behalf, not being
so by nature, but becoming so in His love for man. But by what sacred
utterance was He ever taught His list of so many obediences? Nay, on
the contrary every inspired Scripture attests His independent and
sovereign power, saying, "He spake the word and they were made: He
commanded and they were created [404] ":--for it is plain that the
Psalmist says this concerning Him Who upholds "all things by the word
of His power [405] ," Whose authority, by the sole impulse of His will,
framed every existence and nature, and all things in the creation
apprehended by reason or by sight. Whence, then, was Eunomius moved to
ascribe in such manifold wise to the King of the universe the attribute
of obedience, speaking of Him as "obedient with regard to all the work
of creation, obedient with regard to every ministration, obedient in
words and in acts"? Yet it is plain to every one, that he alone is
obedient to another in acts and words, who has not yet perfectly
achieved in himself the condition of accurate working or
unexceptionable speech, but keeping his eye ever on his teacher and
guide, is trained by his suggestions to exact propriety in deed and
word. But to think that Wisdom needs a master and teacher to guide
aright Its attempts at imitation, is the dream of Eunomius' fancy, and
of his alone. And concerning the Father he says, that He is faithful in
words and faithful in works, while of the Son he does not assert
faithfulness in word and deed, but only obedience and not faithfulness,
so that his profanity extends impartially through all his statements.
But it is perhaps right to pass in silence over the inconsiderate folly
of the assertion interposed between those last mentioned, lest some
unreflecting persons should laugh at its absurdity when they ought
rather to weep over the perdition of their souls, than laugh at the
folly of their words. For this wise and wary theologian says that He
did not attain to being a Son as the result of His obedience! Mark his
penetration! with what cogent force does he lay it down for us that He
was not first obedient and afterwards a Son, and that we ought not to
think that His obedience was prior to His generation! Now if he had not
added this defining clause, who without it would have been sufficiently
silly and idiotic to fancy that His generation was bestowed on Him by
His Father, as a reward of the obedience of Him Who before His
generation had showed due subjection and obedience? But that no one may
too readily extract matter for laughter from these remarks, let each
consider that even the folly of the words has in it something worthy of
tears. For what he intends to establish by these observations is
something of this kind, that His obedience is part of His nature, so
that not even if He willed it would it be possible for Him not to be
obedient.

For he says that He was so constituted that His nature was adapted to
obedience alone [406] , just as among instruments that which is
fashioned with regard to a certain figure necessarily produces in that
which is subjected to its operation the form which the artificer
implanted in the construction of the instrument, and cannot possibly
trace a straight line upon that which receives its mark, if its own
working is in a curve; nor can the instrument, if fashioned to draw a
straight line, produce a circle by its impress. What need is there of
any words of ours to reveal how great is the profanity of such a
notion, when the heretical utterance of itself proclaims aloud its
monstrosity? For if He was obedient for this reason only that He was so
made, then of course He is not on an equal footing even with humanity,
since on this theory, while our soul is self-determining and
independent, choosing as it will with sovereignty over itself that
which is pleasing to it, He on the contrary exercises, or rather
experiences, obedience under the constraint of a compulsory law of His
nature, while His nature suffers Him not to disobey, even if He would.
For it was "as the result of being Son, and being begotten, that He has
thus shown Himself obedient in words and obedient in acts." Alas, for
the brutish stupidity of this doctrine! Thou makest the Word obedient
to words, and supposest other words prior to Him Who is truly the Word,
and another Word of the Beginning is mediator between the Beginning and
the Word that was in the Beginning, conveying to Him the decision. And
this is not one only: there are several words, which Eunomius makes so
many links of the chain between the Beginning and the Word, and which
abuse His obedience as they think good. But what need is there to
linger over this idle talk? Any one can see that even at that time with
reference to which S. Paul says that He became obedient (and he tells
us that He became obedient in this wise, namely, by becoming for our
sakes flesh, and a servant, and a curse, and sin),--even then, I say,
the Lord of glory, Who despised the shame and embraced suffering in the
flesh, did not abandon His free will, saying as He does, "Destroy this
temple, and in three days I will raise it up [407] ;" and again, "No
man taketh My life from Me; I have power to lay it down, and I have
power to take it again [408] "; and when those who were armed with
swords and staves drew near to Him on the night before His Passion, He
caused them all to go backward by saying "I am He [409] ," and again,
when the dying thief besought Him to remember him, He showed His
universal sovereignty by saying, "To-day shalt thou be with Me in
Paradise [410] ." If then not even in the time of His Passion He is
separated from His authority, where can heresy possibly discern the
subordination to authority of the King of glory?
__________________________________________________________________

[389] Is. v. 21.

[390] Is. xxix. 4.

[391] Cf. 1 Tim. i. 17

[392] Cf. S. Matt. ix. 12, and parallel passages.

[393] Cf. Is. xl. 12 and 24. The quotation is not verbally from the
LXX.

[394] Rom. ix. 5.

[395] S. John xvi. 15

[396] Cf. Phil. ii. 10

[397] Ps. lv. 19 (LXX.).

[398] Reading autes, with Oehler. The general sense is the same, if
auto be read; "does yet more strongly attest His existence from all
eternity."

[399] Cf. Ps. cxlviii. 2-10.

[400] Phil. ii. 8.

[401] Cf. S. Matt. viii. 17.

[402] 2 Cor. v. 21.

[403] Gal. iii. 13.

[404] Ps. cxlviii. 5.

[405] Heb. i. 3.

[406] If this phrase is a direct quotation from Eunomius, it is
probably from some other context: its grammatical structure does not
connect it with what has gone before, nor is it quite clear where the
quotation ends, or whether the illustration of the instrument is
Eunomius' own, or is Gregory's exposition of the statement of Eunomius.

[407] S. John ii. 19

[408] S. John x. 18

[409] S. John xviii. 5-6.

[410] S. Luke xxiii. 43.
__________________________________________________________________

S:12. He thus proceeds to a magnificent discourse of the interpretation
of "Mediator," "Like," "Ungenerate," and "generate," and of "The
likeness and seal of the energy of the Almighty and of His Works."

Again, what is the manifold mediation which with wearying iteration he
assigns to God, calling Him "Mediator in doctrines, Mediator in the Law
[411] "? It is not thus that we are taught by the lofty utterance of
the Apostle, who says that having made void the law of commandments by
His own doctrines, He is the mediator between God and man, declaring it
by this saying, "There is one God, and one mediator between God and
man, the man Christ Jesus [412] ;" where by the distinction implied in
the word "mediator" he reveals to us the whole aim of the mystery of
godliness. Now the aim is this. Humanity once revolted through the
malice of the enemy, and, brought into bondage to sin, was also
alienated from the true Life. After this the Lord of the creature calls
back to Him His own creature, and becomes Man while still remaining
God, being both God and Man in the entirety of the two several natures,
and thus humanity was indissolubly united to God, the Man that is in
Christ conducting the work of mediation, to Whom, by the first-fruits
assumed for us, all the lump is potentially united [413] . Since, then,
a mediator is not a mediator of one [414] , and God is one, not divided
among the Persons in Whom we have been taught to believe (for the
Godhead in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost is one), the Lord,
therefore, becomes a mediator once for all betwixt God and men, binding
man to the Deity by Himself. But even by the idea of a mediator we are
taught the godly doctrine enshrined in the Creed. For the Mediator
between God and man entered as it were into fellowship with human
nature, not by being merely deemed a man, but having truly become so:
in like manner also, being very God, He has not, as Eunomius will have
us consider, been honoured by the bare title of Godhead.

What he adds to the preceding statements is characterized by the same
want of meaning, or rather by the same malignity of meaning. For in
calling Him "Son" Whom, a little before, he had plainly declared to be
created, and in calling Him "only begotten God" Whom he reckoned with
the rest of things that have come into being by creation, he affirms
that He is like Him that begat Him only "by an especial likeness, in a
peculiar sense." Accordingly, we must first distinguish the
significations of the term "like," in how many senses it is employed in
ordinary use, and afterwards proceed to discuss Eunomius' positions. In
the first place, then, all things that beguile our senses, not being
really identical in nature, but producing illusion by some of the
accidents of the respective subjects, as form, colour, sound, and the
impressions conveyed by taste or smell or touch, while really different
in nature, but supposed to be other than they truly are, these custom
declares to have the relation of "likeness," as, for example, when the
lifeless material is shaped by art, whether carving, painting, or
modelling, into an imitation of a living creature, the imitation is
said to be "like" the original. For in such a case the nature of the
animal is one thing, and that of the material, which cheats the sight
by mere colour and form, is another. To the same class of likeness
belongs the image of the original figure in a mirror, which gives
appearances of motion, without, however, being in nature identical with
its original. In just the same way our hearing may experience the same
deception, when, for instance, some one, imitating the song of the
nightingale with his own voice, persuades our hearing so that we seem
to be listening to the bird. Taste, again, is subject to the same
illusion, when the juice of figs mimics the pleasant taste of honey:
for there is a certain resemblance to the sweetness of honey in the
juice of the fruit. So, too, the sense of smell may sometimes be
imposed upon by resemblance, when the scent of the herb camomile,
imitating the fragrant apple itself, deceives our perception: and in
the same way with touch also, likeness belies the truth in various
modes, since a silver or brass coin, of equal size and similar weight
with a gold one, may pass for the gold piece if our sight does not
discern the truth.

We have thus generally described in a few words the several cases in
which objects, because they are deemed to be different from what they
really are, produce delusions in our senses. It is possible, of course,
by a more laborious investigation, to extend one's enquiry through all
things which are really different in kind one from another, but are
nevertheless thought, by virtue of some accidental resemblance, to be
like one to the other. Can it possibly be such a form of "likeness" as
this, that he is continually attributing to the Son? Nay, surely he
cannot be so infatuated as to discover deceptive similarity in Him Who
is the Truth. Again, in the inspired Scriptures, we are told of another
kind of resemblance by Him Who said, "Let us make man in our image,
after our likeness [415] ;" but I do not suppose that Eunomius would
discern this kind of likeness between the Father and the Son, so as to
make out the Only-begotten God to be identical with man. We are also
aware of another kind of likeness, of which the word speaks in Genesis
concerning Seth,--"Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his
image [416] "; and if this is the kind of likeness of which Eunomius
speaks, we do not think his statement is to be rejected. For in this
case the nature of the two objects which are alike is not different,
and the impress and type imply community of nature. These, or such as
these, are our views upon the variety of meanings of "like." Let us
see, then, with what intention Eunomius asserts of the Son that
"especial likeness" to the Father, when he says that He is "like the
Father with an especial likeness, in a peculiar sense, not as Father to
Father, for they are not two Fathers." He promises to show us the
"especial likeness" of the Son to the Father, and proceeds by his
definition to establish the position that we ought not to conceive of
Him as being like. For by saying, "He is not like as Father to Father,"
he makes out that He is not like; and again when he adds, "nor as
Ungenerate to Ungenerate," by this phrase, too, he forbids us to
conceive a likeness in the Son to the Father; and finally, by
subjoining "nor as Son to Son," he introduces a third conception, by
which he entirely subverts the meaning of "like." So it is that he
follows up his own statements, and conducts his demonstration of
likeness by establishing unlikeness. And now let us examine the
discernment and frankness which he displays in these distinctions.
After saying that the Son is like the Father, he guards the statement
by adding that we ought not to think that the Son is like the Father,
"as Father to Father." Why, what man on earth is such a fool as, on
learning that the Son is like the Father, to be brought by any course
of reasoning to think of the likeness of Father to Father? "Nor as Son
to Son":--here, again, the acuteness of the distinction is equally
conspicuous. When he tells us that the Son is like the Father, he adds
the further definition that He must not be understood to be like Him in
the same way as He would be like another Son. These are the mysteries
of the awful doctrines of Eunomius, by which his disciples are made
wiser than the rest of the world, by learning that the Son, by His
likeness to the Father, is not like a Son, for the Son is not the
Father: nor is He like "as Ungenerate to Ungenerate," for the Son is
not ungenerate. But the mystery which we have received, when it speaks
of the Father, certainly bids us understand the Father of the Son, and
when it names the Son, teaches us to apprehend the Son of the Father.
And until the present time we never felt the need of these philosophic
refinements, that by the words Father and Son are suggested two Fathers
or two Sons, a pair, so to say, of ungenerate beings.

Now the drift of Eunomius' excessive concern about the Ungenerate has
been often explained before; and it shall here be briefly discovered
yet again. For as the term Father points to no difference of nature
from the Son, his impiety, if he had brought his statement to a close
here, would have had no support, seeing that the natural sense of the
names Father and Son excludes the idea of their being alien in essence.
But as it is, by employing the terms "generate" and "ungenerate," since
the contradictory opposition between them admits of no mean, just like
that between "mortal" and "immortal," "rational" and "irrational," and
all those terms which are opposed to each other by the mutually
exclusive nature of their meaning,--by the use of these terms, I
repeat, he gives free course to his profanity, so as to contemplate as
existing in the "generate" with reference to the "ungenerate" the same
difference which there is between "mortal" and "immortal": and even as
the nature of the mortal is one, and that of the immortal another, and
as the special attributes of the rational and of the irrational are
essentially incompatible, just so he wants to make out that the nature
of the ungenerate is one, and that of the generate another, in order to
show that as the irrational nature has been created in subjection to
the rational, so the generate is by a necessity of its being in a state
of subordination to the ungenerate. For which reason he attaches to the
ungenerate the name of "Almighty," and this he does not apply to
express providential operation, as the argument led the way for him in
suggesting, but transfers the application of the word to arbitrary
sovereignty, so as to make the Son to be a part of the subject and
subordinate universe, a fellow-slave with all the rest to Him Who with
arbitrary and absolute sovereignty controls all alike. And that it is
with an eye to this result that he employs these argumentative
distinctions, will be clearly established from the passage before us.
For after those sapient and carefully-considered expressions, that He
is not like either as Father to Father, or as Son to Son,--and yet
there is no necessity that father should invariably be like father or
son like son: for suppose there is one father among the Ethiopians, and
another among the Scythians, and each of these has a son, the
Ethiopian's son black, but the Scythian white-skinned and with hair of
a golden tinge, yet none the more because each is a father does the
Scythian turn black on the Ethiopian's account, nor does the
Ethiopian's body change to white on account of the Scythian,--after
saying this, however, according to his own fancy, Eunomius subjoins
that "He is like as Son to Father [417] ." But although such a phrase
indicates kinship in nature, as the inspired Scripture attests in the
case of Seth and Adam, our doctor, with but small respect for his
intelligent readers, introduces his idle exposition of the title "Son,"
defining Him to be the image and seal of the energy [418] of the
Almighty. "For the Son," he says, "is the image and seal of the energy
of the Almighty." Let him who hath ears to hear first, I pray, consider
this particular point--What is "the seal of the energy"? Every energy
is contemplated as exertion in the party who exhibits it, and on the
completion of his exertion, it has no independent existence. Thus, for
example, the energy of the runner is the motion of his feet, and when
the motion has stopped there is no longer any energy. So too about
every pursuit the same may be said;--when the exertion of him who is
busied about anything ceases, the energy ceases also, and has no
independent existence, either when a person is actively engaged in the
exertion he undertakes, or when he ceases from that exertion. What then
does he tell us that the energy is in itself, which is neither essence,
nor image, nor person? So he speaks of the Son as the similitude of the
impersonal, and that which is like the non-existent surely has itself
no existence at all. This is what his juggling with idle opinions comes
to,--belief in nonentity! for that which is like nonentity surely
itself is not. O Paul and John and all you others of the band of
Apostles and Evangelists, who are they that arm their venomous tongues
against your words? who are they that raise their frog-like croakings
against your heavenly thunder? What then saith the son of thunder? "In
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was
God [419] ." And what saith he that came after him, that other who had
been within the heavenly temple, who in Paradise had been initiated
into mysteries unspeakable? "Being," he says, "the Brightness of His
glory, and the express Image of His person [420] ." What, after these
have thus spoken, are the words of our ventriloquist [421] ? "The
seal," quoth he, "of the energy of the Almighty." He makes Him third
after the Father, with that non-existent energy mediating between them,
or rather moulded at pleasure by non-existence. God the Word, Who was
in the beginning, is "the seal of the energy":--the Only-begotten God,
Who is contemplated in the eternity of the Beginning of existent
things, Who is in the bosom of the Father [422] , Who sustains all
things, by the word of His power [423] , the creator of the ages, from
Whom and through Whom and in Whom are all things [424] , Who sitteth
upon the circle of the earth, and hath meted out heaven with the span,
Who measureth the water in the hollow of his hand [425] , Who holdeth
in His hand all things that are, Who dwelleth on high and looketh upon
the things that are lowly [426] , or rather did look upon them to make
all the world to be His footstool [427] , imprinted by the footmark of
the Word--the form of God [428] is "the seal" of an "energy." Is God
then an energy, not a Person? Surely Paul when expounding this very
truth says He is "the express image," not of His energy, but "of His
Person." Is the Brightness of His glory a seal of the energy of God?
Alas for his impious ignorance! What is there intermediate between God
and His own form? and Whom does the Person employ as mediator with His
own express image? and what can be conceived as coming between the
glory and its brightness? But while there are such weighty and numerous
testimonies wherein the greatness of the Lord of the creation is
proclaimed by those who were entrusted with the proclamation of the
Gospel, what sort of language does this forerunner of the final
apostasy hold concerning Him? What says he? "As image," he says, "and
seal of all the energy and power of the Almighty." How does he take
upon himself to emend the words of the mighty Paul? Paul says that the
Son is "the Power of God [429] "; Eunomius calls Him "the seal of a
power," not the Power. And then, repeating his expression, what is it
that he adds to his previous statement? He calls Him "seal of the
Father's works and words and counsels." To what works of the Father is
He like? He will say, of course, the world, and all things that are
therein. But the Gospel has testified that all these things are the
works of the Only-begotten. To what works of the Father, then, was He
likened? of what works was He made the seal? what Scripture ever
entitled Him "seal of the Father's works"? But if any one should grant
Eunomius the right to fashion his words at his own will, as he desires,
even though Scripture does not agree with him, let him tell us what
works of the Father there are of which he says that the Son was made
the seal, apart from those that have been wrought by the Son. All
things visible and invisible are the work of the Son: in the visible
are included the whole world and all that is therein; in the invisible,
the supramundane creation. What works of the Father, then, are
remaining to be contemplated by themselves, over and above things
visible and invisible, whereof he says that the Son was made the
"seal"? Will he perhaps, when driven into a corner, return once more to
the fetid vomit of heresy, and say that the Son is a work of the
Father? How then does the Son come to be the seal of these works when
He Himself, as Eunomius says, is the work of the Father? Or does he say
that the same Person is at once a work and the likeness of a work? Let
this be granted: let us suppose him to speak of the other works of
which he says the Father was the creator, if indeed he intends us to
understand likeness by the term "seal." But what other "words" of the
Father does Eunomius know, besides that Word Who was ever in the
Father, Whom he calls a "seal"--Him Who is and is called the Word in
the absolute, true, and primary sense? And to what counsels can he
possibly refer, apart from the Wisdom of God, to which the Wisdom of
God is made like, in becoming a "seal" of those counsels? Look at the
want of discrimination and circumspection, at the confused muddle of
his statement, how he brings the mystery into ridicule, without
understanding either what he says or what he is arguing about. For He
Who has the Father in His entirety in Himself, and is Himself in His
entirety in the Father, as Word and Wisdom and Power and Truth, as His
express image and brightness, Himself is all things in the Father, and
does not come to be the image and seal and likeness of certain other
things discerned in the Father prior to Himself.

Then Eunomius allows to Him the credit of the destruction of men by
water in the days of Noah, of the rain of fire that fell upon Sodom,
and of the just vengeance upon the Egyptians, as though he were making
some great concessions to Him Who holds in His hand the ends of the
world, in Whom, as the Apostle says, "all things consist [430] ," as
though he were not aware that to Him Who encompasses all things, and
guides and sways according to His good pleasure all that hath already
been and all that will be, the mention of two or three marvels does not
mean the addition of glory, so much as the suppression of the rest
means its deprivation or loss. But even if no word be said of these,
the one utterance of Paul is enough by itself to point to them all
inclusively--the one utterance which says that He "is above all, and
through all, and in all [431] ."
__________________________________________________________________

[411] Here again the exact connexion of the quotation from Eunomius
with the extracts preceding is uncertain.

[412] Cf. 1 Tim. ii. 5

[413] Cf. Rom. xi. 16

[414] Gal. iii. 20.

[415] Gen. i. 26.

[416] Gen. v. 3.

[417] This is apparently a quotation from Eunomius in continuation of
what has gone before.

[418] The word employed is energeia; which might be translated by
"active force," or "operation," as elsewhere.

[419] S. John i. 1

[420] Heb. i. 3.

[421] Cf. the use of engastrimuthos in LXX. (e.g. Lev. xix. 31, Is.
xliv. 25).

[422] S. John i. 18

[423] Cf. Heb. i. 3

[424] Cf. Rom. xi. 36

[425] Cf. Isa. xl. 12-22.

[426] Cf. Ps. cxxxviii. 6.

[427] Cf. Isa. lxvi. 1

[428] Cf. Phil. ii. 5

[429] 1 Cor. i. 24.

[430] Col. i. 17.

[431] Eph. iv. 6. The application of the words to the Son is
remarkable.
__________________________________________________________________

S:13. He expounds the passage of the Gospel, "The Father judgeth no
man," and further speaks of the assumption of man with body and soul
wrought by the Lord, of the transgression of Adam, and of death and the
resurrection of the dead.

Next he says, "He legislates by the command of the Eternal God." Who is
the eternal God? and who is He that ministers to Him in the giving of
the Law? Thus much is plain to all, that through Moses God appointed
the Law to those that received it. Now inasmuch as Eunomius himself
acknowledges that it was the only-begotten God Who held converse with
Moses, how is it that the assertion before us puts the Lord of all in
the place of Moses, and ascribes the character of the eternal God to
the Father alone, so as, by thus contrasting Him with the Eternal, to
make out the only-begotten God, the Maker of the Worlds, to be not
Eternal? Our studious friend with his excellent memory seems to have
forgotten that Paul uses all these terms concerning himself, announcing
among men the proclamation of the Gospel by the command of God [432] .
Thus what the Apostle asserts of himself, that Eunomius is not ashamed
to ascribe to the Lord of the prophets and apostles, in order to place
the Master on the same level with Paul, His own servant. But why should
I lengthen out my argument by confuting in detail each of these
assertions, where the too unsuspicious reader of Eunomius' writings may
think that their author is saying what Holy Scripture allows him to
say, while one who is able to unravel each statement critically will
find them one and all infected with heretical knavery. For the
Churchman and the heretic alike affirm that "the Father judgeth no man,
but hath committed all judgment unto the Son [433] ," but to this
assertion they severally attach different meanings. By the same words
the Churchman understands supreme authority, the other maintains
subservience and subjection.

But to what has been already said, ought to be added some notice of
that position which they make a kind of foundation of their impiety in
their discussions concerning the Incarnation, the position, namely,
that not the whole man has been saved by Him, but only the half of man,
I mean the body. Their object in such a malignant perversion of the
true doctrine, is to show that the less exalted statements, which our
Lord utters in His humanity, are to be thought to have issued from the
Godhead Itself, that so they may show their blasphemy to have a
stronger case, if it is upheld by the actual acknowledgment of the
Lord. For this reason it is that Eunomius says, "He who in the last
days became man did not take upon Himself the man made up of soul and
body." But, after searching through all the inspired and sacred
Scripture, I do not find any such statement as this, that the Creator
of all things, at the time of His ministration here on earth for man,
took upon Himself flesh only without a soul. Under stress of necessity,
then, looking to the object contemplated by the plan of salvation, to
the doctrines of the Fathers, and to the inspired Scriptures, I will
endeavour to confute the impious falsehood which is being fabricated
with regard to this matter. The Lord came "to seek and to save that
which was lost [434] ." Now it was not the body merely, but the whole
man, compacted of soul and body, that was lost: indeed, if we are to
speak more exactly, the soul was lost sooner than the body. For
disobedience is a sin, not of the body, but of the will: and the will
properly belongs to the soul, from which the whole disaster of our
nature had its beginning, as the threat of God, that admits of no
falsehood, testifies in the declaration that, in the day that they
should eat of the forbidden fruit, death without respite would attach
to the act. Now since the condemnation of man was twofold, death
correspondingly effects in each part of our nature the deprivation of
the twofold life that operates in him who is thus mortally stricken.
For the death of the body consists in the extinction of the means of
sensible perception, and in the dissolution of the body into its
kindred elements: but "the soul that sinneth," he saith, "it shall die
[435] ." Now sin is nothing else than alienation from God, Who is the
true and only life. Accordingly the first man lived many hundred years
after his disobedience, and yet God lied not when He said, "In the day
that ye eat thereof ye shall surely die [436] ." For by the fact of his
alienation from the true life, the sentence of death was ratified
against him that self-same day: and after this, at a much later time,
there followed also the bodily death of Adam. He therefore Who came for
this cause that He might seek and save that which was lost, (that which
the shepherd in the parable calls the sheep,) both finds that which is
lost, and carries home on His shoulders the whole sheep, not its skin
only, that He may make the man of God complete, united to the deity in
body and in soul. And thus He Who was in all points tempted like as we
are, yet without sin, left no part of our nature which He did not take
upon Himself. Now the soul is not sin though it is capable of admitting
sin into it as the result of being ill-advised: and this He sanctifies
by union with Himself for this end, that so the lump may be holy along
with the first-fruits. Wherefore also the Angel, when informing Joseph
of the destruction of the enemies of the Lord, said, "They are dead
which sought the young Child's life [437] ," (or "soul"): and the Lord
says to the Jews, "Ye seek to kill Me, a man that hath told you the
truth [438] ." Now by "Man" is not meant the body of a man only, but
that which is composed of both, soul and body. And again, He says to
them, "Are ye angry at Me, because I have made a man every whit whole
on the Sabbath day [439] ?" And what He meant by "every whit whole," He
showed in the other Gospels, when He said to the man who was let down
on a couch in the midst, "Thy sins be forgiven thee," which is a
healing of the soul, and, "Arise and walk [440] ," which has regard to
the body: and in the Gospel of S. John, by liberating the soul also
from its own malady after He had given health to the body, where He
saith, "Thou art made whole, sin no more [441] ," thou, that is, who
hast been cured in both, I mean in soul and in body. For so too does S.
Paul speak, "for to make in Himself of twain one new man [442] ." And
so too He foretells that at the time of His Passion He would
voluntarily detach His soul from His body, saying, "No man taketh" my
soul "from Me, but I lay it down of Myself: I have power to lay it
down, and I have power to take it again [443] ." Yea, the prophet David
also, according to the interpretation of the great Peter, said with
foresight of Him, "Thou wilt not leave My soul in hell, neither wilt
Thou suffer Thine Holy One to see corruption [444] ," while the Apostle
Peter thus expounds the saying, that "His soul was not left in hell,
neither His flesh did see corruption." For His Godhead, alike before
taking flesh and in the flesh and after His Passion, is immutably the
same, being at all times what It was by nature, and so continuing for
ever. But in the suffering of His human nature the Godhead fulfilled
the dispensation for our benefit by severing the soul for a season from
the body, yet without being Itself separated from either of those
elements to which it was once for all united, and by joining again the
elements which had been thus parted, so as to give to all human nature
a beginning and an example which it should follow of the resurrection
from the dead, that all the corruptible may put on incorruption, and
all the mortal may put on immortality, our first-fruits having been
transformed to the Divine nature by its union with God, as Peter said,
"This same Jesus Whom ye crucified, hath God made both Lord and Christ
[445] ;" and we might cite many passages of Scripture to support such a
position, showing how the Lord, reconciling the world to Himself by the
Humanity of Christ, apportioned His work of benevolence to men between
His soul and His body, willing through His soul and touching them
through His body. But it would be superfluous to encumber our argument
by entering into every detail.

Before passing on, however, to what follows, I will further mention the
one text, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up
[446] ." Just as we, through soul and body, become a temple of Him Who
"dwelleth in us and walketh in us [447] ," even so the Lord terms their
combination a "temple," of which the "destruction" signifies the
dissolution of the soul from the body. And if they allege the passage
in the Gospel, "The Word was made flesh [448] ," in order to make out
that the flesh was taken into the Godhead without the soul, on the
ground that the soul is not expressly mentioned along with the flesh,
let them learn that it is customary for Holy Scripture to imply the
whole by the part. For He that said, "Unto Thee shall all flesh come
[449] ," does not mean that the flesh will be presented before the
Judge apart from the souls: and when we read in sacred History that
Jacob went down into Egypt with seventy-five souls [450] we understand
the flesh also to be intended together with the souls. So, then, the
Word, when He became flesh, took with the flesh the whole of human
nature; and hence it was possible that hunger and thirst, fear and
dread, desire and sleep, tears and trouble of spirit, and all such
things, were in Him. For the Godhead, in its proper nature, admits no
such affections, nor is the flesh by itself involved in them, if the
soul is not affected co-ordinately with the body.
__________________________________________________________________

[432] Cf. Rom. xvi. 26

[433] S. John v. 22

[434] Cf. S. Luke xix. 10

[435] Ezek. xviii. 20.

[436] Cf. Gen. ii. 17

[437] S. Matt. ii. 20. The word psuchen may be rendered by either
"life" or "soul."

[438] S. John viii. 40. This is the only passage in which our Lord
speaks of Himself by this term.

[439] S. John vii. 20

[440] Cf. S. Luke v. 20, 23, and the parallel passages in S. Matt. ix.
and S. Mark ii.

[441] S. John v. 14

[442] Eph. ii. 15.

[443] Cf. S. John x. 17, 18. Here again the word psuchen is rendered in
the A.V. by "life."

[444] Ps. xvi. 8. Acts ii. 27, 31.

[445] Acts ii. 36. A further exposition of Gregory's views on this
passage will be found in Book V.

[446] S. John ii. 19

[447] Cf. 2 Cor. vi. 16.

[448] S. John i. 14

[449] Ps. lxv. 2.

[450] Acts vii. 14. Cf. Gen. xlvi. 27, and Deut. x. 22.
__________________________________________________________________

S:14. He proceeds to discuss the views held by Eunomius, and by the
Church, touching the Holy Spirit; and to show that the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Ghost are not three Gods, but one God. He also discusses
different senses of "Subjection," and therein shows that the subjection
of all things to the Son is the same as the subjection of the Son to
the Father.

Thus much with regard to his profanity towards the Son. Now let us see
what he says about the Holy Spirit. "After Him, we believe," he says,
"on the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth." I think it will be plain to
all who come across this passage what object he has in view in thus
perverting the declaration of the faith delivered to us by the Lord, in
his statements concerning the Son and the Father. Though this absurdity
has already been exposed, I will nevertheless endeavour, in few words,
to make plain the aim of his knavery. As in the former case, he avoided
using the name "Father," that so he might not include the Son in the
eternity of the Father, so he avoided employing the title Son, that he
might not by it suggest His natural affinity to the Father; so here,
too, he refrains from saying "Holy Spirit," that he may not by this
name acknowledge the majesty of His glory, and His complete union with
the Father and the Son. For since the appellation of "Spirit," and that
of "Holy," are by the Scriptures equally applied to the Father and the
Son (for "God is a Spirit [451] ," and "the anointed Lord is the Spirit
before our face [452] ," and "the Lord our God is Holy [453] ," and
there is "one Holy, one Lord Jesus Christ [454] ") lest there should,
by the use of these terms, be bred in the minds of his readers some
orthodox conception of the Holy Spirit, such as would naturally arise
in them from His sharing His glorious appellation with the Father and
the Son, for this reason, deluding the ears of the foolish, he changes
the words of the Faith as set forth by God in the delivery of this
mystery, making a way, so to speak, by this sequence, for the entrance
of his impiety against the Holy Spirit. For if he had said, "We believe
in the Holy Spirit," and "God is a Spirit," any one instructed in
things divine would have interposed the remark, that if we are to
believe in the Holy Spirit, while God is called a Spirit, He is
assuredly not distinct in nature from that which receives the same
titles in a proper sense. For of all those things which are indicated
not unreally, nor metaphorically, but properly and absolutely, by the
same names, we are necessarily compelled to acknowledge that the nature
also, which is signified by this identity of names, is one and the
same. For this reason it is that, suppressing the name appointed by the
Lord in the formula of the faith, he says, "We believe in the
Comforter." But I have been taught that this very name is also applied
by the inspired Scripture to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost alike. For the
Son gives the name of "Comforter" equally to Himself and to the Holy
Spirit [455] ; and the Father, where He is said to work comfort, surely
claims as His own the name of "Comforter." For assuredly he Who does
the work of a Comforter does not disdain the name belonging to the
work: for David says to the Father, "Thou, Lord, hast holpen me and
comforted me [456] ," and the great Apostle applies to the Father the
same language, when he says, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ, Who comforteth us in all our tribulation [457] "; and
John, in one of his Catholic Epistles, expressly gives to the Son the
name of Comforter [458] . Nay, more, the Lord Himself, in saying that
another Comforter would be sent us, when speaking of the Spirit,
clearly asserted this title of Himself in the first place. But as there
are two senses of the word parakalein [459] ,--one to beseech, by words
and gestures of respect, to induce him to whom we apply for anything,
to feel with us in respect of those things for which we apply,--the
other to comfort, to take remedial thought for affections of body and
soul,--the Holy Scripture affirms the conception of the Paraclete, in
either sense alike, to belong to the Divine nature. For at one time
Paul sets before us by the word parakalein the healing power of God, as
when he says, "God, Who comforteth those that are cast down, comforted
us by the coming of Titus [460] "; and at another time he uses this
word in its other meaning, when he says, writing to the Corinthians,
"Now we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by
us; we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God [461] ." Now
since these things are so, in whatever way you understand the title
"Paraclete," when used of the Spirit, you will not in either of its
significations detach Him from His community in it with the Father and
the Son. Accordingly, he has not been able, even though he wished it,
to belittle the glory of the Spirit by ascribing to Him the very
attribute which Holy Scripture refers also to the Father and to the
Son. But in styling Him "the Spirit of Truth," Eunomius' own wish, I
suppose, was to suggest by this phrase subjection, since Christ is the
Truth, and he called Him the Spirit of Truth, as if one should say that
He is a possession and chattel of the Truth, without being aware that
God is called a God of righteousness [462] ; and we certainly do not
understand thereby that God is a possession of righteousness. Wherefore
also, when we hear of the "Spirit of Truth," we acquire by that phrase
such a conception as befits the Deity, being guided to the loftier
interpretation by the words which follow it. For when the Lord said
"The Spirit of Truth," He immediately added "Which proceedeth from the
Father [463] ," a fact which the voice of the Lord never asserted of
any conceivable thing in creation, not of aught visible or invisible,
not of thrones, principalities, powers, or dominions, nor of any other
name that is named either in this world or in that which is to come. It
is plain then that that, from share in which all creation is excluded,
is something special and peculiar to uncreated being. But this man bids
us believe in "the Guide of godliness." Let a man then believe in Paul,
and Barnabas, and Titus, and Silvanus, and Timotheus, and all those by
whom we have been led into the way of the faith. For if we are to
believe in "that which guides us to godliness," along with the Father
and the Son, all the prophets and lawgivers and patriarchs, heralds,
evangelists, apostles, pastors, and teachers, have equal honour with
the Holy Spirit, as they have been "guides to godliness" to those who
came after them. "Who came into being," he goes on, "by the only God
through the Only-begotten." In these words he gathers up in one head
all his blasphemy. Once more he calls the Father "only God," who
employs the Only-begotten as an instrument for the production of the
Spirit. What shadow of such a notion did he find in Scripture, that he
ventures upon this assertion? by deduction from what premises did he
bring his profanity to such a conclusion as this? Which of the
Evangelists says it? what apostle? what prophet? Nay, on the contrary
every scripture divinely inspired, written by the afflatus of the
Spirit, attests the Divinity of the Spirit. For example (for it is
better to prove my position from the actual testimonies), those who
receive power to become children of God bear witness to the Divinity of
the Spirit. Who knows not that utterance of the Lord which tells us
that they who are born of the Spirit are the children of God? For thus
He expressly ascribes the birth of the children of God to the Spirit,
saying, that as that which is born of the flesh is flesh, so that which
is born of the Spirit is spirit. But as many as are born of the Spirit
are called the children of God [464] . So also when the Lord by
breathing upon His disciples had imparted to them the Holy Spirit, John
says, "Of His fulness have all we received [465] ." And that "in Him
dwelleth the fulness of the Godhead [466] ," the mighty Paul attests:
yea, moreover, through the prophet Isaiah it is attested, as to the
manifestation of the Divine appearance vouchsafed to him, when he saw
Him that sat "on the throne high and lifted up [467] ;" the older
tradition, it is true, says that it was the Father Who appeared to him,
but the evangelist John refers the prophecy to our Lord, saying,
touching those of the Jews who did not believe the words uttered by the
prophet concerning the Lord, "These things said Esaias, when he saw His
glory and spoke of Him [468] ." But the mighty Paul attributes the same
passage to the Holy Spirit in his speech made to the Jews at Rome, when
he says, "Well spoke the Holy Ghost by Esaias the prophet concerning
you, saying, Hearing ye shall hear and shall not understand [469] ,"
showing, in my opinion, by Holy Scripture itself, that every specially
divine vision, every theophany, every word uttered in the Person of
God, is to be understood to refer to the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit. Hence when David says, "they provoked God in the wilderness,
and grieved Him in the desert [470] ," the apostle refers to the Holy
Spirit the despite done by the Israelites to God, in these terms:
"Wherefore, as the Holy Ghost saith, Harden not your hearts, as in the
provocation, in the day of temptation in the wilderness; when your
fathers tempted me [471] ," and goes on to refer all that the prophecy
refers to God, to the Person of the Holy Ghost. Those who keep
repeating against us the phrase "three Gods," because we hold these
views, have perhaps not yet learnt how to count. For if the Father and
the Son are not divided into duality, (for they are, according to the
Lord's words, One, and not Two [472] ) and if the Holy Ghost is also
one, how can one added to one be divided into the number of three Gods?
Is it not rather plain that no one can charge us with believing in the
number of three Gods, without himself first maintaining in his own
doctrine a pair of Gods? For it is by being added to two that the one
completes the triad of Gods. But what room is there for the charge of
tritheism against those by whom one God is worshipped, the God
expressed by the Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost?

Let us however resume Eunomius' statement in its entirety. "Having come
into being from the only God through the Only-begotten, this Spirit
also--" What proof is there of the statement that "this Spirit also" is
one of the things that were made by the Only-begotten? They will say of
course that "all things were made by Him [473] ," and that in the term
"all things" "this Spirit also" is included. Our answer to them shall
be this, All things were made by Him, that were made. Now the things
that were made, as Paul tells us, were things visible and invisible,
thrones, authorities, dominions, principalities, powers, and among
those included under the head of thrones and powers are reckoned by
Paul the Cherubim and Seraphim [474] : so far does the term "all
things" extend. But of the Holy Spirit, as being above the nature of
things that have come into being, Paul said not a word in his
enumeration of existing things, not indicating to us by his words
either His subordination or His coming into being; but just as the
prophet calls the Holy Spirit "good," and "right," and "guiding [475] "
(indicating by the word "guiding" the power of control), even so the
apostle ascribes independent authority to the dignity of the Spirit,
when he affirms that He works all in all as He wills [476] . Again, the
Lord makes manifest the Spirit's independent power and operation in His
discourse with Nicodemus, when He says, "The Spirit breatheth where He
willeth [477] ." How is it then that Eunomius goes so far as to define
that He also is one of the things that came into being by the Son,
condemned to eternal subjection. For he describes Him as "once for all
made subject," enthralling the guiding and governing Spirit in I know
not what form of subjection. For this expression of "subjection" has
many significations in Holy Scripture, and is understood and used with
many varieties of meaning. For the Psalmist says that even irrational
nature is put in subjection [478] , and brings under the same term
those who are overcome in war [479] , while the apostle bids servants
to be in subjection to their own masters [480] , and that those who are
placed over the priesthood should have their children in subjection
[481] , as their disorderly conduct brings discredit upon their
fathers, as in the case of the sons of Eli the priest. Again, he speaks
of the subjection of all men to God, when we all, being united to one
another by the faith, become one body of the Lord Who is in all, as the
subjection of the Son to the Father, when the adoration paid to the Son
by all things with one accord, by things in heaven, and things on
earth, and things under the earth, redounds to the glory of the Father;
as Paul says elsewhere, "To Him every knee shall bow, of things in
heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, and every
tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the
Father [482] ." For when this takes place, the mighty wisdom of Paul
affirms that the Son, Who is in all, is subject to the Father by virtue
of the subjection of those in whom He is. What kind of "subjection once
for all" Eunomius asserts of the Holy Spirit, it is thus impossible to
learn from the phrase which he has thrown out,--whether he means the
subjection of irrational creatures, or of captives, or of servants, or
of children who are kept in order, or of those who are saved by
subjection. For the subjection of men to God is salvation for those who
are so made subject, according to the voice of the prophet, who says
that his soul is subject to God, since of Him cometh salvation by
subjection [483] , so that subjection is the means of averting
perdition. As therefore the help of the healing art is sought eagerly
by the sick, so is subjection by those who are in need of salvation.
But of what life does the Holy Spirit, that quickeneth all things,
stand in need, that by subjection He should obtain salvation for
Himself? Since then it is not on the strength of any Divine utterance
that he asserts such an attribute of the Spirit, nor yet is it as a
consequence of probable arguments that he has launched this blasphemy
against the Holy Spirit, it must be plain at all events to sensible men
that he vents his impiety against Him without any warrant whatsoever,
unsupported as it is by any authority from Scripture or by any logical
consequence.
__________________________________________________________________

[451] S. John iv. 24

[452] Cf. Lam. iv. 20 in LXX.

[453] Ps. xcix. 9.

[454] Cf. the response to the words of the Priest at the elevation the
Gifts in the Greek Liturgies.

[455] S. John xiv. 16

[456] Ps. lxxvi. 17.

[457] 2 Cor. i. 3-4.

[458] 1 S. John ii. 1. (The word is in the A.V. rendered "advocate.")

[459] From which is derived the name Paraclete, i.e. Comforter or
Advocate.

[460] 2 Cor. vii. 6.

[461] 2 Cor. v. 20.

[462] The text reads, "that God is called righteousness," but the
argument seems to require the genitive case. The reference may be to
Ps. iv. 1.

[463] S. John xv. 26

[464] With this passage cf. S. John i. 12, iii. 6; Rom. viii. 14; 1 S.
John iii. 3.

[465] S. John xx. 21, and i. 16.

[466] Col. ii. 9.

[467] Is. vi. 1.

[468] S. John xii. 41. The "older tradition" means presumably the
ancient interpretation of the Jews.

[469] Cf. Acts xxviii. 25, 26. The quotation is not verbal.

[470] Cf. Ps. lxxviii. 40.

[471] Heb. iii. 7.

[472] S. John x. 30

[473] Cf. S. John i. 3

[474] Cf. Col. i. 16; but the enumeration varies considerably.

[475] The last of these epithets is from Ps. li. 14 (pneuma
hegemonikon, the "Spiritus principalis" of the Vulgate, the "free
spirit" of the English version); the "right spirit" of ver. 12 being
also applied by S. Gregory to the Holy Spirit, while the epithet "good"
is from Ps. cxlii. 10.

[476] Cf. 1 Cor. xii. 11.

[477] S. John iii. 8

[478] Ps. viii. 7, 8.

[479] Ps. xlvii. 3.

[480] Tit. ii. 9.

[481] 1 Tim. iii. 4.

[482] Cf. Phil. ii. 10, 11, a passage which is apparently considered as
explanatory of 1 Cor. xv. 28.

[483] Cf. Ps. lxii. 1 (LXX.).
__________________________________________________________________

S:15. Lastly he displays at length the folly of Eunomius, who at times
speaks of the Holy Spirit as created, and as the fairest work of the
Son, and at other times confesses, by the operations attributed to Him,
that He is God, and thus ends the book.

He goes on to add, "Neither on the same level with the Father, nor
connumerated with the Father (for God over all is one and only Father),
nor on an equality with the Son, for the Son is only-begotten, having
none begotten with Him." Well, for my own part, if he had only added to
his previous statement the remark that the Holy Ghost is not the Father
of the Son, I should even then have thought it idle for him to linger
over what no one ever doubted, and forbid people to form notions of Him
which not even the most witless would entertain. But since he
endeavours to establish his impiety by irrelevant and unconnected
statements, imagining that by denying the Holy Spirit to be the Father
of the Only-begotten he makes out that He is subject and subordinate, I
therefore made mention of these words, as a proof of the folly of the
man who imagines that he is demonstrating the Spirit to be subject to
the Father on the ground that the Spirit is not Father of the
Only-begotten. For what compels the conclusion, that if He be not
Father, He must be subject? If it had been demonstrated that "Father"
and "despot" were terms identical in meaning, it would no doubt have
followed that, as absolute sovereignty was part of the conception of
the Father, we should affirm that the Spirit is subject to Him Who
surpassed Him in respect of authority. But if by "Father" is implied
merely His relation to the Son, and no conception of absolute
sovereignty or authority is involved by the use of the word, how does
it follow, from the fact that the Spirit is not the Father of the Son,
that the Spirit is subject to the Father? "Nor on an equality with the
Son," he says. How comes he to say this? for to be, and to be
unchangeable, and to admit no evil whatsoever, and to remain
unalterably in that which is good, all this shows no variation in the
case of the Son and of the Spirit. For the incorruptible nature of the
Spirit is remote from corruption equally with that of the Son, and in
the Spirit, just as in the Son, His essential goodness is absolutely
apart from its contrary, and in both alike their perfection in every
good stands in need of no addition.

Now the inspired Scripture teaches us to affirm all these attributes of
the Spirit, when it predicates of the Spirit the terms "good," and
"wise," and "incorruptible," and "immortal," and all such lofty
conceptions and names as are properly applied to Godhead. If then He is
inferior in none of these respects, by what means does Eunomius
determine the inequality of the Son and the Spirit? "For the Son is,"
he tells us, "Only-begotten, having no brother begotten with Him."
Well, the point, that we are not to understand the "Only-begotten" to
have brethren, we have already discussed in our comments upon the
phrase "first-born of all creation [484] ." But we ought not to leave
unexamined the sense that Eunomius now unfairly attaches to the term.
For while the doctrine of the Church declares that in the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Ghost there is one power, and goodness, and essence,
and glory, and the like, saving the difference of the Persons, this
man, when he wishes to make the essence of the Only-begotten common to
the creation, calls Him "the first-born of all creation" in respect of
His pre-temporal existence, declaring by this mode of expression that
all conceivable objects in creation are in brotherhood with the Lord;
for assuredly the first-born is not the first-born of those otherwise
begotten, but of those begotten like Himself [485] . But when he is
bent upon severing the Spirit from union with the Son, he calls Him
"Only-begotten, not having any brother begotten with Him," not with the
object of conceiving of Him as without brethren, but that by the means
of this assertion he may establish touching the Spirit His essential
alienation from the Son. It is true that we learn from Holy Scripture
not to speak of the Holy Ghost as brother of the Son: but that we are
not to say that the Holy Ghost is homogeneous [486] with the Son, is
nowhere shown in the divine Scriptures. For if there does reside in the
Father and the Son a life-giving power, it is ascribed also to the Holy
Spirit, according to the words of the Gospel. If one may discern alike
in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit the properties of being incorruptible,
immutable, of admitting no evil, of being good, right, guiding, of
working all in all as He wills, and all the like attributes, how is it
possible by identity in these respects to infer difference in kind?
Accordingly the word of godliness agrees in affirming that we ought not
to regard any kind of brotherhood as attaching to the Only-begotten;
but to say that the Spirit is not homogeneous with the Son, the upright
with the upright, the good with the good, the life-giving with the
life-giving, this has been clearly demonstrated by logical inference to
be a piece of heretical knavery.

Why then is the majesty of the Spirit curtailed by such arguments as
these? For there is nothing which can be the cause of producing in him
deviation by excess or defect from conceptions such as befit the
Godhead, nor, since all these are by Holy Scripture predicated equally
of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, can he inform us wherein he discerns
inequality to exist. But he launches his blasphemy against the Holy
Ghost in its naked form, ill-prepared and unsupported by any
consecutive argument. "Nor yet ranked," he says, "with any other: for
He has gone above [487] all the creatures that came into being by the
instrumentality of the Son in mode of being, and nature, and glory, and
knowledge, as the first and noblest work of the Only-begotten, the
greatest and most glorious." I will leave, however, to others the task
of ridiculing the bad taste and surplusage of his style, thinking as I
do that it is unseemly for the gray hairs of age, when dealing with the
argument before us, to make vulgarity of expression an objection
against one who is guilty of impiety. I will just add to my
investigation this remark. If the Spirit has "gone above" all the
creations of the Son, (for I will use his own ungrammatical and
senseless phrase, or rather, to make things clearer, I will present his
idea in my own language) if he transcends all things wrought by the
Son, the Holy Spirit cannot be ranked with the rest of the creation;
and if, as Eunomius says, he surpasses them by virtue of priority of
birth, he must needs confess, in the case of the rest of creation, that
the objects which are first in order of production are more to be
esteemed than those which come after them. Now the creation of the
irrational animals was prior to that of man. Accordingly he will of
course declare that the irrational nature is more honourable than
rational existence. So too, according to the argument of Eunomius, Cain
will be proved superior to Abel, in that he was before him in time of
birth, and so the stars will be shown to be lower and of less
excellence than all the things that grow out of the earth; for these
last sprang from the earth on the third day, and all the stars are
recorded by Moses to have been created on the fourth. Well, surely no
one is such a simpleton as to infer that the grass of the earth is more
to be esteemed than the marvels of the sky, on the ground of its
precedence in time, or to award the meed to Cain over Abel, or to place
below the irrational animals man who came into being later than they.
So there is no sense in our author's contention that the nature of the
Holy Spirit is superior to that of the creatures that came into being
subsequently, on the ground that He came into being before they did.
And now let us see what he who separates Him from fellowship with the
Son is prepared to concede to the glory of the Spirit: "For he too," he
says, "being one, and first and alone, and surpassing all the creations
of the Son in essence and dignity of nature, accomplishing every
operation and all teaching according to the good pleasure of the Son,
being sent by Him, and receiving from Him, and declaring to those who
are instructed, and guiding into truth." He speaks of the Holy Ghost as
"accomplishing every operation and all teaching." What operation? Does
he mean that which the Father and the Son execute, according to the
word of the Lord Himself Who "hitherto worketh [488] " man's salvation,
or does he mean some other? For if His work is that named, He has
assuredly the same power and nature as Him Who works it, and in such an
one difference of kind from Deity can have no place. For just as, if
anything should perform the functions of fire, shining and warming in
precisely the same way, it is itself certainly fire, so if the Spirit
does the works of the Father, He must assuredly be acknowledged to be
of the same nature with Him. If on the other hand He operates something
else than our salvation, and displays His operation in a contrary
direction, He will thereby be proved to be of a different nature and
essence. But Eunomius' statement itself bears witness that the Spirit
quickeneth in like manner with the Father and the Son. Accordingly,
from the identity of operations it results assuredly that the Spirit is
not alien from the nature of the Father and the Son. And to the
statement that the Spirit accomplishes the operation and teaching of
the Father according to the good pleasure of the Son we assent. For the
community of nature gives us warrant that the will of the Father, of
the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is one, and thus, if the Holy Spirit
wills that which seems good to the Son, the community of will clearly
points to unity of essence. But he goes on, "being sent by Him, and
receiving from Him, and declaring to those who are instructed, and
guiding into truth." If he had not previously said what he has
concerning the Spirit, the reader would surely have supposed that these
words applied to some human teacher. For to receive a mission is the
same thing as to be sent, and to have nothing of one's own, but to
receive of the free favour of him who gives the mission, and to
minister his words to those who are under instruction, and to be a
guide into truth for those that are astray. All these things, which
Eunomius is good enough to allow to the Holy Spirit, belong to the
present pastors and teachers of the Church,--to be sent, to receive, to
announce, to teach, to suggest the truth. Now, as he had said above "He
is one, and first, and alone, and surpassing all," had he but stopped
there, he would have appeared as a defender of the doctrines of truth.
For He Who is indivisibly contemplated in the One is most truly One,
and first Who is in the First, and alone Who is in the Only One. For as
the spirit of man that is in him, and the man himself, are but one man,
so also the Spirit of God which is in Him, and God Himself, would
properly be termed One God, and First and Only, being incapable of
separation from Him in Whom He is. But as things are, with his addition
of his profane phrase, "surpassing all the creatures of the Son," he
produces turbid confusion by assigning to Him Who "breatheth where He
willeth [489] ," and "worketh all in all [490] ," a mere superiority in
comparison with the rest of created things.

Let us now see further what he adds to this "sanctifying the saints."
If any one says this also of the Father and of the Son, he will speak
truly. For those in whom the Holy One dwells, He makes holy, even as
the Good One makes men good. And the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Ghost are holy and good, as has been shown. "Acting as a guide to those
who approach the mystery." This may well be said of Apollos who watered
what Paul planted. For the Apostle plants by his guidance [491] , and
Apollos, when he baptizes, waters by Sacramental regeneration, bringing
to the mystery those who were instructed by Paul. Thus he places on a
level with Apollos that Spirit Who perfects men through baptism.
"Distributing every gift." With this we too agree; for everything that
is good is a portion of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. "Co-operating
with the faithful for the understanding and contemplation of things
appointed." As he does not add by whom they are appointed, he leaves
his meaning doubtful, whether it is correct or the reverse. But we will
by a slight addition advance his statement so as to make it consistent
with godliness. For since, whether it be the word of wisdom, or the
word of knowledge, or faith, or help, or government, or aught else that
is enumerated in the lists of saving gifts, "all these worketh that one
and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as He will
[492] ," we therefore do not reject the statement of Eunomius when he
says that the Spirit "co-operates with the faithful for understanding
and contemplation of things appointed" by Him, because by Him all good
teachings are appointed for us. "Sounding an accompaniment to those who
pray." It would be foolish seriously to examine the meaning of this
expression, of which the ludicrous and meaningless character is at once
manifest to all. For who is so demented and beside himself as to wait
for us to tell him that the Holy Spirit is not a bell nor an empty cask
sounding an accompaniment and made to ring by the voice of him who
prays as it were by a blow? "Leading us to that which is expedient for
us." This the Father and the Son likewise do: for "He leadeth Joseph
like a sheep [493] ," and, "led His people like sheep [494] ," and,
"the good Spirit leadeth us in a land of righteousness [495] ."
"Strengthening us to godliness." To strengthen man to godliness David
says is the work of God; "For Thou art my strength and my refuge [496]
," says the Psalmist, and "the Lord is the strength of His people [497]
," and, "He shall give strength and power unto His people [498] ." If
then the expressions of Eunomius are meant in accordance with the mind
of the Psalmist, they are a testimony to the Divinity of the Holy
Ghost: but if they are opposed to the word of prophecy, then by this
very fact a charge of blasphemy lies against Eunomius, because he sets
up his own opinions in opposition to the holy prophets. Next he says,
"Lightening souls with the light of knowledge." This grace also the
doctrine of godliness ascribes alike to the Father, to the Son, and to
the Holy Ghost. For He is called a light by David [499] , and from
thence the light of knowledge shines in them who are enlightened. In
like manner also the cleansing of our thoughts of which the statement
speaks is proper to the power of the Lord. For it was "the brightness
of the Father's glory, and the express image of His person," Who
"purged our sins [500] ." Again, to banish devils, which Eunomius says
is a property of the Spirit, this also the only-begotten God, Who said
to the devil, "I charge thee [501] ," ascribes to the power of the
Spirit, when He says, "If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils [502]
," so that the expulsion of devils is not destructive of the glory of
the Spirit, but rather a demonstration of His divine and transcendent
power. "Healing the sick," he says, "curing the infirm, comforting the
afflicted, raising up those who stumble, recovering the distressed."
These are the words of those who think reverently of the Holy Ghost,
for no one would ascribe the operation of any one of these effects to
any one except to God. If then heresy affirms that those things which
it belongs to none save God alone to effect, are wrought by the power
of the Spirit, we have in support of the truths for which we are
contending the witness even of our adversaries. How does the Psalmist
seek his healing from God, saying, "Have mercy upon me, O Lord, for I
am weak; O Lord, heal me, for my bones are vexed [503] !" It is to God
that Isaiah says, "The dew that is from Thee is healing unto them [504]
." Again, prophetic language attests that the conversion of those in
error is the work of God. For "they went astray in the wilderness in a
thirsty land," says the Psalmist, and he adds, "So He led them forth by
the right way, that they might go to the city where they dwelt [505] :"
and, "when the Lord turned again the captivity of Sion [506] ." In like
manner also the comfort of the afflicted is ascribed to God, Paul thus
speaking, "Blessed be God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,
Who comforteth us in all our tribulation [507] ." Again, the Psalmist
says, speaking in the person of God, "Thou calledst upon Me in trouble
and I delivered thee [508] ." And the setting upright of those who
stumble is innumerable times ascribed by Scripture to the power of the
Lord: "Thou hast thrust sore at me that I might fall, but the Lord was
my help [509] ," and "Though he fall, he shall not be cast away, for
the Lord upholdeth him with His hand [510] ," and "The Lord helpeth
them that are fallen [511] ." And to the loving-kindness of God
confessedly belongs the recovery of the distressed, if Eunomius means
the same thing of which we learn in prophecy, as the Scripture says,
"Thou laidest trouble upon our loins; Thou sufferedst men to ride over
our heads; we went through fire and water, and Thou broughtest us out
into a wealthy place [512] ."

Thus far then the majesty of the Spirit is demonstrated by the evidence
of our opponents, but in what follows the limpid waters of devotion are
once more defiled by the mud of heresy. For he says of the Spirit that
He "cheers on those who are contending": and this phrase involves him
in the charge of extreme folly and impiety. For in the stadium some
have the task of arranging the competitions between those who intend to
show their athletic vigour; others, who surpass the rest in strength
and skill, strive for the victory and strip to contend with one
another, while the rest, taking sides in their good wishes with one or
other of the competitors, according as they are severally disposed
towards or interested in one athlete or another, cheer him on at the
time of the engagement, and bid him guard against some hurt, or
remember some trick of wrestling, or keep himself unthrown by the help
of his art. Take note from what has been said to how low a rank
Eunomius degrades the Holy Spirit. For while on the course there are
some who arrange the contests, and others who settle whether the
contest is conducted according to rule, others who are actually
engaged, and yet others who cheer on the competitors, who are
acknowledged to be far inferior to the athletes themselves, Eunomius
considers the Holy Spirit as one of the mob who look on, or as one of
those who attend upon the athletes, seeing that He neither determines
the contest nor awards the victory, nor contends with the adversary,
but merely cheers without contributing at all to the victory. For He
neither joins in the fray, nor does He implant the power to contend,
but merely wishes that the athlete in whom He is interested may not
come off second in the strife. And so Paul wrestles "against
principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of
this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places [513] ," while
the Spirit of power does not strengthen the combatants nor distribute
to them His gifts, "dividing to every man severally as He will [514] ,"
but His influence is limited to cheering on those who are engaged.

Again he says, "Emboldening the faint-hearted." And here, while in
accordance with his own method he follows his previous blasphemy
against the Spirit, the truth for all that manifests itself, even
through unfriendly lips. For to none other than to God does it belong
to implant courage in the fearful, saying to the faint-hearted, "Fear
not, for I am with thee, be not dismayed [515] ," as says the Psalmist,
"Yea though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death I will
fear no evil, for Thou art with me [516] ." Nay, the Lord Himself says
to the fearful,--"Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be
afraid [517] ," and, "Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith [518] ?"
and, "Be of good cheer, it is I, be not afraid [519] ," and again, "Be
of good cheer: I have overcome the world [520] ." Accordingly, even
though this may not have been the intention of Eunomius, orthodoxy
asserts itself by means even of the voice of an enemy. And the next
sentence agrees with that which went before:--"Caring for all, and
showing all concern and forethought." For in fact it belongs to God
alone to care and to take thought for all, as the mighty David has
expressed it, "I am poor and needy, but the Lord careth for me [521] ."
And if what remains seems to be resolved into empty words, with sound
and without sense, let no one find fault, seeing that in most of what
he says, so far as any sane meaning is concerned, he is feeble and
untutored. For what on earth he means when he says, "for the onward
leading of the better disposed and the guardianship of the more
faithful," neither he himself, nor they who senselessly admire his
follies, could possibly tell us.
__________________________________________________________________

[484] See above, S:8 of this book.

[485] Or, "not the first-born of beings of a different race, but of
those of his own stock."

[486] homogene, "of the same stock": the word being the same which
(when coupled with adelphon) has been translated, in the passages
preceding, by "begotten with."

[487] anabebeke: the word apparently is intended by Eunomius to have
the force of "transcended"; Gregory, later on, criticizes its
employment in this sense.

[488] S. John v. 17

[489] S. John iii. 8

[490] 1 Cor. xii. 6.

[491] If we read katechseos for the kathegeseos of Oehler's text we
have a clearer sense, "the Apostle plants by his instruction."

[492] 1 Cor. xii. 11.

[493] Ps. lxxx. 1.

[494] Ps. lxxvii. 20.

[495] Cf. Ps. cxliii. 10.

[496] Cf. Ps. xxxi. 3

[497] Ps. xxviii. 8.

[498] Ps. lxviii. 35.

[499] Ps. xxvii. 1.

[500] Heb. i. 3.

[501] Cf. S. Mark ix. 25

[502] S. Matt. xii. 28.

[503] Ps. vi. 3.

[504] Is. xxvi. 19 (LXX.).

[505] Ps. cviii. 4-7.

[506] Ps. cxxvi. 1.

[507] 2 Cor. i. 3, 4.

[508] Ps. lxxxi. 17.

[509] Ps. cxviii. 13.

[510] Ps. xxxvii. 24.

[511] Ps. cxlvi. 8.

[512] Ps. lxvi. 10, 11.

[513] Eph. vi. 12.

[514] 1 Cor. xii. 11.

[515] Is. xli. 10.

[516] Ps. xxiii. 4.

[517] S. John xiv. 27

[518] S. Matt. viii. 26.

[519] S. Mark vi. 50

[520] S. John xvi. 33

[521] Ps. xl. 20.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

Book III.

S:1. This third book shows a third fall of Eunomius, as refuting
himself, and sometimes saying that the Son is to be called
Only-begotten in virtue of natural generation, and that Holy Scripture
proves this from the first; at other times, that by reason of His being
created He should not be called a Son, but a "product," or "creature."

If, when a man "strives lawfully [522] ," he finds a limit to his
struggle in the contest by his adversary's either refusing the
struggle, and withdrawing of his own accord in favour of his conqueror
from his effort for victory, or being thrown according to the rules of
wrestling in three falls (whereby the glory of the crown is bestowed
with all the splendour of proclamation upon him who has proved
victorious in the umpire's judgment), then, since Eunomius, though he
has been already twice thrown in our previous arguments, does not
consent that truth should hold the tokens of her victory over
falsehood, but yet a third time raises the dust against godly doctrine
in his accustomed arena of falsehood with his composition,
strengthening himself for his struggle on the side of deceit, our
statement of truth must also be now called forth to put his falsehood
to rout, placing its hopes in Him Who is the Giver and the Judge of
victory, and at the same time deriving strength from the very
unfairness of the adversaries' tricks of wrestling. For we are not
ashamed to confess that we have prepared for our contest no weapon of
argument sharpened by rhetoric, that we can bring forward to aid us in
the fight with those arrayed against us, no cleverness or sharpness of
dialectic, such as with inexperienced judges lays even on truth the
suspicion of falsehood. One strength our reasoning against falsehood
has--first the very Word Himself, Who is the might of our word, [523]
and in the next place the rottenness of the arguments set against us,
which is overthrown and falls by its own spontaneous action. Now in
order that it may be made as clear as possible to all men, that the
very efforts of Eunomius serve as means for his own overthrow to those
who contend with him, I will set forth to my readers his phantom
doctrine (for so I think that doctrine may be called which is quite
outside the truth), and I would have you all, who are present at our
struggle, and watch the encounter now taking place between my doctrine
and that which is matched with it, to be just judges of the lawful
striving of our arguments, that by your just award the reasoning of
godliness may be proclaimed as victor to the whole theatre of the
Church, having won undisputed victory over ungodliness, and being
decorated, in virtue of the three falls of its enemy, with the unfading
crown of them that are saved. Now this statement is set forth against
the truth by way of preface to his third discourse, and this is the
fashion of it:--"Preserving," he says, "natural order, and abiding by
those things which are known to us from above, we do not refuse to
speak of the Son, seeing He is begotten, even by the name of `product
of generation [524] ,' since the generated essence and [525] the
appellation of Son make such a relation of words appropriate." I beg
the reader to give his attention carefully to this point, that while he
calls God both "begotten" and "Son," he refers the reason of such names
to "natural order," and calls to witness to this conception the
knowledge possessed from above: so that if anything should be found in
the course of what follows contrary to the positions he has laid down,
it is clear to all that he is overthrown by himself, refuted by his own
arguments before ours are brought against him. And so let us consider
his statement in the light of his own words. He confesses that the name
of "Son" would by no means be properly applied to the Only-begotten
God, did not "natural order," as he says, confirm the appellation. If,
then, one were to withdraw the order of nature from the consideration
of the designation of "Son," his use of this name, being deprived of
its proper and natural significance, will be meaningless. And moreover
the fact that he says these statements are confirmed, in that they
abide by the knowledge possessed from above, is a strong additional
support to the orthodox view touching the designation of "Son," seeing
that the inspired teaching of the Scriptures, which comes to us from
above, confirms our argument on these matters. If these things are so,
and this is a standard of truth that admits of no deception, that these
two concur--the "natural order," as he says, and the testimony of the
knowledge given from above confirming the natural interpretation--it is
clear, that to assert anything contrary to these, is nothing else than
manifestly to fight against the truth itself. Let us hear again what
this writer, who makes nature his instructor in the matter of this
name, and says that he abides by the knowledge given to us from above
by the instruction of the saints, sets out at length a little further
on, after the passage I have just quoted. For I will pretermit for the
time the continuous recital of what is set next in order in his
treatise, that the contradiction in what he has written may not escape
detection, being veiled by the reading of the intervening matter. "The
same argument," he says, "will apply also in the case of what is made
and created, as both the natural interpretation and the mutual relation
of the things, and also the use of the saints, give us free authority
for the use of the formula: wherefore one would not be wrong in
treating the thing made as corresponding to the maker, and the thing
created to the creator." Of what product of making or of creation does
he speak, as having naturally the relation expressed in its name
towards its maker and creator? If of those we contemplate in the
creation, visible and invisible (as Paul recounts, when he says that by
Him all things were created, visible and invisible) [526] , so that
this relative conjunction of names has a proper and special
application, that which is made being set in relation to the maker,
that which is created to the creator,--if this is his meaning, we agree
with him. For in fact, since the Lord is the Maker of angels, the angel
is assuredly a thing made by Him that made him: and since the Lord is
the Creator of the world, clearly the world itself and all that is
therein are called the creature of Him that created them. If however it
is with this intention that he makes his interpretation of "natural
order," systematizing the appropriation of relative terms with a view
to their mutual relation in verbal sense, even thus it would be an
extraordinary thing, seeing that every one is aware of this, that he
should leave his doctrinal statement to draw out for us a system of
grammatical trivialities [527] . But if it is to the Only-begotten God
that he applies such phrases, so as to say that He is a thing made by
Him that made Him, a creature of Him that created Him, and to refer
this terminology to "the use of the saints," let him first of all show
us in his statement what saints he says there are who declared the
Maker of all things to be a product and a creature, and whom he follows
in this audacity of phrase. The Church knows as saints those whose
hearts were divinely guided by the Holy Spirit,--patriarchs, lawgivers,
prophets, evangelists, apostles. If any among these is found to declare
in his inspired words that God over all, Who "upholds all things with
the word of His power," and grasps with His hand all things that are,
and by Himself called the universe into being by the mere act of His
will, is a thing created and a product, he will stand excused, as
following, as he says, the "use of the saints [528] " in proceeding to
formulate such doctrines. But if the knowledge of the Holy Scriptures
is freely placed within the reach of all, and nothing is forbidden to
or hidden from any of those who choose to share in the divine
instruction, how comes it that he endeavours to lead his hearers astray
by his misrepresentation of the Scriptures, referring the term
"creature," applied to the Only-begotten, to "the use of the saints"?
For that by Him all things were made, you may hear almost from the
whole of their holy utterance, from Moses and the prophets and apostles
who come after him, whose particular expressions it would be tedious
here to set forth. Enough for our purpose, with the others, and above
the others, is the sublime John, where in the preface to his discourse
on the Divinity of the Only-begotten he proclaims aloud the fact that
there is none of the things that were made which was not made through
Him [529] , a fact which is an incontestable and positive proof of His
being Lord of the creation, not reckoned in the list of created things.
For if all things that are made exist by no other but by Him (and John
bears witness that nothing among the things that are, throughout the
creation, was made without Him), who is so blinded in understanding as
not to see in the Evangelist's proclamation the truth, that He Who made
all the creation is assuredly something else besides the creation? For
if all that is numbered among the things that were made has its being
through Him, while He Himself is "in the beginning," and is "with God,"
being God, and Word, and Life, and Light, and express Image, and
Brightness, and if none of the things that were made throughout
creation is named by the same names--(not Word, not God, not Life, not
Light, not Truth, not express Image, not Brightness, not any of the
other names proper to the Deity is to be found employed of the
creation)--then it is clear that He Who is these things is by nature
something else besides the creation, which neither is nor is called any
of these things. If, indeed, there existed in such phrases an identity
of names between the creation and its Maker, he might perhaps be
excused for making the name of "creation" also common to the thing
created and to Him Who made it, on the ground of the community of the
other names: but if the characteristics which are contemplated by means
of the names, in the created and in the uncreated nature, are in no
case reconcilable or common to both, how can the misrepresentation of
that man fail to be manifest to all, who dares to apply the name of
servitude to Him Who, as the Psalmist declares, "ruleth with His power
for ever [530] ," and to bring Him Who, as the Apostle says, "in all
things hath the pre-eminence [531] ," to a level with the servile
nature, by means of the name and conception of "creation"? For that all
[532] the creation is in bondage the great Paul declares [533] ,-- he
who in the schools above the heavens was instructed in that knowledge
which may not be spoken, learning these things in that place where
every voice that conveys meaning by verbal utterance is still, and
where unspoken meditation becomes the word of instruction, teaching to
the purified heart by means of the silent illumination of the thoughts
those truths which transcend speech. If then on the one hand Paul
proclaims aloud "the creation is in bondage," and on the other the
Only-begotten God is truly Lord and God over all, and John bears
witness to the fact that the whole creation of the things that were
made is by Him, how can any one, who is in any sense whatever numbered
among Christians, hold his peace when he sees Eunomius, by his
inconsistent and inconsequent systematizing, degrading to the humble
state of the creature, by means of an identity of name that tends to
servitude, that power of Lordship which surpasses all rule and all
authority? And if he says that he has some of the saints who declared
Him to be a slave, or created, or made, or any of these lowly and
servile names, lo, here are the Scriptures. Let him, or some other on
his behalf, produce to us one such phrase, and we will hold our peace.
But if there is no such phrase (and there could never be found in those
inspired Scriptures which we believe any such thought as to support
this impiety), what need is there to strive further upon points
admitted with one who not only misrepresents the words of the saints,
but even contends against his own definitions? For if the "order of
nature," as he himself admits, bears additional testimony to the Son's
name by reason of His being begotten, and thus the correspondence of
the name is according to the relation of the Begotten to the Begetter,
how comes it that he wrests the significance of the word "Son" from its
natural application, and changes the relation to "the thing made and
its maker"--a relation which applies not only in the case of the
elements of the universe, but might also be asserted of a gnat or an
ant--that in so far as each of these is a thing made, the relation of
its name to its maker is similarly equivalent? The blasphemous nature
of his doctrine is clear, not only from many other passages, but even
from those quoted: and as for that "use of the saints" which he alleges
that he follows in these expressions, it is clear that there is no such
use at all.
__________________________________________________________________

[522] 2 Tim. ii. 5.

[523] The earlier editions here omit a long passage, which Oehler
restores.

[524] gennema.

[525] Inserting kai, which does not appear here in Oehler's text, but
is found in later quotations of the same passage: autes is also found
in the later citations.

[526] Cf. Col. i. 16

[527] Oehler's punctuation here seems to admit of alteration.

[528] Reading te chresei ton hagion for te krisei ton hagion, the
reading of Oehler: the words are apparently a quotation from Eunomius,
from whom the phrase chresis ton hagion has already been cited.

[529] Cf. S. John i. 3

[530] Ps. lxvi. 6 (LXX.).

[531] Col. i. 18.

[532] Substituting pasan for the pasin of Oehler's text.

[533] Rom. viii. 21.
__________________________________________________________________

S:2. He then once more excellently, appropriately, and clearly examines
and expounds the passage, "The Lord Created Me."

Perhaps that passage in the Proverbs might be brought forward against
us which the champions of heresy are wont to cite as a testimony that
the Lord was created--the passage, "The Lord created me in the
beginning of His ways, for His works [534] ." For because these words
are spoken by Wisdom, and the Lord is called Wisdom by the great Paul
[535] , they allege this passage as though the Only-begotten God
Himself, under the name of Wisdom, acknowledges that He was created by
the Maker of all things. I imagine, however, that the godly sense of
this utterance is clear to moderately attentive and painstaking
persons, so that, in the case of those who are instructed in the dark
sayings of the Proverbs, no injury is done to the doctrine of the
faith. Yet I think it well briefly to discuss what is to be said on
this subject, that when the intention of this passage is more clearly
explained, the heretical doctrine may have no room for boldness of
speech on the ground that it has evidence in the writing of the
inspired author. It is universally admitted that the name of "proverb,"
in its scriptural use, is not applied with regard to the evident sense,
but is used with a view to some hidden meaning, as the Gospel thus
gives the name of "proverbs [536] " to dark and obscure sayings; so
that the "proverb," if one were to set forth the interpretation of the
name by a definition, is a form of speech which, by means of one set of
ideas immediately presented, points to something else which is hidden,
or a form of speech which does not point out the aim of the thought
directly, but gives its instruction by an indirect signification. Now
to this book such a name is especially attached as a title, and the
force of the appellation is at once interpreted in the preface by the
wise Solomon. For he does not call the sayings in this book "maxims,"
or "counsels," or "clear instruction," but "proverbs," and proceeds to
add an explanation. What is the force of the signification of this
word? "To know," he tells us, "wisdom and instruction [537] "; not
setting before us the course of instruction in wisdom according to the
method common in other kinds of learning; he bids a man, on the other
hand [538] , first to become wise by previous training, and then so to
receive the instruction conveyed by proverb. For he tells us that there
are "words of wisdom" which reveal their aim "by a turn [539] ." For
that which is not directly understood needs some turn for the
apprehension of the thing concealed; and as Paul, when about to
exchange the literal sense of the history for figurative contemplation,
says that he will "change his voice [540] ," so here the manifestation
of the hidden meaning is called by Solomon a "turn of the saying," as
if the beauty of the thoughts could not be perceived, unless one were
to obtain a view of the revealed brightness of the thought by turning
the apparent meaning of the saying round about, as happens with the
plumage with which the peacock is decked behind. For in him, one who
sees the back of his plumage quite despises it for its want of beauty
and tint, as a mean sight; but if one were to turn it round and show
him the other view of it, he then sees the varied painting of nature,
the half-circle shining in the midst with its dye of purple, and the
golden mist round the circle ringed round and glistening at its edge
with its many rainbow hues. Since then there is no beauty in what is
obvious in the saying (for "all the glory of the king's daughter is
within [541] ," shining with its hidden ornament in golden thoughts),
Solomon of necessity suggests to the readers of this book "the turn of
the saying," that thereby they may "understand a parable and a dark
saying, words of the wise and riddles [542] ." Now as this proverbial
teaching embraces these elements, a reasonable man will not receive any
passage cited from this book, be it never so clear and intelligible at
first sight, without examination and inspection; for assuredly there is
some mystical contemplation underlying even those passages which seem
manifest. And if the obvious passages of the work necessarily demand a
somewhat minute scrutiny, how much more do those passages require it
where even immediate apprehension presents to us much that is obscure
and difficult?

Let us then begin our examination from the context of the passage in
question, and see whether the reading of the neighbouring clauses gives
any clear sense. The discourse describes Wisdom as uttering certain
sayings in her own person. Every student knows what is said in the
passage [543] where Wisdom makes counsel her dwelling-place, and calls
to her knowledge and understanding, and says that she has as a
possession strength and prudence (while she is herself called
intelligence), and that she walks in the ways of righteousness and has
her conversation in the ways of just judgment, and declares that by her
kings reign, and princes write the decree of equity, and monarchs win
possession of their own land. Now every one will see that the
considerate reader will receive none of the phrases quoted without
scrutiny according to the obvious sense. For if by her kings are
advanced to their rule, and if from her monarchy derives its strength,
it follows of necessity that Wisdom is displayed to us as a king-maker,
and transfers to herself the blame of those who bear evil rule in their
kingdoms. But we know of kings who in truth advance under the guidance
of Wisdom to the rule that has no end--the poor in spirit, whose
possession is the kingdom of heaven [544] , as the Lord promises, Who
is the Wisdom of the Gospel: and such also we recognize as the princes
who bear rule over their passions, who are not enslaved by the dominion
of sin, who inscribe the decree of equity upon their own life, as it
were upon a tablet. Thus, too, that laudable despotism which changes,
by the alliance of Wisdom, the democracy of the passions into the
monarchy of reason, brings into bondage what were running unrestrained
into mischievous liberty, I mean all carnal and earthly thoughts: for
"the flesh lusteth against the Spirit [545] ," and rebels against the
government of the soul. Of this land, then, such a monarch wins
possession, whereof he was, according to the first creation, appointed
as ruler by the Word.

Seeing then that all reasonable men admit that these expressions are to
be read in such a sense as this, rather than in that which appears in
the words at first sight, it is consequently probable that the phrase
we are discussing, being written in close connection with them, is not
received by prudent men absolutely and without examination. "If I
declare to you," she says, "the things that happen day by day, I will
remember to recount the things from everlasting: the Lord created me
[546] ." What, pray, has the slave of the literal text, who sits
listening closely to the sound of the syllables, like the Jews, to say
to this phrase? Does not the conjunction, "If I declare to you the
things that happen day by day, the Lord created me," ring strangely in
the ears of those who listen attentively? as though, if she did not
declare the things that happen day by day, she will by consequence deny
absolutely that she was created. For he who says, "If I declare, I was
created," leaves you by his silence to understand, "I was not created,
if I do not declare." "The Lord created me," she says, "in the
beginning of His ways, for His works. He set me up from everlasting, in
the beginning, before He made the earth, before He made the depths,
before the springs of the waters came forth, before the mountains were
settled, before all hills, He begetteth me [547] ." What new order of
the formation of a creature is this? First it is created, and after
that it is set up, and then it is begotten. "The Lord made," she says,
"lands, even uninhabited, and the inhabited extremes of the earth under
heaven [548] ." Of what Lord does she speak as the maker of land both
uninhabited and inhabited? Of Him surely, who made wisdom. For both the
one saying and the other are uttered by the same person; both that
which says, "the Lord created me," and that which adds, "the Lord made
land, even uninhabited." Thus the Lord will be the maker equally of
both, of Wisdom herself, and of the inhabited and uninhabited land.
What then are we to make of the saying, "All things were made by Him,
and without Him was not anything made [549] "? For if one and the same
Lord creates both Wisdom (which they advise us to understand of the
Son), and also the particular things which are included in the
Creation, how does the sublime John speak truly, when he says that all
things were made by Him? For this Scripture gives a contrary sound to
that of the Gospel, in ascribing to the Creator of Wisdom the making of
land uninhabited and inhabited. So, too, with all that follows [550]
:--she speaks of a Throne of God set apart upon the winds, and says
that the clouds above are made strong, and the fountains under the
heaven sure; and the context contains many similar expressions,
demanding in a marked degree that interpretation by a minute and
clear-sighted intelligence, which is to be observed in the passages
already quoted. What is the throne that is set apart upon the winds?
What is the security of the fountains under the heaven? How are the
clouds above made strong? If any one should interpret the passage with
reference to visible objects [551] , he will find that the facts are at
considerable variance with the words. For who knows not that the
extreme parts of the earth under heaven, by excess in one direction or
in the other, either by being too close to the sun's heat, or by being
too far removed from it, are uninhabitable; some being excessively dry
and parched, other parts superabounding in moisture, and chilled by
frost, and that only so much is inhabited as is equally removed from
the extreme of each of the two opposite conditions? But if it is the
midst of the earth that is occupied by man, how does the proverb say
that the extremes of the earth under heaven are inhabited? Again, what
strength could one perceive in the clouds, that that passage may have a
true sense, according to its apparent intention, which says that the
clouds above have been made strong? For the nature of cloud is a sort
of rather slight vapour diffused through the air, which, being light,
by reason of its great subtilty, is borne on the breath of the air,
and, when forced together by compression, falls down through the air
that held it up, in the form of a heavy drop of rain. What then is the
strength in these, which offer no resistance to the touch? For in the
cloud you may discern the slight and easily dissolved character of air.
Again, how is the Divine throne set apart on the winds that are by
nature unstable? And as for her saying at first that she is "created,"
finally, that she is "begotten," and between these two utterances that
she is "set up," what account of this could any one profess to give
that would agree with the common and obvious sense? The point also on
which a doubt was previously raised in our argument, the declaring,
that is, of the things that happen day by day, and the remembering to
recount the things from everlasting, is, as it were, a condition of
Wisdom's assertion that she was created by God.

Thus, since it has been clearly shown by what has been said, that no
part of this passage is such that its language should be received
without examination and reflection, it may be well, perhaps, as with
the rest, so not to interpret the text, "The Lord created me,"
according to that sense which immediately presents itself to us from
the phrase, but to seek with all attention and care what is to be
piously understood from the utterance. Now, to apprehend perfectly the
sense of the passage before us, would seem to belong only to those who
search out the depths by the aid of the Holy Spirit, and know how to
speak in the Spirit the divine mysteries: our account, however, will
only busy itself with the passage in question so far as not to leave
its drift entirely unconsidered. What, then, is our account? It is not,
I think, possible that that wisdom which arises in any man from divine
illumination should come alone, apart from the other gifts of the
Spirit, but there must needs enter in therewith also the grace of
prophecy. For if the apprehension of the truth of the things that are
is the peculiar power of wisdom, and prophecy includes the clear
knowledge of the things that are about to be, one would not be
possessed of the gift of wisdom in perfection, if he did not further
include in his knowledge, by the aid of prophecy, the future likewise.
Now, since it is not mere human wisdom that is claimed for himself by
Solomon, who says, "God hath taught me wisdom [552] ," and who, where
he says "all my words are spoken from God [553] ," refers to God all
that is spoken by himself, it might be well in this part of the
Proverbs to trace out the prophecy that is mingled with his wisdom. But
we say that in the earlier part of the book, where he says that "Wisdom
has builded herself a house [554] ," he refers darkly in these words to
the preparation of the flesh of the Lord: for the trite Wisdom did not
dwell in another's building, but built for Itself that dwelling-place
from the body of the Virgin. Here, however, he adds to his discourse
[555] that which of both is made one--of the house, I mean, and of the
Wisdom which built the house, that is to say, of the Humanity and of
the Divinity that was commingled with man [556] ; and to each of these
he applies suitable and fitting terms, as you may see to be the case
also in the Gospels, where the discourse, proceeding as befits its
subject, employs the more lofty and divine phraseology to indicate the
Godhead, and that which is humble and lowly to indicate the Manhood. So
we may see in this passage also Solomon prophetically moved, and
delivering to us in its fulness the mystery of the Incarnation [557] .
For we speak first of the eternal power and energy of Wisdom; and here
the evangelist, to a certain extent, agrees with him in his very words.
For as the latter in his comprehensive [558] phrase proclaimed Him to
be the cause and Maker of all things, so Solomon says that by Him were
made those individual things which are included in the whole. For he
tells us that God by Wisdom established the earth, and in understanding
prepared the heavens, and all that follows these in order, keeping to
the same sense: and that he might not seem to pass over without mention
the gift of excellence in men, he again goes on to say, speaking in the
person of Wisdom, the words we mentioned a little earlier; I mean, "I
made counsel my dwelling-place, and knowledge, and understanding [559]
," and all that relates to instruction in intellect and knowledge.

After recounting these and the like matters, he proceeds to introduce
also his teaching concerning the dispensation with regard to man, why
the Word was made flesh. For seeing that it is clear to all that God
Who is over all has in Himself nothing as a thing created or imported,
not power nor wisdom, nor light, nor word, nor life, nor truth, nor any
at all of those things which are contemplated in the fulness of the
Divine bosom (all which things the Only-begotten God is, Who is in the
bosom of the Father [560] , the name of "creation" could not properly
be applied to any of those things which are contemplated in God, so
that the Son Who is in the Father, or the Word Who is in the Beginning,
or the Light Who is in the Light, or the Life Who is in the Life, or
the Wisdom Who is in the Wisdom, should say, "the Lord created me." For
if the Wisdom of God is created (and Christ is the Power of God and the
Wisdom of God [561] ), God, it would follow, has His Wisdom as a thing
imported, receiving afterwards, as the result of making, something
which He had not at first. But surely He Who is in the bosom of the
Father does not permit us to conceive the bosom of the Father as ever
void of Himself. He Who is in the beginning is surely not of the things
which come to be in that bosom from without, but being the fulness of
all good, He is conceived as being always in the Father, not waiting to
arise in Him as the result of creation, so that the Father should not
be conceived as at any time void of good, but He Who is conceived as
being in the eternity of the Father's Godhead is always in Him, being
Power, and Life, and Truth, and Wisdom, and the like. Accordingly the
words "created me" do not proceed from the Divine and immortal nature,
but from that which was commingled with it in the Incarnation from our
created nature. How comes it then that the same, called wisdom, and
understanding, and intelligence, establishes the earth, and prepares
the heavens, and breaks up the deeps, and yet is here "created for the
beginning of His works [562] "? Such a dispensation, he tells us, is
not set forward without great cause. But since men, after receiving the
commandment of the things we should observe, cast away by disobedience
the grace of memory, and became forgetful, for this cause, "that I may
declare to you the things that happen day by day for your salvation,
and may put you in mind by recounting the things from everlasting,
which you have forgotten (for it is no new gospel that I now proclaim,
but I labour at your restoration to your first estate),--for this cause
I was created, Who ever am, and need no creation in order to be; so
that I am the beginning of ways for the works of God, that is for men.
For the first way being destroyed, there must needs again be
consecrated for the wanderers a new and living way [563] , even I
myself, Who am the way." And this view, that the sense of "created me"
has reference to the Humanity, the divine apostle more clearly sets
before us by his own words when he charges us, "Put ye on the Lord
Jesus Christ [564] ," and also where (using the same word) he says,
"Put on the new man which after God is created. [565] " For if the
garment of salvation is one, and that is Christ, one cannot say that
"the new man, which after God is created," is any other than Christ,
but it is clear that he who has "put on Christ" has "put on the new man
which after God is created." For actually He alone is properly named
"the new man," Who did not appear in the life of man by the known and
ordinary ways of nature, but in His case alone creation, in a strange
and special form, was instituted anew. For this reason he names the
same Person, when regarding the wonderful manner of His birth [566] ,
"the new man, which after God is created," and, when looking to the
Divine nature, which was blended [567] in the creation of this "new
man," he calls Him "Christ": so that the two names (I mean the name of
"Christ" and the name of "the new man which after God is created") are
applied to one and the same Person.

Since, then, Christ is Wisdom, let the intelligent reader consider our
opponent's account of the matter, and our own, and judge which is the
more pious, which better preserves in the text those conceptions which
are befitting the Divine nature; whether that which declares the
Creator and Lord of all to have been made, and places Him on a level
with the creation that is in bondage, or that rather which looks to the
Incarnation, and preserves the due proportion with regard to our
conception alike of the Divinity and of the Humanity, bearing in mind
that the great Paul testifies in favour of our view, who sees in the
"new man" creation, and in the true Wisdom the power of creation. And,
further, the order of the passage agrees with this view of the doctrine
it conveys. For if the "beginning of the ways" had not been created
among us, the foundation of those ages for which we look would not have
been laid; nor would the Lord have become for us "the Father of the age
to come [568] ," had not a Child been born to us, according to Isaiah,
and His name been called, both all the other titles which the prophet
gives Him, and withal "The Father of the age to come." Thus first there
came to pass the mystery wrought in virginity, and the dispensation of
the Passion, and then the wise master-builders of the Faith laid the
foundation of the Faith: and this is Christ, the Father of the age to
come, on Whom is built the life of the ages that have no end. And when
this has come to pass, to the end that in each individual believer may
be wrought the divine decrees of the Gospel law, and the varied gifts
of the Holy Spirits--(all which the divine Scripture figuratively
names, with a suitable significance, "mountains" and "hills," calling
righteousness the "mountains" of God, and speaking of His judgments as
"deeps [569] ," and giving the name of "earth" to that which is sown by
the Word and brings forth abundant fruit; or in that sense in which we
are taught by David to understand peace by the "mountains," and
righteousness by the "hills [570] "),--Wisdom is begotten in the
faithful, and the saying is found true. For He Who is in those who have
received Him, is not yet begotten in the unbelieving. Thus, that these
things may be wrought in us, their Maker must be begotten in us. For if
Wisdom is begotten in us, then in each of us is prepared by God both
land, and land uninhabited,--the land, that which receives the sowing
and the ploughing of the Word, the uninhabited land, the heart cleared
of evil inhabitants,--and thus our dwelling will be upon the extreme
parts of the earth. For since in the earth some is depth, and some is
surface, when a man is not buried in the earth, or, as it were,
dwelling in a cave by reason of thinking of things beneath (as is the
life of those who live in sin, who "stick fast in the deep mire where
no ground is [571] ," whose life is truly a pit, as the Psalm says,
"let not the pit shut her mouth upon me [572] ")--if, I say, a man,
when Wisdom is begotten in him, thinks of the things that are above,
and touches the earth only so much as he needs must, such a man
inhabits "the extreme parts of the earth under heavens," not plunging
deep in earthly thought; with him Wisdom is present, as he prepares in
himself heaven instead of earth: and when, by carrying out the precepts
into act, he makes strong for himself the instruction of the clouds
above, and, enclosing the great and widespread sea of wickedness, as it
were with a beach, by his exact conversation, hinders the troubled
water from proceeding forth from his mouth; and if by the grace of
instruction he be made to dwell among the fountains, pouring forth the
stream of his discourse with sure caution, that he may not give to any
man for drink the turbid fluid of destruction in place of pure water,
and if he be lifted up above all earthly paths and become aerial in his
life, advancing towards that spiritual life which he speaks of as "the
winds," so that he is set apart to be a throne of Him Who is seated in
him (as was Paul separated for the Gospel to be a chosen vessel to bear
the name of God, who, as it is elsewhere expressed, was made a throne,
bearing Him that sat upon him)--when, I say, he is established in these
and like ways, so that he who has already fully made up in himself the
land inhabited by God, now rejoices in gladness that he is made the
father, not of wild and senseless beasts, but of men (and these would
be godlike thoughts, which are fashioned according to the Divine image,
by faith in Him Who has been created and begotten, and set up in
us;--and faith, according to the words of Paul, is conceived as the
foundation whereby wisdom is begotten in the faithful, and all the
things that I have spoken of are wrought)--then, I say, the life of the
man who has been thus established is truly blessed, for Wisdom is at
all times in agreement with him, and rejoices with him who daily finds
gladness in her alone. For the Lord rejoices in His saints, and there
is joy in heaven over those who are being saved, and Christ, as the
father, makes a feast for his rescued son. Though we have spoken
hurriedly of these matters, let the careful man read the original text
of the Holy Scripture, and fit its dark sayings to our reflections,
testing whether it is not far better to consider that the meaning of
these dark sayings has this reference, and not that which is attributed
to it at first sight. For it is not possible that the theology of John
should be esteemed true, which recites that all created things are the
work of the Word, if in this passage He Who created Wisdom be believed
to have made together with her all other things also. For in that case
all things will not be by her, but she will herself be counted with the
things that were made.

And that this is the reference of the enigmatical sayings is clearly
revealed by the passage that follows, which says, "Now therefore
hearken unto me, my son: and blessed is he that keepeth my ways [573]
," meaning of course by "ways" the approaches to virtue, the beginning
of which is the possession of Wisdom. Who, then, who looks to the
divine Scripture, will not agree that the enemies of the truth are at
once impious and slanderous?--impious, because, so far as in them lies,
they degrade the unspeakable glory of the Only-begotten God, and unite
it with the creation, striving to show that the Lord Whose power over
all things is only-begotten, is one of the things that were made by
Him: slanderous, because, though Scripture itself gives them no ground
for such opinions, they arm themselves against piety as though they
drew their evidence from that source. Now since they can by no means
show any passage of the Holy Scriptures which leads us to look upon the
pre-temporal glory of the Only-begotten God in conjunction with the
subject creation, it is well, these points being proved, that the
tokens of victory over falsehood should be adduced as testimony to the
doctrine of godliness, and that sweeping aside these verbal systems of
theirs by which they make the creature answer to the creator, and the
thing made to the maker, we should confess, as the Gospel from heaven
teaches us, the well-beloved Son--not a bastard, not a counterfeit; but
that, accepting with the name of Son all that naturally belongs to that
name, we should say that He Who is of Very God is Very God, and that we
should believe of Him all that we behold in the Father, because They
are One, and in the one is conceived the other, not overpassing Him,
not inferior to Him, not altered or subject to change in any Divine or
excellent property.
__________________________________________________________________

[534] Prov. viii. 22 (LXX.). On this passage see also Book II. S:10.

[535] 1 Cor. i. 24.

[536] E. g.S. John xvii. 25.

[537] Prov. i. 2.

[538] The hiatus in the Paris editions ends here.

[539] Cf. Prov. i. 3 (LXX.).

[540] Gal. iv. 20.

[541] Ps. xlv. 13 (LXX.).

[542] Prov. i. 6 (LXX.).

[543] Compare with what follows Prov. viii. 12, sqq. (LXX.).

[544] S. Matt. v. 3

[545] Gal. v. 17.

[546] Prov. viii. 21-22 (LXX.).

[547] Prov. viii. 22 sqq. (LXX.).

[548] Prov. viii. 26 (LXX.).

[549] S. John i. 3

[550] Cf. Prov. viii. 27-8 (LXX.).

[551] Or "according to the apparent sense."

[552] Prov. xxx. 3 (LXX. ch. xxiv.).

[553] Prov. xxxi. 1 (LXX. ch. xxiv.). The ordinary reading in the LXX.
seems to be hupo theou, while Oehler retains in his text of Greg. Nyss.
the apo theou of the Paris editions.

[554] Prov. ix. 1, which seems to be spoken of as "earlier" in
contrast, not with the main passage under examination, but with those
just cited.

[555] If prostithesi be the right reading, it would almost seem that
Gregory had forgotten the order of the passages, and supposed Prov.
viii. 22 to have been written after Prov. ix. 1. To read protithesi,
("presents to us") would get rid of this difficulty, but it may be that
Gregory only intends to point out that the idea of the union of the two
natures, from which the "communicatio idiomatum" results, is distinct
from that of the preparation for the Nativity, not to insist upon the
order in which, as he conceives, they are set forth in the book of
Proverbs.

[556] anakratheises to anthropo

[557] tes oikonomias

[558] perilepte appears to be used as equivalent to perileptike

[559] Cf. Prov. viii. 12 (LXX.).

[560] S. John i. 18

[561] 1 Cor. i. 24.

[562] The quotation is an inexact reproduction of Prov. viii. 22
(LXX.).

[563] Cf. Heb. x. 20

[564] Rom. xiii. 14.

[565] Eph. iv. 24.

[566] genneseos

[567] enkratheisan

[568] Is. ix. 6 (LXX.). "The Everlasting Father" of the English
Version.

[569] Cf. Ps. xxxvi. 6

[570] Ps. lxxii. 3.

[571] Ps. lxix. 2.

[572] Ps. lxix. 16.

[573] Prov. viii. 32 (not verbally agreeing with the LXX.).
__________________________________________________________________

S:3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other
examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the
"generate" and "ungenerate."

Now seeing that Eunomius' conflict with himself has been made manifest,
where he has been shown to contradict himself, at one time saying, "He
ought to be called `Son,' according to nature, because He is begotten,"
at another that, because He is created, He is no more called "Son," but
a "product," I think it right that the careful and attentive reader, as
it is not possible, when two statements are mutually at variance, that
the truth should be found equally in both, should reject of the two
that which is impious and blasphemous--that, I mean, with regard to the
"creature" and the "product," and should assent to that only which is
of orthodox tendency, which confesses that the appellation of "Son"
naturally attaches to the Only-begotten God: so that the word of truth
would seem to be recommended even by the voice of its enemies.

I resume my discourse, however, taking up that point of his argument
which we originally set aside. "We do not refuse," he says, "to call
the Son, seeing He is generate, even by the name of `product of
generation [574] ,' since the generated essence itself, and the
appellation of `Son,' make such a relation of words appropriate."
Meanwhile let the reader who is critically following the argument
remember this, that in speaking of the "generated essence" in the case
of the Only-begotten, he by consequence allows us to speak of the
"ungenerate essence" in the case of the Father, so that neither absence
of generation, nor generation, can any longer be supposed to constitute
the essence, but the essence must be taken separately, and its being,
or not being begotten, must be conceived separately by means of the
peculiar attributes contemplated in it. Let us, however, consider more
carefully his argument on this point. He says that an essence has been
begotten, and that the name of this generated essence is "Son." Well,
at this point our argument will convict that of our opponents on two
grounds, first, of an attempt at knavery, secondly, of slackness in
their attempt against ourselves. For he is playing the knave when he
speaks of "generation of essence," in order to establish his opposition
between the essences, when once they are divided in respect of a
difference of nature between "generate" and "ungenerate": while the
slackness of their attempt is shown by the very positions their knavery
tries to establish. For he who says the essence is generate, clearly
defines generation as being something else distinct from the essence,
so that the significance of generation cannot be assigned to the word
"essence." For he has not in this passage represented the matter as he
often does, so as to say that generation is itself the essence, but
acknowledges that the essence is generated, so that there is produced
in his readers a distinct notion in the case of each word: for one
conception arises in him who hears that it was generated, and another
is called up by the name of "essence." Our argument may be made clearer
by example. The Lord says in the Gospel [575] that a woman, when her
travail is drawing near, is in sorrow, but afterwards rejoices in
gladness because a man is born into the world. As then in this passage
we derive from the Gospel two distinct conceptions,--one the birth
which we conceive to be by way of generation, the other that which
results from the birth (for the birth is not the man, but the man is by
the birth),--so here too, when Eunomius confesses that the essence was
generated, we learn by the latter word that the essence comes from
something, and by the former we conceive that subject itself which has
its real being from something. If then the signification of essence is
one thing, and the word expressing generation suggests to us another
conception, their clever contrivances are quite gone to ruin, like
earthen vessels hurled one against the other, and mutually smashed to
pieces. For it will no longer be possible for them, if they apply the
opposition of "generate" and "ungenerate" to the essence of the Father
and the Son, to apply at the same time to the things themselves the
mutual conflict between these names [576] . For as it is confessed by
Eunomius that the essence is generate (seeing that the example from the
Gospel explains the meaning of such a phrase, where, when we hear that
a man is generated, we do not conceive the man to be the same thing as
his generation, but receive a separate conception in each of the two
words), heresy will surely no longer be permitted to express by such
words her doctrine of the difference of the essences. In order,
however, that our account of these matters may be cleared up as far as
possible, let us once more discuss the point in the following way. He
Who framed the universe made the nature of man with all things in the
beginning, and after Adam was made, He then appointed for men the law
of generation one from another, saying, "Be fruitful and multiply [577]
." Now while Abel came into existence by way of generation, what
reasonable man would deny that, in the actual sense of human
generation, Adam existed ungenerately? Yet the first man had in himself
the complete definition of man's essential nature, and he who was
generated of him was enrolled under the same essential name. But if the
essence that was generated was made anything other than that which was
not generated, the same essential name would not apply to both: for of
those things whose essence is different, the essential name also is not
the same. Since, then, the essential nature of Adam and of Abel is
marked by the same characteristics, we must certainly agree that one
essence is in both, and that the one and the other are exhibited in the
same nature. For Adam and Abel are both one so far as the definition of
their nature is concerned, but are distinguished one from the other
without confusion by the individual attributes observed in each of
them. We cannot therefore properly say that Adam generated another
essence besides himself, but rather that of himself he generated
another self, with whom was produced the whole definition of the
essence of him who generated him. What, then, we learn in the case of
human nature by means of the inferential guidance afforded to us by the
definition, this I think we ought to take for our guidance also to the
pure apprehension of the Divine doctrines. For when we have shaken off
from the Divine and exalted doctrines all carnal and material notions,
we shall be most surely led by the remaining conception, when it is
purged of such ideas, to the lofty and unapproachable heights. It is
confessed even by our adversaries that God, Who is over all, both is
and is called the Father of the Only-begotten, and they moreover give
to the Only-begotten God, Who is of the Father, the name of "begotten,"
by reason of His being generated. Since then among men the word
"father" has certain significances attaching to it, from which the pure
nature is alien, it behoves a man to lay aside all material conceptions
which enter in by association with the carnal significance of the word
"father," and to form in the case of the God and Father a conception
befitting the Divine nature, expressive only of the reality of the
relationship. Since, therefore, in the notion of a human father there
is included not only all that the flesh suggests to our thoughts, but a
certain notion of interval is also undoubtedly conceived with the idea
of human fatherhood, it would be well, in the case of the Divine
generation, to reject, together with bodily pollution, the notion of
interval also, that so what properly belongs to matter may be
completely purged away, and the transcendent generation may be clear,
not only from the idea of passion, but from that of interval. Now he
who says that God is a Father will unite with the thought that God is,
the further thought that He is something: for that which has its being
from some beginning, certainly also derives from something the
beginning of its being, whatever it is: but He in Whose case being had
no beginning, has not His beginning from anything, even although we
contemplate in Him some other attribute than simple existence. Well,
God is a Father. It follows that He is what He is from eternity: for He
did not become, but is a Father: for in God that which was, both is and
will be. On the other hand, if He once was not anything, then He
neither is nor will be that thing: for He is not believed to be the
Father of a Being such that it may be piously asserted that God once
existed by Himself without that Being. For the Father is the Father of
Life, and Truth, and Wisdom, and Light, and Sanctification, and Power,
and all else of a like kind that the Only-begotten is or is called.
Thus when the adversaries allege that the Light "once was not," I know
not to which the greater injury is done, whether to the Light, in that
the Light is not, or to Him that has the Light, in that He has not the
Light. So also with Life and Truth and Power, and all the other
characters in which the Only-begotten fills the Father's bosom, being
all things in His own fulness. For the absurdity will be equal either
way, and the impiety against the Father will equal the blasphemy
against the Son: for in saying that the Lord "once was not," you will
not merely assert the non-existence of Power, but you will be saying
that the Power of God, Who is the Father of the Power, "was not." Thus
the assertion made by your doctrine that the Son "once was not,"
establishes nothing else than a destitution of all good in the case of
the Father. See to what an end these wise men's acuteness leads, how by
them the word of the Lord is made good, which says, "He that despiseth
Me despiseth Him that sent Me [578] :" for by the very arguments by
which they despise the existence at any time of the Only-begotten, they
also dishonour the Father, stripping off by their doctrine from the
Father's glory every good name and conception.
__________________________________________________________________

[574] gennema. This word, in what follows, is sometimes translated
simply by the word "product," where it is not contrasted with poiema
(the "product of making"), or where the argument depends especially
upon its grammatical form (which indicates that the thing denoted is
the result of a process), rather than upon the idea of the particular
process.

[575] Cf. S. John xvi. 21

[576] If, that is, they speak of the "generated essence" in
contra-distinction to "ungenerate essence" they are precluded from
saying that the essence of the Son is that He is begotten, and that the
essence of the Father is that He is ungenerate: that which constitutes
the essence cannot be made an epithet of the essence.

[577] Gen. i. 28.

[578] S. Luke x. 16
__________________________________________________________________

S:4. He thus shows the oneness of the Eternal Son with the Father the
identity of essence and the community of nature (wherein is a natural
inquiry into the production of wine), and that the terms "Son" and
"product" in the naming of the Only-Begotten include a like idea of
relationship.

What has been said, therefore, has clearly exposed the slackness which
is to be found in the knavery of our author, who, while he goes about
to establish the opposition of the essence of the Only-begotten to that
of the Father, by the method of calling the one "ungenerate," and the
other "generate," stands convicted of playing the fool with his
inconsistent arguments. For it was shown from his own words, first,
that the name of "essence" means one thing, and that of "generation"
another; and next, that there did not come into existence, with the
Son, any new and different essence besides the essence of the Father,
but that what the Father is as regards the definition of His nature,
that also He is Who is of the Father, as the nature does not change
into diversity in the Person of the Son, according to the truth of the
argument displayed by our consideration of Adam and Abel. For as, in
that instance, he that was not generated after a like sort was yet, so
far as concerns the definition of essence, the same with him that was
generated, and Abel's generation did not produce any change in the
essence, so, in the case of these pure doctrines, the Only-begotten God
did not, by His own generation, produce in Himself any change in the
essence of Him Who is ungenerate (coming forth, as the Gospel says,
from the Father, and being in the Father,) but is, according to the
simple and homely language of the creed we profess, "Light of Light,
very God of very God," the one being all that the other is, save being
that other. With regard, however, to the aim for the sake of which he
carries on this system-making, I think there is no need for me at
present to express any opinion, whether it is audacious and dangerous,
or a thing allowable and free from danger, to transform the phrases
which are employed to signify the Divine nature from one to another,
and to call Him Who is generated by the name of "product of
generation."

I let these matters pass, that my discourse may not busy itself too
much in the strife against lesser points, and neglect the greater; but
I say that we ought carefully to consider the question whether the
natural relation does introduce the use of these terms: for this surely
Eunomius asserts, that with the affinity of the appellations there is
also asserted an essential relationship. For he would not say, I
presume, that the mere names themselves, apart from the sense of the
things signified, have any mutual relation or affinity; but all discern
the relationship or diversity of the appellations by the meanings which
the words express. If, therefore, he confesses that "the Son" has a
natural relation with "the Father," let us leave the appellations, and
consider the force that is found in their significations, whether in
their affinity we discern diversity of essence, or that which is
kindred and characteristic. To say that we find diversity is downright
madness. For how does something without kinship or community "preserve
order," connected and conformable, in the names, where "the generated
essence itself," as he says, "and the appellation of `Son,' make such a
relation of words appropriate"? If, on the other hand, he should say
that these appellations signify relationship, he will necessarily
appear in the character of an advocate of the community of essence, and
as maintaining the fact that by affinity of names is signified also the
connection of subjects: and this he often does in his composition
without being aware of it [579] . For, by the arguments wherewith he
endeavours to destroy the truth, he is often himself unwittingly drawn
into an advocacy of the very doctrines against which he is contending.
Some such thing the history tells us concerning Saul, that once, when
moved with wrath against the prophets, he was overcome by grace, and
was found as one of the inspired, (the Spirit of prophecy willing, as I
suppose, to instruct the apostate by means of himself,) whence the
surprising nature of the event became a proverb in his after life, as
the history records such an expression by way of wonder, "Is Saul also
among the prophets [580] ?"

At what point, then, does Eunomius assent to the truth? When he says
that the Lord Himself, "being the Son of the living God, not being
ashamed of His birth from the Virgin, often named Himself, in His own
sayings, `the Son of Man'"? For this phrase we also allege for proof of
the community of essence, because the name of "Son" shows the community
of nature to be equal in both cases. For as He is called the Son of Man
by reason of the kindred of His flesh to her of whom He was born, so
also He is conceived, surely, as the Son of God, by reason of the
connection of His essence with that from which He has His existence,
and this argument is the greatest weapon of the truth. For nothing so
clearly points to Him Who is the "mediator between God and man [581] "
(as the great Apostle called Him), as the name of "Son," equally
applicable to either nature, Divine or Human. For the same Person is
Son of God, and was made, in the Incarnation, Son of Man, that, by His
communion with each, He might link together by Himself what were
divided by nature. Now if, in becoming Son of Man, he were without
participation in human nature, it would be logical to say that neither
does He share in the Divine essence, though He is Son of God. But if
the whole compound nature of man was in Him (for He was "in all points
tempted like as we are, yet without sin" [582] ), it is surely
necessary to believe that every property of the transcendent essence is
also in Him, as the Word "Son" claims for Him both alike--the Human in
the man, but in the God the Divine.

If then the appellations, as Eunomius says, indicate relationship, and
the existence of relationship is observed in the things, not in the
mere sound of the words (and by things I mean the things conceived in
themselves, if it be not over-bold thus to speak of the Son and the
Father), who would deny that the very champion of blasphemy has by his
own action been dragged into the advocacy of orthodoxy, overthrowing by
his own means his own arguments, and proclaiming community of essence
in the case of the Divine doctrines? For the argument that he
unwillingly casts into the scale on the side of truth does not speak
falsely as regards this point,--that He would not have been called Son
if the natural conception of the names did not verify this calling. For
as a bench is not called the son of the workman, and no sane man would
say that the builder engendered the house, and we do not say that the
vineyard is the "product [583] " of the vine-dresser, but call what a
man makes his work, and him who is begotten of him the son of a man,
(in order, I suppose, that the proper meaning might be attached by
means of the names to the respective subjects,) so too, when we are
taught that the Only-begotten is Son of God, we do not by this
appellation understand a creature of God, but what the word "Son" in
its signification really displays. And even though wine be named by
Scripture the "product [584] " of the vine, not even so will our
argument with regard to the orthodox doctrine suffer by this identity
of name. For we do not call wine the "product" of the oak, nor the
acorn the "product" of the vine, but we use the word only if there is
some natural community between the "product" and that from which it
comes. For the moisture in the vine, which is drawn out from the root
through the stem by the pith, is, in its natural power, water: but, as
it passes in orderly sequence along the ways of nature, and flows from
the lowest to the highest, it changes to the quality of wine, a change
to which the rays of the sun contribute in some degree, which by their
warmth draw out the moisture from the depth to the shoots, and by a
proper and suitable process of ripening make the moisture wine: so
that, so far as their nature is concerned, there is no difference
between the moisture that exists in the vine and the wine that is
produced from it. For the one form of moisture comes from the other,
and one could not say that the cause of wine is anything else than the
moisture which naturally exists in the shoots. But, so far as moisture
is concerned, the differences of quality produce no alteration, but are
found when some peculiarity discerns the moisture which is in the form
of wine from that which is in the shoots, one of the two forms being
accompanied by astringency, or sweetness, or sourness, so that in
substance the two are the same, but are distinguished by qualitative
differences. As, therefore, when we hear from Scripture that the
Only-begotten God is Son of man, we learn by the kindred expressed in
the name His kinship with true man, so even, if the Son be called, in
the adversaries' phrase, a "product," we none the less learn, even by
this name, His kinship in essence with Him that has "produced [585] "
Him, by the fact that wine, which is called the "product" of the vine
has been found not to be alien, as concerns the idea of moisture, from
the natural power that resides in the vine. Indeed, if one were
judiciously to examine the things that are said by our adversaries,
they tend to our doctrine, and their sense cries out against their own
fabrications, as they strive at all points to establish their
"difference in essence." Yet it is by no means an easy matter to
conjecture whence they were led to such conceptions. For if the
appellation of "Son" does not merely signify "being from something,"
but by its signification presents to us specially, as Eunomius himself
says, relationship in point of nature, and wine is not called the
"product" of an oak, and those "products" or "generation of vipers
[586] ," of which the Gospel somewhere speaks, are snakes and not
sheep, it is clear, that in the case of the Only-begotten also, the
appellation of "Son" or of "product" would not convey the meaning of
relationship to something of another kind: but even if, according to
our adversaries' phrase, He is called a "product of generation," and
the name of "Son," as they confess, has reference to nature, the Son is
surely of the essence of Him Who has generated or "produced" Him, not
of that of some other among the things which we contemplate as external
to that nature. And if He is truly from Him, He is not alien from all
that belongs to Him from Whom He is, as in the other cases too it was
shown that all that has its existence from anything by way of
generation is clearly of the same kind as that from whence it came.
__________________________________________________________________

[579] Oehler's punctuation is here slightly altered.

[580] 1 Sam. xix. 24.

[581] 1 Tim. ii. 5.

[582] Heb. iv. 15.

[583] gennema.

[584] gennema. E.g. S. Matt. xxvi. 29.

[585] gegennekota: which, as answering to gennema, is here translated
"produced" rather than "begotten."

[586] gennemata echidnon. E.g. S. Matt. iii. 7.
__________________________________________________________________

S:5. He discusses the incomprehensibility of the Divine essence, and
the saying to the woman of Samaria, "Ye worship ye know not what."

Now if any one should ask for some interpretation, and description, and
explanation of the Divine essence, we are not going to deny that in
this kind of wisdom we are unlearned, acknowledging only so much as
this, that it is not possible that that which is by nature infinite
should be comprehended in any conception expressed by words. The fact
that the Divine greatness has no limit is proclaimed by prophecy, which
declares expressly that of His splendour, His glory, His holiness,
"there is no end [587] :" and if His surroundings have no limit, much
more is He Himself in His essence, whatever it may be, comprehended by
no limitation in any way. If then interpretation by way of words and
names implies by its meaning some sort of comprehension of the subject,
and if, on the other hand, that which is unlimited cannot be
comprehended, no one could reasonably blame us for ignorance, if we are
not bold in respect of what none should venture upon. For by what name
can I describe the incomprehensible? by what speech can I declare the
unspeakable? Accordingly, since the Deity is too excellent and lofty to
be expressed in words, we have learnt to honour in silence what
transcends speech and thought: and if he who "thinketh more highly than
he ought to think [588] ," tramples upon this cautious speech of ours
making a jest of our ignorance of things incomprehensible, and
recognizes a difference of unlikeness in that which is without figure,
or limit, or size, or quantity (I mean in the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Spirit), and brings forward to reproach our ignorance that phrase
which is continually alleged by the disciples of deceit, "`Ye worship
ye know not what [589] ,' if ye know not the essence of that which ye
worship," we shall follow the advice of the prophet, and not fear the
reproach of fools [590] , nor be led by their reviling to talk boldly
of things unspeakable, making that unpractised speaker Paul our teacher
in the mysteries that transcend knowledge, who is so far from thinking
that the Divine nature is within the reach of human perception, that he
calls even the judgments of God "unsearchable," and His ways "past
finding out [591] ," and affirms that the things promised to them that
love Him, for their good deeds done in this life, are above
comprehension so that it is not possible to behold them with the eye,
nor to receive them by hearing, nor to contain them in the heart [592]
. Learning this, therefore, from Paul, we boldly declare that, not only
are the judgments of God too high for those who try to search them out,
but that the ways also that lead to the knowledge of Him are even until
now untrodden and impassable. For this is what we understand that the
Apostle wishes to signify, when he calls the ways that lead to the
incomprehensible "past finding out," showing by the phrase that that
knowledge is unattainable by human calculations, and that no one ever
yet set his understanding on such a path of reasoning, or showed any
trace or sign of an approach, by way of perception, to the things
incomprehensible.

Learning these things, then, from the lofty words of the Apostle, we
argue, by the passage quoted, in this way:--If His judgments cannot be
searched out, and His ways are not traced, and the promise of His good
things transcends every representation that our conjectures can frame,
by how much more is His actual Godhead higher and loftier, in respect
of being unspeakable and unapproachable, than those attributes which
are conceived as accompanying it, whereof the divinely instructed Paul
declares that there is no knowledge:--and by this means we confirm in
ourselves the doctrine they deride, confessing ourselves inferior to
them in the knowledge of those things which are beyond the range of
knowledge, and declare that we really worship what we know. Now we know
the loftiness of the glory of Him Whom we worship, by the very fact
that we are not able by reasoning to comprehend in our thoughts the
incomparable character of His greatness; and that saying of our Lord to
the Samaritan woman, which is brought forward against us by our
enemies, might more properly be addressed to them. For the words, "Ye
worship ye know not what," the Lord speaks to the Samaritan woman,
prejudiced as she was by corporeal ideas in her opinions concerning
God: and to her the phrase well applies, because the Samaritans,
thinking that they worship God, and at the same time supposing the
Deity to be corporeally settled in place, adore Him in name only,
worshipping something else, and not God. For nothing is Divine that is
conceived as being circumscribed, but it belongs to the Godhead to be
in all places, and to pervade all things, and not to be limited by
anything: so that those who fight against Christ find the phrase they
adduce against us turned into an accusation of themselves. For, as the
Samaritans, supposing the Deity to be compassed round by some
circumscription of place, were rebuked by the words they heard, "`Ye
worship ye know not what,' and your service is profitless to you, for a
God that is deemed to be settled in any place is no God,"--so one might
well say to the new Samaritans, "In supposing the Deity to be limited
by the absence of generation, as it were by some local limit, `ye
worship ye know not what,' doing service to Him indeed as God, but not
knowing that the infinity of God exceeds all the significance and
comprehension that names can furnish."
__________________________________________________________________

[587] Cf. Ps. cxlv. 3

[588] Rom. xii. 3.

[589] S. John iv. 22

[590] Cf. Is. li. 7

[591] Rom. xi. 33.

[592] Cf. 1 Cor. ii. 9
__________________________________________________________________

S:6. Thereafter he expounds the appellation of "Son," and of "product
of generation," and very many varieties of "sons," of God, of men, of
rams, of perdition, of light, and of day.

But our discourse has diverged too far from the subject before us, in
following out the questions which arise from time to time by way of
inference. Let us therefore once more resume its sequence, as I imagine
that the phrase under examination has been sufficiently shown, by what
we have said, to be contradictory not only to the truth, but also to
itself. For if, according to their view, the natural relation to the
Father is established by the appellation of "the Son," and so with that
of the "product of generation" to Him Who has begotten Him (as these
men's wisdom falsely models the terms significant of the Divine nature
into a verbal arrangement, according to some grammatical frivolity), no
one could longer doubt that the mutual relation of the names which is
established by nature is a proof of their kindred, or rather of their
identity of essence. But let not our discourse merely turn about our
adversaries' words, that the orthodox doctrine may not seem to gain the
victory only by the weakness of those who fight against it, but appear
to have an abundant supply of strength in itself. Let the adverse
argument, therefore, be strengthened as much as may be by us ourselves
with more energetic advocacy, that the superiority of our force may be
recognized with full confidence, as we bring to the unerring test of
truth those arguments also which our adversaries have omitted. He who
contends on behalf of our adversaries will perhaps say that the name of
"Son," or "product of generation," does not by any means establish the
fact of kindred in nature. For in Scripture the term "child of wrath
[593] " is used, and "son of perdition [594] ," and "product of a viper
[595] ;" and in such names surely no community of nature is apparent.
For Judas, who is called "the son of perdition," is not in his
substance the same with perdition, according to what we understand by
the word [596] . For the signification of the "man" in Judas is one
thing, and that of "perdition" is another. And the argument may be
established equally from an opposite instance. For those who are called
in a certain sense "children of light," and "children of the day [597]
," are not the same with light and day in respect of the definition of
their nature, and the stones are made Abraham's children [598] when
they claim their kindred with him by faith and works; and those who are
"led by the Spirit of God," as the Apostle says, are called "Sons of
God [599] ," without being the same with God in respect of nature; and
one may collect many such instances from the inspired Scripture, by
means of which deceit, like some image decked with the testimonies of
Scripture, masquerades in the likeness of truth.

Well, what do we say to this? The divine Scripture knows how to use the
word "Son" in both senses, so that in some cases such an appellation is
derived from nature, in others it is adventitious and artificial. For
when it speaks of "sons of men," or "sons of rams [600] ," it marks the
essential relation of that which is begotten to that from which it has
its being: but when it speaks of "sons of power," or "children of God,"
it presents to us that kinship which is the result of choice. And,
moreover, in the opposite sense, too, the same persons are called "sons
of Eli," and "sons of Belial [601] ," the appellation of "sons" being
easily adapted to either idea. For when they are called "sons of Eli,"
they are declared to have natural relationship to him, but in being
called "sons of Belial," they are reproved for the wickedness of their
choice, as no longer emulating their father in their life, but
addicting their own purpose to sin. In the case, then, of this lower
nature of ours, and of the things with which we are concerned, by
reason of human nature being equally inclined to either side (I mean,
to vice and to virtue), it is in our power to become sons either of
night or of day, while our nature yet remains, so far as the chief part
of it is concerned, within its proper limits. For neither is he who by
sin becomes a child of wrath alienated from his human generation, nor
does he who by choice addicts himself to good reject his human origin
by the refinement of his habits, but, while their nature in each case
remains the same, the differences of their purpose assume the names of
their relationship, according as they become either children of God by
virtue, or of the opposite by vice.

But how does Eunomius, in the case of the divine doctrines at least--he
who "preserves the natural order" (for I will use our author's very
words), "and abides by those things which are known to us from the
beginning, and does not refuse to call Him that is begotten by the name
of `product of generation,' since the generated essence itself" (as he
says) "and the appellation of `Son' makes such a relation of words
appropriate",--how does he alienate the Begotten from essential kindred
with Him that begat Him? For in the case of those who are called "sons"
or "products" by way of reproach, or again where some praise
accompanies such names, we cannot say that any one is called "a child
of wrath," being at the same time actually begotten by wrath; nor again
had any one the day for his mother, in a corporeal sense, that he
should be called its son; but it is the difference of their will which
gives occasion for names of such relationship. Here, however, Eunomius
says, "we do not refuse to call the Son, seeing He is begotten, by the
name of `product of generation,' since the generated essence," he tells
us, "and the appellation of `Son,' makes such a relation of words
appropriate." If, then, he confesses that such a relation of words is
made appropriate by the fact that the Son is really a "product of
generation," how is it opportune to assign such a rationale of names,
alike to those which are used inexactly by way of metaphor, and to
those where the natural relation, as Eunomius tells us, makes such a
use of names appropriate? Surely such an account is true only in the
case of those whose nature is a border-land between virtue and vice,
where one often shares in turn opposite classes of names, becoming a
child, now of light, then again of darkness, by reason of affinity to
the good or to its opposite. But where contraries have no place, one
could no longer say that the word "Son" is applied metaphorically, in
like manner as in the case of those who by choice appropriate the title
to themselves. For one could not arrive at this view, that, as a man
casting off the works of darkness becomes, by his decent life, a child
of light, so too the Only-begotten God received the more honourable
name as the result of a change from the inferior state. For one who is
a man becomes a son of God by being joined to Christ by spiritual
generation: but He Who by Himself makes the man to be a son of God does
not need another Son to bestow on Him the adoption of a son, but has
the name also of that which He is by nature. A man himself changes
himself, exchanging the old man for the new; but to what shall God be
changed, so that He may receive what He has not? A man puts off
himself, and puts on the Divine nature; but what does He put off, or in
what does He array Himself, Who is always the same? A man becomes a son
of God, receiving what he has not, and laying aside what he has; but He
Who has never been in the state of vice has neither anything to receive
nor anything to relinquish. Again, the man may be on the one hand truly
called some one's son, when one speaks with reference to his nature;
and, on the other hand, he may be so called inexactly, when the choice
of his life imposes the name. But God, being One Good, in a single and
uncompounded nature, looks ever the same way, and is never changed by
the impulse of choice, but always wishes what He is, and is, assuredly,
what He wishes: so that He is in both respects properly and truly
called Son of God, since His nature contains the good, and His choice
also is never severed from that which is more excellent, so that this
word is employed, without inexactness, as His name. Thus there is no
room for these arguments (which, in the person of our adversaries, we
have been opposing to ourselves), to be brought forward by our
adversaries as a demurrer to the affinity in respect of nature.
__________________________________________________________________

[593] Cf. Eph. ii. 3

[594] S. John xvii. 12.

[595] Cf. S. Matt. iii. 7

[596] Reading kata to nooumenon, for kata ton nooumenon as the words
stand in the text of Oehler, who cites no mss. in favour of the change
which he has made.

[597] Cf. 1 Thess. v. 5.

[598] Cf. S. Matt. iii. 9

[599] Rom. viii. 14.

[600] Ps. xxix. 1 (LXX.).

[601] 1 Sam. ii. 12. The phrase is huioi loimoi, or "pestilent sons,"
as in the LXX. Gregory's argument would seem to require the reading
huioi loimou.
__________________________________________________________________

S:7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human
names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms "generate"
and "ungenerate."

But as, I know not how or why, they hate and abhor the truth, they give
Him indeed the name of "Son," but in order to avoid the testimony which
this word would give to the community of essence, they separate the
word from the sense included in the name, and concede to the
Only-begotten the name of "Son" as an empty thing, vouchsafing to Him
only the mere sound of the word. That what I say is true, and that I am
not taking a false aim at the adversaries' mark, may be clearly learnt
from the actual attacks they make upon the truth. Such are those
arguments which are brought forward by them to establish their
blasphemy, that we are taught by the divine Scriptures many names of
the Only-begotten--a stone, an axe, a rock, a foundation, bread, a
vine, a door, a way, a shepherd, a fountain, a tree, resurrection, a
teacher, light, and many such names. But we may not piously use any of
these names of the Lord, understanding it according to its immediate
sense. For surely it would be a most absurd thing to think that what is
incorporeal and immaterial, simple, and without figure, should be
fashioned according to the apparent senses of these names, whatever
they may be, so that when we hear of an axe we should think of a
particular figure of iron, or when we hear of light, of the light in
the sky, or of a vine, of that which grows by the planting of shoots,
or of any one of the other names, as its ordinary use suggests to us to
think; but we transfer the sense of these names to what better becomes
the Divine nature, and form some other conception, and if we do
designate Him thus, it is not as being any of these things, according
to the definition of His nature, but as being called these things while
He is conceived by means of the names employed as something else than
the things themselves. But if such names are indeed truly predicated of
the Only-begotten God, without including the declaration of His nature,
they say that, as a consequence, neither should we admit the
signification of "Son," as it is understood according to the prevailing
use, as expressive of nature, but should find some sense of this word
also, different from that which is ordinary and obvious. These, and
others like these, are their philosophical arguments to establish that
the Son is not what He is and is called. Our argument was hastening to
a different goal, namely to show that Eunomius' new discourse is false
and inconsistent, and argues neither with the truth nor with itself.
Since, however, the arguments which we employ to attack their doctrine
are brought into the discussion as a sort of support for their
blasphemy [602] , it may be well first briefly to discuss his point,
and then to proceed to the orderly examination of his writings.

What can we say, then, to such things without relevance? That while, as
they say, the names which Scripture applies to the Only-begotten are
many, we assert that none of the other names is closely connected with
the reference to Him that begat Him. For we do not employ the name
"Stone," or "Resurrection," or "Shepherd," or "Light," or any of the
rest, as we do the name "Son of the Father," with a reference to the
God of all. It is possible to make a twofold division of the
signification of the Divine names, as it were by a scientific rule: for
to one class belongs the indication of His lofty and unspeakable glory;
the other class indicates the variety of the providential dispensation:
so that, as we suppose, if that which received His benefits did not
exist, neither would those words be applied with respect to them [603]
which indicate His bounty. All those on the other hand, that express
the attributes of God, are applied suitably and properly to the
Only-begotten God, apart from the objects of the dispensation. But that
we may set forth this doctrine clearly, we will examine the names
themselves. The Lord would not have been called a vine, save for the
planting of those who are rooted in Him, nor a shepherd, had not the
sheep of the house of Israel been lost, nor a physician, save for the
sake of them that were sick, nor would He have received for Himself the
rest of these names, had He not made the titles appropriate, in a
manner advantageous with regard to those who were benefited by Him, by
some action of His providence. What need is there to mention individual
instances, and to lengthen our argument upon points that are
acknowledged? On the other hand, He is certainly called "Son," and
"Right Hand," and "Only-begotten," and "Word," and "Wisdom," and
"Power," and all other such relative names, as being named together
with the Father in a certain relative conjunction. For He is called the
"Power of God," and the "Right Hand of God," and the "Wisdom of God,"
and the "Son and Only-begotten of the Father," and the "Word with God,"
and so of the rest. Thus, it follows from what we have stated, that in
each of the names we are to contemplate some suitable sense appropriate
to the subject, so that we may not miss the right understanding of
them, and go astray from the doctrine of godliness. As, then, we
transfer each of the other terms to that sense in which they may be
applied to God, and reject in their case the immediate sense, so as not
to understand material light, or a trodden way, or the bread which is
produced by husbandry, or the word that is expressed by speech, but,
instead of these, all those thoughts which present to us the magnitude
of the power of the Word of God,--so, if one were to reject the
ordinary and natural sense of the word "Son," by which we learn that He
is of the same essence as Him that begat Him, he will of course
transfer the name to some more divine interpretation. For since the
change to the more glorious meaning which has been made in each of the
other terms has adapted them to set forth the Divine power, it surely
follows that the significance of this name also should be transferred
to what is loftier. But what more Divine sense could we find in the
appellation of "Son," if we were to reject, according to our
adversaries' view, the natural relation to Him that begat Him? I
presume no one is so daring in impiety as to think that, in speech
concerning the Divine nature, what is humble and mean is more
appropriate than what is lofty and great. If they can discover,
therefore, any sense of more exalted character than this, so that to be
of the nature of the Father seems a thing unworthy to conceive of the
Only-begotten, let them tell us whether they know, in their secret
wisdom, anything more exalted than the nature of the Father, that, in
raising the Only-begotten God to this level, they should lift Him also
above His relation to the Father. But if the majesty of the Divine
nature transcends all height, and excels every power that calls forth
our wonder, what idea remains that can carry the meaning of the name
"Son" to something greater still? Since it is acknowledged, therefore,
that every significant phrase employed of the Only-begotten, even if
the name be derived from the ordinary use of our lower life, is
properly applied to Him with a difference of sense in the direction of
greater majesty, and if it is shown that we can find no more noble
conception of the title "Son" than that which presents to us the
reality of His relationship to Him that begat Him, I think that we need
spend no more time on this topic, as our argument has sufficiently
shown that it is not proper to interpret the title of "Son" in like
manner with the other names.

But we must bring back our enquiry once more to the book. It does not
become the same persons "not to refuse" (for I will use their own
words) "to call Him that is generated a `product of generation,' since
both the generated essence itself and the appellation of Son make such
a relation of words appropriate," and again to change the names which
naturally belong to Him into metaphorical interpretations: so that one
of two things has befallen them,--either their first attack has failed,
and it is in vain that they fly to "natural order" to establish the
necessity of calling Him that is generated a "product of generation";
or, if this argument holds good, they will find their second argument
brought to nought by what they have already established. For the person
who is called a "product of generation" because He is generated,
cannot, for the very same reason, be possibly called a "product of
making," or a "product of creation." For the sense of the several terms
differs very widely, and one who uses his phrases advisedly ought to
employ words with due regard to the subject, that we may not, by
improperly interchanging the sense of our phrases, fall into any
confusion of ideas. Hence we call that which is wrought out by a craft
the work of the craftsman, and call him who is begotten by a man that
man's son; and no sane person would call the work a son, or the son a
work; for that is the language of one who confuses and obscures the
true sense by an erroneous use of names. It follows that we must truly
affirm of the Only-begotten one of these two things,--if He is a Son,
that He is not to be called a "product of creation," and if He is
created, that He is alien from the appellation of "Son [604] ," just as
heaven and sea and earth, and all individual things, being things
created, do not assume the name of "Son." But since Eunomius bears
witness that the Only-begotten God is begotten (and the evidence of
enemies is of additional value for establishing the truth), he surely
testifies also, by saying that He is begotten, to the fact that He is
not created. Enough, however, on these points: for though many
arguments crowd upon us, we will be content, lest their number lead to
disproportion, with those we have already adduced on the subject before
us.
__________________________________________________________________

[602] The meaning of this seems to be that the Anomoean party make the
same charge of "inconsistency" against the orthodox, which Gregory
makes against Eunomius, basing that charge on the fact that the title
"Son" is not interpreted in the same figurative way as the other titles
recited. Gregory accordingly proceeds to show why the name of "Son"
stands on a different level from those titles, and is to be treated in
a different way.

[603] ep' auton: perhaps "with reference to man," the plural being
employed here to denote the race of men, spoken of in the preceding
clause collectively as to euergetoumenon

[604] Oehler's punctuation here seems faulty, and is accordingly not
followed.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

Book IV.

S:1. The fourth book discusses the account of the nature of the
"product of generation," and of the passionless generation of the
Only-Begotten, and the text, "In the beginning was the Word," and the
birth of the Virgin.

It is, perhaps, time to examine in our discourse that account of the
nature of the "product of generation" which is the subject of his
ridiculous philosophizing. He says, then (I will repeat word for word
his beautifully composed argument against the truth):--"Who is so
indifferent and inattentive to the nature of things as not to know,
that of all bodies which are on earth, in their generating and being
generated, in their activity and passivity, those which generate are
found on examination to communicate their own essence, and those which
are generated naturally receive the same, inasmuch as the material
cause and the supply which flows in from without are common to both;
and the things begotten are generated by passion, and those which
beget, naturally have an action which is not pure, by reason of their
nature being linked with passions of all kinds?" See in what fitting
style he discusses in his speculation the pre-temporal generation of
the Word of God that was in the beginning! he who closely examines the
nature of things, bodies on the earth, and material causes, and passion
of things generating and generated, and all the rest of it,--at which
any man of understanding would blush, even were it said of ourselves,
if it were our nature, subject as it is to passion, which is thus
exposed to scorn by his words. Yet such is our author's brilliant
enquiry into nature with regard to the Only-begotten God. Let us lay
aside complaints, however, (for what will sighing do to help us to
overthrow the malice of our enemy?) and make generally known, as best
we may, the sense of what we have quoted--concerning what sort of
"product" the speculation was proposed,--that which exists according to
the flesh, or that which is to be contemplated in the Only-begotten
God.

As the speculation is two-fold, concerning that life which is Divine,
simple, and immaterial, and concerning that existence which is material
and subject to passion, and as the word "generation" is used of both,
we must needs make our distinction sharp and clear, lest the ambiguity
of the term "generation" should in any way pervert the truth. Since,
then, the entrance into being through the flesh is material, and is
promoted by passion, while that which is bodiless, impalpable, without
form, and free from any material commixture, is alien from every
condition that admits of passion, it is proper to consider about what
sort of generation we are enquiring--that which is pure and Divine, or
that which is subject to passion and pollution. Now, no one, I suppose,
would deny that with regard to the Only-begotten God, it is
pre-temporal existence that is proposed for the consideration [605] of
Eunomius' discourse. Why, then, does he linger over this account of
corporeal nature, defiling our nature by the loathsome presentment of
his argument, and setting forth openly the passions that gather round
human generation, while he deserts the subject set before him? for it
was not about this animal generation, that is accomplished by means of
the flesh, that we had any need to learn. Who is so foolish, when he
looks on himself, and considers human nature in himself, as to seek
another interpreter of his own nature, and to need to be told all the
unavoidable passions which are included in the thought of bodily
generation--that he who begets is affected in one way, that which is
begotten in another--so that the man should learn from this instruction
that he himself begets by means of passion, and that passion was the
beginning of his own generation? For it is all the same whether these
things are passed over or spoken, and whether one publishes these
secrets at length, or keeps hidden in silence things that should be
left unsaid, we are not ignorant of the fact that our nature progresses
by way of passion. But what we are seeking is that a clear account
should be given of the exalted and unspeakable existence of the
Only-begotten, whereby He is believed to be of the Father.

Now, while this is the enquiry set before him, our new theologian
enriches his discourse with "flowing," and "passion," and "material
cause," and some "action" which "is not pure" from pollution, and all
other phrases of this kind [606] . I know not under what influence it
is that he who says, in the superiority of his wisdom, that nothing
incomprehensible is left beyond his own knowledge, and promises to
explain the unspeakable generation of the Son, leaves the question
before him, and plunges like an eel into the slimy mud of his
arguments, after the fashion of that Nicodemus who came by night, who,
when our Lord was teaching him of the birth from above, rushed in
thought to the hollow of the womb, and raised a doubt how one could
enter a second time into the womb, with the words, "How can these
things be? [607] " thinking that he would prove the spiritual birth
impossible, by the fact that an old man could not again be born within
his mother's bowels. But the Lord corrects his erroneous idea, saying
that the properties of the flesh and the spirit are distinct. Let
Eunomius also, if he will, correct himself by the like reflection. For
he who ponders on the truth ought, I imagine, to contemplate his
subject according to its own properties, not to slander the immaterial
by a charge against things material. For if a man, or a bull, or any
other of those things which are generated by the flesh, is not free
from passion in generating or being generated, what has this to do with
that Nature which is without passion and without corruption? The fact
that we are mortal is no objection to the immortality of the
Only-begotten, nor does men's propensity to vice render doubtful the
immutability that is found in the Divine Nature, nor is any other of
our proper attributes transferred to God; but the peculiar nature of
the human and the Divine life is separated, and without common ground,
and their distinguishing properties stand entirely apart, so that those
of the latter are not apprehended in the former, nor, conversely, those
of the former in the latter.

How comes it, therefore, that Eunomius, when the Divine generation is
the subject for discourse, leaves his subject, and discusses at length
the things of earth, when on this matter we have no dispute with him?
Surely our craftsman's aim is clear,--that by the slanderous
insinuation of passion he may raise an objection to the generation of
the Lord. And here I pass by the blasphemous nature of his view, and
admire the man for his acuteness,--how mindful he is of his own zealous
endeavour, who, having by his previous statements established the
theory that the Son must be, and must be called, a "product of
generation," now contends for the view that we ought not to entertain
regarding Him the conception of generation. For, if all generation, as
this author imagines, has linked with it the condition of passion, we
are hereby absolutely compelled to admit that what is foreign to
passion is alien also from generation: for if these things, passion and
generation, are considered as conjoined, He that has no share in the
one would not have any participation in the other. How then does he
call Him a "product" by reason of His generation, of Whom he tries to
show by the arguments he now uses, that He was not generated? and for
what cause does he fight against our master [608] , who counsels us in
matters of Divine doctrine not to presume in name-making, but to
confess that He is generated without transforming this conception into
the formula of a name, so as to call Him Who is generated "a product of
generation," as this term is properly applied in Scripture to things
inanimate, or to those which are mentioned "as a figure of wickedness
[609] "? When we speak of the propriety of avoiding the use of the term
"product," he prepares for action that invincible rhetoric of his, and
takes also to support him his frigid grammatical phraseology, and by
his skilful misuse of names, or equivocation, or whatever one may
properly call his processes--by these means, I say, he brings his
syllogisms to their conclusion, "not refusing to call Him Who is
begotten by the name of `product of generation.'" Then, as soon as we
admit the term, and proceed to examine the conception involved in the
name, on the theory that thereby is vindicated the community of
essence, he again retracts his own words, and contends for the view
that the "product of generation" is not generated, raising an objection
by his foul account of bodily generation, against the pure and Divine
and passionless generation of the Son, on the ground that it is not
possible that the two things, the true relationship to the Father, and
exemption of His nature from passion, should be found to coincide in
God, but that, if there were no passion, there would be no generation,
and that, if one should acknowledge the true relationship, he would
thereby, in admitting generation, certainly admit passion also.

Not thus speaks the sublime John, not thus that voice of thunder which
proclaims the mystery of the Theology, who both names Him Son of God
and purges his proclamation from every idea of passion. For behold how
in the very beginning of his Gospel he prepares our ears, how great
forethought is shown by the teacher that none of his hearers should
fall into low ideas on the subject, slipping by ignorance into any
incongruous conceptions. For in order to lead the untrained hearing as
far away as possible from passion, he does not speak in his opening
words of "Son," or "Father," or "generation," that no one should
either, on hearing first of all of a "Father," be hurried on to the
obvious signification of the word, or, on learning the proclamation of
a "Son," should understand that name in the ordinary sense, or stumble,
as at a "stone of stumbling [610] ," at the word "generation"; but
instead of "the Father," he speaks of "the Beginning": instead of "was
begotten," he says "was": and instead of "the Son," he says "the Word":
and declares "In the Beginning was the Word [611] ." What passion,
pray, is to be found in these words, "beginning," and "was," and
"Word"? Is "the beginning" passion? does "was" imply passion? does "the
Word" exist by means of passion? Or are we to say, that as passion is
not to be found in the terms used, so neither is affinity expressed by
the proclamation? Yet how could the Word's community of essence, and
real relationship, and coeternity with the Beginning, be more strongly
shown by other words than by these? For he does not say, "Of the
Beginning was begotten the Word," that he may not separate the Word
from the Beginning by any conception of extension in time, but he
proclaims together with the Beginning Him also Who was in the
Beginning, making the word "was" common to the Beginning and to the
Word, that the Word may not linger after the Beginning, but may, by
entering in together with the faith as to the Beginning, by its
proclamation forestall our hearing, before this admits the Beginning
itself in isolation. Then he declares, "And the Word was with God."
Once more the Evangelist fears for our untrained state, once more he
dreads our childish and untaught condition: he does not yet entrust to
our ears the appellation of "Father," lest any of the more carnally
minded, learning of "the Father," may be led by his understanding to
imagine also by consequence a mother. Neither does he yet name in his
proclamation the Son; for he still suspects our customary tendency to
the lower nature, and fears lest any, hearing of the Son, should
humanize the Godhead by an idea of passion. For this reason, resuming
his proclamation, he again calls him "the Word," making this the
account of His nature to thee in thine unbelief. For as thy word
proceeds from thy mind, without requiring the intervention of passion,
so here also, in hearing of the Word, thou shalt conceive that which is
from something, and shalt not conceive passion. Hence, once more
resuming his proclamation, he says, "And the Word was with God." O, how
does he make the Word commensurate with God! rather, how does he extend
the infinite in comparison with the infinite! "The Word was with
God"--the whole being of the Word, assuredly, with the whole being of
God. Therefore, as great as God is, so great, clearly, is the Word also
that is with Him; so that if God is limited, then will the Word also,
surely, be subject to limitation. But if the infinity of God exceeds
limit, neither is the Word that is contemplated with Him comprehended
by limits and measures. For no one would deny that the Word is
contemplated together with the entire Godhead of the Father, so that he
should make one part of the Godhead appear to be in the Word, and
another destitute of the Word. Once more the spiritual voice of John
speaks, once more the Evangelist in his proclamation takes tender care
for the hearing of those who are in childhood: not yet have we so much
grown by the hearing of his first words as to hear of "the Son," and
yet remain firm without being moved from our footing by the influence
of the wonted sense. Therefore our herald, crying once more aloud,
still proclaims in his third utterance "the Word," and not "the Son,"
saying, "And the Word was God." First he declared wherein He was, then
with whom He was, and now he says what He is, completing, by his third
repetition, the object of his proclamation. For he says, "It is no Word
of those that are readily understood, that I declare to you, but God
under the designation of the Word." For this Word, that was in the
Beginning, and was with God, was not anything else besides God, but was
also Himself God. And forthwith the herald, reaching the full height of
his lofty speech, declares that this God Whom his proclamation sets
forth is He by Whom all things were made, and is life, and the light of
men, and the true light that shineth in darkness, yet is not obscured
by the darkness, sojourning with His own, yet not received by His own:
and being made flesh, and tabernacling, by means of the flesh, in man's
nature. And when he has first gone through this number and variety of
statements, he then names the Father and the Only-begotten, when there
can be no danger that what has been purified by so many precautions
should be allowed, in consequence of the sense of the word "Father," to
sink down to any meaning tainted with pollution, for, "we beheld His
glory," he says, "the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father."

Repeat, then, Eunomius, repeat this clever objection of yours to the
Evangelist: "How dost thou give the name of `Father' in thy discourse,
how that of Only-begotten, seeing that all bodily generation is
operated by passion?" Surely truth answers you on his behalf, that the
mystery of theology is one thing, and the physiology of unstable bodies
is another. Wide is the interval by which they are fenced off one from
the other. Why do you join together in your argument what cannot blend?
how do you defile the purity of the Divine generation by your foul
discourse? how do you make systems for the incorporeal by the passions
that affect the body? Cease to draw your account of the nature of
things above from those that are below. I proclaim the Lord as the Son
of God, because the gospel from heaven, given through the bright cloud,
thus proclaimed Him; for "This," He saith, "is My beloved Son [612] ."
Yet, though I was taught that He is the Son, I was not dragged down by
the name to the earthly significance of "Son," but I both know that He
is from the Father and do not know that He is from passion. And this,
moreover, I will add to what has been said, that I know even a bodily
generation which is pure from passion, so that even on this point
Eunomius' physiology of bodily generation is proved false, if, that is
to say, a bodily birth can be found which does not admit passion. Tell
me, was the Word made flesh, or not? You would not, I presume, say that
It was not. It was so made, then, and there is none who denies it. How
then was it that "God was manifested in the flesh [613] "? "By birth,"
of course you will say. But what sort of birth do you speak of? Surely
it is clear that you speak of that from the virginity, and that "that
which was conceived in her was of the Holy Ghost [614] ," and that "the
days were accomplished that she should be delivered, and she brought
forth [615] ," and none the less was her purity preserved in her
child-bearing. You believe, then, that that birth which took place from
a woman was pure from passion, if you do believe, but you refuse to
admit the Divine and incorruptible generation from the Father, that you
may avoid the idea of passion in generation. But I know well that it is
not passion he seeks to avoid in his doctrine, for that he does not
discern at all in the Divine and incorruptible nature; but to the end
that the Maker of all creation may be accounted a part of creation, he
builds up these arguments in order to a denial of the Only-begotten
God, and uses his pretended caution about passion to help him in his
task.
__________________________________________________________________

[605] Reading, with the older editions, te theori& 139;. Oehler
substitutes ten theorian (a variation which seems to give no good
sense, unless theoria be translated as "subject of contemplation"), but
alleges no ms. authority for the change.

[606] Oehler's punctuation seems less clear than that of the older
editions, which is here followed.

[607] S. John iii. 10

[608] i.e.S. Basil.

[609] The reference is to S. Basil's treatise against Eunomius (ii.
7-8; p. 242-4 in the Benedictine ed.). Oehler's punctuation is
apparently wrong, for Gregory paraphrases not only the rule, but the
reason given for it, from S. Basil, from whom the last words of the
sentence are a direct quotation.

[610] 1 S. Pet. ii. 8.

[611] S. John i. 1

[612] S. Matt. xvii. 5.

[613] 1 Tim. iii. 16. Here, as elsewhere in Gregory's writings, it
appears that he read theos in this passage.

[614] S. Matt. i. 20

[615] S. Luke ii. 6, 7.
__________________________________________________________________

S:2. He convicts Eunomius of having used of the Only-begotten terms
applicable to the existence of the earth, and thus shows that his
intention is to prove the Son to be a being mutable and created.

And this he shows very plainly by his contention against our arguments,
where he says that "the essence of the Son came into being from the
Father, not put forth by way of extension, not separated from its
conjunction with Him that generated Him by flux or division, not
perfected by way of growth, not transformed by way of change, but
obtaining existence by the mere will of the Generator." Why, what man
whose mental senses are not closed up is left in ignorance by this
utterance that by these statements the Son is being represented by
Eunomius as a part of the creation? What hinders us from saying all
this word for word as it stands, about every single one of the things
we contemplate in creation? Let us apply, if you will, the definition
to any of the things that appear in creation, and if it does not admit
the same sequence, we will condemn ourselves for having examined the
definition slightingly, and not with the care that befits the truth.
Let us exchange, then, the name of the Son, and so read the definition
word by word. We say that the essence of the earth came into being from
the Father, not separated by way of extension or division from its
conjunction with Him Who generated it, nor perfected by way of growth,
nor put forth by way of change, but obtaining existence by the mere
will of Him Who generated it. Is there anything in what we have said
that does not apply to the existence of the earth? I think no one would
say so: for God did not put forth the earth by being extended, nor
bring its essence into existence by flowing or by dissevering Himself
from conjunction with Himself, nor did He bring it by means of gradual
growth from being small to completeness of magnitude, nor was He
fashioned into the form of earth by undergoing mutation or alteration,
but His will sufficed Him for the existence of all things that were
made: "He spake and they were generated [616] ," so that even the name
of "generation" does not fail to accord with the existence of the
earth. Now if these things may be truly said of the parts of the
universe, what doubt is still left as to our adversaries' doctrine,
that while, so far as words go, they call Him "Son," they represent Him
as being one of the things that came into existence by creation, set
before the rest only in precedence of order? just as you might say
about the trade of a smith, that from it come all things that are
wrought out of iron; but that the instrument of the tongs and hammer,
by which the iron is fashioned for use, existed before the making of
the rest; yet, while this has precedence of the rest, there is not on
that account any difference in respect of matter between the instrument
that fashions and the iron that is shaped by the instrument, (for both
one and the other are iron,) but the one form is earlier than the
other. Such is the theology of heresy touching the Son,--to imagine
that there is no difference between the Lord Himself and the things
that were made by Him, save the difference in respect of order.

Who that is in any sense classed among Christians admits that the
definition [617] of the essence of the parts of the world, and of Him
Who made the world, is the same? For my own part I shudder at the
blasphemy, knowing that where the definition of things is the same
neither is their nature different. For as the definition of the essence
of Peter and John and other men is common and their nature is one, in
the same way, if the Lord were in respect of nature even as the parts
of the world, they must acknowledge that He is also subject to those
things, whatever they may be, which they perceive in them. Now the
world does not last for ever: thus, according to them, the Lord also
will pass away with the heaven and the earth, if, as they say, He is of
the same kind with the world. If on the other hand He is confessed to
be eternal, we must needs suppose that the world too is not without
some part in the Divine nature, if, as they say, it corresponds with
the Only-begotten in the matter of creation. You see where this fine
process of inference makes the argument tend, like a stone broken off
from a mountain ridge and rushing down-hill by its own weight. For
either the elements of the world must be Divine, according to the
foolish belief of the Greeks, or the Son must not be worshipped. Let us
consider it thus. We say that the creation, both what is perceived by
the mind, and that which is of a nature to be perceived by sense, came
into being from nothing: this they declare also of the Lord. We say
that all things that have been made consist by the will of God: this
they tell us also of the Only-begotten. We believe that neither the
angelic creation nor the mundane is of the essence of Him that made it:
and they make Him also alien from the essence of the Father. We confess
that all things serve Him that made them: this view they also hold of
the Only-begotten. Therefore, of necessity, whatever else it may be
that they conceive of the creation, all these attributes they will also
attach to the Only-begotten: and whatever they believe of Him, this
they will also conceive of the creation: so that, if they confess the
Lord as God, they will also deify the rest of the creation. On the
other hand, if they define these things to be without share in the
Divine nature, they will not reject the same conception touching the
Only-begotten also. Moreover no sane man asserts Godhead of the
creation. Then neither--I do not utter the rest, lest I lend my tongue
to the blasphemy of the enemy. Let those say what consequence follows,
whose mouth is well trained in blasphemy. But their doctrine is evident
even if they hold their peace. For one of two things must necessarily
happen:--either they will depose the Only-begotten God, so that with
them He will no more either be, or be called so: or, if they assert
Godhead of Him, they will equally assert it of all creation:--or, (for
this is still left to them,) they will shun the impiety that appears on
either side, and take refuge in the orthodox doctrine, and will
assuredly agree with us that He is not created, that they may confess
Him to be truly God.

What need is there to take time to recount all the other blasphemies
that underlie his doctrine, starting from this beginning? For by what
we have quoted, one who considers the inference to be drawn will
understand that the father of falsehood, the maker of death, the
inventor of wickedness, being created in a nature intellectual and
incorporeal, was not by that nature hindered from becoming what he is
by way of change. For the mutability of essence, moved either way at
will, involves a capacity of nature that follows the impulse of
determination, so as to become that to which its determination leads
it. Accordingly they will define the Lord as being capable even of
contrary dispositions, drawing Him down as it were to a rank equal with
the angels, by the conception of creation [618] . But let them listen
to the great voice of Paul. Why is it that he says that He alone has
been called Son? Because He is not of the nature of angels, but of that
which is more excellent. "For unto which of the angels said He at any
time, `Thou art My Son, This day have I begotten Thee'? and when again
He bringeth the first-begotten into the world He saith, `And let all
the angels of God worship Him.' And of the angels He saith, `Who maketh
His angels spirits, and His ministers a flame of fire': but of the Son
He saith, `Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever; a sceptre of
righteousness is the sceptre of Thy kingdom [619] ,'" and all else that
the prophecy recites together with these words in declaring His
Godhead. And he adds also from another Psalm the appropriate words,
"Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth,
and the heavens are the works of Thine hands," and the rest, as far as
"But Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail [620] ," whereby
he describes the immutability and eternity of His nature. If, then, the
Godhead of the Only-begotten is as far above the angelic nature as a
master is superior to his slaves, how do they make common either with
the sensible creation Him Who is Lord of the creation, or with the
nature of the angels Him Who is worshipped by them [621] , by
detailing, concerning the manner of His existence, statements which
will properly apply to the individual things we contemplate in
creation, even as we already showed the account given by heresy,
touching the Lord, to be closely and appropriately applicable to the
making of the earth?
__________________________________________________________________

[616] Cf. Ps. xxxiii. 9, and Ps. cxlviii. 5, in LXX. (reading
egennethesan).

[617] The force of logos here appears to be nearly equivalent to
"idea," in the sense of an exact expression of the nature of a thing.
Gulonius renders it by "ratio."

[618] The argument appears to be this:--The Anomoeans assert, on the
ground that He is created, that the Son's essence is trepton, liable to
change; where there is the possibility of change, the nature must have
a capacity of inclining one way or the other, according to the balance
of will determining to which side the nature shall incline: and that
this is the condition of the angels may be seen from the instance of
the fallen angels, whose nature was inclined to evil by their
proairesis. It follows that to say the Son is treptos implies that He
is on a level with the angelic nature, and might fall even as the
angels fell.

[619] Cf. Heb. i. 4, and foll. It is to be noted that Gregory connects
palin in v. 6, with eisagage, not treating it, as the A.V. does, as
simply introducing another quotation. This appears from his later
reference to the text.

[620] Cf. Ps. cii. 25, 26.

[621] Oehler's punctuation here seems to be unsatisfactory.
__________________________________________________________________

S:3. He then again admirably discusses the term prototokos as it is
four times employed by the Apostle.

But that the readers of our work may find no ambiguity left of such a
kind as to afford any support to the heretical doctrines, it may be
worth while to add to the passages examined by us this point also from
Holy Scripture. They will perhaps raise a question from the very
apostolic writings which we quoted: "How could He be called `the
first-born of creation [622] ' if He were not what creation is? for
every first-born is the first-born not of another kind, but of its own:
as Reuben, having precedence in respect of birth of those who are
counted after him, was the first-born, a man the first-born of men; and
many others are called the first-born of the brothers who are reckoned
with them." They say then, "We assert that He Who is `the first-born of
creation' is of that same essence which we consider the essence of all
creation. Now if the whole creation is of one essence with the Father
of all, we will not deny that the first-born of creation is this also:
but if the God of all differs in essence from the creation, we must of
necessity say that neither has the first-born of creation community in
essence with God." The structure of this objection is not, I think, at
all less imposing in the form in which it is alleged by us, than in the
form in which it would probably be brought against us by our
adversaries. But what we ought to know as regards this point shall now,
so far as we are able, be plainly set forth in our discourse.

Four times the name of "first-born" or "first-begotten" is used by the
Apostle in all his writings: but he has made mention of the name in
different senses and not in the same manner. For now he speaks of "the
first-born of all creation [623] ," and again of "the first-born among
many brethren [624] ," then of "the first-born from the dead [625] ;"
and in the Epistle to the Hebrews the name of "first-begotten" is
absolute, being mentioned by itself: for he speaks thus, "When again He
bringeth the first-begotten into the world, He saith, `Let all the
angels worship Him [626] .'" As these passages are thus distinct, it
may be well to interpret each of them separately by itself, how He is
the "first-born of creation," how "among many brethren," how "from the
dead," and how, spoken of by Himself apart from each of these, when He
is again brought into the world, He is worshipped by all His angels.
Let us begin then, if you will, our survey of the passages before us
with the last-mentioned.

"When again He bringeth in," he says, "the first-begotten into the
world." The addition of "again" shows, by the force of this word, that
this event happens not for the first time: for we use this word of the
repetition of things which have once happened. He signifies, therefore,
by the phrase, the dread appearing of the Judge at the end of the ages,
when He is seen no more in the form of a servant, but seated in glory
upon the throne of His kingdom, and worshipped by all the angels that
are around Him. Therefore He Who once entered into the world, becoming
the first-born "from the dead," and "of His brethren," and "of all
creation," does not, when He comes again into the world as He that
judges the world in righteousness [627] , as the prophecy saith, cast
off the name of the first-begotten, which He once received for our
sakes; but as at the name of Jesus, which is above every name, every
knee bows [628] , so also the company of all the angels worships Him
Who comes in the name of the First-begotten, in their rejoicing over
the restoration of men, wherewith, by becoming the first-born among us,
He restored us again to the grace which we had at the beginning [629] .
For since there is joy among the angels over those who are rescued from
sin, (because until now that creation groaneth and travaileth in pain
at the vanity that affects us [630] , judging our perdition to be their
own loss,) when that manifestation of the sons of God takes place which
they look for and expect, and when the sheep is brought safe to the
hundred above, (and we surely--humanity that is to say--are that sheep
which the Good Shepherd saved by becoming the first-begotten [631] ,)
then especially will they offer, in their intense thanksgiving on our
behalf, their worship to God, Who by being first-begotten restored him
that had wandered from his Father's home.

Now that we have arrived at the understanding of these words, no one
could any longer hesitate as to the other passages, for what reason He
is the first-born, either "of the dead," or "of the creation," or
"among many brethren." For all these passages refer to the same point,
although each of them sets forth some special conception. He is the
first-born from the dead, Who first by Himself loosed the pains of
death [632] , that He might also make that birth of the resurrection a
way for all men [633] . Again, He becomes "the first-born among many
brethren," Who is born before us by the new birth of regeneration in
water, for the travail whereof the hovering of the Dove was the
midwife, whereby He makes those who share with Him in the like birth to
be His own brethren, and becomes the first-born of those who after Him
are born of water and of the Spirit [634] : and to speak briefly, as
there are in us three births, whereby human nature is quickened, one of
the body, another in the sacrament of regeneration, another by that
resurrection of the dead for which we look, He is first-born in all
three:--of the twofold regeneration which is wrought by two (by baptism
and by the resurrection), by being Himself the leader in each of them;
while in the flesh He is first-born, as having first and alone devised
in His own case that birth unknown to nature, which no one in the many
generations of men had originated. If these passages, then, have been
rightly understood, neither will the signification of the "creation,"
of which He is first-born, be unknown to us. For we recognize a twofold
creation of our nature, the first that whereby we were made, the second
that whereby we were made anew. But there would have been no need of
the second creation had we not made the first unavailing by our
disobedience. Accordingly, when the first creation had waxed old and
vanished away, it was needful that there should be a new creation in
Christ, (as the Apostle says, who asserts that we should no longer see
in the second creation any trace of that which has waxed old, saying,
"Having put off the old man with his deeds and his lusts, put on the
new man which is created according to God [635] ," and "If any man be
in Christ," he says, "he is a new creature: the old things are passed
away, behold all things are become new [636] :") --for the maker of
human nature at the first and afterwards is one and the same. Then He
took dust from the earth and formed man: again, He took dust from the
Virgin, and did not merely form man, but formed man about Himself:
then, He created; afterwards, He was created: then, the Word made
flesh; afterwards, the Word became flesh, that He might change our
flesh to spirit, by being made partaker with us in flesh and blood. Of
this new creation therefore in Christ, which He Himself began, He was
called the first-born, being the first-fruits of all, both of those
begotten into life, and of those quickened by resurrection of the dead,
"that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living [637] ," and
might sanctify the whole lump [638] by means of its first-fruits in
Himself. Now that the character of "first-born" does not apply to the
Son in respect of His pre-temporal existence the appellation of
"Only-begotten" testifies. For he who is truly only-begotten has no
brethren, for how could any one be only-begotten if numbered among
brethren? but as He is called God and man, Son of God and Son of
man,--for He has the form of God and the form of a servant [639] ,
being some things according to His supreme nature, becoming other
things in His dispensation of love to man,--so too, being the
Only-begotten God, He becomes the first-born of all creation,--the
Only-begotten, He that is in the bosom of the Father, yet, among those
who are saved by the new creation, both becoming and being called the
first born of the creation. But if, as heresy will have it, He is
called first-born because He was made before the rest of the creation,
the name does not agree with what they maintain concerning the
Only-begotten God. For they do not say this,--that the Son and the
universe were from the Father in like manner,--but they say, that the
Only-begotten God was made by the Father, and that all else was made by
the Only-begotten. Therefore on the same ground on which, while they
hold that the Son was created, they call God the Father of the created
Being, on the same ground, while they say that all things were made by
the Only-begotten God, they give Him the name not of the "first-born"
of the things that were made by Him, but more properly of their
"Father," as the same relation existing in both cases towards the
things created, logically gives rise to the same appellation. For if
God, Who is over all, is not properly called the "First-born," but the
Father of the Being He Himself created, the Only-begotten God will
surely also be called, by the same reasoning, the "father," and not
properly the "first-born" of His own creatures, so that the appellation
of "first-born" will be altogether improper and superfluous, having no
place in the heretical conception.
__________________________________________________________________

[622] Cf. Col. i. 15 Prototokos may be, as it is in the Authorized
Version, translated either by "first born," or by "first-begotten."
Compare with this passage Book II. S:8, where the use of the word in
Holy Scripture is discussed.

[623] Cf. Col. i. 15

[624] Rom. viii. 29.

[625] Col. i. 18.

[626] Cf. Heb. i. 6

[627] Ps. xcviii. 10.

[628] Cf. Phil. ii. 10

[629] Oehler's punctuation, which is probably due to a printer's error,
is here a good deal altered.

[630] Cf. Rom. viii. 19-23.

[631] This interpretation is of course common to many of the Fathers,
though S. Augustine, for instance, explains the "ninety and nine"
otherwise, and his explanation has been often followed by modern
writers and preachers. The present interpretation is assumed in a
prayer, no doubt of great antiquity, which is found in the Liturgy of
S. James, both in the Greek and the Syriac version, and also in the
Greek form of the Coptic Liturgy of S. Basil, where it is said to be
"from the Liturgy of S. James."

[632] Acts ii. 24.

[633] See Book II. S:S:4 and 8, and note on the former passage.

[634] With this passage may be compared the parallel passage in Bk. II.
S:8. The interpretation of the "many brethren" of those baptized
suggests that Gregory understood the "predestination" spoken of in Rom.
viii. 29 to be predestination to baptism.

[635] Cf. Col. iii. 9, and Eph. iv. 24.

[636] Cf. 2 Cor. v. 17

[637] Rom. xiv. 9.

[638] Cf. Rom. xi. 16

[639] Cf. Phil. ii. 6
__________________________________________________________________

S:4. He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord's
generation; and the folly of Eunomius, who says that the generated
essence involves the appellation of Son, and again, forgetting this,
denies the relation of the Son to the Father: and herein he speaks of
Circe and of the mandrake poison.

We must, however, return to those who connect passion with the Divine
generation, and on this account deny that the Lord is truly begotten,
in order to avoid the conception of passion. To say that passion is
absolutely linked with generation, and that on this account, in order
that the Divine nature may continue in purity beyond the reach of
passion, we ought to consider that the Son is alien to the idea of
generation, may perhaps appear reasonable in the eyes of those who are
easily deceived, but those who are instructed in the Divine mysteries
[640] have an answer ready to hand, based upon admitted facts. For who
knows not that it is generation that leads us back to the true and
blessed life, not being the same with that which takes place "of blood
and of the will of the flesh [641] ," in which are flux and change, and
gradual growth to perfection, and all else that we observe in our
earthly generation: but the other kind is believed to be from God, and
heavenly, and, as the Gospel says, "from above [642] ," which excludes
the passions of flesh and blood? I presume that they both admit the
existence of this generation, and find no passion in it. Therefore not
all generation is naturally connected with passion, but the material
generation is subject to passion, the immaterial pure from passion.
What constrains him then to attribute to the incorruptible generation
of the Son what properly belongs to the flesh, and, by ridiculing the
lower form of generation with his unseemly physiology, to exclude the
Son from affinity with the Father? For if, even in our own case, it is
generation that is the beginning of either life,--that generation which
is through the flesh of a life of passion, that which is spiritual of a
life of purity, (and no one who is in any sense numbered among
Christians would contradict this statement,)--how is it allowable to
entertain the idea of passion in thinking of generation as it concerns
the incorruptible Nature? Let us moreover examine this point in
addition to those we have mentioned. If they disbelieve the passionless
character of the Divine generation on the ground of the passion that
affects the flesh, let them also, from the same tokens, (those, I mean,
to be found in ourselves,) refuse to believe that God acts as a Maker
without passion. For if they judge of the Godhead by comparison of our
own conditions, they must not confess that God either begets or
creates; for neither of these operations is exercised by ourselves
without passion. Let them therefore either separate from the Divine
nature both creation and generation, that they may guard the
impassibility of God on either side, and let them, that the Father may
be kept safely beyond the range of passion, neither growing weary by
creation, nor being defiled by generation, entirely reject from their
doctrine the belief in the Only-begotten, or, if they agree [643] that
the one activity is exercised by the Divine power without passion, let
them not quarrel about the other: for if He creates without labour or
matter, He surely also begets without labour or flux.

And here once more I have in this argument the support of Eunomius. I
will state his nonsense concisely and briefly, epitomizing his whole
meaning. That men do not make materials for us, but only by their art
add form to matter,--this is the drift of what he says in the course of
a great quantity of nonsensical language. If, then, understanding
conception and formation to be included in the lower generation, he
forbids on this ground the pure notion of generation, by consequence,
on the same reasoning, since earthly creation is busied with the form,
but cannot furnish matter together with the form, let him forbid us
also, on this ground, to suppose that the Father is a Creator. If, on
the other hand, he refuses to conceive creation in the case of God
according to man's measure of power, let him also cease to slander
Divine generation by human imperfections. But, that his accuracy and
circumspection in argument may be more clearly established, I will
again return to a small point in his statements. He asserts that
"things which are respectively active and passive share one another's
nature," and mentions, after bodily generation, "the work of the
craftsman as displayed in materials." Now let the acute hearer mark how
he here fails in his proper aim, and wanders about among whatever
statements he happens to invent. He sees in things that come into being
by way of the flesh the "active and passive conceived, with the same
essence, the one imparting the essence, the other receiving it." Thus
he knows how to discern the truth with accuracy as regards the nature
of existing things, so as to separate the imparter and the receiver
from the essence, and to say that each of these is distinct in himself
apart from the essence. For he that receives or imparts is surely
another besides that which is given or received, so that we must first
conceive some one by himself, viewed in his own separate existence, and
then speak of him as giving that which he has, or receiving that which
he has not [644] . And when he has sputtered out this argument in such
a ridiculous fashion, our sage friend does not perceive that by the
next step he overthrows himself once more. For he who by his art forms
at his will the material before him, surely in this operation acts; and
the material, in receiving its form at the hand of him who exercises
the art, is passively affected: for it is not by remaining unaffected
and unimpressionable that the material receives its form. If then, even
in the case of things wrought by art, nothing can come into being
without passivity and action concurring to produce it, how can our
author think that he here abides by his own words? seeing that, in
declaring community of essence to be involved in the relation of action
and passion, he seems not only to attest in some sense community of
essence in Him that is begotten with Him that begat Him, but also to
make the whole creation of one essence [645] with its Maker, if, as he
says, the active and the passive are to be defined as mutually akin in
respect of nature. Thus, by the very arguments by which he establishes
what he wishes, he overthrows the main object of his effort, and makes
the glory of the coessential Son more secure by his own contention. For
if the fact of origination from anything shows the essence of the
generator to be in the generated, and if artificial fabrication (being
accomplished by means of action and passion) reduces both that which
makes and that which is produced to community of essence, according to
his account, our author in many places of his own writings maintains
that the Lord has been begotten. Thus by the very arguments whereby he
seeks to prove the Lord alien from the essence of the Father, he
asserts for Him intimate connexion. For if, according to his account,
separation in essence is not observed either in generation or in
fabrication, then, whatever he allows the Lord to be, whether "created"
or a "product of generation," he asserts, by both names alike, the
affinity of essence, seeing that he makes community of nature in active
and passive, in generator and generated, a part of his system.

Let us turn however to the next point of the argument. I beg my readers
not to be impatient at the minuteness of examination which extends our
argument to a length beyond what we would desire. For it is not any
ordinary matters on which we stand in danger, so that our loss would be
slight if we should hurry past any point that required more careful
attention, but it is the very sum of our hope that we have at stake.
For the alternative before us is, whether we should be Christians, not
led astray by the destructive wiles of heresy, or whether we should be
completely swept away into the conceptions of Jews or heathen. To the
end, then, that we may not suffer either of these things forbidden,
that we may neither agree with the doctrine of the Jews by a denial of
the verily begotten Son, nor be involved in the downfall of the
idolaters by the adoration of the creature, let us perforce spend some
time in the discussion of these matters, and set forth the very words
of Eunomius, which run thus:--

"Now as these things are thus divided, one might reasonably say that
the most proper and primary essence, and that which alone exists by the
operation of the Father, admits for itself the appellations of `product
of generation,' `product of making,' and `product of creation':" and a
little further on he says, "But the Son alone, existing by the
operation of the Father, possesses His nature and His relation to Him
that begat Him, without community [646] ." Such are his words. But let
us, like men who look on at their enemies engaged in a factious
struggle among themselves, consider first our adversaries' contention
against themselves, and so proceed to set forth on the other side the
true doctrine of godliness. "The Son alone," he says, "existing by the
operation of the Father, possesses His nature and His relation to Him
that begat Him, without community." But in his previous statements, he
says that he "does not refuse to call Him, that is begotten a `product
of generation,' as the generated essence itself, and the appellation of
Son, make such a relation of words appropriate."

The contradiction existing in these passages being thus evident, I am
inclined to admire for their acuteness those who praise this doctrine.
For it would be hard to say to which of his statements they could turn
without finding themselves at variance with the remainder. His earlier
statement represented that the generated essence, and the appellation
of "Son," made such a relation of words appropriate. His present system
says the contrary:--that "the Son possesses His relation to Him that
begat Him without community." If they believe the first statement, they
will surely not accept the second: if they incline to the latter, they
will find themselves opposed to the earlier conception. Who will stay
the combat? Who will mediate in this civil war? Who will bring this
discord into agreement, when the very soul is divided against itself by
the opposing statements, and drawn in different ways to contrary
doctrines? Perhaps we may see here that dark saying of prophecy which
David speaks of the Jews--"They were divided but were not pricked at
heart [647] ." For lo, not even when they are divided among contrariety
of doctrines have they a sense of their discordancy, but they are
carried about by their ears like wine-jars, borne around at the will of
him who shifts them. It pleased him to say that the generated essence
was closely connected with the appellation of "Son": straightway, like
men asleep, they nodded assent to his remarks. He changed his statement
again to the contrary one, and denies the relation of the Son to Him
that begat Him: again his well-beloved friends join in assent to this
also, shifting in whatever direction he chooses, as the shadows of
bodies change their form by spontaneous mimicry with the motion of the
advancing figure, and even if he contradicts himself, accepting that
also. This is another form of the drought that Homer tells us of, not
changing the bodies of those who drink its poison into the forms of
brutes, but acting on their souls to produce in them a change to a
state void of reason. For of those men, the tale tells that their mind
was sound, while their form was changed to that of beasts, but here,
while their bodies remain in their natural state, their souls are
transformed to the condition of brutes. And as there the poet's tale of
wonder says that those who drank the drug were changed into the forms
of various beasts, at the pleasure of her who beguiled their nature,
the same thing happens now also from this Circe's cup. For they who
drink the deceit of sorcery from the same writing are changed to
different forms of doctrine, transformed now to one, now to another.
And meanwhile these very ridiculous people, according to the revised
edition of the fable, are still well pleased with him who leads them to
such absurdity, and stoop to gather the words he scatters about, as if
they were cornel fruit or acorns, running greedily like swine to the
doctrines that are shed on the ground, not being naturally capable of
fixing their gaze on those which are lofty and heavenly. For this
reason it is that they do not see the tendency of his argument to
contrary positions, but snatch without examination what comes in their
way: and as they say that the bodies of men stupefied with mandrake are
held in a sort of slumber and inability to move, so are the senses of
these men's souls affected, being made torpid as regards the
apprehension of deceit. It is certainly a terrible thing to be held in
unconsciousness by hidden guile, as the result of some fallacious
argument: yet where it is involuntary the misfortune is excusable: but
to be brought to make trial of evil as the result of a kind of
forethought and zealous desire, not in ignorance of what will befall,
surpasses every extreme of misery. Surely we may well complain, when we
hear that even greedy fish avoid the steel when it comes near them
unbaited, and take down the hook only when hope of food decoys them to
a bait: but where the evil is apparent, to go over of their own accord
to this destruction is a more wretched thing than the folly of the
fish: for these are led by their greediness to a destruction that is
concealed from them, but the others swallow with open mouth the hook of
impiety in its bareness, satisfied with destruction under the influence
of some unreasoning passion. For what could be clearer than this
contradiction--than to say that the same Person was begotten and is a
thing created, and that something is closely connected with the name of
"Son," and, again, is alien from the sense of "Son"? But enough of
these matters.
__________________________________________________________________

[640] That is, in the sacramental doctrine with regard to Holy Baptism.

[641] S. John i. 13

[642] S. John iii. 3, where anothen may be interpreted either "from
above" or as in A.V.

[643] Reading ei for eis, according to Oehler's suggestion.

[644] It is not quite clear whether any of this passage, or, if so, how
much of it, is a direct quotation from Eunomius. Probably only the
phrase about the imparting and receiving of the essence is taken from
him, the rest of the passage being Gregory's expansion of the phrase
into a distinction between the essence and the thing of which it is the
essence, so that the thing can be viewed apart from its own essence.

[645] homoousion

[646] This seems to be the force of akoinoneton: it is clear from what
follows that it is to be understood as denying community of essence
between the Father and the Son, not as asserting only the unique
character alike of the Son and of His relation to the Father.

[647] This is the LXX. version of the last part of Ps. xxxv. 15, a
rendering with which the Vulgate version practically agrees.
__________________________________________________________________

S:5. He again shows Eunomius, constrained by truth, in the character of
an advocate of the orthodox doctrine, confessing as most proper and
primary, not only the essence of the Father, but the essence also of
the Only-begotten.

It might, however, be useful to look at the sense of the utterance of
Eunomius that is set before us in orderly sequence, recurring to the
beginning of his statement. For the points we have now examined were an
obvious incitement to us to begin our reply with the last passage, on
account of the evident character of the contradiction involved in his
words.

This, then, is what Eunomius says at the beginning:--

"Now, as these things are thus divided, one might reasonably say that
the most proper and primary essence, and that which alone exists by the
operation of the Father, admits for itself the appellations of `product
of generation,' `product of making,' and `product of creation.'" First,
then, I would ask those who are attending to this discourse to bear in
mind, that in his first composition he says that the essence of the
Father also is "most proper," introducing his statement with these
words, "The whole account of our teaching is completed with the supreme
and most proper essence." And here he calls the essence of the
Only-begotten "most proper and primary." Thus putting together
Eunomius' phrases from each of his books, we shall call him himself as
a witness of the community of essence, who in another place makes a
declaration to this effect, that "of things which have the same
appellations, the nature also is not different" in any way. For our
self-contradictory friend would not indicate things differing in nature
by identity of appellation, but it is surely for this reason, that the
definition of essence in Father and Son is one, that he says that the
one is "most proper," and that the other also is "most proper." And the
general usage of men bears witness to our argument, which does not
apply the term "most proper" where the name does not truly agree with
the nature. For instance, we call a likeness, inexactly, "a man," but
what we properly designate by this name is the animal presented to us
in nature. And similarly, the language of Scripture recognizes the
appellation of "god" for an idol, and for a demon, and for the belly:
but here too the name has not its proper sense; and in the same way
with all other cases. A man is said to have eaten food in the fancy of
a dream, but we cannot call this fancy food, in the proper sense of the
term. As, then, in the case of two men existing naturally, we properly
call both equally by the name of man, while if any one should join an
inanimate portrait in his enumeration with a real man, one might
perhaps speak of him who really exists and of the likeness, as "two
men," but would no longer attribute to both the proper meaning of the
word, so, on the supposition that the nature of the Only-begotten was
conceived as something else than the essence of the Father, our author
would not have called each of the essences "most proper." For how could
any one signify things differing in nature by identity of names? Surely
the truth seems to be made plain even by those who fight against it, as
falsehood is unable, even when expressed in the words of the enemy,
utterly to prevail over truth. Hence the doctrine of orthodoxy is
proclaimed by the mouth of its opponents, without their knowing what
they say, as the saving Passion of the Lord for us had been foretold in
the case of Caiaphas, not knowing what he said [648] . If, therefore,
true propriety of essence is common to both (I mean to the Father and
the Son), what room is there for saying that their essences are
mutually divergent? Or how is a difference by way of superior power, or
greatness, or honour, contemplated in them, seeing that the "most
proper" essence admits of no diminution? For that which is whatever it
is imperfectly, is not that thing "most properly," be it nature, or
power, or rank, or any other individual object of contemplation, so
that the superiority of the Father's essence, as heresy will have it,
proves the imperfection of the essence of the Son. If then it is
imperfect, it is not proper; but if it is "most proper" it is also
surely perfect. For it is not possible to call that which is deficient
perfect. But neither is it possible, when, in comparing them, that
which is perfect is set beside that which is perfect, to perceive any
difference by way of excess or defect: for perfection is one in both
cases, as in a rule, not showing a hollow by defect, nor a projection
by excess. Thus, from these passages Eunomius' advocacy in favour of
our doctrine may be sufficiently seen--I should rather say, not his
earnestness on our behalf, but his conflict with himself. For he turns
against himself those devices whereby he establishes our doctrines by
his own arguments. Let us, however, once more follow his writings word
for word, that it may be clear to all that their argument has no power
for evil except the desire to do mischief.
__________________________________________________________________

[648] S. John xi. 51
__________________________________________________________________

S:6. He then exposes argument about the "Generate," and the "product of
making," and "product of creation," and shows the impious nature of the
language of Eunomius and Theognostus on the "immediate" and "undivided"
character of the essence, and its "relation to its creator and maker."

Let us listen, then, to what he says. "One might reasonably say that
the most proper and primary essence, and that which alone exists by the
operation of the Father, admits for itself the appellations of `product
of generation,' `product of making,' and `product of creation.'" Who
knows not that what separates the Church from heresy is this term,
"product of creation," applied to the Son? Accordingly, the doctrinal
difference being universally acknowledged, what would be the reasonable
course for a man to take who endeavours to show that his opinions are
more true than ours? Clearly, to establish his own statement, by
showing, by such proofs as he could, that we ought to consider that the
Lord is created. Or omitting this, should he rather lay down a law for
his readers that they should speak of matters of controversy as if they
were acknowledged facts? For my own part, I think he should take the
former course, and perhaps all who possess any share of intelligence
demand this of their opponents, that they should, to begin with,
establish upon some incontrovertible basis the first principle of their
argument, and so proceed to press their theory by inferences. Now our
writer leaves alone the task of establishing the view that we should
think He is created, and goes on to the next steps, fitting on the
inferential process of his argument to this unproved assumption, being
just in the condition of those men whose minds are deep in foolish
desires, with their thoughts wandering upon a kingdom, or upon some
other object of pursuit. They do not think how any of the things on
which they set their hearts could possibly be, but they arrange and
order their good fortune for themselves at their pleasure, as if it
were theirs already, straying with a kind of pleasure among
non-existent things. So, too, our clever author somehow or other lulls
his own renowned dialectic to sleep, and before giving a demonstration
of the point at issue, he tells, as if to children, the tale of this
deceitful and inconsequent folly of his own doctrine, setting it forth
like a story told at a drinking-party. For he says that the essence
which "exists by the operation of the Father" admits the appellation of
"product of generation," and of "product of making," and of "product of
creation." What reasoning showed us that the Son exists by any
constructive operation, and that the nature of the Father remains
inoperative with regard to the Personal existence [649] of the Son?
This was the very point at issue in the controversy, whether the
essence of the Father begat the Son, or whether it made Him as one of
the external things which accompany His nature [650] . Now seeing that
the Church, according to the Divine teaching, believes the
Only-begotten to be verily God, and abhors the superstition of
polytheism, and for this cause does not admit the difference of
essences, in order that the Godheads may not, by divergence of essence,
fall under the conception of number (for this is nothing else than to
introduce polytheism into our life)--seeing, I say, that the Church
teaches this in plain language, that the Only-begotten is essentially
God, very God of the essence of the very God, how ought one who opposes
her decisions to overthrow the preconceived opinion? Should he not do
so by establishing the opposing statement, demonstrating the disputed
point from some acknowledged principle? I think no sensible man would
look for anything else than this. But our author starts from the
disputed points, and takes, as though it were admitted, matter which is
in controversy as a principle for the succeeding argument. If it had
first been shown that the Son had His existence through some operation,
what quarrel should we have with what follows, that he should say that
the essence which exists through an operation admits for itself the
name of "product of making"? But let the advocates of error tell us how
the consequence has any force, so long as the antecedent remains
unestablished. For supposing one were to grant by way of hypothesis
that man is winged, there will be no question of concession about what
comes next: for he who becomes winged will fly in some way or other,
and lift himself up on high above the earth, soaring through the air on
his wings. But we have to see how he whose nature is not aerial could
become winged, and if this condition does not exist, it is vain to
discuss the next point. Let our author, then, show this to begin with,
that it is in vain that the Church has believed that the Only-begotten
Son truly exists, not adopted by a Father falsely so called, but
existing according to nature, by generation from Him Who is, not
alienated from the essence of Him that begat Him. But so long as his
primary proposition remains unproved, it is idle to dwell on those
which are secondary. And let no one interrupt me, by saying that what
we confess should also be confirmed by constructive reasoning: for it
is enough for proof of our statement, that the tradition has come down
to us from our fathers, handed on, like some inheritance, by succession
from the apostles and the saints who came after them. They, on the
other hand, who change their doctrines to this novelty, would need the
support of arguments in abundance, if they were about to bring over to
their views, not men light as dust, and unstable, but men of weight and
steadiness: but so long as their statement is advanced without being
established, and without being proved, who is so foolish and so brutish
as to account the teaching of the evangelists and apostles, and of
those who have successively shone like lights in the churches, of less
force than this undemonstrated nonsense?

Let us further look at the most remarkable instance of our author's
cleverness; how, by the abundance of his dialectic skill, he
ingeniously draws over to the contrary view the more simple sort. He
throws in, as an addition to the title of "product of making," and that
of "product of creation," the further phrase, "product of generation,"
saying that the essence of the Son "admits these names for itself"; and
thinks that, so long as he harangues as if he were in some gathering of
topers, his knavery in dealing with doctrine will not be detected by
any one. For in joining "product of generation" with "product of
making," and "product of creation," he thinks that he stealthily makes
away with the difference in significance between the names, by putting
together what have nothing in common. These are his clever tricks of
dialectic; but we mere laymen in argument [651] do not deny that, so
far as voice and tongue are concerned, we are what his speech sets
forth about us, but we allow also that our ears, as the prophet says,
are made ready for intelligent hearing. Accordingly, we are not moved,
by the conjunction of names that have nothing in common, to make a
confusion between the things they signify: but even if the great
Apostle names together wood, hay, stubble, gold, silver, and precious
stones [652] , we reckon up summarily the number of things he mentions,
and yet do not fail to recognize separately the nature of each of the
substances named. So here, too, when "product of generation" and
"product of making" are named together, we pass from the sounds to the
sense, and do not behold the same meaning in each of the names; for
"product of creation" means one thing, and "product of generation"
another: so that even if he tries to mingle what will not blend, the
intelligent hearer will listen with discrimination, and will point out
that it is an impossibility for any one nature to "admit for itself"
the appellation of "product of generation," and that of "product of
creation." For, if one of these were true, the other would necessarily
be false, so that, if the thing were a product of creation, it would
not be a product of generation, and conversely, if it were called a
product of generation, it would be alienated from the title of "product
of creation." Yet Eunomius tells us that the essence of the Son "admits
for itself the appellations of `product of generation,' `product of
making,' and `product of creation'"!

Does he, by what still remains, make at all more secure this headless
and rootless statement of his, in which, in its earliest stage, nothing
was laid down that had any force with regard to the point he is trying
to establish? or does the rest also cling to the same folly, not
deriving its strength from any support it gets from argument, but
setting out its exposition of blasphemy with vague details like the
recital of dreams? He says (and this he subjoins to what I have already
quoted)--"Having its generation without intervention, and preserving
indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator." Well,
if we were to leave alone the absence of intervention and of division,
and look at the meaning of the words as it stands by itself, we shall
find that everywhere his absurd teaching is cast upon the ears of those
whom he deceives, without corroboration from a single argument. "Its
Generator, and Maker, and Creator," he says. These names, though they
seem to be three, include the sense of but two concepts, since two of
the words are equivalent in meaning. For to make is the same as to
create, but generation is another thing distinct from those spoken of.
Now, seeing that the result of the signification of the words is to
divide the ordinary apprehension of men into different ideas, what
argument demonstrates to us that making is the same thing with
generation, to the end that we may accommodate the one essence to this
difference of terms? For so long as the ordinary significance of the
words holds, and no argument is found to transfer the sense of the
terms to an opposite meaning, it is not possible that any one nature
should be divided between the conception of "product of making," and
that of "product of generation." Since each of these terms, used by
itself, has a meaning of its own, we must also suppose the relative
conjunction in which they stand to be appropriate and germane to the
terms. For all other relative terms have their connection, not with
what is foreign and heterogeneous, but, even if the correlative term be
suppressed, we hear spontaneously, together with the primary word, that
which is linked with it, as in the case of "maker," "slave," "friend,"
"son," and so forth. For all names that are considered as relative to
another, present to us, by the mention of them, each its proper and
closely connected relationship with that which it declares, while they
avoid all mixture of that which is heterogeneous [653] . For neither is
the name of "maker" linked with the word "son," nor the term "slave"
referred to the term "maker," nor does "friend" present to us a
"slave," nor "son" a "master," but we recognize clearly and distinctly
the connection of each of these with its correlative, conceiving by the
word "friend" another friend; by "slave," a master; by "maker," work;
by "son," a father. In the same way, then, "product of generation" has
its proper relative sense; with the "product of generation," surely, is
linked the generator, and with the "product of creation" the creator;
and we must certainly, if we are not prepared by a substitution of
names to introduce a confusion of things, preserve for each of the
relative terms that which it properly connotes.

Now, seeing that the tendency of the meaning of these words is
manifest, how comes it that one who advances his doctrine by the aid of
logical system failed to perceive in these names their proper relative
sense? But he thinks that he is linking on the "product of generation"
to "maker," and the "product of making" to "generator," by saying that
the essence of the Son "admits for itself the appellations of `product
of generation,' `product of making,' and `product of creation,'" and
"preserves indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and
Creator." For it is contrary to nature, that a single thing should be
split up into different relations. But the Son is properly related to
the Father, and that which is begotten to him that begat it, while the
"product of making" has its relation to its "maker"; save if one might
consider some inexact use, in some undistinguishing way of common
parlance, to overrule the strict signification.

By what reasoning then is it, and by what arguments, according to that
invincible logic of his, that he wins back the opinion of the mass of
men, and follows out at his pleasure this line of thought, that as the
God Who is over all is conceived and spoken of both as "Creator" and as
"Father," the Son has a close connection with both titles, being
equally called both "product of creation" and "product of generation"?
For as customary accuracy of speech distinguishes between names of this
kind, and applies the name of "generation" in the case of things
generated from the essence itself, and understands that of "creation"
of those things which are external to the nature of their maker, and as
on this account the Divine doctrines, in handing down the knowledge of
God, have delivered to us the names of "Father" and "Son," not those of
"Creator" and "work," that there might arise no error tending to
blasphemy (as might happen if an appellation of the latter kind
repelled the Son to the position of an alien and a stranger), and that
the impious doctrines which sever the Only-begotten from essential
affinity with the Father might find no entrance--seeing all this, I
say, he who declares that the appellation of "product of making" is one
befitting the Son, will safely say by consequence that the name of
"Son" is properly applicable to that which is the product of making; so
that, if the Son is a "product of making," the heaven is called "Son,"
and the individual things that have been made are, according to our
author, properly named by the appellation of "Son." For if He has this
name, not because He shares in nature with Him that begat Him, but is
called Son for this reason, that He is created, the same argument will
permit that a lamb, a dog, a frog, and all things that exist by the
will of their maker, should be named by the title of "Son." If, on the
other hand, each of these is not a Son and is not called God, by reason
of its being external to the nature of the Son, it follows, surely,
that He Who is truly Son is Son, and is confessed to be God by reason
of His being of the very nature of Him that begat Him. But Eunomius
abhors the idea of generation, and excludes it from the Divine
doctrine, slandering the term by his fleshly speculations. Well, our
discourse, in what precedes, showed sufficiently on this point that, as
the Psalmist says, "they are afraid where no fear is [654] ." For if it
was shown in the case of men that not all generation exists by way of
passion, but that that which is material is by passion, while that
which is spiritual is pure and incorruptible, (for that which is
begotten of the Spirit is spirit and not flesh, and in spirit we see no
condition that is subject to passion,) since our author thought it
necessary to estimate the Divine power by means of examples among
ourselves, let him persuade himself to conceive from the other mode of
generation the passionless character of the Divine generation.
Moreover, by mixing up together these three names, of which two are
equivalent, he thinks that his readers, by reason of the community of
sense in the two phrases, will jump to the conclusion that the third is
equivalent also. For since the appellation of "product of making," and
"product of creation," indicate that the thing made is external to the
nature of the maker, he couples with these the phrase, "product of
generation," that this too may be interpreted along with those above
mentioned. But argument of this sort is termed fraud and falsehood and
imposition, not a thoughtful and skilful demonstration. For that only
is called demonstration which shows what is unknown from what is
acknowledged; but to reason fraudulently and fallaciously, to conceal
your own reproach, and to confound by superficial deceits the
understanding of men, as the Apostle says, "of corrupt minds [655] ,"
this no sane man would call a skilful demonstration.

Let us proceed, however, to what follows in order. He says that the
generation of the essence is "without intervention," and that it
"preserves indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and
Creator." Well, if he had spoken of the immediate and indivisible
character of the essence, and stopped his discourse there, it would not
have swerved from the orthodox view, since we too confess the close
connection and relation of the Son with the Father, so that there is
nothing inserted between them which is found to intervene in the
connection of the Son with the Father, no conception of interval, not
even that minute and indivisible one, which, when time is divided into
past, present, and future, is conceived indivisibly by itself as the
present, as it cannot be considered as a part either of the past or of
the future, by reason of its being quite without dimensions and
incapable of division, and unobservable, to whichever side it might be
added. That, then, which is perfectly immediate, admits we say, of no
such intervention; for that which is separated by any interval would
cease to be immediate. If, therefore, our author, likewise, in saying
that the generation of the Son is "without intervention," excluded all
these ideas, then he laid down the orthodox doctrine of the conjunction
of Him Who is with the Father. When, however, as though in a fit of
repentance, he straightway proceeded to add to what he had said that
the essence "preserves its relation to its Generator, Maker, and
Creator," he polluted his first statement by his second, vomiting forth
his blasphemous utterance upon the pure doctrine. For it is clear that
there too his "without intervention" has no orthodox intention, but, as
one might say that the hammer is mediate between the smith and the
nail, but its own making is "without intervention," because, when tools
had not yet been found out by the craft, the hammer came first from the
craftsman's hands by some inventive process, not [656] by means of any
other tool, and so by it the others were made; so the phrase, "without
intervention," indicates that this is also our author's conception
touching the Only-begotten. And here Eunomius is not alone in his error
as regards the enormity of his doctrine, but you may find a parallel
also in the works of Theognostus [657] , who says that God, wishing to
make this universe, first brought the Son into existence as a sort of
standard of the creation; not perceiving that in his statement there is
involved this absurdity, that what exists, not for its own sake, but
for the sake of something else, is surely of less value than that for
the sake of which it exists: as we provide an implement of husbandry
for the sake of life, yet the plough is surely not reckoned as equally
valuable with life. So, if the Lord also exists on account of the
world, and not all things on account of Him, the whole of the things
for the sake of which they say He exists, would be more valuable than
the Lord. And this is what they are here establishing by their
argument, where they insist that the Son has His relation to His
Creator and Maker "without intervention."
__________________________________________________________________

[649] hupostasin

[650] At a later stage Gregory points out that the idea of creation is
involved, if the thing produced is external to the nature of the Maker.

[651] This phrase seems to be quoted from Eunomius. The reference to
the "prophet" may possibly be suggested by Is. vi. 9-10: but it is more
probably only concerned with the words otia and akoen, as applied to
convey the idea of mental alertness.

[652] Cf. 1 Cor. iii. 12.

[653] E.g."A thing made" suggests to us the thought of a "maker," "a
maker" the thought of the thing made; and they suggest also a close
connection as existing between the two correlative terms of one of
which the name is uttered; but neither suggests in the same way any
term which is not correlative, or with which it is not, in some manner,
in pari materia.

[654] Cf. Ps. liii. 6

[655] 2 Tim. iii. 8.

[656] It seems necessary for the sense to read ou di' heterou tinos
organou, since the force of the comparison consists in the hammer being
produced immediately by the smith: otherwise we must understand di'
heterou tinos organou to refer to the employment of some tool not
properly belonging to the techne of the smith: but even so the parallel
would be destroyed.

[657] Theognostus, a writer of the third century, is said to have been
the head of the Catechetical School at Alexandria, and is quoted by S.
Athanasius as an authority against the Arians. An account of his work
is to be found in Photius, and this is extracted and printed with the
few remaining fragments of his actual writings in the 3rd volume of
Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae.
__________________________________________________________________

S:7. He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the
impossibility of comparison with the things made after the Son, and
exposes the idolatry contrived by Eunomius, and concealed by the
terminology of "Son" and "Only-begotten," to deceive his readers.

In the remainder of the passage, however, he becomes conciliatory, and
says that the essence "is not compared with any of the things that were
made by it and after it [658] ." Such are the gifts which the enemies
of the truth offer to the Lord [659] , by which their blasphemy is made
more manifest. Tell me what else is there of all things in creation
that admits of comparison with a different thing, seeing that the
characteristic nature that appears in each absolutely rejects community
with things of a different kind [660] ? The heaven admits no comparison
with the earth, nor this with the stars, nor the stars with the seas,
nor water with stone, nor animals with trees, nor land animals with
winged creatures, nor four-footed beasts with those that swim, nor
irrational with rational creatures. Indeed, why should one take up time
with individual instances, in showing that we may say of every single
thing that we behold in the creation, precisely what was thrown to the
Only-begotten, as if it were something special--that He admits of
comparison with none of the things that have been produced after Him
and by Him? For it is clear that everything which you conceive by
itself is incapable of comparison with the universe, and with the
individual things which compose it; and it is this, which may be truly
said of any creature you please, which is allotted by the enemies of
the truth, as adequate and sufficient for His honour and glory, to the
Only-begotten God! And once more, putting together phrases of the same
sort in the remainder of the passage, he dignifies Him with his empty
honours, calling Him "Lord" and "Only-begotten": but that no orthodox
meaning may be conveyed to his readers by these names, he promptly
mixes up blasphemy with the more notable of them. His phrase runs
thus:--"Inasmuch," he says, "as the generated essence leaves no room
for community to anything else (for it is only-begotten [661] ), nor is
the operation of the Maker contemplated as common." O marvellous
insolence! as though he were addressing his harangue to brutes, or
senseless beings "which have no understanding [662] ," he twists his
argument about in contrary ways, as he pleases; or rather he suffers as
men do who are deprived of sight; for they too behave often in unseemly
ways before the eyes of those who see, supposing, because they
themselves cannot see, that they are also unseen. For what sort of man
is it who does not see the contradiction in his words? Because it is
"generated," he says, the essence leaves other things no room for
community, for it is only-begotten; and then when he has uttered these
words, really as though he did not see or did not suppose himself to be
seen, he tacks on, as if corresponding to what he has said, things that
have nothing in common with them, coupling "the operation of the maker"
with the essence of the Only-begotten. That which is generated is
correlative to the generator, and the Only-begotten, surely, by
consequence, to the Father; and he who looks to the truth beholds, in
co-ordination with the Son, not "the operation of the maker," but the
nature of Him that begat Him. But he, as if he were talking about
plants or seeds, or some other thing in the order of creation, sets
"the operation of the maker" by the side of the existence [663] of the
Only-begotten. Why, if a stone or a stick, or something of that sort,
were the subject of consideration, it would be logical to pre-suppose
"the operation of the maker"; but if the Only-begotten God is
confessed, even by His adversaries, to be a Son, and to exist by way of
generation, how do the same words befit Him that befit the lowest
portions of the creation? how do they think it pious to say concerning
the Lord the very thing which may be truly said of an ant or a gnat?
For if any one understood the nature of an ant, and its peculiar ties
in reference to other living things, he would not be beyond the truth
in saying that "the operation of its maker is not contemplated as
common" with reference to the other things. What, therefore, is
affirmed of such things as these, this they predicate also of the
Only-begotten, and as hunters are said to intercept the passage of
their game with holes, and to conceal their design by covering over the
mouths of the holes with some unsound and unsubstantial material, in
order that the pit may seem level with the ground about it, so heresy
contrives against men something of the same sort, covering over the
hole of their impiety with these fine-sounding and pious names, as it
were with a level thatch, so that those who are rather unintelligent,
thinking that these men's preaching is the same with the true faith,
because of the agreement of their words, hasten towards the mere name
of the Son and the Only-begotten, and step into emptiness in the hole,
since the significance of these titles will not sustain the weight of
their tread, but lets them down into the pitfall of the denial of
Christ. This is why he speaks of the generated essence that leaves
nothing room for community, and calls it "Only-begotten." These are the
coverings of the hole. But when any one stops before he is caught in
the gulf, and puts forth the test of argument, like a hand, upon his
discourse, he sees the dangerous downfall of idolatry lying beneath the
doctrine. For when he draws near, as though to God and the Son of God,
he finds a creature of God set forth for his worship. This is why they
proclaim high and low the name of the Only-begotten, that the
destruction may be readily accepted by the victims of their deceit, as
though one were to mix up poison in bread, and give a deadly greeting
to those who asked for food, who would not have been willing to take
the poison by itself, had they not been enticed to what they saw. Thus
he has a sharp eye to the object of his efforts, at least so far as his
own opinion goes. For if he had entirely rejected from his teaching the
name of the Son, his falsehood would not have been acceptable to men,
when his denial was openly stated in a definite proclamation; but now
leaving only the name, and changing the signification of it to express
creation, he at once sets up his idolatry, and fraudulently hides its
reproach. But since we are bidden not to honour God with our lips [664]
, and piety is not tested by the sound of a word, but the Son must
first be the object of belief in the heart unto righteousness, and then
be confessed with the mouth unto salvation [665] , and those who say in
their hearts that He is not God, even though with their mouths they
confess Him as Lord, are corrupt and became abominable [666] , as the
prophet says,--for this cause, I say, we must look to the mind of those
who put forward, forsooth, the words of the faith, and not be enticed
to follow their sound. If, then, one who speaks of the Son does not by
that word refer to a creature, he is on our side and not on the
enemy's; but if any one applies the name of Son to the creation, he is
to be ranked among idolaters. For they too gave the name of God to
Dagon and Bel and the Dragon, but they did not on that account worship
God. For the wood and the brass and the monster were not God.
__________________________________________________________________

[658] Oehler's proposal to read "vel invitis libris quod sententia
flagitat ton di autou kai met' auton" does not seem necessary. autes
and auten refer to ousia, the quotation being made (not verbally) from
Eunomius, not from Theognostus, and following apparently the phrase
about "preserving the relation," etc. If the clause were a continuation
of the quotation from Theognostus, we should have to follow Oehler's
proposal.

[659] Reading, according to Cotelerius' suggestion, (mentioned with
approval by Oehler, though not followed by him,) dorophorousin for
doruphorousin

[660] That is to say, because there is no "common measure" of the
distinct natures.

[661] Altering Oehler's punctuation; it is the fact that the essence is
monogenes which excludes all other things from community with it.

[662] Ps. xxxii. 9.

[663] hupostase.

[664] Cf. Is. xxix. 13

[665] Cf. Rom. x. 10

[666] Cf. Ps. xiii. 2
__________________________________________________________________

S:8. He proceeds to show that there is no "variance" in the essence of
the Father and the Son: wherein he expounds many forms of variation and
harmony, and explains the "form," the "seal," and the "express image."

But what need is there in our discourse to reveal his hidden deceit by
mere guesses at his intention, and possibly to give our hearers
occasions for objection, on the ground that we make these charges
against our enemies untruly? For lo, he sets forth to us his blasphemy
in its nakedness, not hiding his guile by any veil, but speaking boldly
in his absurdities with unrestrained voice. What he has written runs
thus:--"We, for our part," he says, "as we find nothing else besides
the essence of the Son which admits of the generation, are of opinion
that we must assign the appellations to the essence itself, or else we
speak of `Son' and `begotten' to no purpose, and as a mere verbal
matter, if we are really to separate them from the essence; starting
from these names, we also confidently maintain that the essences are
variant from each other [667] ."

There is no need, I imagine, that the absurdity here laid down should
be refuted by arguments from us. The mere reading of what he has
written is enough to pillory his blasphemy. But let us thus examine it.
He says that the essences of the Father and the Son are "variant." What
is meant by "variant"? Let us first of all examine the force of the
term as it is applied by itself [668] , that by the interpretation of
the word its blasphemous character may be more clearly revealed. The
term "variance" is used, in the inexact sense sanctioned by custom, of
bodies, when, by palsy or any other disease, any limb is perverted from
its natural co-ordination. For we speak, comparing the state of
suffering with that of health, of the condition of one who has been
subjected to a change for the worse, as being a "variation" from his
usual health; and in the case of those who differ in respect of virtue
and vice, comparing the licentious life with that of purity and
temperance, or the unjust life with that of justice, or the life which
is passionate, warlike, and prodigal of anger, with that which is mild
and peaceful--and generally all that is reproached with vice, as
compared with what is more excellent, is said to exhibit "variance"
from it, because the marks observed in both--in the good, I mean, and
the inferior--do not mutually agree. Again, we say that those qualities
observed in the elements are "at variance" which are mutually opposed
as contraries, having a power reciprocally destructive, as heat and
cold, or dryness and moisture, or, generally, anything that is opposed
to another as a contrary; and the absence of union in these we express
by the term "variation"; and generally everything which is out of
harmony with another in their observed characteristics, is said to be
"at variance" with it, as health with disease, life with death, war
with peace, virtue with vice, and all similar cases.

Now that we have thus analyzed these expressions, let us also consider
in regard to our author in what sense he says that the essences of the
Father and the Son are "variant from each other." What does he mean by
it? Is it in the sense that the Father is according to nature, while
the Son "varies" from that nature? Or does he express by this word the
perversion of virtue, separating the evil from the more excellent by
the name of "variation," so as to regard the one essence in a good, the
other in a contrary aspect? Or does he assert that one Divine essence
also is variant from another, in the manner of the opposition of the
elements? or as war stands to peace, and life to death, does he also
perceive in the essences the conflict which so exists among all such
things, so that they cannot unite one with another, because the mixture
of contraries exerts upon the things mingled a consuming force, as the
wisdom of the Proverbs saith of such a doctrine, that water and fire
never say "It is enough [669] ," expressing enigmatically the nature of
contraries of equal force and equal balance, and their mutual
destruction? Or is it in none of these ways that he sees "variance" in
the essences? Let him tell us, then, what he conceives besides these.
He could not say, I take it, even if he were to repeat his wonted
phrase [670] , "The Son is variant from Him Who begat Him"; for thereby
the absurdity of his statements is yet more clearly shown. For what
mutual relation is so closely and concordantly engrafted and fitted
together as that meaning of relation to the Father expressed by the
word "Son"? And a proof of this is that even if both of these names be
not spoken, that which is omitted is connoted by the one that is
uttered, so closely is the one implied in the other, and concordant
with it: and both of them are so discerned in the one that one cannot
be conceived without the other. Now that which is "at variance" is
surely so conceived and so called, in opposition to that which is "in
harmony," as the plumb-line is in harmony with the straight line, while
that which is crooked, when set beside that which is straight, does not
harmonize with it. Musicians also are wont to call the agreement of
notes "harmony," and that which is out of tune and discordant
"inharmonious." To speak of things as at "variance," then, is the same
as to speak of them as "out of harmony." If, therefore, the nature of
the Only-begotten God is at "variance," to use the heretical phrase,
with the essence of the Father, it is surely not in harmony with it:
and inharmoniousness cannot exist where there is no possibility of
harmony [671] . For the case is as when, the figure in the wax and in
the graying of the signet being one, the wax that has been stamped by
the signet, when it is fitted again to the latter, makes the impression
on itself accord with that which surrounds it, filling up the hollows
and accommodating the projections of the engraving with its own
patterns: but if some strange and different pattern is fitted to the
engraving of the signet, it makes its own form rough and confused, by
rubbing off its figure on an engraved surface that does not correspond
with it. But He Who is "in the form of God [672] " has been formed by
no impression different from the Father, seeing that He is "the express
image" of the Father's Person [673] , while the "form of God" is surely
the same thing as His essence. For as, "being made in the form of a
servant [674] ," He was formed in the essence of a servant, not taking
upon Him the form merely, apart from the essence, but the essence is
involved in the sense of "form," so, surely, he who says that He is "in
the form of God" signified essence by "form." If, therefore, He is "in
the form of God," and being in the Father is sealed with the Father's
glory, (as the word of the Gospel declares, which saith, "Him hath God
the Father sealed [675] ,"--whence also "He that hath seen Me hath seen
the Father [676] ,") then "the image of goodness" and "the brightness
of glory," and all other similar titles, testify that the essence of
the Son is not out of harmony with the Father. Thus by the text cited
is shown the insubstantial character of the adversaries' blasphemy. For
if things at "variance" are not in harmony, and He Who is sealed by the
Father, and displays the Father in Himself, both being in the Father,
and having the Father in Himself [677] , shows in all points His close
relation and harmony, then the absurdity of the opposing views is
hereby overwhelmingly shown. For as that which is at "variance" was
shown to be out of harmony, so conversely that which is harmonious is
surely confessed beyond dispute not to be at "variance." For as that
which is at "variance" is not harmonious, so the harmonious is not at
"variance." Moreover, he who says that the nature of the Only-begotten
is at "variance" with the good essence of the Father, clearly has in
view variation in the good itself. But as for what that is which is at
variance with the good--"O ye simple," as the Proverb saith,
"understand his craftiness [678] !"
__________________________________________________________________

[667] The whole passage is rather obscure, and Oehler's punctuation
renders it perhaps more obscure than that which is here adopted. The
argument seems to be something like this:--"The generated essence is
not compared with any of the things made by it, or after it, because
being only-begotten it leaves no room for a common basis of comparison
with anything else, and the operation of its maker is also peculiar to
itself (since it is immediate, the operation in the case of other
things being mediate). The essence of the Son, then, being so far
isolated, it is to it that the appellations of gennema, poiema, and
ktisma are to be assigned; otherwise the terms `Son' and
`Only-begotten' are meaningless. Therefore the Son, being in essence a
poiema or ktisma, is alien from the Father Who made or created Him."
The word parellachthai, used to express the difference of essence
between the Father and the Son, is one for which it is hard to find an
equivalent which shall suit all the cases of the use of the word
afterwards instanced: the idea of "variation," however, seems to attach
to all these cases, and the verb has been translated accordingly.

[668] Following Oehler's suggestion and reading eph' heautes.

[669] Cf. Prov. xxx. 15 (LXX.).

[670] The sense given would perhaps be clearer if we were to read (as
Gulonius seems to have done) asunethe for sunethe. This might be
interpreted, "He could not say, I take it, even if he uses the words in
an unwonted sense, that the Son is at variance with Him Who begat Him."
The sunethe would thus be the senses already considered and set aside:
and the point would be that such a statement could not be made without
manifest absurdity, even if some out-of-the-way sense were attached to
the words. As the passage stands, it must mean that even if Eunomius
repeats his wonted phrase, that can suggest no other sense of
"variance" than those enumerated.

[671] The reading of Oehler is here followed: but the sense of the
clause is not clear either in his text or in that of the Paris
editions.

[672] Phil. ii. 6.

[673] Heb. i. 3.

[674] Phil. ii. 7.

[675] S. John vi. 27

[676] S. John xiv. 9

[677] Cf. S. John xiv. 10

[678] Prov. viii. 5 (LXX.).
__________________________________________________________________

S:9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares
the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He
proceeds to show that the language used by the great Basil on the
subject of the generation of the Only-begotten has been grievously
slandered by Eunomius, and so ends the book.

I will pass by these matters, however, as the absurdity involved is
evident; let us examine what precedes. He says that nothing else is
found, "besides the essence of the Son, which admits of the
generation." What does he mean when he says this? He distinguishes two
names from each other, and separating by his discourse the things
signified by them, he sets each of them individually apart by itself.
"The generation" is one name, and "the essence" is another. The
essence, he tells us, "admits of the generation," being therefore of
course something distinct from the generation. For if the generation
were the essence (which is the very thing he is constantly declaring),
so that the two appellations are equivalent in sense, he would not have
said that the essence "admits of the generation": for that would amount
to saying that the essence admits of the essence, or the generation the
generation,--if, that is, the generation were the same thing as the
essence. He understands, then, the generation to be one thing, and the
essence to be another, which "admits of generation": for that which is
taken cannot be the same with that which admits it. Well, this is what
the sage and systematic statement of our author says: but as to whether
there is any sense in his words, let him consider who is expert in
judging. I will resume his actual words.

He says that he finds "nothing else besides the essence of the Son
which admits of the generation"; that there is no sense in his words
however, is clear to every one who hears his statement at all: the task
which remains seems to be to bring to light the blasphemy which he is
trying to construct by aid of these meaningless words. For he desires,
even if he cannot effect his purpose, to produce in his hearers by this
slackness of expression, the notion that the essence of the Son is the
result of construction: but he calls its construction "generation,"
decking out his horrible blasphemy with the fairest phrase, that if
"construction" is the meaning conveyed by the word "generation," the
idea of the creation of the Lord may receive a ready assent. He says,
then, that the essence "admits of generation," so that every
construction may be viewed, as it were, in some subject matter. For no
one would say that that is constructed which has no existence, so
extending "making" in his discourse, as if it were some constructed
fabric, to the nature of the Only-begotten God [679] . "If, then," he
says, "it admits of this generation,"--wishing to convey some such
meaning as this, that it would not have been, had it not been
constructed. But what else is there among the things we contemplate in
the creation which is without being made? Heaven, earth, air, sea,
everything whatever that is, surely is by being made. How, then, comes
it that he considered it a peculiarity in the nature of the Only
begotten, that it "admits generation" (for this is his name for making)
"into its actual essence," as though the humble-bee or the gnat did not
admit generation into itself [680] , but into something else besides
itself. It is therefore acknowledged by his own writings, that by them
the essence of the Only-begotten is placed on the same level with the
smallest parts of the creation: and every proof by which he attempts to
establish the alienation of the Son from the Father has the same force
also in the case of individual things. What need has he, then, for this
varied acuteness to establish the diversity of nature, when he ought to
have taken the short cut of denial, by openly declaring that the name
of the Son ought not to be confessed, or the Only-begotten God to be
preached in the churches, but that we ought to esteem the Jewish
worship as superior to the faith of Christians, and, while we confess
the Father as being alone Creator and Maker of the world, to reduce all
other things to the name and conception of the creation, and among
these to speak of that work which preceded the rest as a "thing made,"
which came into being by some constructive operation, and to give Him
the title of "First created," instead of Only-begotten and Very Son.
For when these opinions have carried the day, it will be a very easy
matter to bring doctrines to a conclusion in agreement with the aim
they have in view, when all are guided, as you might expect from such a
principle, to the consequence that it is impossible that He Who is
neither begotten nor a Son, but has His existence through some energy,
should share in essence with God. So long, however, as the declarations
of the Gospel prevail, by which He is proclaimed as "Son," and
"Only-begotten," and "of the Father," and "of God," and the like,
Eunomius will talk his nonsense to no purpose, leading himself and his
followers astray by such idle chatter. For while the title of "Son"
speaks aloud the true relation to the Father, who is so foolish that,
while John and Paul and the rest of the choir of the Saints proclaim
these words,--words of truth, and words that point to the close
affinity,--he does not look to them, but is led by the empty rattle of
Eunomius' sophisms to think that Eunomius is a truer guide than the
teaching of these who by the Spirit speak mysteries [681] , and who
bear Christ in themselves? Why, who is this Eunomius? Whence was he
raised up to be the guide of Christians?

But let all this pass, and let our earnestness about what lies before
us calm down our heart, that is swollen with jealousy on behalf of the
faith against the blasphemers. For how is it possible not to be moved
to wrath and hatred, while our God, and Lord, and Life-giver, and
Saviour is insulted by these wretched men? If he had reviled my father
according to the flesh, or been at enmity with my benefactor, would it
have been possible to bear without emotion his anger against those I
love? And if the Lord of my soul, Who gave it being when it was not,
and redeemed it when in bondage, and gave me to taste of this present
life, and prepared for me the life to come, Who calls us to a kingdom,
and gives us His commands that we may escape the damnation of
hell,--these are small things that I speak of, and not worthy to
express the greatness of our common Lord--He that is worshipped by all
creation, by things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under
the earth, by Whom stand the unnumbered myriads of the heavenly
ministers, to Whom is turned all that is under rule here, and that has
the desire of good--if He is exposed to reviling by men, for whom it is
not enough to associate themselves with the party of the apostate, but
who count it loss not to draw others by their scribbling into the same
gulf with themselves, that those who come after may not lack a hand to
lead them to destruction, is there any one [682] who blames us for our
anger against these men? But let us return to the sequence of his
discourse.

He next proceeds once more to slander us as dishonouring the generation
of the Son by human similitudes, and mentions what was written on these
points by our father [683] , where he says that while by the word "Son"
two things are signified, the being formed by passion, and the true
relationship to the begetter, he does not admit in discourses upon
things divine the former sense, which is unseemly and carnal, but in so
far as the latter tends to testify to the glory of the Only-begotten,
this alone finds a place in the sublime doctrines. Who, then,
dishonours the generation of the Son by human notions? He who sets far
from the Divine generation what belongs to passion and to man, and
joins the Son impassibly to Him that begat Him? or he who places Him
Who brought all things into being on a common level with the lower
creation? Such an idea, however, as it seems,--that of associating the
Son in the majesty of the Father,--this new wisdom seems to regard as
dishonouring; while it considers as great and sublime the act of
bringing Him down to equality with the creation that is in bondage with
us. Empty complaints! Basil is slandered as dishonouring the Son, who
honours Him even as he honours the Father [684] , and Eunomius is the
champion of the Only-begotten, who severs Him from the good nature of
the Father! Such a reproach Paul also once incurred with the Athenians,
being charged therewith by them as "a setter forth of strange gods
[685] ," when he was reproving the wandering among their gods of those
who were mad in their idolatry, and was leading them to the truth,
preaching the resurrection by the Son. These charges are now brought
against Paul's follower by the new Stoics and Epicureans, who "spend
their time in nothing else," as the history says of the Athenians, "but
either to tell or to hear some new thing [686] ." For what could be
found newer than this,--a Son of an energy, and a Father of a creature,
and a new God springing up from nothing, and good at variance with
good? These are they who profess to honour Him with due honour by
saying that He is not that which the nature of Him that begat Him is.
Is Eunomius not ashamed of the form of such honour, if one were to say
that he himself is not akin in nature to his father, but has community
with something of another kind? If he who brings the Lord of the
creation into community with the creation declares that he honours Him
by so doing, let him also himself be honoured by having community
assigned him with what is brute and senseless: but, if he finds
community with an inferior nature hard and insolent treatment, how is
it honour for Him Who, as the prophet saith, "ruleth with His power for
ever [687] ," to be ranked with that nature which is in subjection and
bondage? But enough of this.
__________________________________________________________________

[679] This whole passage, as it stands in Oehler's text, (which has
here been followed without alteration,) is obscure: the connection
between the clauses themselves is by no means clear; and the general
meaning of the passage, in view of the succeeding sentences, seems
doubtful. For it seems here to be alleged that Eunomius considered the
kataskeue to imply the previous existence of some material, so to say,
which was moulded by generation--on the ground that no one would say
that the essence, or anything else, was constructed without being
existent. On the other hand it is immediately urged that this is just
what would be said of all created things. If the passage might be
emended thus:--hin', hosper en hupokeimeno tini pragmati pasa kataskeue
theoreitai, (ou gar an tis eipoi kataskeuasthai ho me huphesteken),
houtos hoion kataskeuasmati te tou monogenous phusei proteine to logo
ten poiesin--we should have a comparatively clear sense--"in order that
as all construction is observed in some subject matter, (for no one
would say that that is constructed which has not existence) so he may
extend the process of `making' by his argument to the nature of the
Only-begotten God, as to some product of construction." The force of
this would be, that Eunomius is really employing the idea of "receiving
generation," to imply that the essence of the Only-begotten is a
kataskeuasma: and this, Gregory says, puts him at once on a level with
the physical creation.

[680] Oehler's punctuation seems faulty here.

[681] Cf. 1 Cor. xiv. 2.

[682] Reading hara tis for ara tis of Oehler's text.

[683] That is, by S. Basil: the reference seems to be to the treatise
Adv. Eunomium ii. 24 (p. 260 C. in the Benedictine edition), but the
quotation is not exact.

[684] Cf. S. John v. 23

[685] Acts xvii. 18.

[686] Acts xvii. 21.

[687] Ps. lxvi. 6 (LXX.).
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

Book V.

S:1. The fifth book promises to speak of the words contained in the
saying of the Apostle Peter, but delays their exposition. He discourses
first of the creation, to the effect that, while nothing therein is
deserving of worship, yet men, led astray by their ill-informed and
feeble intelligence, and marvelling at its beauty, deified the several
parts of the universe. And herein he excellently expounds the passage
of Isaiah, "I am God, the first."

It is now, perhaps, time to make enquiry into what is said concerning
the words of the Apostle Peter [688] , by Eunomius himself, and by our
father [689] concerning the latter. If a detailed examination should
extend our discourse to considerable length, the fair-minded reader
will no doubt pardon this, and will not blame us for wasting time in
words, but lay the blame on him who has given occasion for them. Let me
be allowed also to make some brief remarks preliminary to the proposed
enquiry: it may be that they too will be found not to be out of keeping
with the aim of our discussion.

That no created thing is deserving of man's worship, the divine word so
clearly declares as a law, that such a truth may be learned from almost
the whole of the inspired Scripture. Moses, the Tables, the Law, the
Prophets that follow, the Gospels, the decrees of the Apostles, all
alike forbid the act of reverencing the creation. It would be a lengthy
task to set out in order the particular passages which refer to this
matter; but though we set out only a few from among the many instances
of the inspired testimony, our argument is surely equally convincing,
since each of the divine words, albeit the least, has equal force for
declaration of the truth. Seeing, then, that our conception of
existences is divided into two, the creation and the uncreated Nature,
if the present contention of our adversaries should prevail, so that we
should say that the Son of God is created, we should be absolutely
compelled either to set at naught the proclamation of the Gospel, and
to refuse to worship that God the Word Who was in the beginning, on the
ground that we must not address worship to the creation, or, if these
marvels recorded in the Gospels are too urgent for us, by which we are
led to reverence and to worship Him Who is displayed in them, to place,
in that case, the created and the Uncreated on the same level of
honour; seeing that if, according to our adversaries' opinion, even the
created God is worshipped, though having in His nature no prerogative
above the rest of the creation, and if this view should get the upper
hand, the doctrines of religion will be entirely transformed to a kind
of anarchy and democratic independence. For when men believe that the
nature they worship is not one, but have their thoughts turned away to
diverse Godheads, there will be none who will stay the conception of
the Deity in its progress through creation, but the Divine element,
once recognized in creation, will become a stepping-stone to the like
conception in the case of that which is next contemplated, and that
again for the next in order, and as a result of this inferential
process the error will extend to all things, as the first deceit makes
its way by contiguous cases even to the very last.

To show that I am not making a random statement beyond what probability
admits of, I will cite as a credible testimony in favour of my
assertion the error which still prevails among the heathen [690] .
Seeing that they, with their untrained and narrow intelligence, were
disposed to look with wonder on the beauties of nature, not employing
the things they beheld as a leader and guide to the beauty of the
Nature that transcends them, they rather made their intelligence halt
on arriving at the objects of its apprehension, and marvelled at each
part of the creation severally--for this cause they did not stay their
conception of the Deity at any single one of the things they beheld,
but deemed everything they looked on in creation to be divine. And thus
with the Egyptians, as the error developed its force more in respect of
intellectual objects, the countless forms of spiritual beings were
reckoned to be so many natures of Gods; while with the Babylonians the
unerring circuit of the firmament was accounted a God, to whom they
also gave the name of Bel. So, too, the foolishness of the heathen
deifying individually the seven successive spheres, one bowed down to
one, another to another, according to some individual form of error.
For as they perceived all these circles moving in mutual relation,
seeing that they had gone astray as to the most exalted, they
maintained the same error by logical sequence, even to the last of
them. And in addition to these, the aether itself, and the atmosphere
diffused beneath it, the earth and sea and the subterranean region, and
in the earth itself all things which are useful or needful for man's
life,--of all these there was none which they held to be without part
or lot in the Divine nature, but they bowed down to each of them,
bringing themselves, by means of some one of the objects conspicuous in
the creation, into bondage to all the successive parts of the creation,
in such a way that, had the act of reverencing the creation been from
the beginning even to them a thing evidently unlawful, they would not
have been led astray into this deceit of polytheism. Let us look to it,
then, lest we too share the same fate,--we who in being taught by
Scripture to reverence the true Godhead, were trained to consider all
created existence as external to the Divine nature, and to worship and
revere that uncreated Nature alone, Whose characteristic and token is
that it never either begins to be or ceases to be; since the great
Isaiah thus speaks of the Divine nature with reference to these
doctrines, in his exalted utterance,--who speaks in the person of the
Deity, "I am the first, and hereafter am I, and no God was before Me,
and no God shall be after Me [691] ." For knowing more perfectly than
all others the mystery of the religion of the Gospel, this great
prophet, who foretold even that marvellous sign concerning the Virgin,
and gave us the good tidings [692] of the birth of the Child, and
clearly pointed out to us that Name of the Son,--he, in a word, who by
the Spirit includes in himself all the truth,--in order that the
characteristic of the Divine Nature, whereby we discern that which
really is from that which came into being, might be made as plain as
possible to all, utters this saying in the person of God: "I am the
first, and hereafter am I, and before Me no God hath been, and after Me
is none." Since, then, neither is that God which was before God, nor is
that God which is after God, (for that which is after God is the
creation, and that which is anterior to God is nothing, and Nothing is
not God;--or one should rather say, that which is anterior to God is
God in His eternal blessedness, defined in contradistinction to Nothing
[693] ;--since, I say, this inspired utterance was spoken by the mouth
of the prophet, we learn by his means the doctrine that the Divine
Nature is one, continuous with Itself and indiscerptible, not admitting
in Itself priority and posteriority, though it be declared in Trinity,
and with no one of the things we contemplate in it more ancient or more
recent than another. Since, then, the saying is the saying of God,
whether you grant that the words are the words of the Father or of the
Son, the orthodox doctrine is equally upheld by either. For if it is
the Father that speaks thus, He bears witness to the Son that He is not
"after" Himself: for if the Son is God, and whatever is "after" the
Father is not God, it is clear that the saying bears witness to the
truth that the Son is in the Father, and not after the Father. If, on
the other hand, one were to grant that this utterance is of the Son,
the phrase, "None hath been before Me," will be a clear intimation that
He Whom we contemplate "in the Beginning [694] " is apprehended
together with the eternity of the Beginning. If, then, anything is
"after" God, this is discovered, by the passages quoted, to be a
creature, and not God: for He says, "That which is after Me is not God
[695] ."
__________________________________________________________________

[688] The words referred to are those in Acts ii. 36.

[689] S. Basil: the passages discussed are afterwards referred to in
detail.

[690] With the following passage may be compared the parallel account
in the Book of Wisdom (ch. xiii.).

[691] Cf. Is. xli. 4, xliv. 6, xlviii. 12 (LXX.). If the whole passage
is intended to be a quotation, it is not made exactly from any one of
these; the opening words are from the second passage referred to; and
perhaps this is the only portion intended to be a quotation, the second
clause being explanatory; the words of the second clause are varied in
the repetition immediately afterwards.

[692] euangelisamenos

[693] pros ouden horizomenos; i.e. before the name of "God" could be
applied, as now, in contradistinction to creation, it was applied in
contradistinction to nothing, and that distinction was in a sense the
definition of God. Or the words may be turned, as Gulonius turns them,
"nulla re determinatus," "with no limitation"--the contradistinction to
creation being regarded as a limitation by way of definition.

[694] S. John i. 1

[695] Taking the whole phrase to met' eme on as a loose quotation.
__________________________________________________________________

S:2. He then explains the phrase of S. Peter, "Him God made Lord and
Christ." And herein he sets forth the opposing statement of Eunomius,
which he made on account of such phrase against S. Basil, and his
lurking revilings and insults.

Now that we have had presented to us this preliminary view of
existences, it may be opportune to examine the passage before us. It is
said, then, by Peter to the Jews, "Him God made Lord and Christ, this
Jesus Whom ye crucified [696] ," while on our part it is said that it
is not pious to refer the word "made" to the Divine Nature of the
Only-begotten, but that it is to be referred to that "form of a servant
[697] ," which came into being by the Incarnation [698] , in the due
time of His appearing in the flesh; and, on the other hand, those who
press the phrase the contrary way say that in the word "made" the
Apostle indicates the pretemporal generation of the Son. We shall,
therefore, set forth the passage in the midst, and after a detailed
examination of both the suppositions, leave the judgment of the truth
to our reader. Of our adversaries' view Eunomius himself may be a
sufficient advocate, for he contends gallantly on the matter, so that
in going through his argument word by word we shall completely follow
out the reasoning of those who strive against us: and we ourselves will
act as champion of the doctrine on our side as best we may, following
so far as we are able the line of the argument previously set forth by
the great Basil. But do you, who by your reading act as judges in the
cause, "execute true judgment," as one of the prophets [699] says, not
awarding the victory to contentious preconceptions, but to the truth as
it is manifested by examination. And now let the accuser of our
doctrines come forward, and read his indictment, as in a court of law.

"In addition, moreover, to what we have mentioned, by his refusal to
take the word `made' as referring to the essence of the Son, and withal
by his being ashamed of the Cross, he ascribes to the Apostles what no
one even of those who have done their best to speak ill of them on the
score of stupidity, lays to their charge; and at the same time he
clearly introduces, by his doctrines and arguments, two Christs and two
Lords; for he says that it was not the Word Who was in the beginning
Whom God made Lord and Christ, but He Who `emptied Himself to take the
form of a servant [700] ,' and `was crucified through weakness [701] .'
At all events the great Basil writes expressly as follows [702]
:--`Nor, moreover, is it the intention of the Apostle to present to us
that existence of the Only-begotten which was before the ages (which is
now the subject of our argument), for he clearly speaks, not of the
very essence of God the Word, Who was in the beginning with God, but of
Him Who emptied Himself to take the form of a servant, and became
conformable to the body of our humiliation [703] , and was crucified
through weakness.' And again, `This is known to any one who even in a
small degree applies his mind to the meaning of the Apostle's words,
that he is not setting forth to us the mode of the Divine existence,
but is introducing the terms which belong to the Incarnation; for he
says, Him God made Lord and Christ, this Jesus Whom ye crucified,
evidently laying stress by the demonstrative word on that in Him which
was human and was seen by all [704] .'

"This, then, is what the man has to say who substitutes,--for we may
not speak of it as `application,' lest any one should blame for such
madness men holy and chosen for the preaching of godliness, so as to
reproach their doctrine with a fall into such extravagance,--who
substitutes his own mind [705] for the intention of the Apostles! With
what confusion are they not filled, who refer their own nonsense to the
memory of the saints! With what absurdity do they not abound, who
imagine that the man `emptied himself' to become man, and who maintain
that He Who by obedience `humbled himself' to take the form of a
servant was made conformable to men even before He took that form upon
Him! Who, pray, ye most reckless of men, when he has the form of a
servant, takes the form of a servant? and how can any one `empty
himself' to become the very thing which he is? You will find no
contrivance to meet this, bold as you are in saying or thinking things
uncontrivable. Are you not verily of all men most miserable, who
suppose that a man has suffered death for all men, and ascribe your own
redemption to him? For if it is not of the Word Who was in the
beginning and was God that the blessed Peter speaks, but of him who was
`seen,' and who `emptied Himself,' as Basil says, and if the man who
was seen `emptied Himself' to take `the form of a servant,' and He Who
`emptied Himself' to take `the form of a servant,' emptied Himself to
come into being as man, then the man who was seen emptied himself to
come into being as man [706] . The very nature of things is repugnant
to this; and it is expressly contradicted by that writer [707] who
celebrates this dispensation in his discourse concerning the Divine
Nature, when he says not that the man who was seen, but that the Word
Who was in the beginning and was God took upon Him flesh, which is
equivalent in other words to taking `the form of a servant.' If, then,
you hold that these things are to be believed, depart from your error,
and cease to believe that the man `emptied himself' to become man. And
if you are not able to persuade those who will not be persuaded,
destroy their incredulity by another saying, a second decision against
them. Remember him who says, `Who being in the form of God thought it
not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form
of a servant.' There is none among men who will appropriate this phrase
to himself. None of the saints that ever lived was the Only-begotten
God and became man:--for that is what it means to `take the form of a
servant,' `being in the form of God.' If, then, the blessed Peter
speaks of Him Who `emptied Himself' to `take the form of a servant,'
and if He Who was `in the form of God' did `empty Himself' to `take the
form of a servant,' and if He Who in the beginning was God, being the
Word and the Only-begotten God, is He Who was `in the form of God,'
then the blessed Peter speaks to us of Him Who was in the beginning and
was God, and expounds to us that it was He Who became Lord and Christ.
This, then, is the conflict which Basil wages against himself, and he
clearly appears neither to have `applied his own mind to the intention
of the Apostles', nor to be able to preserve the sequence of his own
arguments; for, according to them, he must, if he is conscious of their
irreconcilable character, admit that the Word Who was in the beginning
and was God became Lord; or if he tries to fit together statements that
are mutually conflicting, and contentiously stands by them, he will add
to them others yet more hostile, and maintain that there are two
Christs and two Lords. For if the Word that was in the beginning and
was God be one, and He Who `emptied Himself' and `took the form of a
servant' be another, and if God the Word, by Whom are all things, be
Lord, and this Jesus, Who was crucified after all things had come into
being, be Lord also, there are, according to his view, two Lords and
Christs. Our author, then, cannot by any argument clear himself from
this manifest blasphemy. But if any one were to say in support of him
that the Word Who was in the beginning is indeed the same Who became
Lord, but that He became Lord and Christ in respect of His presence in
the flesh, He will surely be constrained to say that the Son was not
Lord before His presence in the flesh. At all events, even if Basil and
his faithless followers falsely proclaim two Lords and two Christs, for
us there is one Lord and Christ, by Whom all things were made, not
becoming Lord by way of promotion, but existing before all creation and
before all ages, the Lord Jesus, by Whom are all things, while all the
saints with one harmonious voice teach us this truth and proclaim it as
the most excellent of doctrines. Here the blessed John teaches us that
God the Word, by Whom all things were made, has become incarnate,
saying, `And the Word was made flesh [708] '; here the most admirable
Paul, urging those who attend to him to humility, speaks of Christ
Jesus, Who was in the form of God, and emptied Himself to take the form
of a servant, and was humbled to death, even the death of the Cross
[709] ; and again in another passage calls Him Who was crucified `the
Lord of Glory': `for had they known it,' he says, `they would not have
crucified the Lord of Glory [710] '. Indeed, he speaks far more openly
than this of the very essential nature by the name of `Lord,' where he
says, `Now the Lord is the Spirit [711] '. If, then, the Word Who was
in the beginning, in that He is Spirit, is Lord, and the Lord of glory,
and if God made Him Lord and Christ, it was the very Spirit and God the
Word that God so made, and not some other Lord Whom Basil dreams
about."
__________________________________________________________________

[696] Acts ii. 36.

[697] Phil. ii. 7.

[698] oikonomikos genomenen

[699] Zech. vii. 9.

[700] Cf. Phil. ii. 7

[701] Cf. 2 Cor. xiii. 4.

[702] The quotations are from S. Basil c. Eunomius II. 3. (pp. 239-40
in the Benedictine edition.)

[703] Cf. Phil. iii. 21.

[704] The latter part of the quotation from S. Basil does not exactly
agree with the Benedictine text, but the variations are not material.

[705] Reading heautou for the heauton of Oehler's text, for which no
authority is alleged by the editor, and which is probably a mere
misprint.

[706] The argument here takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum;
assuming that S. Peter's reference is to the "visible man," and bearing
in mind S. Basil's words that S. Peter refers to Him Who "emptied
Himself," it is said "then it was the `visible man' who `emptied
himself.' But the purpose of that `emptying' was the `taking the form
of a servant,' which again is the coming into being as man: therefore
the `visible man' `emptied himself,' to come into being as man, which
is absurd." The wording of S. Basil's statement makes the argument in a
certain degree plausible;--if he had said that S. Peter referred to the
Son, not in regard to his actual essence, but in regard to the fact
that He "emptied Himself" to become man, and as so having "emptied
Himself" (which is no doubt what he intended his words to mean), then
the reductio ad absurdum would not apply; nor would the later
arguments, by which Eunomius proceeds to prove that He Who "emptied
Himself" was no mere man, but the Word Who was in the beginning, have
any force as against S. Basil's statement.

[707] S. John i. 1 sqq.

[708] S. John i. 14

[709] Cf. Phil. ii. 7, 8.

[710] 1 Cor. ii. 8.

[711] 2 Cor. iii. 17.
__________________________________________________________________

S:3. A remarkable and original reply to these utterances, and a
demonstration of the power of the Crucified, and of the fact that this
subjection was of the Human Nature, not that which the Only-Begotten
has from the Father. Also an explanation of the figure of the Cross,
and of the appellation "Christ," and an account of the good gifts
bestowed on the Human Nature by the Godhead which was commingled with
it.

Well, such is his accusation. But I think it necessary in the first
place to go briefly, by way of summary, over the points that he urges,
and then to proceed to correct by my argument what he has said, that
those who are judging the truth may find it easy to remember the
indictment against us, which we have to answer, and that we may be able
to dispose of each of the charges in regular order. He says that we are
ashamed of the Cross of Christ, and slander the saints, and say that a
man has "emptied himself" to become man, and suppose that the Lord had
the "form of a servant" before His presence by the Incarnation, and
ascribe our redemption to a man, and speak in our doctrine of two
Christs and two Lords, or, if we do not do this, then we deny that the
Only-begotten was Lord and Christ before the Passion. So that we may
avoid this blasphemy, he will have us confess that the essence of the
Son has been made, on the ground that the Apostle Peter by his own
voice establishes such a doctrine. This is the substance of the
accusation; for all that he has been at the trouble of saying by way of
abuse of ourselves, I will pass by in silence, as being not at all to
the point. It may be that this rhetorical stroke of phrases framed
according to some artificial theory is the ordinary habit of those who
play the rhetorician, an invention to swell the bulk of their
indictment. Let our sophist then use his art to display his insolence,
and vaunt his strength in reproaches against us, showing off his
strokes in the intervals of the contest; let him call us foolish, call
us of all men most reckless, of all men most miserable, full of
confusion and absurdity, and make light of us at his good pleasure in
any way he likes, and we will bear it; for to a reasonable man disgrace
lies, not in hearing one who abuses him, but in making retort to what
he says. There may even be some good in his expenditure of breath
against us; for it may be that while he occupies his railing tongue in
denouncing us he will at all events make some truce in his conflict
against God. So let him take his fill of insolence as he likes: none
will reply to him. For if a man has foul and loathsome breath, by
reason of bodily disorder, or of some pestilential and malignant
disease, he would not rouse any healthy person to emulate his
misfortune so that one should choose, by himself acquiring disease, to
repay, in the same evil kind, the unpleasantness of the man's ill
odour. Such men our common nature bids us to pity, not to imitate. And
so let us pass by everything of this kind which by mockery,
indignation, provocation, and abuse, he has assiduously mixed up with
his argument, and examine only his arguments as they concern the
doctrinal points at issue. We shall begin again, then, from the
beginning, and meet each of his charges in turn.

The beginning of his accusation was that we are ashamed of the Cross of
Him Who for our sakes underwent the Passion. Surely he does not intend
to charge against us also that we preach the doctrine of dissimilarity
in essence! Why, it is rather to those who turn aside to this opinion
that the reproach belongs of going about to make the Cross a shameful
thing. For if by both parties alike the dispensation of the Passion is
held as part of the faith, while we hold it necessary to honour, even
as the Father is honoured, the God Who was manifested by the Cross, and
they find the Passion a hindrance to glorifying the Only-begotten God
equally with the Father that begat Him, then our sophist's charges
recoil upon himself, and in the words with which he imagines himself to
be accusing us, he is publishing his own doctrinal impiety. For it is
clear that the reason why he sets the Father above the Son, and exalts
Him with supreme honour, is this,--that in Him is not seen the shame of
the Cross: and the reason why he asseverates that the nature of the Son
varies in the sense of inferiority is this,--that the reproach of the
Cross is referred to Him alone, and does not touch the Father. And let
no one think that in saying this I am only following the general drift
of his composition, for in going through all the blasphemy of his
speech, which is there laboriously brought together, I found, in a
passage later than that before us, this very blasphemy clearly
expressed in undisguised language; and I propose to set forth, in the
orderly course of my own argument, what they have written, which runs
thus:--"If," he says, "he can show that the God Who is over all, Who is
the unapproachable Light, was incarnate, or could be incarnate, came
under authority, obeyed commands, came under the laws of men, bore the
Cross, then let him say that the Light is equal to the Light." Who then
is it who is ashamed of the Cross? he who, even after the Passion,
worships the Son equally with the Father, or he who even before the
Passion insults Him, not only by ranking Him with the creation, but by
maintaining that He is of passible nature, on the ground that He could
not have come to experience His sufferings had He not had a nature
capable of such sufferings? We on our part assert that even the body in
which He underwent His Passion, by being mingled with the Divine
Nature, was made by that commixture to be that which the assuming [712]
Nature is. So far are we from entertaining any low idea concerning the
Only-begotten God, that if anything belonging to our lowly nature was
assumed in His dispensation of love for man, we believe that even this
was transformed to what is Divine and incorruptible [713] ; but
Eunomius makes the suffering of the Cross to be a sign of divergence in
essence, in the sense of inferiority, considering, I know not how, the
surpassing act of power, by which He was able to perform this, to be an
evidence of weakness; failing to perceive the fact that, while nothing
which moves according to its own nature is looked upon as surprisingly
wonderful, all things that overpass the limitations of their own nature
become especially the objects of admiration, and to them every ear is
turned, every mind is attentive, in wonder at the marvel. And hence it
is that all who preach the word point out the wonderful character of
the mystery in this respect,--that "God was manifested in the flesh
[714] ," that "the Word was made flesh [715] ," that "the Light shined
in darkness [716] ," "the Life tasted death," and all such declarations
which the heralds of the faith are wont to make, whereby is increased
the marvellous character of Him Who manifested the superabundance of
His power by means external to his own nature. But though they think
fit to make this a subject for their insolence, though they make the
dispensation of the Cross a reason for partitioning off the Son from
equality of glory with the Father, we believe, as those "who from the
beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word [717] "
delivered to us by the Holy Scriptures, that the God who was in the
beginning, "afterwards", as Baruch says, "was seen upon the earth, and
conversed with men [718] ," and, becoming a ransom for our death,
loosed by His own resurrection the bonds of death, and by Himself made
the resurrection a way for all flesh [719] , and being on the same
throne and in the same glory with His own Father, will in the day of
judgment give sentence upon those who are judged, according to the
desert of the lives they have led. These are the things which we
believe concerning Him Who was crucified, and for this cause we cease
not to extol Him exceedingly, according to the measure of our powers,
that He Who by reason of His unspeakable and unapproachable greatness
is not comprehensible by any, save by Himself and the Father and the
Holy Spirit, He, I say, was able even to descend to community with our
weakness. But they adduce this proof of the Son's alienation in nature
from the Father, that the Lord was manifested by the flesh and by the
Cross, arguing on the ground that the Father's nature remained pure in
impassibility, and could not in any way admit of a community which
tended to passion, while the Son, by reason of the divergence of His
nature by way of humiliation, was not incapable of being brought to
experience the flesh and death, seeing that the change of condition was
not great, but one which took place in a certain sense from one like
state to another state kindred and homogeneous, because the nature of
man is created, and the nature of the Only-begotten is created also.
Who then is fairly charged with being ashamed of the Cross? he who
speaks basely of it [720] , or he who contends for its more exalted
aspect? I know not whether our accuser, who thus abases the God Who was
made known upon the Cross, has heard the lofty speech of Paul, in what
terms and at what length he discourses with his exalted lips concerning
that Cross. For he, who was able to make himself known by miracles so
many and so great, says, "God forbid that I should glory in anything
else, than in the Cross of Christ [721] ." And to the Corinthians he
says that the word of the Cross is "the power of God to them that are
in a state of salvation [722] ." To the Ephesians, moreover, he
describes by the figure of the Cross the power that controls and holds
together the universe, when he expresses a desire that they may be
exalted to know the exceeding glory of this power, calling it height,
and depth, and breadth, and length [723] , speaking of the several
projections we behold in the figure of the Cross by their proper names,
so that he calls the upper part "height," and that which is below, on
the opposite side of the junction, "depth," while by the name "length
and breadth" he indicates the cross-beam projecting to either side,
that hereby might be manifested this great mystery, that both things in
heaven, and things under the earth, and all the furthest bounds of the
things that are, are ruled and sustained by Him Who gave an example of
this unspeakable and mighty power in the figure of the Cross. But I
think there is no need to contend further with such objections, as I
judge it superfluous to be anxious about urging arguments against
calumny when even a few words suffice to show the truth. Let us
therefore pass on to another charge.

He says that by us the saints are slandered. Well, if he has heard it
himself, let him tell us the words of our defamation: if he thinks we
have uttered it to others, let him show the truth of his charge by
witnesses: if he demonstrates it from what we have written, let him
read the words, and we will bear the blame. But he cannot bring forward
anything of the kind: our writings are open for examination to any one
who desires it. If it was not said to himself, and he has not heard it
from others, and has no proof to offer from our writings, I think he
who has to make answer on this point may well hold his peace: silence
is surely the fitting answer to an unfounded charge.

The Apostle Peter says, "God made this Jesus, Whom ye crucified, Lord
and Christ [724] ." We, learning this from him, say that the whole
context of the passage tends one way,--the Cross itself, the human
name, the indicative turn of the phrase. For the word of the Scripture
says that in regard to one person two things were wrought,--by the
Jews, the Passion, and by God, honour; not as though one person had
suffered and another had been honoured by exaltation: and he further
explains this yet more clearly by his words in what follows, "being
exalted by the right hand of God." Who then was "exalted"? He that was
lowly, or He that was the Highest? and what else is the lowly, but the
Humanity? what else is the Highest, but the Divinity? Surely, God needs
not to be exalted, seeing that He is the Highest. It follows, then,
that the Apostle's meaning is that the Humanity was exalted: and its
exaltation was effected by its becoming Lord and Christ. And this took
place after the Passion. [725] It is not therefore the pre-temporal
existence of the Lord which the Apostle indicates by the word "made,"
but that change of the lowly to the lofty which was effected "by the
right hand of God." Even by this phrase is declared the mystery of
godliness; for he who says "exalted by the right hand of God"
manifestly reveals the unspeakable dispensation of this mystery, that
the Right Hand of God, that made all things that are, (which is the
Lord, by Whom all things were made, and without Whom nothing that is
subsists,) Itself raised to Its own height the Man united with It,
making Him also to be what It is by nature. Now It is Lord and King:
Christ is the King's name: these things It made Him too. For as He was
highly exalted by being in the Highest, so too He became all
else,--Immortal in the Immortal, Light in the Light, Incorruptible in
the Incorruptible, Invisible in the Invisible, Christ in the Christ,
Lord in the Lord. For even in physical combinations. when one of the
combined parts exceeds the other in a great degree, the inferior is
wont to change completely to that which is more potent. And this we are
plainly taught by the voice of the Apostle Peter in his mystic
discourse, that the lowly nature of Him Who was crucified through
weakness, (and weakness, as we have heard from the Lord, marks the
flesh [726] ,) that lowly nature, I say, by virtue of its combination
with the infinite and boundless element of good, remained no longer in
its ow